JUDGMENT : SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD , J 1. Since these matters are interlinked and, as such, both are heard together and being disposed of by a common order. 2. Both of these criminal revision petitions have been filed under Section397 and 401 of Cr.P.C. 3. Criminal Revision No. 1091 of 2012 is directed against the order dated 25.09.2012 passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI cum PMLA, Ranchi in in connection with ECIR/02/PAT/09/AD registered for the offence under section 3 and punishable under section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (in short PMLA, 2002) whereby and whereunder, the application filed by the petitioner seeking discharge has been rejected. 4. Criminal Revision No.1326 of 2018 is directed against the order dated 13.06.2018 in connection with ECIR/02/PAT/09/AD registered for the offence under section 4 of the PMLA, 2002 whereby and whereunder, the charge has been framed against the petitioners with respect to Supplementary Complaint. Factual Matrix: 5. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the instant petition which requires to be enumerated herein, read as under: (i) The Petitioner filed the Cr. Rev. 1091 of 2012 challenging the Order dated 25.09.2012 passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI cum PMLA at Ranchi in the petitioner's application for discharge filed under section 227 of the Cr. P. C. against the Complaint dated 06.10.2010 filed by the Opposite Party against the Petitioner under section 45 of the PMLA, 2002. (ii) The petitioners filed Cr. Rev. No.1326 of 2018 challenging the Order dated 13.06.2018 passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI cum PMLA at Ranchi whereby charges have been framed against the petitioners with respect to Supplementary Complaint. (iii) It needs to refer herein that the petitioner's (in Cr. Rev. No.1326 of 2018) application for discharge filed under section 227 of the Cr. P. C. against the Supplementary Complaint dated 14.02.2018 filed by the Opposite Party against the petitioners-Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamiya and his 2 companies Balaji Lifestyle Realtors Private Limited and Balaji Universal Tradelink Private Limited under section 45 of the PMLA, 2002 has been dismissed vide order dated 07.06.2018 and consequent to the aforesaid dismissal of the said discharge application charges have been framed against the petitioners. (iv) It is pleaded that an application under section 156(3) of the Code was filed in the Hon'ble Court of Vigilance Judge Cum Additional Judicial Commissioner Ranchi praying for taking cognizance of offence u/s 409, 420, 423, 424, 465, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code 1860 read with sections 7, 10, 11 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 against the accused persons and the petitioner was not amongst the accused named in the said complaint application; (v) It is pleaded that pursuant to the cognizance of the above complaint application, u/s 156(3) by the said learned Court, a F.I.R. came to be filed bearing number 09/09 dated 02.07.2009 against the accused persons. The petitioner was not amongst such accused persons; (vi) It is pleaded that pursuant to the above F.I.R. filed by the Vigilance Police the Enforcement Directorate proceeded to file a case bearing number ECIR/02/PAT/09/AD dated 08.10.2009 for investigation of money laundering from the proceeds, if any, arising out of the alleged offences under Indian Penal Code 1860 and Prevention Of Corruption Act 1988 registered in the above F.I.R. 09/09 dated 02.07.2009 and the same being listed as Scheduled Offences in Part B and Part C of the PMLA 2002. The said ECIR named 9 accused persons. The petitioner was not amongst the said accused persons; (vii) It is pleaded that the name of the Petitioner appeared in some records of one of the accused mentioned in the ECIR based on which the Enforcement Directorate through/with the Income Tax Department raided the premises of the Petitioner and based on the presence of the name of the Petitioner in some records of one of the accused mentioned in the ECIR made out a case that the Petitioner was liable for prosecution for the offence of money laundering under the provisions of the PMLA 2002; (viii) It is pleaded that the Enforcement Directorate regularly carried out investigations with the Petitioner from the period October 2009 to August 2010 including personal appearance before the Enforcement Directorate, recording of statements, submission of various records etc. The Petitioner rendered full co-operation to the Enforcement Directorate and the Petitioner was arrested on 11.08.2010; (ix) It is pleaded that thereafter on 06.10.2010 the Enforcement Directorate filed a Complaint in respect of the Petitioner u/s 45 of the PMLA 2002 bearing number ECIR/02/PAT/09/AD (Suppl.) dated 06.10.2010. The Petitioner rendered full co-operation to the Enforcement Directorate and the Petitioner was arrested on 11.08.2010; (ix) It is pleaded that thereafter on 06.10.2010 the Enforcement Directorate filed a Complaint in respect of the Petitioner u/s 45 of the PMLA 2002 bearing number ECIR/02/PAT/09/AD (Suppl.) dated 06.10.2010. At such time the Enforcement Directorate held that, further investigation in the case was continuing. (x) The Petitioner has not been charged with any Scheduled Offences and has been charged with the allegation of offence u/s 3 of PMLA 2002 and which in the event of conviction is punishable u/s 4 of the said Act. (xi) It is pleaded that the petitioner was sent to S.L. Raheja Hospital, Mumbai for better treatment for nuero surgical complications under custody as per the orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in Cr.M.P.No.21278 of 2011 in Writ petition (Crl.) No.82 of 2011. (xii) Thereafter, an amalgamation petition filed by the Enforcement Directorate on 09.02.2012 before the Court of 1st Addl. Judicial Commissioner which was disposed of by the above-said Court on12.04.2012. (xiii) It is pleaded that the petitioner has been admitted to bail vide Order dated 31.08.2012 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. (xiv) Thereafter the Petitioner filed a detailed application for discharge u/s 227 of the Code which has been dismissed on 25.09.2012. 6. Being aggrieved with the order dated 25.09.2012, the revision application being Cr. Revision 1091 of 2012 has been filed for revision of the impugned order dated 25.09.2012. 7. It requires to refer herein that during pendency of the said Criminal Revision (Cr. Revision 1091 of 2012) supplementary complaint dated 14.2.2018 was filed against the Petitioner Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia along with the company M/s Balaji Life Style Retailers Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Balaji Universal Trade Links Pvt. Ltd. for the offence U/s 4 of Money Laundering Act where at para 10.1, 10.8 and 11.1 total Rs.138.18 crore shown as proceeds of crime. 8. Accordingly discharge application against the supplementary complaint has been filed by the petitioners on the ground that the supplementary complaint was filed by the complainant after eight years after arrest of Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia on 11.8.10 and six years after the accused was granted bail by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 31.8.12. 8. Accordingly discharge application against the supplementary complaint has been filed by the petitioners on the ground that the supplementary complaint was filed by the complainant after eight years after arrest of Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia on 11.8.10 and six years after the accused was granted bail by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 31.8.12. Further ground has been taken that the investigation is complete and the SAID supplementary complaint has been filed six years after framing of charge on 25.9.12 and commencement of trial. 9. The respondent ED has taken the ground that there is no bar in filing of supplementary complaint and the materials collected therein are sufficient to show that there is a new facts and grounds disclosed during the further investigation against the above said petitioners and since the matter was under investigation against the accused M/s Balaji Life Style Pvt. Ltd. as well as against M/s Balaji Universal Trade Links Pvt. Ltd., the same could not be brought earlier. 10. The learned special Judge PML Act Ranchi, after perusing the evidence has dismissed the said discharge application vide order dated 07.06.2018 and consequent to dismissal of the said application charges have been framed against the petitioners vide order dated 13.06.2018 under Section3 of PML Act 2002 punishable under Section 4 of the PML Act 2002. 11. Being aggrieved with the order dated 13.06.2018 the revision application being Cr. Revision 1326 of 2018 has been filed for revision of the impugned order dated 13.06.2018. 12. It needs to mention herein that the petitioner has earlier moved before this Hon'ble Court for quashing of warrant of arrest issued by the learned Trial Court in for writ petition vide W.P. (Cr.) No.10/2010 and the said application was dismissed vide order dated 3.2.2010 by the learned Single Judge of this Court. 13. Thereafter, the petitioner has moved against the order dated 03.02.2010 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India vide S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 1779/2010 and the said SLP was directed to be withdrawn with liberty to move an application for regular bail before the appropriate Court. 14. 13. Thereafter, the petitioner has moved against the order dated 03.02.2010 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India vide S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 1779/2010 and the said SLP was directed to be withdrawn with liberty to move an application for regular bail before the appropriate Court. 14. Thereafter, the petitioner has moved for grant of regular bail before learned 1 st A.J.C. Cum Special Judge under PMLA and the same has been rejected vide the order dated 06.10.2010 and accordingly, the petitioner has moved before this Hon'ble Court for grant of the Regular Bail on 03.12.2010 in the said case ECIR/02/PAT/09 vide Bail Application No.9104 of 2010 and it was finally withdrawn on05.05.2011 by the petitioner. 15. