ORDER : 1. The present criminal revision case is filed by the petitioner/accused No.1 under Sections 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C., aggrieved by the order dated 12.01.2022 in Crl.MP No.266 of 2020 in CC No.5 of 2012 passed by the learned III Additional Special Judge for CBI Cases, Hyderabad wherein the prayer of the petitioner under Section 239 of Cr.P.C., seeking to discharge him from the offences punishable under Sections 120-B read with Section 7 and Section 13 (2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was rejected. 2. Heard Sri KRKV Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri T. Srujan Kumar Reddy, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the respondent/CBI. 3. The brief averments of the case of the prosecution against the petitioner herein are that the petitioner while working as a Professor at the Military College of Electronics and Mechanical Engineering (MCEME), was implicated in a case arising out of a trap allegedly laid on 04.03.2010 by Col. Akash Popli, Head of the Department of Mechanical Engineering, acting upon a complaint by one Major Jasbir Singh Guman. The allegation made against the petitioner is that he demanded an illegal gratification of Rs.2,00,000/- from the de-facto complainant/Major Jasbir Singh Guman to pass him in the subject of Mechanical Vibration and in that process, the petitioner advised him to pay the amount to his conduit/A2. Subsequently, the said amount was reduced to Rs.60,000/-. Having not willing to pay such amount, the de-facto complainant complained the same to Col. Akash Popli on 04.03.2010. On 04.03.2010 a sum of Rs.45,000/- was recovered from one Shri Modhugu Srinivas at Lal Bazar, Secunderabad, allegedly received on behalf of the petitioner. Col. Popli forwarded an Occurrence Report dated 05.03.2010 to the Superintendent of Police, CBI, Hyderabad, resulting in registration of FIR No.R.C.6(A)/2010 dated 05.03.2010 under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, arraying the petitioner as accused No.1. The petitioner was arrested on 10.03.2010 and later he was enlarged on bail: (a) Subsequently, the CBI filed a final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. for offences under Sections 120-B IPC and 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d)(i) & (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The petitioner’s earlier Criminal Petitions viz. Crl.P.Nos.6267 of 2010 and 6433 of 2012 seeking quash of the FIR and final report were disposed of by this Court, granting liberty to the petitioner to seek discharge before the trial Court. The petitioner’s earlier Criminal Petitions viz. Crl.P.Nos.6267 of 2010 and 6433 of 2012 seeking quash of the FIR and final report were disposed of by this Court, granting liberty to the petitioner to seek discharge before the trial Court. (b) Accordingly, the petitioner filed a discharge petition under Section 239 Cr.P.C. in Crl.M.P. No.266 of 2020 in C.C.No.5 of 2012 before the trial Court. The trial Court, by order dated 12.01.2022, dismissed the petition, holding that, in view of the observations made by this Court in Criminal Petition No.6433 of 2012 dated 26.09.2016, the grounds raised involve disputed questions of fact that can only be adjudicated after a full-fledged trial. The trial Court further noted that the grounds raised in the discharge application are identical to those previously raised, that there exists prima facie material to frame charges against the petitioner and that the contentions raised are matters to be determined during trial and not at the discharge stage. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed the present criminal revision case. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order is contrary to law and in violation of the mandatory provisions under Section 6A(1) of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. The petitioner’s earlier challenge to the FIR on the ground of absence of prior sanction from the Central Government was disposed of with liberty to raise the issue after filing of the final report. Despite this, the trial Court failed to appreciate that an investigation conducted without the requisite sanction is without jurisdiction, thereby rendering the charge sheet null and void. The trial Court also failed to apply the binding precedent laid down in Dr. R.R. Kishore Vs. CBI , ILR (2006) II Delhi 1039 , which underscores the mandatory nature of compliance with Section 6A(1) of the Act. Moreover, the preliminary inquiry conducted by Col.Akash Popli and his team, who are not police officers, prior to the registration of the FIR, is illegal and vitiates the entire proceedings, amounting to an abuse of the process of law: (a) Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the prosecution’s reliance on alleged electronic recordings is unsustainable in light of the judgment in Anvar P.V. Vs. P.K. Basheer , (2014) 10 SCC 473 as the said recordings lack the necessary certification under Section 65B of the Evidence Act. P.K. Basheer , (2014) 10 SCC 473 as the