JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. The instant appeal under Clause 10 of the LETTERS PATENT is directed against the common order dated 28.02.2022 passed in W.P(S) No.4661 of 2018 and analogous cases whereby and whereunder this batch of writ petitions has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge whereby and whereunder the common prayer for extending the benefits to these writ petitioners as that of the Non-Formal/Special Education Instructors in the State of Bihar has been declined. 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ petition needs to refer herein which reads as under: (i) It is pleaded that in the erstwhile State of Bihar a Central sponsored National Adult Education came into existence and started w.e.f. 02.10.1978. Subsequently, another scheme namely Non-Formal Education Scheme was launched in the year 1980-81. (ii) Petitioners in all these writ petitions are claiming that they were appointed as Instructors in the Non-Formal Education Scheme. Subsequently, the scheme was closed and the engagement of personnel, including the petitioners, stood terminated. (iii) Aggrieved by the same, some of the persons moved before the Hon'ble Patna High Court by filing writ petitions being CWJC No. 1458 of 1988 and CWJC No. 8418 of 2010, seeking a direction for absorption of the Instructors as permanent employees. (iv) The petitioners have made a specific averment in these writ petitions that this Court in W.P.(S). No. 5966 of 2008 directed the respondents to take steps in light of the observations made by the Hon'ble Patna High Court in CWJC No. 8418 of 2010 and subsequently, in some other writ petitions filed in this Court, similar observations were made. But, still the services of the petitioners have neither been considered for absorption nor they have been absorbed. 3. Being aggrieved, the writ petitioners has preferred batch of writ petitions being W.P.(S) No. 4661 of 2018 and analogous cases and the same was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide a common order dated 28.02.2022. 4. To challenge the aforesaid order of the learned Single Judge, the instant appeal has been preferred by the writ petitioners. 5. 3. Being aggrieved, the writ petitioners has preferred batch of writ petitions being W.P.(S) No. 4661 of 2018 and analogous cases and the same was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide a common order dated 28.02.2022. 4. To challenge the aforesaid order of the learned Single Judge, the instant appeal has been preferred by the writ petitioners. 5. It is evident from the factual aspect that the writ petitioners had been appointed by the erstwhile State of Bihar under the Non-Formal Education /Special Education Scheme as Instructors and while they were working but by virtue of policy decision the entire Non-Formal Education Scheme has been closed vide the decision so taken dated 30.05.2007. 6. The writ petitioners along with the others have been allocated their services to the State of Jharkhand after enactment of Bihar Reorganization Act, 2000. The State of Jharkhand has taken policy decision vide Memorandum dated 30.05.2007 whereby and whereunder the employees working under the some of the posts under Non-Formal Education have been decided to be absorbed which would be evident from the nomenclature of the post as referred in the said Notification which is being referred herein as: 7. From the aforesaid tabular chart, it appears that the post of the writ petitioners, i.e., the post of the Instructors has not been mentioned in the said policy decision. 8. The writ petitioners have approached the authority for their absorption on the ground of parity . The respondent-authority when not passed the order in favour of the writ petitioners, they have approached this Court by filing writ petitions being W.P(S) Nos.4516 of 2018, 4542 of 2018, 4571 of 2018, 4661 of 2018 and W.P(S) No.6266 of 2018 which have been tagged and heard together by the learned Single Judge of this Court. 9. The learned Single Judge has dismissed these writ petitions against which the instant LETTERS PATENT Appeal being L.P.A No.503 of 2022 has been filed but the same has also been dismissed by a co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 10.10.2023. 10. The writ petitioners had moved to the Hon’ble Apex Court by challenging the order dated 10.10.2023 passed by a co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court vide Civil Appeal No(s).5629 of 2025. 10. The writ petitioners had moved to the Hon’ble Apex Court by challenging the order dated 10.10.2023 passed by a co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court vide Civil Appeal No(s).5629 of 2025. The said Civil Appeal has been allowed by the Hon’ble Apex Court and the order passed by a co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court dated 10.10.2023 has been quashed and set aside with an order of remand for deciding the issue on merit, for ready reference the relevant part of the said order of the Hon’ble Apex Court is being quoted hereinbelow as: ORDER “1. Delay condoned. 2. Leave granted. 3. The appellant(s) filed a writ petition before the High Court in the year 2008 with the following prayer(s): "It is, therefore, prayed that Your Lordships may graciously be pleased to admit this writ application and issue notices to each and every other respondents as this writ application has been directed for issuance of an appropriate writ order direction and directing and commanding upon the respondent to absorption and regularize the petitioner No.1 and other petitioners on post of teacher of elementary school or any equivalent suitable post considering long and continuous services rendered by the petitioner and its members for imparting education as non formal Instructor and be not allowed and after hearing the parties make the same absolute. AND For issuance of directions to the respondent authority to the respondent authority not to discriminate the petitioner as well as its members from the case of Gram Raksha Vahini and employees of Census department then service has been rendered for depilation Census for the year 1981, 1991 and 2001 and their service has been regularization by the State Government. AND/OR For issuance of direction upon the Respondent Authority to absorption the provision of Article 14, 16(1) and 39 (d) along with the guidelines of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which has been made time to time in this regard. AND/OR Any other writ/s be issued, order/s be passed, direction/s be made as Your Lordships may deem, fit and proper. 