JUDGMENT : Ziyad Rahman A.A., J. The petitioner is the owner in possession of property having an extent of 26.65 Ares of land comprised in Re.Sy.No.342/12 and 342/3 in Block No.032 of Vembayam Village in Nedumangad Taluk in Thiruvananthapuram District. The grievance of the petitioner is that, even though the said property stood reclaimed before the enactment of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 Act (hereinafter referred to as the Paddy Land Act), the same is described as “paddy land” in the revenue records. In such circumstances, the petitioner submitted an application in Form 7, as evidenced by Ext.P3, before the 2nd respondent. As per Ext.P4, the 2nd respondent rejected the said application. Aggrieved the same, the petitioner submitted Ext P5 appeal under Sec.27B of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008. 2. The case of the petitioner is that Ext.P5 appeal is not being considered because, the appeal was filed beyond the period contemplated in Sec.27B. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, there were valid reasons that prevented the petitioner from invoking the remedy of appeal as contemplated under Sec.27B within the period prescribed. It is also pointed out that, as per statutory provisions, there is no absolute prohibition against entertaining appeals after the period stipulated. 3. After hearing Sri.Jomy K. Jose, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Smt Deepa V, the learned Government Pleader, I find merits in the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. An appeal is contemplated under Section 27B of the Paddy Land Act and sub-section (1) of Sec. 27B reads as follows:- “Any person aggrieved by an order of the Revenue Divisional Officer under sub-section (2) of Section 27A may prefer an appeal to the District Collector within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order.” 4. The crucial aspect to be noticed is that, nowhere in Sec.27B, there is an absolute prohibition for the District Collector to entertain the application beyond the period stipulated therein. The relevant words used in the said provision are, “Any person aggrieved …………. may prefer an appeal…………. within thirty days…….” . It is an enabling provision to file an appeal before the authority concerned within a specified period. The said provision does not contain any negative words prohibiting the authority concerned from entertaining the appeal after the period stipulated. The relevant words used in the said provision are, “Any person aggrieved …………. may prefer an appeal…………. within thirty days…….” . It is an enabling provision to file an appeal before the authority concerned within a specified period. The said provision does not contain any negative words prohibiting the authority concerned from entertaining the appeal after the period stipulated. When the statute does not provide for express prohibition, it is to be understood as permissible. This principle has been enunciated by the Court in Narsingh Das V. Mangal Dubey, ILR (1883) 5 All 163, Para 6 “Courts are not to act upon the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for by the Code, but on the converse principle that every procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by the law. As a matter of general principle prohibition cannot be presumed.” 5. The above view was followed by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Raj Narain Saxena v. Bhim Sen, AIR 1966 All 84 , and has been subsequently affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajendra Prasad Gupta v. Prakash Chandra Mishra (2011) 2 SCC 705 , where it was held that the provision has to be interpreted to mean that every procedure is permitted to the court for doing justice unless expressly prohibited, and not that every procedure is prohibited unless expressly permitted. 6. Thus, in the light of the above principles, the only conclusion possible is that, a reasonable opportunity has to be granted to the aggrieved parties to avail the next layer of the dispute redressal mechanism, in cases where, they could not invoke the remedies, due to reasons beyond their control or other valid reasons. 7. Of course, it is true that there is also no enabling provision in the Paddy Land Act for the appellate authority to accept the appeal after the period specified in subsection (2) of Section 27B. 7. Of course, it is true that there is also no enabling provision in the Paddy Land Act for the appellate authority to accept the appeal after the period specified in subsection (2) of Section 27B. However, I am of the view that, in such circumstances, in the absence of an absolute prohibition against entertaining the application by the District Collector beyond the period stipulated, necessary directions can be issued by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to enable the parties to avail the statutory remedy of appeal, who could not invoke the said remedy due to reasons beyond their control or due to any other valid reasons. Such directions are essential because, as far as the stipulations in the provisions of the Paddy Land Act are concerned, those restrict the rights of the owner of the property by confining the use of the property to certain limited purposes. Since the right to property is a Constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India, it must be ensured that no person is deprived of the said right save by the authority of law, as held by the Apex Court in Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1995 SC 142 , Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2020) 9 SCC 356 , State of Mysore v. K. Chandrasekhara Adiga, AIR 1976 SC 853 , Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 705 . 8. In Prabin Ram Phukan v. State of Assam, AIR 2015 SC 1252 , the following observations were made in para 27; “It is a settled principle of law that no person can be deprived of his property or any interest in the property save by authority of law. Article 300- A of the Constitution recognizes this constitutional right of a person, which was till 1978 recognized as the fundamental right of a citizen. Indeed whether fundamental or constitutional, the fact remains that it has always been recognized as a right guaranteed under the Constitution in favour of a citizen/person and hence no person cannot be deprived of this valuable right which the Constitution has given to him save by authority of law.” 9. Indeed whether fundamental or constitutional, the fact remains that it has always been recognized as a right guaranteed under the Constitution in favour of a citizen/person and hence no person cannot be deprived of this valuable right which the Constitution has given to him save by authority of law.” 9. Even if the right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and hence the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300A of the Constitution protects such rights. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed, as observed in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 , K. T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 , P. N. Padmamma and others v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy and others, (2008) 15 SCC 517 , Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State Of Maharashtra (2020) 9 SCC 356 . Hence, it is to be ensured that such curtailments in the form of restrictive use of one’s own property are made only to those properties which strictly come within the classes of properties (“paddy land” or “wetland” in the case of Paddy Land Act), to which such restrictions are intended to be imposed by the relevant statute. 10. Thus, every endeavour has to be taken to see that only those properties are dealt with under the provisions of the Act, which, on account of their inherent features and characteristics, deserve/liable to be included within the ambit of the Paddy Land Act. Therefore, all possible errors in making such a determination are to be ruled out by enabling the aggrieved party to avail of the multilayered dispute redressal mechanism contemplated under the Act. The denial of access to such mechanism on technical grounds, without providing a reasonable opportunity to get such grievances redressed on merits, should be avoided to the maximum extent possible. Hence, I am of the view that necessary directions are to be issued to the 1st respondent to provide the petitioner with an opportunity to highlight the reasons which prevented the petitioner from exercising his statutory rights, and those have to be considered by the said respondent. Hence, I am of the view that necessary directions are to be issued to the 1st respondent to provide the petitioner with an opportunity to highlight the reasons which prevented the petitioner from exercising his statutory rights, and those have to be considered by the said respondent. In such circumstances, the writ petition is disposed of, directing the petitioner to file an affidavit explaining the reasons for the delay in submitting the appeal before the 1st respondent. In case such an affidavit is submitted within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, the same shall be considered after hearing the petitioner and upon the 1st respondent finding the reasons satisfactory; the appeal shall be entertained. Necessary orders in this regard shall be passed on the question of delay within one month from the date of receipt of the affidavit as referred to above. If the 1st respondent is convinced of the reasons for the delay, the appeal shall be taken up, and orders shall be passed within three months from the date of admission of the appeal by complying with the principles of natural justice.