JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. Prayer 1. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a direction commanding and directing the respondents particularly the Respondent No. 2 to issue the Letter of Intent (LOI) in favour of the Petitioner for grant of Mining Lease for stone over being consisted for an area of 27.50 acres of land, situated under Mauza-Nawadih and Bandarchakwa within the District of Koderma, since despite the application filed by the Petitioner vide Application No. 21 dated 06.06.2016 along with all the requisites the Letter of Intent could not be issued to him without any cogent reasons irrespective of the fact that the land applied by the Petitioner being declared as protected forest by virtue of notification in the year 1953, which has lost its force in view of the provisions, as contained in Section 30 of the FOREST ACT , after expiry of 30 years and thereafter no further notification has been issued in terms of Section 29 of the FOREST ACT , and presently the applied land would be treated as vacant land of the Government and over which the Petitioner had applied for grant of the Mining Lease in the year 2016, but even then the matter of the Petitioner remain pending without any cogent ground. Brief facts of the case 2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, which are required to be enumerated, read as under:- It is the case of the petitioner that in respect to Plot No. 01 (Part) and 02 (Part) corresponding to Khata No. 1 situated under Mauza-Nawadih and also for Plot No. 10 situated under Mauza-Bandarchakwa, total area comprising of 27.50 acres of land within the District- Koderma, the Petitioner by his application bearing Application No. 21 dated 06-06-2016, had submitted an application for grant of Mining Lease over the alleged lands and the acknowledgement of the application was issued under signature of the Assistant Mining Officer, Koderma on the same day in Form-'B'. 3. After submission of the aforesaid application vide Memo No. 655 dated 18.06.2016 issued under signature of the Assistant Mining Officer, Koderma, the Petitioner was directed to submit the required documents within time limit of a month failing which his application be rejected. 4. 3. After submission of the aforesaid application vide Memo No. 655 dated 18.06.2016 issued under signature of the Assistant Mining Officer, Koderma, the Petitioner was directed to submit the required documents within time limit of a month failing which his application be rejected. 4. In compliance of the aforesaid letter dated 18.06.2016, the Petitioner informed that some of required documents are the officials documents and reports, which could be available through internal correspondence. 5. After issuance of the aforesaid letter, the Circle Officer, Domchanch vide Letter No. 1054 dated 24.12.2016 addressing to the Assistant Mining Officer, Koderma reported that the applied land of the Petitioner falling under forest area and is recorded as forest and has not been settled with any else and at the same time prior to the said report of the Circle Officer, the Divisional Forest Officer, Koderma vide Letter No. 2601 dated 05.08.2016, addressing to the Assistant Mining Officer, Koderma had informed that the applied land of the Petitioner is notified as forest land and without prior consent/ permission of the Central Government, no mining lease can be granted to any person. 6. It is the further case of the petitioner that even after submission of all the reports and documents the aforesaid application of the Petitioner dated 06.06.2016 could not be disposed of on merit and, consequently, resulted into deemed rejection. 7. Against un-communicated order of deemed rejection passed upon the application dated 06.06.2016 filed for grant of mining lease for stone in terms of the provisions of Rule 62 of JMMC Rules, 2004, the Revision Case No. 176 of 2016 was filed by the Petitioner on 04.10.2016 which is still pending before the Mines Commissioner, Jharkhand. 8. During pendency of the aforesaid revision, the Petitioner sought information from the Assistant Forest Conservator, Koderma by his application dated 03.11.2020 on the issue that whether the Plot No. 01 and 02 corresponding to Mauza-Nawadih and Plot No. 10 of Mauza- Bandarchakwa, District- Koderma have been notified as a forest area after 30 years from the earlier date of notification dated 08.12.1953. 9. 9. In response to the aforesaid application of the Petitioner dated 03.11.2020 the Divisional Forest Officer supplied information to the Petitioner vide Letter No. 2749 dated 28.11.2020 informing that pursuant to the notification being issued by the Governor of Bihar vide notification dated 08.12.1953, the applied land of the Petitioner has been declared as protected forest. 10. It is the case of the petitioner that the date on which the Petitioner had submitted his application for grant of Mining Lease on 06.06.2016, the alleged land was lying vacant belonging to the Government, though as per the information given by the Divisional Forest Officer under Right to Information that pursuant to notification being issued by the Governor of Bihar vide Notification dated 08.12.1953 the alleged land was declared as forest land in terms of Section 29 of the FOREST ACT , but at the time of reporting the aforesaid fact, the Divisional Forest Officer, Koderma failed to take notice of the fact that in view of the provisions as contained in Section 30 of the Indian FOREST ACT , 1927, the notification issued in the year 1953 or 1955 lost its force after expiry of 30 years and, thus, it is clear that on the date of application and even till date the alleged land is not protected forest, rather would be treated as a vacant land of the Government over which the mining activities can be done through mining lease. 