4. While this writ petition was pending similarly placed employees belonging to the State of Bihar initiated proceedings for regularization and their writ petition came to be allowed by the Single Judge on 02.07.2009 and 21.04.2011 and State appeal against the said orders was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court on 11.08.2015. 4. While this writ petition was pending similarly placed employees belonging to the State of Bihar initiated proceedings for regularization and their writ petition came to be allowed by the Single Judge on 02.07.2009 and 21.04.2011 and State appeal against the said orders was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court on 11.08.2015. While disposing of the Special Leave Petition (C) No. 32079 of 2015, this Court passed the following order: "We find no infirmity in the order impugned herein. The Special Leave Petitions are dismissed. The relief granted by the High Court shall be restricted to those who approached the High Court who were heard as well as who wanted to get themselves impleaded and those who have filed applications here at par with those former as well as all those petitioner Instructors which are pending as on date before the High Court but shall not apply to any fresh case either here or before the High Court. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of." 5. It is evident from the above that the relief granted by the High Court was confined to those as indicated in the order extracted hereinabove. 6. We are of the opinion that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar vs. Prabhat Ranjan (viz. SLP (C) No. 32079 of 2015) could not have become the basis of not examining the prayer made by the appellants for the simple reason that many of the appellants had in fact approached the Court in the year 2008 itself. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the case of the appellants deserves to be examined. 7. We have not examined the merits of the matter and we leave it open for the State to raise such objections as they are entertainable and it is for the High Court to examine the case on its own merits. 8. In view of the above, we allow the appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court in LPA No. 503 of 2022 dated 10.10.2023. The High Court shall now consider the submissions made by the appellants on its own merits and decide the case in accordance with law. 9. Pending application(s) including impleadment applications are dismissed.” 11. In view of the above, we allow the appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court in LPA No. 503 of 2022 dated 10.10.2023. The High Court shall now consider the submissions made by the appellants on its own merits and decide the case in accordance with law. 9. Pending application(s) including impleadment applications are dismissed.” 11. The present appeal has been revived in pursuance to the order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No(s).5629 of 2025 and thereby the case has been listed on the Board of this Court. Submission on behalf of the appellant-writ petitioners: 12. Mr. Afaque Rashidi, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners/appellants has taken the following grounds: (i) That the writ petitioners have been discriminated in not getting absorbed in service while absorbing the other identically placed employees. But this aspect of the matter has not been taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment. (ii) The State has taken policy decision for regularising the employees working under the Non-Formal Education but even then, the services of the writ petitioners have not been regularized. (iii) The learned counsel has relied upon the judgment passed by this Court on the issue of absorption of so called other identically placed former employees working under the Non-Formal Education. 13. The learned counsel based upon the aforesaid ground has submitted that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, therefore, suffers from an error. Submission on behalf of the Respondent-State: 14. Per contra, Mr. Devesh Krishna, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State to defend the impugned order has raised the following grounds: (i) It is incorrect on the part of the petitioners to take the ground that they are entitled for absorption in service at par with other former employees under Non-Formal Education, rather the absorption of the other formal employees is based upon the policy decision dated 30.05.2007, but in the said policy decision there is no reference of the post of the writ petitioners, i.e, the post of Instructors. Hence, the case of the writ petitioners does not fall under the category of parity. Hence, the case of the writ petitioners does not fall under the category of parity. (ii) The further contention has been raised that the identical issue has been decided by a co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court in the caseof Jharkhand Pradesh Anupcharik Jan Sah Vishesh Shiksha Anudishak Sangh, through its Secretary Anil Kumar Pathak 2019 SCC OnLine Jhar 592 wherein the LETTERS PATENT Appeal has been dismissed. Hence, the issue having been decided and, as such, the order passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be said to be a faulted one. 15. The learned counsel based upon the aforesaid grounds has submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge needs no interference and the present appeal is fit to be dismissed. Analysis: 16. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and gone through the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment as also the material available on record. 17. The question which has been raised on behalf of the writ petitioners on the issue of absorption by claiming parity with the other co-employees. 