said recordings lack the necessary certification under Section 65B of the Evidence Act. Further, there is no independent evidence to establish either demand or acceptance of illegal gratification. The charge sheet does not disclose any material sufficient to prima facie constitute offences under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of PC Act, or under Section 120-B of the IPC. Consequently, the trial Court’s finding of a prima facie case is erroneous. (b) The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the trial Court also failed to consider the well-settled principle that an investigation conducted without lawful authority renders both cognizance and subsequent trial invalid, as held in State of U.P. Vs. Singhara Singh , AIR 1964 SC 358 and Navinchandra N. Majithia Vs. State of Meghalaya , (2000) 8 SCC 323 . (c) Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the trial Court failed to appreciate that Col.Akash Popli, Head of the Department of Mechanical Engineering at the Military College of Electronics and Mechanical Engineering, being a non-police officer, was not legally competent to inquire into or examine any complaint against the petitioner. It was contended that Col.Popli acted without authority by constituting a team of subordinates and conducting an investigation, thereby taking the law into his own hands. In the absence of an FIR registered by a competent authority, the so-called "Occurrence Report" prepared by Col.Popli and his team lacks legal sanctity and cannot withstand judicial scrutiny. (d) It was further argued that the respondent/CBI, by accepting the said Occurrence Report and registering RC No.6(A) of 2010 for an offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, acted in violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 6A(1) of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. The actions of Col. Akash Popli, in allegedly interfering with the administration of justice, facilitating the commission of bribery involving a public servant namely, a Student Officer, who was a Commissioned Officer in the Indian Army, are unlawful. Moreover, it is submitted that the CBI ought to have examined Col.Popli’s role critically and considered arraigning the said Student Officer as an accused, being the alleged bribe-giver, particularly as he did not approach the CBI under Section 24 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Moreover, it is submitted that the CBI ought to have examined Col.Popli’s role critically and considered arraigning the said Student Officer as an accused, being the alleged bribe-giver, particularly as he did not approach the CBI under Section 24 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. (e) The learned counsel further submitted that the trial Court committed a manifest error in failing to appreciate the total absence of corroborative evidence or any material substantiating the investigation, which was conducted by a non-police officer and predicated upon an illegitimate trap. In the complete absence of any evidence establishing the alleged demand, acceptance, or criminal conspiracy involving the petitioner, the trial Court’s conclusion that prima facie material exists to frame charges against the petitioner is fundamentally unsustainable. Crucially, there is not even an allegation that the petitioner personally demanded or accepted any gratification. On the contrary, the tainted currency was recovered from an entirely different person/accused No.2. The absence of any demand strikes at the very foundation of the prosecution and renders the essential ingredients of the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act wholly absent. In such a factual matrix, no conviction can be sustained, irrespective of the recovery of alleged tainted money. This position finds clear support in the authoritative pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Satyanarayana Murthy Vs. State of A.P. (2015) 10 SCC 152 and B. Jayaraj Vs. State of A.P. (2014) 13 SCC 55 yet the trial Court egregiously failed to apply this settled law. Further, the fact that the alleged bribe amount was recovered from a third party wholly unconnected to the petitioner decisively undermines the prosecution’s narrative and erodes any semblance of a credible case. In these circumstances, the trial Court erred in taking cognizance of the alleged offences arising from a frivolous and motivated complaint, rather than protecting the integrity of the administrative and investigative processes from abuse. The petitioner’s position is thus fortified by both fact and law, demonstrating that the prosecution’s case is devoid of any merit and cannot withstand scrutiny. (f) The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the charge sheet contains no recital or sequence of events that would suggest any knowledge on the part of the petitioner regarding the alleged discussion by accused No.2 about the bribe. There is, in fact, a complete absence of evidence indicating any demand made by the petitioner. (f) The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the