ORDER : A. BADHARUDEEN, J. Accused No.8 in C.C.No.23/2016 on the files of Special Judge, CBI, Ernakulam, has filed this Criminal Revision Petition challenging order in CMP.No.59/2025 dated 07.04.2025 (marked as Annexure-A1) under Sections 438 r/w 442 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (' BNSS ’ for short), whereby the plea of discharge raised by the petitioner was dismissed by the trial court. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/accused No.8 and the learned Special Public Prosecutor (Standing Counsel) for the Central Bureau of Investigation (`CBI’ for short) in detail. Perused the records and the order impugned. 3. In this matter, prosecution alleges commission of offences punishable under Sections 11 , 12, 13(2) read with Section 13 (1) (a) and 13(1)(d) and Section 14 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (`PC Act’ for short) as well as under Section 24 of the IMMIGRATION ACT . 4. In a nut shell, the allegation in the common charge shown as charge No.1 in the charge sheet is that Accused No 1, employed in Kerala Police as Civil Police Officer, was working at Cochin International Airport immigration wing from 3.6.2003 to 15.12.2003 and 13.12.2007 to 5.7.2011, sometime during 2005 entered into criminal conspiracy with accused Nos A3 to A16 and A20 who are travel agents engaged in the business of servicing of travel documents and other senior officers functioning as counter officers in the immigration wing such as A17, A18, A19 and A21 to illegally clear passengers proceeding abroad without valid travel documents by abusing their official position as public servants employed as Immigration counter Officers and obtained pecuniary advantage for themselves. In pursuance of the said conspiracy, A3 to A17 and A20 forwarded their passengers without valid travel documents to A1, AP Ajeeb and he with the undue influence exerted on senior officers on counter duty abusing their official position cleared the passengers to travel abroad without valid travel documents. In furtherance of the conspiracy A3 to A17 and A20 collected bribes from the passengers or arranged their own funds and the same were deposited to SB account of A2 who is the father of Al and the same was withdrawn and distributed to the officers concerned who cleared the passengers. As per the-common charge, the petitioner was alleged to have remitted an amount of Rs. As per the-common charge, the petitioner was alleged to have remitted an amount of Rs. 1,45,000- during the period from 18.7.06 to 7.5.2011 to the account of A2. 5. Challenging Annexure-A1 order, the learned counsel for the petitioner pressed the grounds urged in this Criminal Revision Petition to contend that the prosecution materials in no way would show that the petitioner has been running a travel agency and in that capacity he transferred money in the account of the 2 nd accused. The Grounds C to H urged to assail Annexure-A1 order are relevant. The same read as under: “C. The trial Court failed to appreciate that there was no evidence even to raise suspicion of the allegation of conspiracy. Trial court also failed to appreciate the dictum laid down in the decision reported in AIR 1972 SC 2598 that to attract the offence of 120 B IPC there should be a specific allegation of mens rea and actus reus. Criminal conspiracy has to be proved like any other offence. 2009(2) KLD 513 (SC). In the instant charge sheet, the prosecution recorded the statement of 151 witnesses. In none of these statements there is even a whisper about conspiracy or meeting of minds. D. Trial court did not appreciate the fact that travel agents who facilitated travel of ineligible passengers to abroad function from different places like Trivandrum, Ernakulam, Pathanamthitta, Calicut etc. Each individual travel agent allegedly sent passengers with the assistance of Al. Since their individual interests are different there could be separate meetings of minds for achieving their own objectives if at all there was conspiracy, as held in Ramlal Narang Vs State (NCT) AIR 1979 SC 1791 . Trial court also failed to appreciate the dictum in Khersigh Vs State AIR 1988 SC 1883 . Here the investigating officer has inferred that Al has hatched conspiracy only because there was remittance from various sources. E. The trial court failed to take note of the point that proof of demand is a sine qua non for an offence to be established under section 7,13(1)(d) and (ii) of the Act and de hors the proof of demand the offence under the two sections. The mere receipt of any property or valuable security would not tantamount to acceptance unless the bribe giver had made an offer demanding favour from the public servant. The mere receipt of any property or valuable security would not tantamount to acceptance unless the bribe giver had made an offer demanding favour from the public servant. F. Trial court also failed to consider the decision reported in Neeraj Dutta Vs State , ( AIR 2023 SC 330 ) the constitution bench held that Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under