JUDGMENT : C. PRATHEEP KUMAR, J. 1. The defendants 1 and 2 in O.S. No.47 of 2014 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Ernakulam, are the appellants. (For the purpose of convenience the parties are hereafter referred to as per their rank before the trial court). 2. The plaintiffs filed this suit for partition. As per the plaint averments, the plaint A, B, C, D and E schedule properties belonged to late Haridasan, who died intestate on 12.4.2005. The 1 st plaintiff is the wife, the 2 nd plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 are the children born to 1 st plaintiff and Haridas. According to plaintiffs, the parties are governed by the Hindu Succession Act and as such the plaintiffs 1 and 2 and the defendants 1 and 2 are entitled to get ¼ share each from the schedule property. According to them, the defendants are not co-operating for an amicable partition and hence the suit. 3. The defendants 1 and 2 filed written statement admitting the relationship between the parties and also that the plaint schedule properties are left behind by Haridasan, who died intestate on 12.4.2005. However, according to the defendants, it was the 2 nd plaintiff, who killed Haridasan on 12.4.2005. Therefore, according to the defendants, the 2 nd plaintiff is disqualified from inheriting the properties left behind by Haridasan. Further, they have contended that on 29.11.2003, the 2 nd plaintiff converted to Islam religion and changed his name as Ijaz and living as a Muslim and on that ground also he is not entitled to inherit the properties left behind by Haridas. Therefore, they prayed for dividing the properties among 1 st plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2. 4. The trial court framed four issues. The evidence in the case consists of the oral testimony of the 1 st plaintiff as PW1, Exhibits A1 to A13 and B1 to B4. After evaluating the evidence on record, the trial court found that the 2 nd plaintiff is entitled to get share from the schedule properties and passed a preliminary decree accordingly. The evidence in the case consists of the oral testimony of the 1 st plaintiff as PW1, Exhibits A1 to A13 and B1 to B4. After evaluating the evidence on record, the trial court found that the 2 nd plaintiff is entitled to get share from the schedule properties and passed a preliminary decree accordingly. As per the preliminary decree the trial court directed that plaint A schedule property is liable to be divided into 16 shares from which the 1 st plaintiff is entitled to get 1 share and the 2 nd plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 are entitled to get 5/16 shares each while plaint B to E schedule properties were to be divided equally among them. Being dissatisfied with the above judgment and decree of the trial court, the defendants preferred this appeal. 5. Now, the points that arise for consideration are the following: 1) Whether a person, who was charged of murder and acquitted under Section 84 of the IPC , is disqualified from inheriting the properties of the murdered? 2) Whether the 2 nd plaintiff is disqualified from inheriting the properties of Haridasan for the reason that he has converted his religion? 6. Heard Sri. A. Balagopalan, the learned counsel for the appellants and Sri. Anoop Krishnan, the learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs. 7. The points: The fact that the 1 st plaintiff is the wife and 2 nd plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 are the children of late Haridasan, is not in dispute. It is also admitted that plaint A to E schedule properties were left behind by Haridasan, who died intestate on 12.4.2005. The contention taken by the defendants is that the 2 nd plaintiff is disqualified from inheriting the properties of Haridasan as he murdered Haridasan on 12.4.2005. Another contention taken by the defendants is that the 2 nd plaintiff abandoned Hinduism and converted to Islam religion and on that ground also, he is disqualified from inheriting the properties of Haridasan. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellants would argue that the trial court was not justified in allotting a share from the plaint schedule property to the 2 nd plaintiff. 8. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellants would argue that the trial court was not justified in allotting a share from the plaint schedule property to the 2 nd plaintiff. 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents would argue that in the murder case, the 2 nd plaintiff was acquitted under Section 84 of the IPC and as such there is no disqualification under Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act . Further, it was argued that by virtue of Section 26 of the Hindu Succession Act , only the descendants of the convert are disqualified and not the convert himself. Now, let us consider the contentions one after another. 9. Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act dealing with disqualification of murderer is extracted below for reference: “ 25. Murderer disqualified.— A person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered, or any other property in furtherance of the succession to which he or she committed or abetted the commission of the murder. ” 10. The law is thus clear that a murderer is disqualified from inheriting the properties of the murdered. However, the peculiarity in this case is that in Sessions Case No.698/2005 registered in connection with the murder of Haridasan, the III Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc), Thrissur acquitted the 2 nd plaintiff under Section 84 of the IPC . Exhibit B1 is the certified copy of the Final Report in Crime No.146 of 2005 of Valappad Police Station in respect of the murder of Haridasan and Ext. B2 is the certified copy of the judgment in SC No.698 of 2005. 11. Therefore, now the question to be considered is, whether a person, who has been acquitted under Section 84 of the IPC , is disqualified from inheriting the properties of the deceased? 12. A learned Single Judge of this Court in the decision in Manathankandiyil Nani and Another v. Kuniyil Gangadharan (SA 231 of 1997) dated 6.6.2012, held that merely because the murderer was able to secure an acquittal under Section 84 of IPC , does not entitle the person to inherit the murdered, if it is found that the murderer was involved in the murder. The learned Single Judge further held that in such a case of his involvement, mere acquittal on ground of insanity or unsoundness of mind will not ensure him/her the benefit of inheritance of murdered since the term 'murderer' has different meaning under the Indian Penal Code and under Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act , 1956 and that the term murder has a wider meaning under Section 25 of of the Hindu Succession Act . Therefore, the learned Single Judge held in the above case that, even if the murderer is acquitted under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code , the disqualification under Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act will prevail. 