11. It is the further case of the petitioner that the application of the Petitioner dated 06.06.2016 could not be disposed of on merit, rather on technicality of law the same was stood deemed rejected and presently the matter is sub-judice before the revisional authority. 12. It has been averred that since the alleged land was lying vacant without having any trees, plant or any bushes and, accordingly, the Petitioner had applied over the alleged land and after submission of the report of the Circle Officer, Domchanch vide Letter No. 1054 dated 24.12.2016, the Petitioner came to learn that the land bearing Plot No. 1 and 2 is recorded as forest. 13. After having aware with the fact, the Petitioner came to know that with the prior approval of the Ministry of Forest and Environment, Government of India, the Mining Lease can be granted subject to fulfillment of all the legal formalities. 14. 13. After having aware with the fact, the Petitioner came to know that with the prior approval of the Ministry of Forest and Environment, Government of India, the Mining Lease can be granted subject to fulfillment of all the legal formalities. 14. It is the case of the petitioner that after submission of the application of the Petitioner dated 06.06.2016 the same has been deemed rejected for lack of requisites documents, though all the reports had already been submitted and after deemed rejection of the aforesaid application of the Petitioner the matter for restoration of the aforesaid application is still pending before the Mines Commissioner, Jharkhand, Ranchi in Rev. Case No. 176 of 2016. 15. The condition precedent for issuing any notification under Section 29 (1) of the Indian FOREST ACT , 1927 in the enquiry be conducted under Section 29 (3) of the said Act regarding the nature and extent of the right of the Government and of the private persons upon the forest land or the waste land 16. The petitioner has approached this Court by filing the instant writ petition with a prayer to direct the respondents to issue the Letter of Intent (LOI) in favour of the Petitioner for grant of Mining Lease for stone. Submission made on behalf of the Petitioner 17. Mr. Kanti Kumar Ojha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the application has been submitted for grant of lease for the gair mazurwa land in view of the fact that the notification has been issued under Section 29 of the Indian FOREST ACT declaring the particular land to be protected forest but the same will be only for the limited period of 30 years in view of the provision of Section 30 of the Indian FOREST ACT . 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the notification under section 29 of the Indian FOREST ACT was issued in the year 1953 and, as such, after lapse of 30 years, i.e., on or after 1983, the force of the said notification declaring the land to be protected forest will lose its force and in that view of the matter, the nature of land will again be gair mazurwa in which the lease was required to be granted in favour of the writ petitioner but having not done so gross illegality has been done. 19. 19. The learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid ground, has submitted that direction may be passed upon the respondents to issue the Letter of Intent (LOI) in favour of the Petitioner for grant of Mining Lease for stone. Submission made on behalf of the Respondent 20. While on the other hand, Mr. Shray Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the State of Jharkhand, has submitted that it is incorrect on the part of the writ petitioner to take the ground that notification under Section 29 of the Indian FOREST ACT particularly sub-section (3) thereof will lose its force after lapse of 30 years in view of the provision of Section 30 of the Indian FOREST ACT . Such submission has been made based upon the ground that the scope of Section 29 and 30 of the Indian FOREST ACT are in two different fields. Section 29 speaks about the issue of protected forest while Section 30 speaks about the issue of trees. 21. The notification which is required to be issued under section 29 of the Indian FOREST ACT therefore will not be restricted only to the period of 30 years since the claim which is being made on behalf of the writ petitioner is on the basis of the notification issued under section 29 (3) rather once the notification has been issued declaring a part of the land to be protected forest that will remain there unless by issuance of a denotification of the notification issued under section 29 (3) of the Indian FOREST ACT . 22. The argument has also been advanced that even accepting what is being submitted by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner to be correct then also no lease license is to be issued in view of the restriction imposed by virtue of Rule 9 of the JHARKHAND MINOR MINERAL CONCESSION RULES , 2004, amended in the year 2017,2019 and 2020, wherein it has been provided that in any circumstances no lease can be granted merely on making application on or after 31.03.2022, rather, after 31.03.2022 the lease license will only be granted by way of auction. 23. Learned counsel for the State, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the writ petition lacks merit and, as such, fit to be dismissed. Consideration 24. Heard learned counsel for the parties and gone across the pleading made in the writ petition. 25. 23. Learned counsel for the State, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the writ petition lacks merit and, as such, fit to be dismissed. Consideration 24. Heard learned counsel for the parties and gone across the pleading made in the writ petition. 