section 13(1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act. Only monies were deposited in the account of A2 being a mere acceptance, without anything more would not make an offence under section 7 or 13(1)(d)(i) & (ii) of the Act. G. The trial court failed to appreciate the fact that Al was only a Civil Police officer who was on deputation to the Immigration wing of the CIAL. A police constable (Civil Police Officer) cannot influence any counter officers in getting any ineligible passenger cleared. H. The trial court lost sight of the fact that there is no evidence to link the alleged receipt of money by the public servant, the Civil Police Officer or any favors shown by the public servant. For the total money credited to the various accounts of the A2 there is no evidence to show how many persons have travelled without valid documents or on the favours shown by the accused persons.” 6. Opposing interference in Annexure-A1 order, the learned Public Prosecutor would submit that when considering the plea of discharge, there is no mandate that the prosecution allegations to be made out, prima facie, satisfactorily and even a substance to have some doubt as regards to the involvement would be sufficient to frame charge against the accused. 7. In so far as the essentials to be considered while considering the petition seeking discharge and while framing charge, the law is well settled. 8. This Court considered the essentials to be considered while considering discharge sought under Section 227 of Cr.P.C and framing charge under Section 228 of Cr.P.C, in the decisions reported in [ 2024 KHC OnLine 586 ] , Sandeep G. v. State of Kerala , this Court set out the principle as under, following the Apex Court decisions in this regard. This Court considered the essentials to be considered while considering discharge sought under Section 227 of Cr.P.C and framing charge under Section 228 of Cr.P.C, in the decisions reported in [ 2024 KHC OnLine 586 ] , Sandeep G. v. State of Kerala , this Court set out the principle as under, following the Apex Court decisions in this regard. “(i) Matters to be considered at the time of considering discharge and while framing charge are not aimless etiquette. Concomitantly the same are not scrupulous exertion. Keeping an equilibrium in between aimless etiquette and scrupulous exertion, the trial judge need to merely examine the materials placed by the prosecution in order to determine whether or not the grounds are sufficient to proceed against the accused on the basis of police charge/final report. The trial Judge shall look into the materials collected by the investigating agency produced before the Court, to see, prima facie, whether those materials would induce suspicious circumstances against the accused, so as to frame a charge and such material would be taken into account for the purposes of framing the charge. If there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused necessarily, the accused would be discharged. But if the court is of the opinion, after such consideration of the materials there are grounds for presuming that accused has committed the offence/s which is/are triable, then necessarily charge shall be framed. (ii) The trial Judge has to apply his judicial mind to the facts of the case, with reference to the materials produced by the prosecution, as may be necessary, to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for trial on the basis of charge/final report. (iii) Once the accused is able to demonstrate from the materials form part of the charge/final report at the stage of framing the charge which might drastically affect the very sustainability of the case, it is unfair to suggest that such material should not be considered or ignored by the court at this stage. The main intention of granting a chance to the accused of making submissions as envisaged under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. is to assist the court to determine whether it is required to proceed to conduct the trial. The main intention of granting a chance to the accused of making submissions as envisaged under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. is to assist the court to determine whether it is required to proceed to conduct the trial. (iv) At the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on an assumption that the materials which have been brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate said materials, in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the materials taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence/s alleged. (v) The defence of the accused not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks discharge. The expression "the record of the case" used in Section 227 Cr. P.C. is to be understood as the documents and objects, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. The submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the prosecution. (vi) The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of existence of a