18. The fact of extending benefit of parity cannot be disputed since that is the mandate under Article 14 of the Constitution of India but while following the principle of parity the Court of law is to consider the issue of classification based upon the reasonable classification and if the classification is reasonable then the principle of Article 14 of the Constitution will not be applicable. However, if the principle of classification is unreasonable then certainly the Article 14 will be attracted, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar [ AIR 1952 SC 75 ] wherein it has been held that differentia between the basis of classification and the object of the things are two different things. It is important that there must be nexus between the basis of classification with the object of the Act. 19. In Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia & Ors Vs. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar & Ors [ AIR 1958 SC 538 ] , the Hon’ble Apex Court, taking into consideration catena of judgments rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court, has held that Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. 19. In Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia & Ors Vs. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar & Ors [ AIR 1958 SC 538 ] , the Hon’ble Apex Court, taking into consideration catena of judgments rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court, has held that Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of this Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure. Paragraph 11 of the said judgment is quoted as under: “ 11. ... (a). That a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself; (b). That there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles; (c). That it must be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds; (d). That the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest; (e). That in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation; and (f). That in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation; and (f). That while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and un- known reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation....” 20. The aforesaid principle can further be found from The Special Courts Bill, 1978, which contains that: (1). The basic principle of Article 14 is that the persons in similar circumstances shall be treated similarly both in privileges conferred and liability imposed. (2). The State shall have the power to determine with regard to the process of classification, which should be regarded as a class for the purpose of legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject. (3). The classification does not mean arbitrary application of law to certain person instead it means segregation in classes which had a systematic relation, usually found common property and characteristics. (4). The law can make and set apart the classes according to the needs and exigencies of the society and suggested by experience. It can even recognize ‘degrees of evil’ but the classification should never be arbitrary, or artificial. 21. In R.K. Garg Vs. Union of India & Ors [ (1981) 4 SCC 675 ] , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that Article 14 forbids class legislation but does not forbid reasonable classification. 22. It is, thus, evident that Article 14 prohibits discriminatory legislation against an individual or against a class of individual but it does not prohibit reasonable classification. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in D.S. Nakara & Ors. v. Union of India [ (1983) 1 SCC 305 ] , wherein at paragraph 11, it has been held as under:- “11. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in D.S. Nakara & Ors. v. Union of India [ (1983) 1 SCC 305 ] , wherein at paragraph 11, it has been held as under:- “11. The decisions clearly lay down that though Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled viz. (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group; and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the statute in question (see Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar [ AIR 1958 SC 538 : 1959 SCR 279 , 296 : 1959 SCJ 147 ] ). The classification may be founded on differential basis according to objects sought to be achieved but what is implicit in it is that there ought to be a nexus i.e. causal connection between the basis of classification and object of the statute under consideration. It is equally well settled by the decisions of this Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.” 23. This Court is now proceeding to examine as to whether the writ petitioners have been able to make out a case of unreasonable classification warranting the benefit under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 24. The factual aspect which is not in dispute and it cannot be disputed by the writ petitioners also by going through the face of the policy decision upon which the insistence has been given by the learned counsel for the writ petitioners that the absorption in the service of the writ petitioners is on the basis of the said policy decision. 25. We have referred the said policy decision hereinabove from which it would be evident that the State of Jharkhand has taken a policy decision for absorption of the services of the ex-employees working under the Non-Formal Education but restricting it to certain post, i.e., the post of (1) Project Officer, (2) Statistics-cum-Evaluation Supervisor, (3) Stenographer, (4) Clerk-cum-Accountant, (5) Clerk-cum-Typist, (6) Jeep Driver, and (7) Orderly (Peon). 26. 26. After going through the entire policy decision, it is evident that there is no reference in the said policy decision of the posts of the Instructors for the purpose of absorbing the ex-employees who were working as Instructor under the Non-Formal Education. 27. It is also admitted case of the writ petitioners that the said policy decision has not been challenged as to why the post of Instructor has not been included by the State of Jharkhand by a policy decision for absorption in service, meaning thereby, the said policy decision has been admitted by the writ petitioners since not challenged as yet. 28. The law is well settled that if the State has to come out with a policy decision which is not benefitting the interest of the concerned, herein the writ petitioners/appellants, then the parity cannot be claimed with the others whose reference is there in the policy decision taken by the State. 29. This Court, in view of the aforesaid admitted fact, is of the view that the writ petitioners/appellants cannot claim parity with the other employees holding the posts of Instructors prior to closer of Non-Formal Education Scheme. 