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2025 DIGILAW 1750 (KER)

G. ramesh Babu v. Union of India

2025-07-01

NITIN JAMDAR

body2025
JUDGMENT : Nitin Jamdar, C.J. By way of this Original Petition, the Petitioner/Original Applicant has challenged the judgment and order dated 31 July 2018 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench, in O.A. No.180/00745/2017, and the consequential orders relieving the Petitioner from service on 3 August 2018 and terminating him with effect from 6 August 2018. 2. The Petitioner was appointed as the Joint Director in the National Institute of Fashion Technology (NIFT), Kannur, on 6 December 2013, on contract basis for a period of three years. His contract was subsequently extended till 5 September 2017. Thereafter, his contract was not extended. The Petitioner approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench, by filing O.A. No.180/01137/2014, challenging the non consideration of his application for extension. During the pendency of the original application, the Petitioner was terminated from service. Challenging the order of termination, the Petitioner filed O.A. No.180/00745/2017. 3. The Tribunal initially stayed the termination order and directed the Respondents to retain the Petitioner in service until further orders. Thereafter, both the applications were heard together and dismissed by a common order dated 31 July 2018. O.A. No.180/01137/2014 was dismissed on the ground that the Petitioner did not possess the required qualification and that there was no error in the action of the Respondent. After the dismissal of O.A. No.180/00745/2017, the Petitioner was relieved from service with effect from 3 August 2018. Thereafter, a letter dated 6 August 2018 was issued by the Registrar, NIFT, terminating the services of the Petitioner. Aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Tribunal, the Petitioner has filed this Original Petition. 4. The Director of NIFT, Kannur, has filed a counter affidavit dated 19 January 2019 on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1, 3 to 5. 5. We have heard Mr. K. Jayakumar, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Petitioner, and Mr. T.V. Vinu, learned Central Government Counsel for the Respondents. 6. The learned Senior Advocate for the Petitioner relied upon the notification issued by the NIFT dated 11 April 2012 under the National Institute of Fashion Technology Act , 2006, laying down the terms and conditions of employees on long-term contracts. T.V. Vinu, learned Central Government Counsel for the Respondents. 6. The learned Senior Advocate for the Petitioner relied upon the notification issued by the NIFT dated 11 April 2012 under the National Institute of Fashion Technology Act , 2006, laying down the terms and conditions of employees on long-term contracts. The notification states that the appointing authority may appoint any person on long-term contract on terms and conditions as specified by the Board for a period not exceeding three years and that the appointing authority may renew the contract for a further period subject to satisfactory performance and the requirements of the institute. The learned Senior Advocate submitted that despite the fact that the contractual period was extended for a short duration twice and there were favourable remarks in the service records of the Petitioner, only because the Petitioner filed an original application, unsatisfactory remarks regarding his service were subsequently entered and it was recommended that the Petitioner was not entitled to a further extension. The learned Senior Advocate submitted that it was out of malice that the contract was not renewed and the impugned order came to be passed. It was submitted that the Respondent – State instrumentality ought to have acted fairly, and that judicial review in matters of contractual appointments is permissible if the action is mala fide, arbitrary, or irrational. Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of GRIDCO Limited and Another v. Sri. Sadananda Doloi and Others , (2011) 15 SCC 16 . The learned Senior Advocate was also submitted that every entry in the Annual Performance Appraisal Report (APAR) has to be communicated within a reasonable period and relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sukhdev Singh v. Union of India and Others , (2013) 9 SCC 566 . Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Others v. Sanjay Jethi and Another , (2013) 16 SCC 116, it was submitted that the ground of bias can be considered in the fact situation of the present case. The learned Central Government Counsel supported the impugned order contending that the Petitioner has no right to seek extension of the contract which had expired several years ago, and that the Petitioner is almost sixty years old, and therefore, no relief can be granted in the present petition. The learned Central Government Counsel supported the impugned order contending that the Petitioner has no right to seek extension of the contract which had expired several years ago, and that the Petitioner is almost sixty years old, and therefore, no relief can be granted in the present petition. 7. Clause 21 of the National Institute of Fashion Technology Notification dated 11 April 2012 states that a person can be appointed on a long-term contract for a period not exceeding three years. The renewal is subject to satisfactory performance and requirement, and the services of a contractor can be terminated at any time by one month’s notice. Therefore, there is clearly no vested legal right to seek further contractual appointments irrespective of the circumstances. 8. The burden to prove malice as a ground of challenge is on the Petitioner. The allegations of mala fides raised in the petition are bald and bereft of any particulars. The Petitioner has not joined the officer who, according to the Petitioner, out of personal malice had not recommended the extension of further contractual appointment. To substantiate malice, the Petitioner has relied upon the communication dated 4 March 2015 in respect of the original application filed by the Petitioner. However, this communication is an official communication which states that the authorities were needlessly joined in the original application and for defending such a proceeding expenses had to be incurred, and why the same should not be recovered from the Petitioner. No malice can be directly inferred from this communication. Further, the entry in the Petitioner’s service record states that the performance of the Petitioner was rated as “average” for the first term, and for the second term, it was “good”. Thereupon, the proposal for extension of the contract was not recommended. If the entries in the service record were against the Petitioner, the decision not to extend the contract cannot be termed mala fide. The Respondents, in their reply statement, have pointed out that as against the adverse entry, the Petitioner had made a representation and the representation was rejected. Therefore, we find no merit in the contention that the denial of further contract was out of malice. 9. The present case thus pertains to a contractual employee who, after receiving two extensions, was not granted any further extension of the contract. Therefore, we find no merit in the contention that the denial of further contract was out of malice. 9. The present case thus pertains to a contractual employee who, after receiving two extensions, was not granted any further extension of the contract. An entry adverse to the Petitioner existed in the record based on which the further extension of the contract was not recommended. The Petitioner accepted that he was engaged under a three-year contract and had also agreed to the two extensions. There is no statutory obligation on the part of the Respondents or mandate to continue or grant further extension of the contract to the Petitioner. Such insistence on the continuation or extension of the contract till the age of superannuation would be akin to backdoor entry, which cannot be permitted. Therefore, there is no perversity in the view taken by the Tribunal that the Petitioner had no vested right to seek extension of the contract. In the circumstances, the Tribunal did not commit any error in rejecting the original applications. 10. As per the Petitioner’s own showing, the contract ended in the year 2017, whereas this petition was filed in the year 2018, and there is no interim relief. It has now been almost eight years since the contract expired. The Petitioner is presently around 60 years of age. 11. No case is made out for setting aside the order of the Tribunal dated 31 July 2018 and to issue a writ directing the Respondents to grant a further extension of the contract to the Petitioner.