prima-facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record shall not be evaluated. (vii) At the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial. (viii) In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which are really the function of the trial Judge, after the trial. At the stage of Section 227 , the Judge has merely to sift the prosecution materials in order to find out whether or not there are sufficient grounds to proceed with trial of the accused. (ix) Strong suspicion in favour of the accused, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. At the stage of Section 227 , the Judge has merely to sift the prosecution materials in order to find out whether or not there are sufficient grounds to proceed with trial of the accused. (ix) Strong suspicion in favour of the accused, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the time of framing charge, if there is suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In such case also charge needs to be framed to permit the prosecution to adduce evidence. (x) If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.” 9. Coming to Annexure-A1 order, it could be seen that the trial court discharged accused Nos.12, 16 and 20. Thereafter, the trial court framed charge against accused Nos.1, 19 and 21 under Section 12 0B of IPC as well as under Sections 11 , 12, 14, 13(2) r/w Sections 13 (1)(a) and 13(1)(d) of the P.C Act. Similarly, charge framed against accused 4 to 11, 13, 14, 15 and 17 under Section 12 0B of IPC and under Sections 12 and 14 of the P.C Act. In paragraph Nos.56 to 58 of the order, the trial court addressed the plea of the 8 th accused. Paragraph Nos.56 to 58 read as under: “56. As per the prosecution case the 8th accused, Mr. C. H. Moosa is the proprietor of M/s. Riya Tours and Travels, Vadakara and he has remitted Rs.1,45,000/- to the account of the 2 nd accused during the period from 18-07-2006 to 07-05-2011. Document No.12 produced along with the final report contains the pay-in slips (5 Nos) of different dates of Federal Bank, Vadakara branch for remittance of a total sum of Rs.1,22,000/- to the account of the 2 nd accused. The documents produced by the prosecution suggests that the 8 th accused had been making remittances to the account of the 2 nd accused. 57. The documents produced by the prosecution suggests that the 8 th accused had been making remittances to the account of the 2 nd accused. 57. As stated above, the contention of the learned counsel for the 8 th accused is that there is no material to prove the existence of Riya Travels,Vadakara or the connection of the 8th accused with it. It is also contended that the prosecution is relying on the evidence of CW14, Bijoy, Manager of Federal Bank. According to him, the statement of this witness will show that he joined the bank after the transactions occurred and he has no direct knowledge. The counsel also contended that the witness has given statement that an amount of Rs 49.000/- was deposited by one Abbas and prosecution has taken this amount also as a remittance made by the 8 th accused. According to him, out of the six remittances, the first remittance of Rs.12,000 to the account of the 2 nd accused was made on 18.07.2006 and the first accused was not working CIAL at that time. There is no dispute to the fact that the first accused joined CIAL in 2003 and thereafter worked again during 2007 to 2011. It is also argued that documents D11 and D12 show remittances to the account of Pareeth and they contain some mobile numbers, However, the investigating officer has not collected any evidence to prove the existence of a travel agency and he had any connection with any travel agent. 58. The prosecution has produced the pay-in slips mentioned in the preceding paragraph to show that the 8 th accused had been remitting money to the account of the 2nd accused regularly. The first payment was in the year 2006. The first accused was officiating as immigration officer in CIAL from 2003 onwards. It is the specific case of the prosecution that he was the king pin of the entire transaction. It is alleged that even after his transfer from CIAL, he was collecting money from the travel agents and the passengers sponsored by the travel agents were being illegally cleared by influencing the counter officers on duty by paying illegal gratification. Whether there is clear evidence to prove the same or not has to be considered at the time of trial. At this stage, the court has to rely on the materials placed by the prosecution. Whether there is clear evidence to prove the same or not has to be considered at the time of trial. At this stage, the court has to rely on the materials placed by the prosecution. The pay-in slips produced by the prosecution show that money was being remitted by the 8th accused to the account of the 2nd accused. The 8th accused has no case that he had any other transaction with the 2nd accused. It is true that the prosecution has not produced the best evidence to prove that the 8th accused was the proprietor of Riya Tours and