JUDGMENT : BUDI HABUNG, J. Heard Mr. V. Devnath, learned counsel for the appellant. I have also heard Mr. B. N. Sarmah, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 to 5/claimants and Ms. Moajungla, learned counsel for the respondent no. 6. 2. By filing this appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, the appellant has assailed the judgment and award dated 21.04.2022 passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Tuensang, Nagaland, in MAC case no. 16/2019. 3. The case leading to the filing of this appeal in brief is that the respondent nos. 1 to 5 as claimants filed MAC case no. 16/2019, under Section 166 read with Section 144 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 before the learned Member, Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Tuensang, Nagaland, claiming compensation on account of alleged accidental death of her son late Munna Sarmah in road traffic accident on 05.04.2019, involving the motorcycle bearing registration No. AS-07M/6831. The deceased was travelling on the said motorcycle as a pillion rider. The appellants were impleaded as party respondent nos. 3 and 4 respectively. 4. The appellant contested the claim petition by filing written statement and raised preliminary objection on the question of jurisdiction of the Tribunal. However, on conclusion of the trial, the learned Tribunal by judgment and award dated 21.04.2022, awarded a compensation amount of Rs. 36,98,800/- with interest at the rate of 9 % per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until payment of the awarded amount, and directed the appellants-Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Limited, Divisional Office, Dimapur, Nagaland to deposit the awarded amount along with the interest within 30 (thirty) days from the date of the said order. 5. Being aggrieved, the appellants filed this appeal on the following grounds: (i) That the claim petition was filed under Section 166 read with Section 140 of the M.V. Act 1988, as such, to prove rash and negligent driving by conclusive evidences is a condition precedent. But the claimants have failed to discharge the onus to prove rash and negligent of the driver, and the Learned Member failed to appreciate this legal aspect of the matter. But the claimants have failed to discharge the onus to prove rash and negligent of the driver, and the Learned Member failed to appreciate this legal aspect of the matter. (ii) There was no final investigation report of the accident before, nor any site plan or a report of extensive investigation, but by overlooking this vital aspect of the case the Award was passed on the basis of a mere accident information report and the police report that does not disclose anything about rash and negligent driving of the said motorcycle. (iii) That the accident took place in Dhalpur, under Lakhimpur district of Assam, the treatment and other medical procedures of the injured (now deceased) were followed up at Lakhimpur, Assam, the permanent residential address of the respondents are also at Dhalpur in the district of Lakhimpur, Assam and the claimants/respondents did not exhibit any documentary evidence showing that she was the residential of Tuensang. But it was overlooked and passed the impugned Judgment & Award dated 21.04.2022 exceeding its jurisdiction. (iv) There were no conclusive evidences showing that the deceased was agriculturist and he earned income from agriculture cultivation, however, the Learned Tribunal assessed the loss of income of the claimant basing on a mere certificate issued by Mouzadar. The salary cum employment certificate issued by the GREF does not disclose the actual income of the deceased nor the documents of income was proved by the author before the Tribunal. However, in absence of any conclusive proof of the income of the deceased, the learned Tribunal passed the impugned judgment and award merely on assumption, accepting the income of the deceased as Rs. 16,000/- per month merely basing on the pleadings of the claimants. (v) The interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the claim till realization, is on the higher side. (vi) That the claimant is not entitled to interest on loss of future prospect. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that for the grounds stated above, the impugned judgment and award dated 21.04.2022 is liable to be set aside and quashed. 7. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 to 5/claimants submitted that the appellants/insurer was impleaded only as a notice as provided under Section 149 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. 7. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 to 5/claimants submitted that the appellants/insurer was impleaded only as a notice as provided under Section 149 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. As such, unless the Tribunal passed a reason order as required under section 170 of the M.V.Act and by satisfying with the two conditions allowed the insurer to implead as a party to the proceedings, no insurer can contest or raised any ground other than the defence within the meaning of section 149 (2) of the M.V.Act. He goes on to submit that in the instant case, no such prayer was made by the insurer before the tribunal for allowing the appellant to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made, nor the insurer/appellants have filed any petition before this Court along with the memorandum of appeal for allowing the appellant to filed the appeal on all available grounds. 8. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of NIC Ltd.-Vs-Nicolletta Rohtagi and others reported in (2002) 7 SCC 456 ::2003 (3) ?.?.C. 293 (SC):: AIR 2002 SC 3350 , wherein at Paragraph 26, it was held that two conditions precedent embodied in section 170 are to be satisfied. However, the application for such permission should be bona fide and held, the insurer can challenge only that part of the Accidents Claims Tribunal's Order in an Appeal on the grounds specified in Section 149(2). 9. Regarding, the allegation that there is no present residential address proof of the respondents/claimants showing that they were resident of Tuensang, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in the course of examination of the respondents/claimants, no such question was raised by the appellant, and no permission to raise such defence obtained under section 170 of the MV Act, as such, the same cannot be a disputed before this Court in appeal. 10. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the respondents’ claimants has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mantoo Sarkar Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2009) 2 SCC 244, wherein at Paragraph 12, it was held that a claimant has a wide option. 10. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the respondents’ claimants has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mantoo Sarkar Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2009) 2 SCC 244, wherein at Paragraph 12, it was held that a claimant has a wide option. Residence of the claimant also determines jurisdiction of the Tribunal. What would be a residence of a person would, however, depend upon the fact situation obtaining in each case. 11. The learned counsel for the respondents further submits that in the instant case, after the death of the deceased, the respondents/claimants were temporary resided at Tuensang, at Nagaland with their relatives and, therefore, she filed the claim petition before the learned Tribunal at Tuensang. 12. With regards to the allegation that the agricultural income certificate, income certificate and employment certificate was not proved by calling the authors, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the claimant mother in her claim petition categorically stated that her deceased son prior to his death used to earn Rs. 26,100/- per month of which Rs. 11,000/- comes from salary and Rs. 15,000/- comes from agricultural farming. The said statement was corroborated by her in her examination-in-chief, wherein she stated that, “At the time of death, my son was 24 years old, and working under Employment of General Reserved Engineer Force, (GREF) Border Road Organization, and used to earn from our agricultural farming. The deceased was my son who was shouldering the entire responsibility of our family after death of my husband”. It is further submitted that even in her cross-examination by the opposite party Nos. 1 and 2, the income of the deceased was reaffirmed stating that, “It is correct to say that at the time of death, my son was earning Rs. 11,100/- as salary from GREF and also earning another Rs. 15,000/- from our agricultural farming”. 13. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that before the learned Tribunal, no contrary evidence could be produced by the appellants to disprove the income of the deceased; rather, the monthly income of the deceased was reaffirmed during the cross examination. However, the learned Tribunal had considered the income of the deceased and fixed at Rs. 16,000/-. 13. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that before the learned Tribunal, no contrary evidence could be produced by the appellants to disprove the income of the deceased; rather, the monthly income of the deceased was reaffirmed during the cross examination. However, the learned Tribunal had considered the income of the deceased and fixed at Rs. 16,000/-. Furthermore, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in absence of any dispute by the appellants against the income of the deceased or his employment, the question for calling of the employer for examination does not arise. 14. Regarding the interest being at the higher side according to the appellants, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that it was as per the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In support of his submission, the learned counsel relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Ajay Kumar Mohandy & Anr, reported in (2018) 3 SCC 686 , wherein at Paragraph 13, it was held that the claimants shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition. 15. In view of his above submission and the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above referred cases, the learned counsel for the respondents prays for dismissal of the present appeal. 16. Heard both the learned counsel for the parties. I have also perused the record and the relevant provisions under Section 149 (2) and 170 of the MV Act, 1988, which reads as follows: “ Section 149 (2) - An officer designated by the insurance company for processing the settlement of claim of compensation may make an offer to the claimant for settlement before the Claims Tribunal giving such details, within thirty days and after following such procedure as may be prescribed by the Central Government.” Section 170 - Impleading insurer in certain cases. - Where in the course of any inquiry, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that- (a)there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made, or (b)the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, it may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have, without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of [section 150], the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made.” 17. In view of the provisions under Section 149(2) and 170 of the MV Act, the learned counsel for the appellant fairly submitted that he no longer is pressing for the other prayer made in the memo of appeal. However, he submitted that as the law does not provides any interest on the loss of future prospect of the deceased, the respondents/ claimants will not be entitled to an interest in loss of future prospect. 18. As pointed out and submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents/claimants regarding the income of the deceased given at Rs. 16,000/-, the record does not reveal that appellant/respondent had ever raised any objection in this regard before the learned Tribunal during trial. The learned counsel for the appellant also fairly submitted that the appellant/respondent did not raise any objection before the tribunal. 19. In view of the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent/claimants and also considering the fair submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant who fairly admitted that they have not raised any objection before the learned Tribunal, this Court is not inclined to interfere or change the income of the deceased as awarded by the learned Tribunal. 20. However, considering that the law provides that the claimant is not entitled to interest in loss of future prospect, this Court makes it clear that the claimant shall not be entitled to any interest in the 40% loss of future prospect. 21. 20. However, considering that the law provides that the claimant is not entitled to interest in loss of future prospect, this Court makes it clear that the claimant shall not be entitled to any interest in the 40% loss of future prospect. 21. In light of the above, this court do not find any reason to interfere with the judgement and award dated 21.04.2022, passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Tuensang, Nagaland in MAC case no. 16/2019, however, the claimant shall not be entitled to any interest in the loss of future prospect. Accordingly, the award stands modified to the extend as indicated above. 22. With the above observation, this appeal stands partly allowed and disposed of.