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed a bail application No. 8919 of 2012 and this Hon'ble High Court vide its Order dated 13.02.2012 has rejected the prayer of the petitioner for the grant of the regular bail and thereafter the SLP (Crl) no. 1963/2012 with prayer for bail and the same has been dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide its Order dated 19.03.2012 since investigation is pending. 16. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed a writ petition being W.P. (Crl) 54 of 2012 for stay of proceeding on trial under PMLA before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the same is withdrawn vide its Order dtd 09.07.2012. Thereafter petitioner has filed a bail application being B.A. No. 3565 of 2012 and this Hon'ble High Court vide its Order dtd 19.05.2012 has rejected the prayer of the petitioner and thereafter the petitioner moved SLP (Crl) no 4516 of 2012 with prayer for grant of regular bail before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the said prayer is allowed and the petitioner is enlarged on regular bail. 17. These revision applications have been preferred against the impugned orders dated 25.09.2012 and 13.06.2018. Submission on behalf of the learned counsel for the Petitioner: 18. Mr. 17. These revision applications have been preferred against the impugned orders dated 25.09.2012 and 13.06.2018. Submission on behalf of the learned counsel for the Petitioner: 18. Mr. Krishna Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned order: (i) The ground has been taken that the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court is completely illegal and perverse in the eyes of law being non-application of judicial mind, hence, unsustainable in the eyes of law; (ii) The ground has also been taken that the impugned findings and order of the learned trial court suffer from an error of law and manifestly wrong and are grossly unjust, as such, the same deserves to be set aside. (iii) By referring of the order dated 25.09.2012 it has been submitted that the learned trial Court summarily rejected the Discharge Application without recording submission of either the petitioner or the Enforcement Directorate and without any hearing at all on the merits of the Discharge Application. (iv) It has been contended that the framing of charges is a procedure of criminal law but subject to appropriate and reasoned disposal of any discharge pending prior to it with recording of proper submissions and meritorious hearing. (v) It has been contended that framing of the charges on the same i.e. on 25.09.20212, and the rejection of the discharge application on that very day without any opportunity to know the reasons for the rejection of the Discharge Application is untenable in the eyes of law. (vi) It has been that after seven years of filing of the supplementary complaint dated 6.10.10 against Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia and after six years an amalgamation order dated 9.2.12 where the investigation against the accused/revisionist Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia was completed and charges be framed, the supplementary complaint has been filed after lapse of six years when the amalgamation application was positively adjudicated vide order dated 12.4.12. (vii) It has been contended that petitioners never received or handled with the proceeds of crime directly or indirectly relating to the schedule offence and, therefore, it is not possible to sustain the supplementary complaint alleging proceeds of crime to the tune of Rs. 138 crores. (vii) It has been contended that petitioners never received or handled with the proceeds of crime directly or indirectly relating to the schedule offence and, therefore, it is not possible to sustain the supplementary complaint alleging proceeds of crime to the tune of Rs. 138 crores. (viii) Further the properties prayed for confiscation in the supplementary complaint have been acquired by M/s Balaji Life Style Retailers Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Balaji Universal Trade Links Pvt. Ltd. from legitimate sources and details of each and every account has been submitted thereof in appeal pending before the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal. (ix) It has been contended that the impugned orders are entirely incorrect and illegal as it is contrary to the express provisions of sections 227 and 228 of the Code as also provisions of PMLA, 2002, which mandate the compliance of provisions and procedures set out in the Code; (x) It has been contended that the learned Court is compounding its illegality of first summarily rejecting the Discharge Application without submissions of the Enforcement Directorate and any hearing by proceeding to frame charges of laundering where charges have not framed and trial not determining the generation and existence of proceeds of crime that are being charged to have been laundered; (xi) It has been contended that the Impugned Orders are therefore vitiated and in contravention to all necessary provisions of law, procedures laid down by law, well settled principles of law and principles of natural justice; (xii) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that none of the alleged offences has been made out against the petitioner. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is, therefore, a fit case where the impugned order needs to be interfered with. Submission on behalf of the learned counsel for the Respondent-State: 20. Per contra, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the Opposite Party-ED, has taken the following grounds in defending the order impugned: (i) It has been contended that sufficient material has been surfaced in course of investigation to the effect that the involvement of the petitioners in the commission of alleged crime is there as would be evident from the record. (ii) There is enough material on record to frame charge against the petitioner and accordingly the petition for discharge has been rightly rejected. (ii) There is enough material on record to frame charge against the petitioner and accordingly the petition for discharge has been rightly rejected. Further, there is no illegality or perversity or material irregularity in the impugned orders calling for any interference in revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The learned trial Court has passed a well-reasoned order refusing to discharge the petitioner. (iii) It has been contended that the present petition is not maintainable as Directorate of Enforcement has filed Prosecution Complaint and several Supplementary Prosecution Complaint in the matter elaborating the close nexus of Manoj Babulal Punamia, Arvind Vyas, Anil Bastawade with Binod Sinha and Madhu Koda. Various steps of Money Laundering and involvement of various persons like Manoj Babulal Punamia, Arvind Vyas, Anil Bastawade, Vijay Joshi at various steps of laundering of corrupt money earned by Madhu Koda by misusing his position. Properties involved in Proceeds of Crime were identified and attached as per PML Act, 2002. Prosecution was launched in Trial Court and always at the time of filing Prosecution Complaint or Supplementary Prosecution Complaint, the Prosecution craved leave to file Supplementary Prosecution Complaint. (iv) It has been contended that there is a clear nexus of Madhu Koda with Manoj Babulal Punamia present revisionist through Binod Kumar Sinha. Supplementary Prosecution Complaint has been filed against Manoj Babulal Punamia by the Directorate of Enforcement on 14.02.2018, clearly reveals the documentary evidences linking Shri Manoj Babulal Punamia with Shri Binod Kumar Sinha and other associates of Shri Madhu Koda. (v) The said Supplementary Prosecution Complaint also reveals the relationship of Madhu Koda with Shri Manoj Babulal Punamia and M/s Balaji Group Companies wherein the ill- gotten money of Madhu Koda was parked. Income tax details, shareholding patterns, inter-related transactions clearly show this relation and process of money laundering. Statements of Arvind Vyas, Binod Kumar Sinha, Anil Bastawade confirms the transactions made in the process of hiding the tainted money (Proceeds of Crime) and further projecting it as untainted. (vi) It has further been contended the record of the case reveals that earlier a complaint was filed against the accused Manoj Babulal Punamia for the same offence of money laundering. Pending the further investigation and cognizance was taking on the same day against Manoj Babulal Punamia, under section 4 of PML Act and trial was proceeded jointly against seven accused persons. Pending the further investigation and cognizance was taking on the same day against Manoj Babulal Punamia, under section 4 of PML Act and trial was proceeded jointly against seven accused persons. In view of the fact that cognizance was earlier taken against Manoj Babulal Punamia for the same offence in the case as such, fresh cognizance is not required, keep this supplementary complaint as a part of earlier complaint in this case. (vii) It has been contended that it is wrongly interpreted by the petitioner that Directorate of Enforcement will have to confine itself up to the quantum of Proceeds of Crime mentioned by the agency investigating the scheduled offence. It is to mention here that CBI has no purview over money laundering and is responsible to investigate the criminality only. Even in the submission made by Investigating Officer of CBI in the case, the term 'Proceeds of Crime' is not used rather the term illegal acquiring has been used. On the other hand, Directorate of Enforcement has given responsibility to investigate the Proceeds of Crime generated through scheduled criminal activity, under Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. (viii) It has been contended that Directorate of Enforcement not only deals with money directly generated from criminal activities but also looks into the various steps of money laundering where illegal money is routed through various channels and after going through various points, it is projected as untainted. (ix) It has been contended that during the investigation, it was found that illegally acquired money of Madhu Koda through its partner went through many inter-related transactions, was used in acquiring many companies, was used in purchase and sale of shares of various companies, and documentary evidences as well as statements of various persons clearly shows that Proceeds of Crime laundered by Manoj Babulal Punamia with the help of Binod Sinha and other associates of Madhu Koda to the tune of Rs. 138.18 Crore. (x) It has been contended that so far as sections 23 and 24 of PMLA are concerned, these sections put the onus on petitioner to prove that proceed of crime is not involved in money-laundering. Any inter-connected transaction relating to proceeds of crime will be considered as money-laundering. 