25. The undisputed fact in this case is that the Petitioner by his application dated 06-06-2016 had applied for grant of Mining Lease over the alleged lands. 26. After submission of the aforesaid application, vide Memo dated 18.06.2016 issued under signature of the Assistant Mining Officer, Koderma, the Petitioner was directed to submit certain documents within time limit of a month failing which his application be rejected. 27. In compliance of the aforesaid letter dated 18.06.2016, the Petitioner informed that some of the documents are the officials documents and reports, which could be available through internal correspondence. 28. Thereafter, the aforesaid application of the Petitioner dated 06.06.2016 could not be disposed of on merit and, consequently, resulted into deemed rejection by virtue of rule 11 (?). 29. Against which the petitioner filed Revision Case No. 176 of 2016 which is still pending before the Mines Commissioner, Jharkhand. 30. The petitioner has approached this Court by filing the instant writ petition with a prayer to direct the respondents to issue the Letter of Intent (LOI) in favour of the Petitioner for grant of Mining Lease for stone. 31. Before entering into the merit of the case, this Court deems it fit and proper to refer the statutory provisions in this regard, particularly, Section 29 and 30 of the Indian FOREST ACT which reads hereunder as :- “ 29. Protected forests .—(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare the provisions of this Chapter applicable to any forest-land or waste-land which is not included in a reserved forest, but which is the property of Government, or over which the Government has proprietary rights, or to the whole or any part of the forests produce of which the Government is entitled. (2) The forest-land and waste-lands comprised in any such notification shall be called a “protected forests”. (2) The forest-land and waste-lands comprised in any such notification shall be called a “protected forests”. (3) No such notification shall be made unless the nature and extent of the rights of Government and of private persons in or over the forest-land or waste-land comprised therein have been inquired into and recorded at a survey or settlement, or in such other manner as the State Government thinks sufficient. Every such record shall be presumed to be correct until the contrary is proved: Provided that, if, in the case of any forest-land or waste-land, the State Government thinks that such inquiry and record are necessary, but that they will occupy such length of time as in the meantime to endanger the rights of Government, the State Government may, pending such inquiry and record, declare such land to be a protected forest, but so as not to abridge or affect any existing rights of individuals or communities. 30. Power to issue notification reserving trees, etc. — The 1 [State Government] may, by notification in the Official Gazette,— (a) declare any trees or class of trees in a protected forests to be reserved from a date fixed by the notification; (b) declare that any portion of such forest specified in the notification shall be closed for such term, not exceeding thirty years, as the State Government thinks fit, and that the rights of private persons, if any, over such portion shall be suspended during such term, provided that the remainder of such forest be sufficient, and in a locality reasonably convenient, for the due exercise of the rights suspended in the portion so closed; or (c) prohibit, from a date fixed as aforesaid, the quarrying of stone, or the burning of lime or charcoal, or the collection or subjection to any manufacturing process, or removal of, any forest produce in any such forest, and the breaking up or clearing for cultivation, for building, for herding cattle or for any other purpose, of any land in any such forest.” 32. It is evident from the provision of Section 29 thereof that the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare the provisions applicable to any forest-land or waste-land which is not included in a reserved forest, but which is the property of Government, or over which the Government has proprietary rights, or to the whole or any part of the forests produce of which the Government is entitled. Further, it has been provided that the forest-land and waste-lands comprised in any such notification shall be called a ?protected forest 33. Thus, it is evident that Sub-section (1) of Section 29 permits the State Government to issue notification declaring the application of the provisions of Chapter IV to any forest land which is not included in a reserved forest but which is the property of government, or over which the government has proprietary rights, or to the whole or any part of the forest produce of which the government is entitled. The forest land comprised in any such notification is called a protected forest’. 34. Further, it is settled position of law that before Section 29 (1) by the State Government, it must be shown that the requirements of that provision are satisfied. 35. Sub-Section 3 of Section 29 thereof says that no such notification shall be made unless the nature and extent of the rights of Government and of private persons in or over the forest-land or waste-land comprised therein have been inquired into and recorded at a survey or settlement, or in such other manner as the State Government thinks sufficient. Every such record shall be presumed to be correct until the contrary is proved, provided that, if, in the case of any forest-land or waste- land, the State Government thinks that such inquiry and record are necessary, but that they will occupy such length of time as in the meantime to endanger the rights of Government, the State Government may, pending such inquiry and record, declare such land to be a protected forest, but so as not to abridge or affect any existing rights of individuals or communities. 