charge sheet contains no recital or sequence of events that would suggest any knowledge on the part of the petitioner regarding the alleged discussion by accused No.2 about the bribe. There is, in fact, a complete absence of evidence indicating any demand made by the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner, relying on the findings of this Court in Crl.RC No.222 of 2020, further contended that fundamental defects in the prosecution’s case preclude the framing of charges. Stating thus, the learned counsel for the petitioner seeks to allow the present criminal revision case. 5. Opposing the present criminal revision case, the learned special public prosecutor appearing for the respondent/CBI by filing a counter, vehemently contended that the petitioner/accused No.1, while serving as a Professor at the Military College of Electronics & Mechanical Engineering, Trimulgherry, Secunderabad, abused his official position by demanding illegal gratification from a Student Officer, Mr.Jasbir Singh Ghuman and engaged accused No.2 as a conduit to collect the bribe. Upon being approached by A-2, the complainant informed Colonel Akash Popli, who immediately formed a team that apprehended A-2 in the act of accepting the bribe. The team, along with the complainant, submitted a written complaint, the seized bribe amount and other relevant material to the CBI for further action: (a) Based on the said complaint and supporting material, the CBI Hyderabad, registered FIR No.RC.6(A)/2010 dated 05.03.2010 and commenced investigation. During the course of investigation, the CBI collected both oral and documentary evidence indicating the involvement of the petitioner/accused No.1 and accused No.2 in the alleged offences punishable under Section 120-B IPC, Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. Upon conclusion of investigation, sanction for prosecution was obtained from the competent authority and a charge sheet was duly filed before the competent Court. (b) The petitioner’s claim that the investigation is vitiated for lack of prior approval under Section 6A of the DSPE Act is untenable, as no proof of holding a Joint Secretary equivalent post was furnished. In any case, valid sanction for prosecution was obtained before laying charge-sheet. The allegation that the investigation was based solely on the investigation done by a non-police personnel is baseless. The CBI registered the FIR independently and conducted a lawful investigation based on credible material disclosing a cognizable offence. In any case, valid sanction for prosecution was obtained before laying charge-sheet. The allegation that the investigation was based solely on the investigation done by a non-police personnel is baseless. The CBI registered the FIR independently and conducted a lawful investigation based on credible material disclosing a cognizable offence. The initial complaint to Colonel Akash Popli led to the apprehension of A2 and all relevant materials were duly handed over to the CBI. It is settled law that private individuals may detain persons caught in the act and hand them over to authorities. The CBI conducted a professional investigation and filed a charge sheet supported by oral and documentary evidence, establishing a strong prima facie case. The petitioner’s claim of "no case" is a bald assertion. At the stage of framing charges, detailed scrutiny of evidence is not required. The revision lacks merit, is premature and amounts to abuse of process. (c) The investigation was conducted independently by the CBI, relying on the occurrence report of Military officials only to ascertain the genuineness of the complaint and not as the basis of evidence. Prior sanction under Section 6A of the DSPE Act was not required, as the accused was apprehended on the spot for demand and acceptance of illegal gratification and Section 6A has been held unconstitutional by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with retrospective effect. The bribe giver need not have directly lodged a complaint and procedural requirements regarding phone evidence have been duly complied with. Sufficient material exists to constitute a prima facie case and the trial Court may rightly proceed to frame charges without delving into the evidentiary weight. (d) Apart from making the above submissions, learned Special Public Prosecutor for CBI relied upon the decisions rendered in State of Rajasthan Vs. Shambhoogiri , Criminal Appeal No. 955 of 2003 of Hon’ble Supreme Court, Dr. Subramanian Swamy Vs. Director, CBI & Another , WP (Civil) No. 38 of 1997 of Hon’ble Supreme Court. CBI Vs. R.R. Kishore , Crl. Appeal No. 2763 of 2023 of Hon’ble Supreme Court and Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Shambhoogiri , Criminal Appeal No. 955 of 2003 of Hon’ble Supreme Court, Dr. Subramanian Swamy Vs. Director, CBI & Another , WP (Civil) No. 38 of 1997 of Hon’ble Supreme Court. CBI Vs. R.R. Kishore , Crl. Appeal No. 2763 of 2023 of Hon’ble Supreme Court and Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Aryan