138.18 Crore. (x) It has been contended that so far as sections 23 and 24 of PMLA are concerned, these sections put the onus on petitioner to prove that proceed of crime is not involved in money-laundering. Any inter-connected transaction relating to proceeds of crime will be considered as money-laundering. The Special Court had issued summon to petitioner after taking cognizance of the supplementary complaint filed by the Directorate of Enforcement and accorded an opportunity to the petitioner to be heard and to show if proceeds of crime possessed by the petitioner at the time of the attachment were not involved in money-laundering. (xi) It has been contended that it is evident from the abovementioned fact that Directorate of Enforcement is not confined only to the amount of illegal acquiring by any criminal activity of scheduled offence, as revealed by investigation of CBI or any other agency, rather, the Directorate of Enforcement investigate the money laundering and whole Proceeds of Crime generated through any scheduled criminal activity directly or indirectly. 21. Learned counsel for the Opposite Party-ED, on the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is, therefore, not a fit case where the impugned orders to be interfered with. Analysis: 22. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and has also gone through the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in the impugned order as also the case diary. 23. It is evident that pursuant to a PIL filed in this Court bearing W.P. No. 4700/2008 the Court directed the investigation to be conducted against various persons by Income Tax authority, Enforcement Directorate and CBI. Pursuant to that Enforcement Directorate has lodged the present case numbered as ECIR/02/Pat/09/AD and after investigation Enforcement Directorate has submitted several complaints against the petitioner Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia and other co-accused persons on different dates. 24. It was alleged through these complaint petitions that Madhu Kora, the then Chief Minister of Jharkhand State along with other co-accused have amassed huge wealth disproportionate to their known sources of income by abusing their official position and also through corrupt and illegal means. Madhu Kora and his close associates Binod Sinha, Sunil Kumar Sinha, Vikash Sinha, Sanjay Choudhary and Dhananjay Choudhary, some others were named as associates of Madhu Kora in the alleged criminal acts. Madhu Kora and his close associates Binod Sinha, Sunil Kumar Sinha, Vikash Sinha, Sanjay Choudhary and Dhananjay Choudhary, some others were named as associates of Madhu Kora in the alleged criminal acts. Through those complaint petitions it was stated that in conspiracy with each other huge investments by the aforesaid accused persons have been done in different business streams like real estate, mining, steel and power which are spread over in India and also abroad like Dubai, Thailand, Indonesia etc. 25. It was alleged that Camtech Manufacturing Co., Dubai was related with M/s KGN of Dubai and papers related to coal mines investment in Indonesia was seized by the I.T. authorities at the residence of Arvind Vyas on 31.10.09 which was allegedly brought by Arvind Vyas for Manoj Punamia. The seized papers showed the payment of Rs. 25 crores out of the total cost of US 60 million dollars and that Anil Adinath Bastawade had sent those papers from Dubai for Babulal Punamia. 26. It was also alleged that Camptech Manufacturing Co. was a company registered at Dubai and shares of the company were held by Sanjay Chudhary, Dhananjay Choudhary, Anil Adinath Bastawade, Manoj Punamia and one local person of Dubai. It was further alleged that the petitioners were managing the illegal money of Binod Sinha in Jumerra village Down Town Jabel Ali Project, Dubai and handled Binod Sinha’s fund in coal mines in Indonesia. 27. Further on perusal of the record reveals that vide court order dated 25.9.12 the discharge application filed by the petitioner was dismissed and accordingly charges were framed. Thereafter on 14.02.2018 supplementary prosecution complaint has been filed against the petitioners and against the aforesaid complaint the discharge application has been filed by the petitioners which has been dismissed on 07.06.2013 and consequent to dismissal of the said application vide order dated 13.06.2018 the charge has been framed against the petitioners. 28. the aforesaid orders dated 25.09.2012 and 13.06.2018 is impugned herein. 29. In the background of the factual aspect stated hereinabove, the issues which require consideration are— (i) Whether the orders dated 25.09.2012 and 13.06.2018 by which the application for discharge filed by the petitioner has been dismissed and charges have been framed respectively, can be said to suffer from an error? 29. In the background of the factual aspect stated hereinabove, the issues which require consideration are— (i) Whether the orders dated 25.09.2012 and 13.06.2018 by which the application for discharge filed by the petitioner has been dismissed and charges have been framed respectively, can be said to suffer from an error? (ii) Whether on the basis of the evidence which has been collected in course of investigation, prima facie case against the petitioner and his company is made out or not? 30. Since both the issues are interlinked as such, they are taken up together. 31. This Court, before appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the parties deems it fit and proper to discuss herein some of the provisions of law as contained under the Act, 2002 with its object and intent. 32. The Act 2002 was enacted to address the urgent need to have a comprehensive legislation inter alia for preventing money-laundering, attachment of proceeds of crime, adjudication and confiscation thereof including vesting of it in the Central Government, setting up of agencies and mechanisms for coordinating measures for combating money- laundering and also to prosecute the persons indulging in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime. 33. It is, thus, evident that Act 2002 was enacted in order to answer the urgent requirement to have a comprehensive legislation inter alia for preventing money-laundering, attachment of proceeds of crime, adjudication and confiscation thereof for combating money-laundering and also to prosecute the persons indulging in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime. 34. It needs to refer herein the definition of “proceeds of crime” as provided under Section 2 (1)(u) of the Act, 2002 which reads as under: “2 (1) (u) “ proceeds of crime ” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property 3[or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country] 4[or abroad]; [Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that "proceeds of crime" include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence;]” 35. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad. 36. In the explanation it has been referred that for removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that "proceeds of crime" include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. The aforesaid explanation has been inserted in the statute book by way of Act 23 of 2019. 37. It is, thus, evident that the reason for giving explanation under Section 2 (1)(u) is by way of clarification to the effect that whether as per the substantive provision of Section 2 (1)(u), the property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country but by way of explanation the proceeds of crime has been given broader implication by including property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. 38. The “property” has been defined under Section 2 (1)(v) which means any property or assets of every description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible and includes deeds and instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such property or assets, wherever located. 39. The schedule has been defined under Section 2 (1)(x) which means schedule to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. 39. The schedule has been defined under Section 2 (1)(x) which means schedule to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The “scheduled offence” has been defined under Section 2 (1)(y) which reads as under: “2(y) “scheduled offence” means— (i) the offences specified under Part A of the Schedule; or (ii) the offences specified under Part B of the Schedule if the total value involved in such offences is [one crore rupees] or more; or (iii) the offences specified under Part C of the Schedule.” 40.It is evident that the “scheduled offence” means the offences specified under Part A of the Schedule; or the offences specified under Part B of the Schedule if the total value involved in such offences is [one crore rupees] or more; or the offences specified under Part C of the Schedule. 41.The offence of money laundering has been defined under Section 3 of the Act, 2002 which reads as under: “3. Offence of money-laundering .—Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the [proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming] it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering. [Explanation.— For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that,— (i) a person shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering if such person is found to have directly or indirectly attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in one or more of the following processes or activities connected with proceeds of crime, namely:— (a) concealment; or (b) possession; or (c) acquisition; or (d) use; or (e) projecting as untainted property; or (f) claiming as untainted property, in any manner whatsoever; (ii) the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever.]” 42. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that “offence of money-laundering” means whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering. 43. It is further evident that the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever. 44. The punishment for money laundering has been provided under Section 4 of the Act, 2002. 45. The various provisions of the Act, 2002 alongwith interpretation of the definition of “ proceeds of crime ” has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. , (2022) SCC OnLine SC 929 wherein the Bench comprising of three Hon’ble Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has decided the issue by taking into consideration the object and intent of the Act, 2002. 46. It is evident that the purposes and objects of the 2002 Act for which it has been enacted, is not limited to punishment for offence of money- laundering, but also to provide measures for prevention of money- laundering. It is also to provide for attachment of proceeds of crime, which are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceeding relating to confiscation of such proceeds under the 2002 Act. This Act is also to compel the banking companies, financial institutions and intermediaries to maintain records of the transactions, to furnish information of such transactions within the prescribed time in terms of Chapter IV of the 2002 Act. 47. This Act is also to compel the banking companies, financial institutions and intermediaries to maintain records of the transactions, to furnish information of such transactions within the prescribed time in terms of Chapter IV of the 2002 Act. 47. The predicate offence has been considered in the aforesaid judgment wherein by taking into consideration the explanation as inserted by way of Act 23 of 2019 under the definition of the “proceeds of crime” as contained under Section 2 (1)(u), whereby and whereunder, it has been clarified for the purpose of removal of doubts that, the "proceeds of crime" include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence, meaning thereby, the words “any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence” will come under the fold of the proceeds of crime. 48. In the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) as under paragraph 284, it has been held that the Authority under the 2002 Act, is to prosecute a person for offence of money-laundering only if it has reason to believe, which is required to be recorded in writing that the person is in possession of “proceeds of crime”. Only if that belief is further supported by tangible and credible evidence indicative of involvement of the person concerned in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, action under the Act can be taken forward for attachment and confiscation of proceeds of crime and until vesting thereof in the Central Government, such process initiated would be a standalone process. 49. Now, after having discussed the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court on the issue of various provisions of the Act, 2002, this Court, is proceeding to discuss the principle of discharge and framing of charge. 50. Now, after having discussed the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court on the issue of various provisions of the Act, 2002, this Court, is proceeding to discuss the principle of discharge. 51. 50. Now, after having discussed the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court on the issue of various provisions of the Act, 2002, this Court, is proceeding to discuss the principle of discharge. 51. It is well settled that at the time of framing of charge meticulous examination of evidence is not required, however the evidence can be sifted or weighed at least for the purpose of recording a satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out for framing charge to proceed in the case. Further the trial Court is not required to discuss the evidence for the purpose of conducting a trial but the discussion of the materials on record is required to reflect the application of judicial mind for finding that a prima-facie case is made out against the petitioner. 52. It is settled connotation of law that at the stage of framing of charge, the probable defence of the accused is not to be considered and the materials, which are relevant for consideration, are the allegations made in the First Information Report/complaint, the statement of the witnesses recorded in course of investigation, the documents on which the prosecution relies and the report of investigation submitted by the prosecuting agency. The probative value of the defence is to be tested at the stage of trial and not at the stage of framing of charge and at the stage of framing of charge minute scrutiny of the evidence is not to be made and even on a very strong suspicion charges can be framed. 53. Further it is settled position of law that at the stage of framing the charge, the trial Court is not required to meticulously examine and marshal the material available on record as to whether there is sufficient material against the accused which would ultimately result in conviction. The Court is prima facie required to consider whether there is sufficient material against the accused to presume the commission of the offence. Even strong suspicion about commission of offence is sufficient for framing the charge, the guilt or innocence of the accused has to be determined at the time of conclusion of the trial after evidence is adduced and not at the stage of framing the charge and, therefore, at the stage of framing the charge, the Court is not required to undertake an elaborate inquiry for the purpose of sifting and weighing the material. 54. The issue of discharge was the subject matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamilnadu, by Inspector of Police in Vigilance and Anti-Corruption v. N. Suresh Rajan , (2014) 11 SCC 709 , wherein at paragraphs no. 29, 32.4, 33 and 34 the Hon'ble Apex Court has been observed as under:— “29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr. Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage. 32.4. While passing the impugned orders [N. Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 528 22 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)], [State v. K. Ponmudi, (2007) 1 Mad LJ (Cri) 100], the court has not sifted the materials for the purpose of finding out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused but whether that would warrant a conviction. We are of the opinion that this was not the stage where the court should have appraised the evidence and discharged the accused as if it was passing an order of acquittal. Further, defect in investigation itself cannot be a ground for discharge. In our opinion, the order impugned [N. Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 528 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)] suffers from grave error and calls for rectification. 33. Any observation made by us in this judgment is for the purpose of disposal of these appeals and shall have no bearing on the trial. The surviving respondents are directed to appear before the respective courts on 3-2-2014. The Court shall proceed with the trial from the stage of charge in accordance with law and make endeavour to dispose of the same expeditiously. 34. In the result, we allow these appeals and set aside the order of discharge with the aforesaid observations. 55. It has been further held in the case of Asim Shariff v. National Investigation Agency , (2019) 7 SCC 148 , that mini trial is not expected by the trial court for the purpose of marshalling the evidence on record at the time of framing of charge. It has been held at paragraph no. 18 of the said judgment as under:— “18. Taking note of the exposition of law on the subject laid down by this Court, it is settled that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 CrPC in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are possible and one of them giving rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion against the accused, the trial Judge will be justified in discharging him. It is thus clear that while examining the discharge application filed under Section 227 CrPC, it is expected from the trial Judge to exercise its judicial mind to determine as to whether a case for trial has been made out or not. It is true that in such proceedings, the court is not supposed to hold a mini trial by marshalling the evidence on record.” 56. It is further settled position of law that defence on merit is not to be considered at the time of stage of framing of charge and that cannot be a ground of discharge. A reference may be made to the judgment as rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap , (2021) 11 SCC 191 . For ready reference Paragraph no.11 of the said judgment are quoted below:— “11. While considering the legality of the impugned judgment [Ashok Kumar Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 3468] and order passed by the High Court, the law on the subject and few decisions of this Court are required to be referred to. 11.1. In P. Vijayan [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488], this Court had an occasion to consider Section 2 27 CrPC What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 2 27 , the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 2 28 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 2 28 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11.2. In the recent decision of this Court in M.R. Hiremath [State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 109 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 380], one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under : (SCC p. 526) “25. The High Court [M.R. Hiremath v. State, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4970] ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 2 39 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721], adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held : (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29) ‘29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. 721-22, para 29) ‘29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.’” 57. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further dealt with the proper basis for framing of charge in the case of Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of Delhi) wherein at paragraphs 11, 12 and 14 it has been held as under: “11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. 12. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [ (1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404], a three-Judge Bench of this Court had observed that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [ (1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404], a three-Judge Bench of this Court had observed that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As framing of charge affects a person's liberty substantially, need for proper consideration of material warranting such order was emphasised. 14. In a later decision in State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni [ (2000) 6 SCC 338 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1110] this Court, referring to several previous decisions held that : (SCC p. 342, para 7) “7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.” 58. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Palwinder Singh v. Balvinder Singh , (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 850 has been pleased to hold that charges can also be framed on the basis of strong suspicion. Marshaling and appreciation of the evidence is not in the domain of the court at that point of time. 59. Further it is pertinent to mention here that power to discharge an accused was designed to prevent harassment to an innocent person by the arduous trial or the ordeal of prosecution. How that intention is to be achieved is reasonably clear in the section itself. The power has been entrusted to the Sessions Judge who brings to bear his knowledge and experience in criminal trials. Besides, he has the assistance of counsel for the accused and Public Prosecutor. He is required to hear both sides before framing any charge against the accused or for discharging him. If the Sessions Judge after hearing the parties frames a charge and also makes an order in support thereof, the law must be allowed to take its own course. Self- restraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule unless there is a glaring injustice which stares the court in the face. The opinion on any matter may differ depending upon the person who views it. Self- restraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule unless there is a glaring injustice which stares the court in the face. The opinion on any matter may differ depending upon the person who views it. There may be as many opinions on a particular matter as there are courts but it is no ground for the High Court to interdict the trial. It would be better for the High Court to allow the trial to proceed. Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment as rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia , (1989) 1 SCC 715. 60. Further, the difference between the approach with which the Court should examine the matter in the discharge has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander , (2012) 9 SCC 460 , in the following words: “17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the “record of the case” and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the Section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code. 30. We have already noticed that the legislature in its wisdom has used the expression “there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence”. This has an inbuilt element of presumption once the ingredients of an offence with reference to the allegations made are satisfied, the Court would not doubt the case of the prosecution unduly and extend its jurisdiction to quash the charge in haste. A Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659 referred to the meaning of the word “presume” while relying upon Black's Law Dictionary. It was defined to mean “to believe or accept upon probable evidence”; “to take as proved until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming”. In other words, the truth of the matter has to come out when the prosecution evidence is led, the witnesses are cross-examined by the defence, the incriminating material and evidence is put to the accused in terms of Section 313 of the Code and then the accused is provided an opportunity to lead defence, if any. It is only upon completion of such steps that the trial concludes with the court forming its final opinion and delivering its judgment. Merely because there was a civil transaction between the parties would not by itself alter the status of the allegations constituting the criminal offence. 61. Thus, it is evident that the law regarding the approach to be adopted by the Court while considering an application for discharge of the accused person the Court has to form a definite opinion, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. However, while framing charges, the Court is not required to form a definite opinion that the accused is guilty of committing an offence. However, while framing charges, the Court is not required to form a definite opinion that the accused is guilty of committing an offence. The truth of the matter will come out when evidence is led during the trial. Once the facts and ingredients of the Section exist, the court would presume that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly and the Court would not doubt the case of the prosecution. 62. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Sajjan Kumar v. CBI , reported in (2010) 9 SCC 368 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the scope of Sections 227 and 228 CrPC. The principles which emerged therefrom have been taken note of in para21 as under: “21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.” 63. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of M.E. Shivalingamurthy v. CBI , reported in (2020) 2 SCC 768 , the above principles have been reiterated in para 17, 18, 28 to 31 and the Hon'ble supreme court has explained as to how the matters of grave suspicion are to be dealt with. The aforesaid paragraphs of the report are quoted as under: “17. This is an area covered by a large body of case law. We refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the earlier decisions viz. P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and discern the following principles: 17.1. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused. 17.2. The trial Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution. 17.3. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused. 17.2. The trial Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution. 17.3. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court. 17.4. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, “cannot show that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial”. 17.5. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion. 17.6. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons. 17.7. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true. 17.8. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused. 18. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged under Section 227 CrPC (see State of J&K v. Sudershan Chakkar). The expression, “the record of the case”, used in Section 227 CrPC, is to be understood as the documents and the articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. At the stage of framing of the charge, the submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the police (see State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi). 28. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. At the stage of framing of the charge, the submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the police (see State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi). 28. It is here that again it becomes necessary that we remind ourselves of the contours of the jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC. The principle established is to take the materials produced by the prosecution, both in the form of oral statements and also documentary material, and act upon it without it been subjected to questioning through cross-examination and everything assumed in favour of the prosecution, if a scenario emerges where no offence, as alleged, is made out against the accused, it, undoubtedly, would ensure to the benefit of the accused warranting the trial court to discharge the accused. 29. It is not open to the accused to rely on the material by way of defence and persuade the court to discharge him. 30. However, what is the meaning of the expression “materials on the basis of which grave suspicion is aroused in the mind of the court's”, which is not explained away? Can the accused explain away the material only with reference to the materials produced by the prosecution? Can the accused rely upon material which he chooses to produce at the stage? 31. In view of the decisions of this Court that the accused can only rely on the materials which are produced by the prosecution, it must be understood that the grave suspicion, if it is established on the materials, should be explained away only in terms of the materials made available by the prosecution. No doubt, the accused may appeal to the broad probabilities to the case to persuade the court to discharge him.” 64. In the case of Asim Shariff v. NIA, (supra) , it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the words ‘not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’ clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227 , the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex-facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. 65. Recently, the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohd. Maqbool Magrey , (2022) 12 SCC 657 has elaborately discussed the issue of framing of charge and has held in paragraph 27 which reads as under: “ 27. Thus from the aforesaid, it is evident that the trial court is enjoined with the duty to apply its mind at the time of framing of charge 14 and should not act as a mere post office. The endorsement on the charge-sheet presented by the police as it is without applying its mind and without recording brief reasons in support of its opinion is not countenanced by law. However, the material which is required to be evaluated by the court at the time of framing charge should be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting of such material is not to be so meticulous as would render the exercise a mini trial to find out the guilt or otherwise of the accused. All that is required at this stage is that the court must be satisfied that the evidence collected by the prosecution is sufficient to presume that the accused has committed an offence. Even a strong suspicion would suffice. Undoubtedly, apart from the material that is placed before the court by the prosecution in the shape of final report in terms of Section 173 CrPC, the court may also rely upon any other evidence or material which is of sterling quality and has direct bearing on the charge laid before it by the prosecution.” 