36. The said inquiry is contemplated to determine the nature and extent of the rights of the government and of private persons in or over the forest land. Based on the findings of the inquiry the record is to be prepared. 36. The said inquiry is contemplated to determine the nature and extent of the rights of the government and of private persons in or over the forest land. Based on the findings of the inquiry the record is to be prepared. Further, under sub-section (3) such a record shall be presumed to be correct until the contrary is proved. The presumption, therefore, attaches to the record prepared in pursuance of the inquiry. 37. The Section 29 (3) particularly its proviso whereby power has been conferred upon the State that, if, in the case of any forest-land or waste-land, the State Government thinks that such inquiry and record are necessary, but that will occupy such length of time as in the mean time to endanger the rights of Government, the State Government may, pending such inquiry and record, declare such land to be a protected forest, but so as not to abridge or affect any existing rights of individuals or communities. 38. It is evident from Section 30 of the FOREST ACT that the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare any trees or class of trees in a protected forests to be reserved from a date fixed by the notification or declare that any portion of such forest specified in the notification shall be closed for such term, not exceeding thirty years, as the State Government thinks fit, and that the rights of private persons, if any, over such portion shall be suspended during such term. 39. At this juncture It is also relevant to refer Rule 9 (? 9(?), 9(?), 9(?), 11(?) and 11 (?) and (?) of the JHARKHAND MINOR MINERAL CONCESSION RULES , 2004, amended in the year 2017,2019 and 2020 for ready reference the aforesaid provisions are being referred herein :- 40. It is evident that there has been an amendment in the Rules and by virtue of said amendment, under the provisions of Rule 9 (?) under the JHARKHAND MINOR MINERAL CONCESSION RULES , 2004, lease for mining purpose can only be granted on holding a proper auction. 41. It is evident from the aforesaid Rule particularly Rule (?) of rule 11 of the JHARKHAND MINOR MINERAL CONCESSION RULES , 2004 that the application submitted for grant of mining lease if not finalized within 120 days, it will be deemed to be rejected. 42. 41. It is evident from the aforesaid Rule particularly Rule (?) of rule 11 of the JHARKHAND MINOR MINERAL CONCESSION RULES , 2004 that the application submitted for grant of mining lease if not finalized within 120 days, it will be deemed to be rejected. 42. It is the case of the petitioner that after submission of the application of the Petitioner dated 06.06.2016 the same has been deemed rejected for lack of requisites documents, though all the reports had already been submitted and after deemed rejection of the aforesaid application of the Petitioner the matter for restoration of the aforesaid application is still pending before the Mines Commissioner, Jharkhand, Ranchi in Rev. Case No. 176 of 2016. 43. It is the admitted case of the petitioner that he had applied for grant of mining lease on 06.06.2016 and since then 09 years have elapsed. 44. Further, it would also be evident from the provision as contained in 9(?) and rule 11 of the amended Rule, 2017 that all the pending applications submitted for grant of mining lease before issuance of Amended Rule, 2017 i.e., 22.02.2017, on government land or Raiyati land of more than 05.00 hectare will be automatically deemed to be rejected. 45. Here, in the instant case also, the petitioner had applied on 06.06.2016 i.e., prior to issuance of Amended Rule, 2017, for grant of mining lease on raiyati land comprising of 27.5 acre (more than 11 hectare). 46. It is pertinent to mention herein that the provision as inserted by way of amendment in the Rule 2004 amended in 2017, 2019 and 2020, has statutorily commanded the authority that on or after 31.03.2022 the mining lease will only be granted by virtue of auction. 47. Thus, from the aforesaid logical deduction it is evident that when the renewal and extension cannot be granted after the 31.03.2022 as per the mandate of Rule 9 of Rule 2004, there is no question of granting the fresh lease after 31.03.2022 without following the mandate of Rule 2004 particularly Rule 9(ka) wherein it has been provided that lease for mining purpose can only be granted on holding a proper auction. The aforesaid issue has already been decided by the Co-ordinate Bench in the writ petition being W.P. (C) 3560 of 2025 wherein it has been categorically observed that the license if renewed or extended the validity of which is after 31.03.2022, then, the validity of license will remain there upto the period of lease but there cannot be any extension, thereafter, since as per the mandate of the provision of Rule 9, the lease is to be granted by way of auction. 48. This Court, taking the aforesaid provisions into consideration, is of the view that no positive direction can be passed in favour of the petitioner since the petitioner, who had applied for grant of mining lease in the year 2016 which was not allowed in his favour and thereafter, the amended Rule came into existence as per which now the mining lease will be granted through auction. Further herein although revision is pending for its consideration before the authority concerned, but no positive direction even can be issued by the revisional authority in view of the aforesaid discussed and referred, mandate of the Rule 2004. 