13. In the decision in Jyothish Kumar and Ors. v. B. Chithra (RFA No. 888 of 2012) dealt with by a Division Bench of this Court, the wife murdered her husband and later she was acquitted under Section 84 of the Indian penal Code. In the above facts, the Division Bench held that, since she was acquitted under Section 84 of the IPC , she could not be held as a murderer and she was entitled to inherit her husband. In this context, it is worthwhile to see Section 84 of IPC , which is extracted below for reference: “ 84. Act of a person of unsound mind: - Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.” 14. In the Decision in Jyothish Kumar (supra), the Division Bench held in paragraph 31 as follows: “When Section 84 starts with the wording“nothing is an offence...........” it has to be noted that it was not proved that the 3 rd appellant had committed any offence at all. Whether the term 'murder' or 'murderer' is taken in the literally sense in general parlance, or in the legal sense as contained in the Indian Penal Code , she should have committed 'an offence' for categorising her as the 'murderer' of the deceased. When she has not committed any offence or what was allegedly committed by her was not an offence, she cannot be termed as a 'murderer'. When she has not committed any offence or what was allegedly committed by her was not an offence, she cannot be termed as a 'murderer'. When she was found not guilty by a competent criminal court by extending the protection under Section 84 of IPC , she cannot be termed as 'murderer' within the meaning of Sections 25 and 27 of the Act, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.” 15. In the instant case also, the 2 nd plaintiff was acquitted of the offence of murder of Haridasan, under Section 84 IPC . That means, the 2 nd plaintiff has not committed any offence. If he has not committed any offence, he cannot be termed as 'murderer' within the meaning of Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act . Therefore, it is to be held that in this case also the disqualification under Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act will not apply as against the 2 nd plaintiff. In other words, the 2 nd plaintiff is entitled to inherit the properties of Haridasan. 16. The next question to be considered is, whether the 2 nd plaintiff is disqualified in the light of the fact that he ceased to be a Hindu, as he has converted to Islam religion. Section 26 of the Hindu Succession Act dealing with the subject is extracted below for reference: “ 26. Convert’s descendants disqualified.— Where, before or after the commencement of this Act, a Hindu has ceased or ceases to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion, children born to him or her after such conversion and their descendants shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of any of their Hindu relatives, unless such children or descendants are Hindus at the time when the succession opens.” 17. The above provision itself shows that only the convert's descendants are disqualified from inheriting the property of any of their Hindu relatives and not by the convert himself. The precedents are also to the effect that only the descendants of the convert are disqualified from inheriting the estate and not by the convert himself ( See Asoke Naidu vs. Raymond S. Mulu , AIR 1976 Cal 272 , Shabana Khan vs. D.B. Sulochana and Ors. The precedents are also to the effect that only the descendants of the convert are disqualified from inheriting the estate and not by the convert himself ( See Asoke Naidu vs. Raymond S. Mulu , AIR 1976 Cal 272 , Shabana Khan vs. D.B. Sulochana and Ors. MANU/AP/1020/2007, E. Ramesh v. P. Rajini, (2002) 1 MLJ 216 , Balachand Jairamdas Lalwant v. Nazeen Khalid Qureshi , AIR 2018 Bom 103 , Nayanaben Firozkhan Pathan v. Patel Shantaben Bhikhabhai and Ors. MANU/GJ/1605/2017, and K. Sivanandam v. Maragathammal , AIR 2013 MAD 30 ). In the above decisions, the Calcutta High Court, Andhra Pradesh High Court, Madras High Court, Bombay High Court and Gujarat High Court also held that conversion of a Hindu to another religion will not disqualify the convert, but only the descendants of the convert are disqualified from inheriting the estate. In the above circumstances, this point is also found against the appellants. 18. The learned counsel for the appellants raised another contention that the trial court has not conducted any proper enquiry under Order XXXII of the CPC to ascertain whether the 2 nd plaintiff was capable of protecting his interest and no next friend was appointed to him. On a perusal of the impugned judgment, it can be seen that there was no occasion for the trial court to conduct such an enquiry as no serious objection was raised from the side of the defendants to that effect. Though in the written statement, the defendants raised a contention that the 2 nd plaintiff was suffering from mental illness, no further steps were taken in that regard. 19. The object of Order XXXII CPC is to protect the interest of a person who is suffering from disabilities like mental infirmity and thereby unable to protect his interest. This is a suit for partition and the parties are not disputing the shares allotted by the trial court to the parties. The 2 nd plaintiff is entitled to get only ¼ share from the properties of his father and the said share was allotted by the trial court and no prejudice was caused to any of the parties including the 2 nd plaintiff. The 2 nd plaintiff is entitled to get only ¼ share from the properties of his father and the said share was allotted by the trial court and no prejudice was caused to any of the parties including the 2 nd plaintiff. On the other hand, based on evidence the trial court found that at the time of filing the suit the 2 nd plaintiff was not suffering from any such disability and I find no grounds to disbelieve the aforesaid finding. Therefore, I do not find any grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree of the trial court on that ground also. In the light of the above discussions, it is to be held that there is no merits in this appeal and as such it is liable to be dismissed. 20. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. Considering the facts, I order no costs.