66. Undoubtedly, apart from the material that is placed before the court by the prosecution in the shape of final report in terms of Section 173 CrPC, the court may also rely upon any other evidence or material which is of sterling quality and has direct bearing on the charge laid before it by the prosecution.” 66. Thus, from aforesaid legal propositions it can be safely inferred that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so and if, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the trial Court shall frame the charge. 67. Therefore, the stage of discharge is a stage prior to framing of the charge and once the Court rejects the discharge application, it would proceed for framing of charge. At the stage of discharge, the Judge has merely to sift and weigh the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame the charge against him and after that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge and, if not, he will discharge the accused. 68. While exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 69. 69. It is considered view that at this stage of the instant case, the Court was only required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not because at the stage of framing of the charge and / or considering the discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible. 70. In the backdrop of aforesaid case laws and judicial deduction, this Court is now proceeding to examine the fact so as to come to the conclusion as to whether the evidence which has been collected in course of investigation and has been brought on record, as would be available in the impugned order prima facie case against the petitioner is made out or not? 71. It is evident from record that present petitioner is an accused in connection with ECIR/02/PAT/09/AD registered for the offence under sections 3 and punishable under section 4 of the PMLA, 2002. The petitioner has preferred the discharge application under Section 227 of Cr. P.C. but the same has been dismissed vide order dated 25.09.2012 by the court concerned by taking into consideration the entire material available on record. 72. The learned counsel for the petitioner has emphatically contended that while rejecting the discharge application, rule of natural Justice has not been adhered by the Spl. Judge PML Act, therefore the order dated 25.09.2012 is not sustainable in the eye of law. 73. This Court in order to appreciate the aforesaid contention has gone through the order dated 25.09.2012 by which the application for discharge of the petitioner has been rejected. 74. It is evident from the aforesaid order that the case was fixed for charge on 13.10.11 and therefore ample time was available to the accused persons including the revisionist for filing or for taking any step but the petitioner/revisionist did not file application for discharge, thereafter on 13.9.12 i.e. almost after one year, it had been ordered by the Court concerned that every petition filed for discharge shall be deemed to be rejected. Accordingly, the Spl. Judge PML Act while taking into entire material available on record has dismissed the said discharge application on the ground of delaying tactics which had been adopted by the petitioner. 75. Accordingly, the Spl. Judge PML Act while taking into entire material available on record has dismissed the said discharge application on the ground of delaying tactics which had been adopted by the petitioner. 75. Thus, from the aforesaid order it is evident that the contention of learned counsel that rule of natural justice has not been followed is not correct since the accused/revisionist himself had not filed the discharge application and consumed time in order to delay the trial. 76. Now this Court in the backdrop of the settled position of law which has already been discussed hereinabove is adverting to order dated 13.06.2018 by which charges has been framed against the petitioner along with the companies namely M/s Balaji Life Style Retailers Pvt. Ltd. And M/s Balaji Universal Trade Links Pvt. Ltd. through its representative accused Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia. 77. But before coming to the order dated 13.06.2018 it needs to refer herein that on the basis of supplementary prosecution complaint dated 14.02.2018 charges have been reframed against the petitioner. The relevant paragraph of the order of re-framing of charge based upon the said supplementary prosecution complaint has been quoted in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent ED, for ready reference the same is being quoted as under: "Perused the case along with Supplementary Complaint and documents produced by the Prosecution, it appears that the accused Manoj Babulal Punamia has committed prima-facie offence under section 3 read section 4 of PMLA, 2002 by using his companies/firms cited accused no. 2 and 3 for disguising the Proceeds of Crime to the tune of Rs. 138.18 Crore and dealt with an investment. Further the record of the case reveals that earlier was a complaint was filed against the accused Manoj BabulalPunamia for the same offence of money laundering to the tune of Rs. 58.69 Crore. Pending the further investigation and cognizance was taking on the same day against Manoj Babulal Punamia, under section 4 of PML Act and trial proceeded jointly against seven accused persons. In view of the fact that cognizance was earlier taken against Manoj Babulal Punamia for the same offence in the case as such, fresh cognizance is not required, keep this supplementary complaint as a part of earlier complaint in this case..... 78. Thereafter discharge application has been filed by the petitioners which has been dismissed vide order dated 07.06.2013 by the Spl. 78. Thereafter discharge application has been filed by the petitioners which has been dismissed vide order dated 07.06.2013 by the Spl. Judge and consequent to the dismissal of the said discharge application, the charges have been framed under Section 3 of the PML Act 2002 against the petitioners vide order dated 13.06.2018. 79. It needs to refer herein that in the present criminal Revision application (Cr. Revision No. 1326 of 2018) the order framing charge dated 13.06.2018 has been challenged, wherein it has been mention about the culpability of the petitioners. It has been stated therein that the petitioners along with the other accused persons during the period from 2005 to 2008 have knowingly assisted and have been a party in the process and activities connected with the proceed of crime and projected it as untainted property by obtaining/acquiring huge properties and also by showing transaction through paper companies and by obtaining accommodation entries in such paper companies for the purpose of projecting the proceeds of crime as untainted properties and knowingly have obtained/acquired huge properties at different states of India and across the border in Foreign countries such as Dubai, Sweden, Indonesia, Thailand and Liberia, you all have directly or indirectly indulged and knowingly assisted each other and by involving in process and activity connected with the proceeds of crime of schedule offence of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, obtained/acquired properties valued worth 36,33,11,16,240/- and US $ 2,429,990 and out of which the petitioners has projected the proceeds of crime by its investment in the properties valued worth Rs. 138 .18 Crores as untainted properties. 80. So far as the allegations against the petitioners are concerned, it needs to refer herein that It has come on record that the accused/revisionist namely Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia and Arvind Vyas are the close associates of co-accused Binod Sinha and Sanjay Choudhary, Anil Adinath Bastawade, Dhananjay Choudhary who actively helped them in investment of proceeds of crime in a suspected manner and during the course of investigation statement of D.K. Srivastava, Senior Assistant General Manager (Projects) of IVRCL Infrastructure and Projects Ltd., Lucknow was recorded on 21.7.2010 and whereby it is revealed that Binod Sinha was a mastermind to decide the percentage of ill legal gratification to be taken and the place where the money was to be delivered. 81. 81. It has come on record that Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia has also admitted in his statement dated 6.12.2012 that the shares were transferred to Binod Kumar Sinha and Sanjay Choudhary on 2.8.2008, whereas the payments were received on 17.3.2009 are going to show his nexus with Binod Kumar Sinha and Sanjay Choudhary. Shares of this company were sold at premium (at Rs. 1,000/- per share), whereas Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia sold these shares to Binod Kumar Sinha and Sanjay Choudhary @ Rs. 10/-, thereby making a loss of Rs. 25,07,99,670/-. 82. Further it is alleged that Balaji Group of Companies under control of Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia had transactions with companies controlled by Binod Kumar Sinha through another company under control of Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia namely Keyman Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. Statements of bank accounts of companies of Balaji Group, M/s Keyman Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd., M/s Quantum Powertech Pvt. Ltd., M/s Blue Techno Projects Ltd. reveals nexus of these companies. The further investigation also reveals that the accused Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia processed the proceeds of crime through those two companies namely M/s Balaji Lifestyle Retailers Pvt. Ltd. And M/s Balaji Universal Tradelink Pvt. Ltd. wherein he is the Director and maximum percentage of share of both the companies are holding by himself or his associates or group of companies which is owned/controlled by him. 83. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that prima facie- material is available against the present petitioners, as such charges have been framed under the Section 3 of the Act 2002. 84. Further it needs to refer herein that supplementary prosecution complaint has been filed on 14.02.2018 but there is no bar in the filing of the supplementary complaint as per the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE and further as per the mandate of Section 216 Cr. P.C. the charge can be added or alter at any stage but before pronouncement of the judgment. 85. Further it needs to refer herein that co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Directorate of Enforcement V/s Narendra Mohan Singh and Ankita Singh , 2014 (3) JLJR 260 in para-16 and 17 it has been observed that the “provisions as contained in Section 44 (1)(b) and 45 of the PML Act, refers to ‘a complaint’. 85. Further it needs to refer herein that co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Directorate of Enforcement V/s Narendra Mohan Singh and Ankita Singh , 2014 (3) JLJR 260 in para-16 and 17 it has been observed that the “provisions as contained in Section 44 (1)(b) and 45 of the PML Act, refers to ‘a complaint’. Even if such reference is there of ‘a complaint’, it never prevents the department from filing of supplementary complaint inasmuch as the reference of the complaint has been made in those provisions in the context that whenever a complaint filed by an authority authorized, Court may take cognizance over it.” 86. Further it needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Pavna Dibbur v. Directorate of Enforcement , (Criminal Appeal No. 2779/2023 ) held that the who could commit an offence under the PMLA maybe not be named in the scheduled offence. 87. Further the offence of money laundering as contemplated in Section 3 of the PMLA has been elaborately dealt with by the three Judge Bench in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), in which it has been observed that Section 3 has a wider reach. The offence as defined captures every process and activity in dealing with the proceeds of crime, directly or indirectly, and is not limited to the happening of the final act of integration of tainted property in the formal economy to constitute an act of money laundering. Of course, the authority of the Authorised Officer under the Act to prosecute any person for the offence of money laundering gets triggered only if there exist proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 2 (1)(u) of the Act and further it is involved in any process or activity. Not even in case of existence of undisclosed income and irrespective of its volume, the definition of “Proceeds of Crime” under Section 2 (1)(u) will get attracted, unless the property has been derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The property must qualify the definition of “Proceeds of Crime” under Section 2 (1)(u) of the Act. As observed, in all or whole of the crime property linked to scheduled offence need not be regarded as proceeds of crime, but all properties qualifying the definition of “Proceeds of Crime” under Section 2 (1)(u) will necessarily be the crime properties. 88. The property must qualify the definition of “Proceeds of Crime” under Section 2 (1)(u) of the Act. As observed, in all or whole of the crime property linked to scheduled offence need not be regarded as proceeds of crime, but all properties qualifying the definition of “Proceeds of Crime” under Section 2 (1)(u) will necessarily be the crime properties. 88. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pavana Dibbur vs. The Directorate of Enforcement (supra) has considered the effect of the appellant not being shown as an accused in the predicate offence by taking into consideration Section 3 of the Act, 2002. 89. Based upon the definition Clause (u) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act 2002 which defines "proceeds of crime", the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to observe that clause (v) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of PMLA defines "property" to mean any property or assets of every description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible. 90. To constitute any property as proceeds of crime, it must be derived or obtained directly or indirectly by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The explanation clarifies that the proceeds of crime include property, not only derived or obtained from scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. Clause (u) also clarifies that even the value of any such property will also be the proceeds of crime. 91. It has further been observed by referring the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) that the condition precedent for the existence of proceeds of crime is the existence of a scheduled offence. At paragraph-15 the finding has been given therein that on plain reading of Section 3 of the Act, 2002, an offence under Section 3 can be committed after a scheduled offence is committed. By giving an example, it has been clarified that if a person who is unconnected with the scheduled offence, knowingly assists the concealment of the proceeds of crime or knowingly assists the use of proceeds of crime, in that case, he can be held guilty of committing an offence under Section 3 of the PMLA. By giving an example, it has been clarified that if a person who is unconnected with the scheduled offence, knowingly assists the concealment of the proceeds of crime or knowingly assists the use of proceeds of crime, in that case, he can be held guilty of committing an offence under Section 3 of the PMLA. Therefore, it is not necessary that a person against whom the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA is alleged must have been shown as the accused in the scheduled offence. For ready reference relevant paragraphs are being quoted as under: 15. The condition precedent for the existence of proceeds of crime is the existence of a scheduled offence. On this aspect, it is necessary to refer to the decision of this Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1 ] . In para 109 of the said decision [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1 ] , this Court held thus : (SCC p. 166) “109. Tersely put, it is only such property which is derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence that can be regarded as proceeds of crime. The authorities under the 2002 Act cannot resort to action against any person for money laundering on an assumption that the property recovered by them must be proceeds of crime and that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless the same is registered with the jurisdictional police or pending inquiry by way of complaint before the competent forum. For, the expression “derived or obtained” is indicative of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence already accomplished. Similarly, in the event the person named in the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence is finally absolved by a court of competent jurisdiction owing to an order of discharge, acquittal or because of quashing of the criminal case (scheduled offence) against him/her, there can be no action for money laundering against such a person or person claiming through him in relation to the property linked to the stated scheduled offence. This interpretation alone can be countenanced on the basis of the provisions of the 2002 Act, in particular Section 2 (1)(u) read with Section 3 . This interpretation alone can be countenanced on the basis of the provisions of the 2002 Act, in particular Section 2 (1)(u) read with Section 3 . Taking any other view would be rewriting of these provisions and disregarding the express language of definition clause “proceeds of crime”, as it obtains as of now.” (emphasis in original and supplied) 16. In paras 134 and 135, this Court held thus : (Vijay Madanlal Choudhary case [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1 ] , SCC p. 182) “134. From the bare language of Section 3 of the 2002 Act, it is amply clear that the offence of money laundering is an independent offence regarding the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime which had been derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to or in relation to a scheduled offence. The process or activity can be in any form — be it one of concealment, possession, acquisition, use of proceeds of crime as much as projecting it as untainted property or claiming it to be so. Thus, involvement in any one of such process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime would constitute offence of money laundering. This offence otherwise has nothing to do with the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence — except the proceeds of crime derived or obtained as a result of that crime. 135.Needless to mention that such process or activity can be indulged in only after the property is derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity (a scheduled offence). It would be an offence of money-laundering to indulge in or to assist or being party to the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime; and such process or activity in a given fact situation may be a continuing offence, irrespective of the date and time of commission of the scheduled offence. It would be an offence of money-laundering to indulge in or to assist or being party to the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime; and such process or activity in a given fact situation may be a continuing offence, irrespective of the date and time of commission of the scheduled offence. In other words, the criminal activity may have been committed before the same had been notified as scheduled offence for the purpose of the 2002 Act, but if a person has indulged in or continues to indulge directly or indirectly in dealing with proceeds of crime, derived or obtained from such criminal activity even after it has been notified as scheduled offence, may be liable to be prosecuted for offence of money laundering under the 2002 Act — for continuing to possess or conceal the proceeds of crime (fully or in part) or retaining possession thereof or uses it in trenches until fully exhausted. The offence of money-laundering is not dependent on or linked to the date on which the scheduled offence, or if we may say so, the predicate offence has been committed. The relevant