49. Further, it needs to refer herein the power which is to be exercised by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by way of issuance of prerogative writs and one of the same is writ of mandamus which is the subject matter in the present writ petition. 50. The purpose of a writ of mandamus is to ensure to compel action and prevent arbitrary or unlawful inaction by those in authority. Mandamus serves to promote the rule of law, protect individual rights, and ensure that the government functions in accordance with the law. Its ability to compel the performance of a specific duty or act. It is a remedy used to enforce a clear legal right, ensuring that public officials, or government agencies fulfill their obligations in accordance with the law. 51. The writ of mandamus is closely associated with the power of judicial review. It allows the higher courts to examine the actions or inactions of public officials or authorities to ensure they are in compliance with the law. The court reviews the legality and validity of the actions and may issue the writ to correct any deficiencies or omissions. 52. The writ of mandamus is closely associated with the power of judicial review. It allows the higher courts to examine the actions or inactions of public officials or authorities to ensure they are in compliance with the law. The court reviews the legality and validity of the actions and may issue the writ to correct any deficiencies or omissions. 52. But it is equally settled that the writ of mandamus cannot be issued merely because a person is praying for. One must establish the right first and then he must seek for the prayer to enforce the said right. If there is failure of duty by the authorities or inaction, one can approach the Court for mandamus. The said position is well settled by in series of decisions. 53. In the case of State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra , (1996) 9 SCC 309 at paragraph 10, the Apex Court held as follows: “ 10 Under the Constitution a mandamus can be issued by the court when the applicant establishes that he has a legal right to the performance of legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and the said right was subsisting on the date of the petition….” 54. Further, in the decision reported in Union of India v. S.B. Vohra , (2004) 2 SCC 150 the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the said issue and held that ‘for issuing a writ of mandamus in favour of a person, the person claiming, must establish his legal right in himself. Then only a writ of mandamus could be issued against a person, who has a legal duty to perform, but has failed and/or neglected to do so. 55. In the decision reported in Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Sunder Lal Jain , (2008) 2 SCC 280 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that Mandamus is, subject to the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, the appropriate remedy to enforce a plain, positive, specific and ministerial duty presently existing and imposed by law upon officers and others who refuse or neglect to perform such duty. The relevant paragraph are being quoted as under: “11. The relevant paragraph are being quoted as under: “11. The principles on which a writ of mandamus can be issued have been stated as under in The Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies by F.G. Ferris and F.G. Ferris, Jr.: “Note 187.—Mandamus, at common law, is a highly prerogative writ, usually issuing out of the highest court of general jurisdiction, in the name of the sovereignty, directed to any natural person, corporation or inferior court within the jurisdiction, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified, and which appertains to their office or duty. Generally speaking, it may be said that mandamus is a summary writ, issuing from the proper court, commanding the official or board to which it is addressed to perform some specific legal duty to which the party applying for the writ is entitled of legal right to have performed. *** Note 192.—Mandamus is, subject to the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, the appropriate remedy to enforce a plain, positive, specific and ministerial duty presently existing and imposed by law upon officers and others who refuse or neglect to perform such duty, when there is no other adequate and specific legal remedy and without which there would be a failure of justice. The chief function of the writ is to compel the performance of public duties prescribed by statute, and to keep subordinate and inferior bodies and tribunals exercising public functions within their jurisdictions. It is not necessary, however, that the duty be imposed by statute; mandamus lies as well for the enforcement of a common law duty. *** Note 196.—Mandamus is not a writ of right. Its issuance unquestionably lies in the sound judicial discretion of the court, subject always to the well-settled principles which have been established by the courts. An action in mandamus is not governed by the principles of ordinary litigation where the matters alleged on one side and not denied on the other are taken as true, and judgment pronounced thereon as of course. While mandamus is classed as a legal remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles. Before granting the writ the court may, and should, look to the larger public interest which may be concerned—an interest which private litigants are apt to overlook when striving for private ends. While mandamus is classed as a legal remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles. Before granting the writ the court may, and should, look to the larger public interest which may be concerned—an interest which private litigants are apt to overlook when striving for private ends. The court should act in view of all the existing facts, and with due regard to the consequences which will result. It is in every case a discretion dependent upon all the surrounding facts and circumstances. Note 206.