Singh, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 292 and contended that statutory and constitutional safeguards like authorisation to investigate, requirement of prior sanction, limits on quashing powers exist to ensure fairness, prevent abuse of prosecutorial power, protect rights of accused and maintain rule of law but, these safeguards must not become insurmountable barriers or tools of impunity, especially in cases of public corruption or serious offences, since doing so would undermine the rule of law, equality before the law and the very power of investigation or prosecution. He further submits that the Courts in these cases are concerned with delineating the circumstances in which procedural irregularities or statutory impediments warrant the quashing or invalidation of proceedings, as opposed to those in which such defects are curable and do not vitiate the process. 6. This Court has carefully considered the submissions advanced by both parties and examined the record. The petitioner contends that the investigation and charge sheet stand vitiated due to non-compliance with Section 6A(1) of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (DSPE Act) and that the preliminary inquiry was illegally undertaken by Army personnel lacking statutory authority. It is further urged that there is no evidence of demand, acceptance or conspiracy and that the electronic evidence is inadmissible under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Consequently, the charge sheet discloses no prima facie case and amounts to an abuse of the process of law: (a) Under the statutory framework, the CBI is empowered to investigate offences under the PC Act only upon receiving credible information and conducting an independent verification. Under Sections 69 and 70 of the Army Act, 1950, a person subject to the Act who commits a civil offence may be tried either by court-martial or in an ordinary criminal court. In cases involving corruption or offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act by military personnel, therefore, it is both necessary and desirable to have coordination with the CBI or appropriate civil investigative agency to ensure compliance with the dual-jurisdiction framework and to determine the correct forum. In cases involving corruption or offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act by military personnel, therefore, it is both necessary and desirable to have coordination with the CBI or appropriate civil investigative agency to ensure compliance with the dual-jurisdiction framework and to determine the correct forum. The CBI cannot rely solely on departmental reports and an independent investigation is mandatory. This proposition stands fortified by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka Vs. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy, SLP (Criminal) No. 13264 of 2024 of Hon’ble Supreme Court. (b) Section 6 of the DSPE Act restricts the CBI’s investigative powers to cases where consent has been granted by the State or the Central Government. Under Section 17 of the PC Act, investigative powers, including the laying of traps, are vested only in police officers not below the rank of Inspector or those specifically authorized by law. Army officials, irrespective of rank, cannot conduct criminal investigations or trap operations unless duly notified or acting under the supervision of a competent investigative agency. (c) In the present case, the alleged trap was orchestrated solely by Army officials led by Colonel Akash Popli, without registration of an FIR or coordination with either the CBI or the ACB. This renders the entire operation unauthorized and procedurally flawed. Judicial precedents such as State of West Bengal Vs. Swapan Kumar Guha , (1982) 1 SCC 561 , State of Punjab Vs. Baldev Singh , (1999) 6 SCC 172 and State of U.P. Vs. Singhara Singh , 1964 (4) SCR 485 reaffirm that strict adherence to procedural safeguards is indispensable in corruption cases and deviation from prescribed procedure vitiates the investigation and renders the evidence inadmissible. (d) The active participation of Army officials in the investigative process, beyond mere reporting or assistance, constitutes an unlawful exercise of investigative power. In the absence of legal sanction, any trap or evidence thereby obtained stands vitiated and subsequent proceedings by the CBI cannot cure this foundational illegality. Traps under the PC Act must be conducted only by competent authorities such as the CBI or ACB duly empowered under Section 17 of the PC Act and the DSPE Act. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mubarak Ali , (2022) 10 SCC 509 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that compliance with Section 17 of the Act is mandatory and an investigation by an unauthorized officer is incurably defective. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mubarak Ali , (2022) 10 SCC 509 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that compliance with Section 17 of the Act is mandatory and an investigation by an unauthorized officer is incurably defective. Similarly, in CBI Vs. R.R. Kishore , (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1029 it was reiterated that sanction and authorization are jurisdictional prerequisites. Departmental vigilance officers may only gather preliminary information and report it to the competent agency and they cannot conduct or lay traps independently. Any evidence collected through such unauthorized means is tainted and inadmissible. (e) While State of Karnataka Vs. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy (supra) clarified that a preliminary inquiry is not mandatory in every case and this discretion does not extend to unauthorized individuals conducting covert operations under the guise of investigation. (f) The trial Court, while taking cognizance, failed to appreciate the settled principle that an investigation conducted without lawful authority vitiates both the cognizance and the subsequent trial. As held in H.N. Rishbud Vs. The State of Delhi , (1955) 1 SCR 1150 and reaffirmed in R.A.H. Siguran Vs. Shankare Gowda , (2017) 16 SCC 126 , illegality in investigation cannot be cured by later proceedings. The trial Court’s acceptance of the charge sheet despite the unlawful investigation is, therefore, legally unsustainable. In N.K. Janoo Vs. State of U.P. and another , Crl. Pet. No. 31673 of 2016 it was held that a Magistrate cannot rely upon extraneous material not forming part of the case diary while taking cognizance. Further, Gaurav Maini Vs. State of Haryana , Crl. Appeal Nos. 695 of 2010 of Hon’ble Supreme Court and Dipakbhai Jagadishchandra Patel Vs. State of Gujarat , (2019) 16 SCC 547 emphasized that Courts must carefully evaluate the material before them and cannot act as mere post offices. (g) On merits, there is no credible evidence linking the petitioner to the alleged offence. The prosecution has failed to establish any demand or acceptance of illegal gratification by the petitioner and that too recovery was made from a co-accused unconnected to the petitioner. Demand and acceptance are sine qua non for offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. Mere recovery of tainted money, particularly from another person, cannot sustain conviction. This principle has been consistently upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Satyanarayana Murthy Vs. State of A.P. (supra) and B. Jayaraj Vs. Demand and acceptance are sine qua non for offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. Mere recovery of tainted money, particularly from another person, cannot sustain conviction. This principle has been consistently upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Satyanarayana Murthy Vs. State of A.P. (supra) and B. Jayaraj Vs. State of A.P. (supra). The trial Court’s failure to apply this settled law while rejecting the petitioner’s plea for discharge constitutes a serious error. (h) When examined in light of the above legal principles, it is evident that the trial Court committed a grave error in accepting the charge sheet despite multiple procedural irregularities namely, the unauthorized trap and investigation by Army personnel, failure to register an FIR prior to the trap, absence of prior sanction, recovery of tainted currency from a co-accused rather than the petitioner and the lack of evidence substantiating the alleged demand. (i) The absence of prior sanction under Section 6A(1) of the DSPE Act and the unauthorized preliminary inquiry vitiate the CBI’s jurisdiction. Any evidence obtained through such irregularities is tainted ab-initio and subsequent proceedings cannot cure the foundational illegality. The CBI has failed to refute the petitioner’s assertion that he held a Joint Secretary equivalent post at the relevant time, thereby necessitating prior sanction. 7. In light of the foregoing, it is evident that the investigation was conducted without lawful authority, in violation of the PC Act, DSPE Act and settled judicial precedent. Initiated solely by unauthorized Army officials without sanction or coordination with competent investigative agencies, the inquiry and resultant evidence are fundamentally tainted. The absence of credible evidence and disregard for mandatory procedural safeguards vitiate the CBI’s jurisdiction, rendering the proceedings legally untenable. Accordingly, the cognizance and trial based on such defective proceedings cannot be sustained. The investigation and charge sheet, being devoid of legal foundation, are liable to be quashed. 8. In the result, the present criminal revision case is allowed. Consequently, the impugned order dated 12.01.2022 passed in Crl.M.P. No.266 of 2020 in C.C.No.5 of 2012 by the learned III Additional Special Judge for CBI Cases, Hyderabad is hereby set aside and the petitioner, accordingly, is discharged from the offences punishable under Sections 120-B read with Section 7 and Section 13 (2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 pertaining to the said calendar case. 9. Miscellaneous Applications, if any pending, stand closed.