30. Therefore, it is not a case where the principle of unreasonable classification is available and, hence, the action of the respondent authority cannot be said to contrary to the principle available under Article 14 of Constitution of India. 31. The further admitted fact is that a similar issue has been decided by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 28.02.2019 passed in the case of Jharkhand Pradesh Anupcharik Jan Sah Vishesh Shiksha Anudishak Sangh, through its Secretary Anil Kumar Pathak (supra) wherein the issue absorption of the instructor has been dealt with by dismissing the said writ petition preferred by the Association, relevant part of the said order is being referred hereinbelow as: The appellant-Jharkhand Pradesh Anupcharik Jan Sah Vishesh Shiksha Anudishak Sangh is aggrieved of the order dated 22.09.2017 passed in W.P.(S) No.3339 of 2010 by which its prayer seeking a direction upon the respondent-State of Jharkhand to absorb/regularize its members on any equivalent post of 'Instructor' has been declined. 2. 2. Contention raised on behalf of the appellant-Sangh is that the respondent-State of Jharkhand has discriminated between the employees who all were appointed by the State of Bihar around the same time on similar terms and conditions, prior to bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Bihar, but were posted in the State of Jharkhand at the relevant time. 3. The appellant-Sangh has pleaded that 75 persons who are its members were working as 'Instructor' under the Non-Formal Education Scheme on payment of honorarium varying between Rs.105/- to Rs.200/- per month in different units. They were appointed over a period ranging between 1981 to 1998 and they were discharging duties similar to the teachers in Elementary School. By a public notice dated 21.05.2001 the employees working under the Non-Formal Education Scheme were informed that the centers have been closed. The reason for closure of the unit/center was that the Central Government had withdrawn/closed the Scheme. In a batch of writ petitions filed in the Patna High Court vide C.W.J.C. No.8110 of 2001 and batch cases, a learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court by an order dated 02.07.2009 directed the State of Bihar to absorb the non-formal Instructors in service. The Division Bench of Patna High Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court has affirmed the order passed in C.W.J.C. No.8110 of 2001. 4. Relying on the aforesaid judgment of the Patna High Court, Mr. A.K. Sahani, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the employees who were also appointed by the State of Bihar who came within the State of Jharkhand due to bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Bihar cannot be treated differently. 5. In the first place, the issue before the Patna High Court was whether after regularising the service of non-formal Supervisors the State could have discriminated and refused to regularize services of non-formal Instructors, who were also appointed by the State of Bihar on similar terms and conditions and working under the same Scheme. Here the appellant-Sangh has not brought on record any decision of the respondent-State of Jharkhand that one set of employees for example, non-formal Supervisors have been regularised whereas claim for regularisation of the members of the appellant-Sangh who were working as non-formal Instructors has been declined. Here the appellant-Sangh has not brought on record any decision of the respondent-State of Jharkhand that one set of employees for example, non-formal Supervisors have been regularised whereas claim for regularisation of the members of the appellant-Sangh who were working as non-formal Instructors has been declined. The question of appointment/regularisation in service is primarily a policy matter of the State and decision of the State of Bihar shall not be binding on the State of Jharkhand. The learned writ Court has rightly observed that after the Scheme was closed the employees under the Scheme has no right to seek regularisation. The learned Single Judge has held, thus; “As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines and judicial pronouncements, I am of the considered view that case of the petitioners are not tenable in the eyes of law. No case of regularisation has been made out. State has no Scheme to continue the centrally sponsored time bound scheme which has already been closed by Government of India and as such, the writ petition is dismissed.” 6. Having carefully examined the materials on record, we find no infirmity in the order passed by the writ Court and, accordingly, L.P.A No.649 of 2017 is dismissed. 32. This Court, in view of the aforesaid discussions, is of the view that when the similar issue has already been decided by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court which has also been upheld by the Hon’ble Apex Court by dismissal of S.L.P being Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s). 26808/2019 vide order dated 26.08.2019, for ready reference same is being quoted as under: “ We have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. Delay condoned. We do not find any good ground warranting interference with the impugned order in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The special leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of” 33. Delay condoned. We do not find any good ground warranting interference with the impugned order in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The special leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of” 33. Thus, on basis of discussion made hereinabove and also taking into consideration the policy decision of the state of Jharkhand vide Memorandum dated 30.05.2007 by which the employees working under the some of the posts under Non-Formal Education have been decided to be absorbed but the post of the Instructors have been excluded and further taking into consideration that the similar issue has already been decided by the Division Bench of this Court against which the SLP has been dismissed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court is of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No.4661 of 2018 and analogous cases cannot be said to be suffered from an error. 34. Accordingly, the present LETTERS PATENT Appeal being L.P.A No.503 of 2022 sans merit and is hereby dismissed. 35. Pending I.As, if any, stands disposed of.