— … The correct rule is that mandamus will not lie where the duty is clearly discretionary and the party upon whom the duty rests has exercised his 12. These very principles have been adopted in our country. In Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Coop. Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh [ (1977) 4 SCC 145 : AIR 1977 SC 2149 ] after referring to the earlier decisions in Lekhraj Sathramdas Lalvani v. N.M. Shah [ AIR 1966 SC 334 ], Rai Shivendra Bahadur (Dr.) v. Nalanda College [ AIR 1962 SC 1210 ] and Umakant Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [ (1973) 1 SCC 485 : AIR 1973 SC 964 ] this Court observed as follows in para 15 of the Reports (SCC): (Sipahi Singh case [ (1977) 4 SCC 145 : AIR 1977 SC 2149 ], SCC pp. 152-53) “15. … There is abundant authority in favour of the proposition that a writ of mandamus can be granted only in a case where there is a statutory duty imposed upon the officer concerned and there is a failure on the part of that officer to discharge the statutory obligation. The chief function of a writ is to compel performance of public duties prescribed by statute and to keep subordinate tribunals and officers exercising public functions within the limit of their jurisdiction. It follows, therefore, that in order that mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute which imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. … In the instant case, it has not been shown by Respondent 1 that there is any statute or rule having the force of law which casts a duty on Respondents 2 to 4 which they failed to perform. … In the instant case, it has not been shown by Respondent 1 that there is any statute or rule having the force of law which casts a duty on Respondents 2 to 4 which they failed to perform. All that is sought to be enforced is an obligation flowing from a contract which, as already indicated, is also not binding and enforceable. Accordingly, we are clearly of the opinion that Respondent 1 was not entitled to apply for grant of a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution and the High Court was not competent to issue the same.” 56. The mandamus which is being sought for by the High Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is to be issued if there is in-action on the part of the State and if such action is statutorily been directed to be performed by the State authority. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of Maharashtra , (2020) 9 SCC 356 wherein at paragraphs-100 and 101, it has been observed which reads as under: “100. The High Courts exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, not only have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or in the nature of mandamus, but are dutybound to exercise such power, where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised discretion conferred upon it by a statute, or a rule, or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion mala fide, or on irrelevant consideration. 101. In all such cases, the High Court must issue a writ of mandamus and give directions to compel performance in an appropriate and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority.” 57. It is, thus, evident that the mandamus is to be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if there is any in-action on the part of the State. 58. It is, thus, evident that the mandamus is to be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if there is any in-action on the part of the State. 58. This Court, in the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position is now adverting to the facts of the case in order to consider as to whether there is any in-action on the part of the authority concerned so as to issue mandamus in the present case to issue direction upon them to issue LOI in favour of petitioner. 59. Here, in the instant case, the petitioner had applied on 06.06.2016 i.e., prior to issuance of Amended Rule, for grant of mining lease on land comprising of 27.5 acre (more than 11 hectare) which is as per the counter affidavit is still protected forest area. But whether the particular area is protected forest area or not has not been issue of adjudication herein rather the present petition has been filed for issuance of command and direction upon the respondents particularly the Respondent No. 2 to issue the Letter of Intent (LOI) in favour of the Petitioner for grant of Mining Lease for stone over being consisted for an area of 27.50 acres of land. 60. It needs to refer herein that by virtue of Rule 11 of Rule 2004 the application which has been filed in year 2016 has already been deem to be rejected and the revision has been preferred before the authority concerned, and further the amendment has already been carried out in the rule 2004 in the method of grant of lease, therefore in the aforesaid circumstances, it is considered view of this Court there is no requirement herein for issuance of any prerogative writ. 61. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussion, is of the view that it is not a fit case where any command is to be issued upon the State for consideration of the case of the writ petitioner. 62. Accordingly, the instant writ petition fails and is dismissed.