Travels. But, the fact that he was remitting money to the account of the father of the first accused regularly and the passengers sponsored by him were being illegally cleared by the counter officers is prima facie sufficient to attract abetment of the offence under the PC Act. Whether the evidence is sufficient to convict a person after trial is not a question to be considered at the stage. At this stage, the duty of the court is only to see whether the prosecution evidence stands unchallenged, it will warrant a conviction. On going through the materials on record, I am of the view that there are sufficient materials for the abetment of commission of the offence under the PC Act.” 10. On perusal of the observations of the trial court in paragraphs 56 to 58, the trial court found that as per the prosecution case, the 8 th accused Mr.C.H.Moosa, who is the proprietor of M/s.Riya Tours and Travels, Vadakara, had remitted Rs.1,45,000/- to the account of the 2 nd accused during the period from 18.07.2006 to 07.05.2011. The trial court relied on document No.12 produced along with the final report containing 5 pay-in-slips of different dates of Federal Bank, Vadakara, for remittance of Rs.1,22,000/- by the 8 th accused in favour of the 2 nd accused. While addressing the contention raised by the 8 th accused, the trial court found that the contention of CW14 that Rs.49,000/- deposited by one Abbas also was reckoned with the remittance made by the 8 th accused. While addressing the contention raised by the 8 th accused, the trial court found that the contention of CW14 that Rs.49,000/- deposited by one Abbas also was reckoned with the remittance made by the 8 th accused. In this matter, the trial court found that the 8 th accused continuously remitted money in the account of the 2 nd accused, who was the father of the 1 st accused, starting from the year 2006 onwards, while the 1 st accused was officiating as Immigration Officer of CIAL from 2003 onwards. The prosecution allegation against the 1 st accused mainly is that he had received illegal gratification from various travel agents, including the 8 th accused. The trial court mainly found that the 8 th accused did not explain whether he had any other personal transaction with the 2 nd accused. In this case, even though the learned Standing Counsel for the CBI was directed to point out the document to show that the 8 th accused was the proprietor of M/s.Riya Tours and Travels, he fairly pointed out that no such materials is collected during the investigation, since the allegations were pertaining to 2003 onwards. Coming to the allegation, the prosecution case is that as part of conspiracy hatched between the 1 st accused and the other accused, including the 8 th accused, they organised collection of money from travel agents and passengers especially from those, who hail from weaker sections of the society, in the pretext of facilitating their emigration clearance. A share of this money was being paid to public servants for facilitating smooth emigration clearance, including the 1 st accused through the 2 nd accused, his father. As a sequel thereof, unauthorised passengers travelled to foreign countries without emigration and thereby all the accused persons obtained illegal money and also caused corresponding loss to the State Exchequer. 11. It is true that conspiracy could not be proved with the aid of direct evidence and the same always should have to be decided on the basis of the circumstances available from the records. It is true that a private person could not be roped into alleging commission of offence under the P.C Act without the aid of Section 120B of IPC. It is true that a private person could not be roped into alleging commission of offence under the P.C Act without the aid of Section 120B of IPC. Here the prosecution case is that the accused herein hatched conspiracy and done overt acts and thereby all the accused obtained illegal gratification and also thereby corresponding loss to the State Exchequer. 12. As per Annexure-A1 order, the trial court discharged all the accused for the offence under Section 24 of the Emigration Act. Therefore, much discussion on the said point is not necessary. The crucial point to be addressed herein is, whether there are materials to see involvement of the petitioner also in this crime as part of conspiracy and payment of money, collected from various passengers, to the 1 st accused through his father, who is arrayed as the 2 nd accused. The prosecution materials including the pay-in-slips were relied on by the prosecution to substantiate the same. Thus from the materials available there are grounds for presuming that the petitioner has committed the offences alleged warranting trial. In such a case, the discharge plea at the instance of the petitioner could not succeed, as rightly found by the trial court, though the petitioner can take this contention during trial. In view of the same, the order doesn’t require any interference. In the result, this Criminal Revision Petition stands dismissed.