date is the date on which the person indulges in the process or activity connected with such proceeds of crime. These ingredients are intrinsic in the original provision ( Section 3 , as amended until 2013 and were in force till 31-7-2019); and the same has been merely explained and clarified by way of Explanation vide Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019. Thus understood, inclusion of clause (ii) in Explanation inserted in 2019 is of no consequence as it does not alter or enlarge the scope of Section 3 at all.” (emphasis supplied) 17. Coming back to Section 3 PMLA, on its plain reading, an offence under Section 3 can be committed after a scheduled offence is committed. For example, let us take the case of a person who is unconnected with the scheduled offence, knowingly assists the concealment of the proceeds of crime or knowingly assists the use of proceeds of crime. In that case, he can be held guilty of committing an offence under Section 3 PMLA. To give a concrete example, the offences under Sections 3 84 to 389IPC relating to “extortion” are scheduled offences included in Para 1 of the Schedule to PMLA. In that case, he can be held guilty of committing an offence under Section 3 PMLA. To give a concrete example, the offences under Sections 3 84 to 389IPC relating to “extortion” are scheduled offences included in Para 1 of the Schedule to PMLA. An accused may commit a crime of extortion covered by Sections 3 84 to 389IPC and extort money. Subsequently, a person unconnected with the offence of extortion may assist the said accused in the concealment of the proceeds of extortion. In such a case, the person who assists the accused in the scheduled offence for concealing the proceeds of the crime of extortion can be guilty of the offence of money-laundering. Therefore, it is not necessary that a person against whom the offence under Section 3 PMLA is alleged must have been shown as the accused in the scheduled offence. What is held in para 135 of the decision of this Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1 ] supports the above conclusion. The conditions precedent for attracting the offence under Section 3 PMLA are that there must be a scheduled offence and that there must be proceeds of crime in relation to the scheduled offence as defined in clause (u) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 PMLA.. 92. Be it noted that the legal presumption under Section 24 (a) of the Act 2002, would apply when the person is charged with the offence of money-laundering and his direct or indirect involvement in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, is established. The existence of proceeds of crime is, therefore, a foundational fact, to be established by the prosecution, including the involvement of the person in any process or activity connected therewith. Once these foundational facts are established by the prosecution, the onus must then shift on the person facing charge of offence of money- laundering to rebut the legal presumption that the proceeds of crime are not involved in money- laundering, by producing evidence which is within his personal knowledge of the accused. 93. Thus, in light of the aforesaid principles and the law enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (Supra), this Court must determine whether the foundational facts necessary to invoke the presumption under Section 24 of the PMLA have been established by the respondent/ED. 94. 93. Thus, in light of the aforesaid principles and the law enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (Supra), this Court must determine whether the foundational facts necessary to invoke the presumption under Section 24 of the PMLA have been established by the respondent/ED. 94. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma Versus Directorate of Enforcement and Another 2025 SCC OnLine SC 560 has observed that which reads as under : “ 30. The PMLA was enacted with the primary objective of preventing money laundering and confiscating the proceeds of crime, thereby ensuring that such illicit funds do not undermine the financial system. Money laundering has far-reaching consequences, not only in terms of individual acts of corruption but also in causing significant loss to the public exchequer. The laundering of proceeds of crime results in a significant loss to the economy, disrupts lawful financial transactions, and erodes public trust in the system. The alleged offences in the present case have a direct bearing on the economy, as illicit financial transactions deprive the state of legitimate revenue, distort market integrity, and contribute to economic instability. Such acts, when committed by persons in positions of power, erode public confidence in governance and lead to systemic vulnerabilities within financial institutions. 31. The illegal diversion and layering of funds have a cascading effect, leading to revenue losses for the state and depriving legitimate sectors of investment and financial resources. It is settled law that in cases involving serious economic offences, judicial intervention at a preliminary stage must be exercised with caution, and proceedings should not be quashed in the absence of compelling legal grounds. The respondent has rightly argued that in cases involving allegations of such magnitude, a trial is imperative to establish the full extent of wrongdoing and to ensure accountability. 32. The PMLA was enacted to combat the menace of money laundering and to curb the use of proceeds of crime in the formal economy. Given the evolving complexity of financial crimes, courts must adopt a strict approach in matters concerning economic offences to ensure that perpetrators do not exploit procedural loopholes to evade justice. 33. The present case involves grave and serious allegations of financial misconduct, misuse of position, and involvement in transactions constituting money laundering. Given the evolving complexity of financial crimes, courts must adopt a strict approach in matters concerning economic offences to ensure that perpetrators do not exploit procedural loopholes to evade justice. 33. The present case involves grave and serious allegations of financial misconduct, misuse of position, and involvement in transactions constituting money laundering. The appellant seeks an end to the proceedings at a preliminary stage, effectively preventing the full adjudication of facts and evidence before the competent forum. However, as established in multiple judicial pronouncements, cases involving economic offences necessitate a thorough trial to unearth the complete chain of events, financial transactions, and culpability of the accused. 34. The material submitted by the respondent, coupled with the broad legislative framework of the PMLA, indicates the necessity of allowing the trial to proceed and not discharging the appellant at the nascent stage of charge framing. The argument that the proceedings are unwarranted is devoid of substance in light of the statutory objectives, the continuing nature of the offence, and the significant financial implications arising from the alleged acts. Discharging the appellant at this stage would be premature and contrary to the principles governing the prosecution in money laundering cases. 95. From perusal of case record, statements of witnesses as referred in the impugned order, materials available on record and in view of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that prima-facie sufficient materials are available on the record for framing of charge against the present petitioner and his companies. 96. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Munna Devi v. State of Rajasthan , (2001) 9 SCC 631 has observed that the revisional power under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such powers the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the appellate courts are required to do. Revisional powers could be exercised only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the first information report even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged. 97. 97. Thus, it is evident that the revisional power can only be exercised to correct patent error of law or procedure which would occasion unfairness, if it is not corrected. The revisional power cannot be compared with the appellate power. A Revisional Court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as it is undertaken by the trial court or the appellate court. This power can only be exercised if there is any legal bar to the continuance of the proceedings or if the facts as stated in the charge-sheet are taken to be true on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged. 98. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency (P) Ltd. v. CBI, (2018) 16 SCC 299 has held that interference in the order framing charges or refusing to discharge is called for in the rarest of rare case only to correct the patent error of jurisdiction. 99. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Soundirarasu,(supra) has held in paragraph 81 to 83 as under: 81. The High Court has acted completely beyond the settled parameters, as discussed above, which govern the power to discharge the accused from the prosecution. The High Court could be said to have donned the role of a chartered accountant. This is exactly what this Court observed in Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi [CBI v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi, (2021) 18 SCC 135 ]. The High Court has completely ignored that it was not at the stage of trial or considering an appeal against a verdict in a trial. The High Court has enquired into the materials produced by the accused persons, compared with the information compiled by the investigating agency and pronounced a verdict saying that the explanation offered by the accused persons deserves to be accepted applying the doctrine of preponderance of probability This entire exercise has been justified on account of the investigating officer not taking into consideration the explanation offered by the public servant and also not taking into consideration the lawful acquired assets of the wife of the public servant i.e. Respondent 2 herein. 82. 82. By accepting the entire evidence put forward by the accused persons applying the doctrine of preponderance of probability, the case put up by the prosecution cannot be termed as “groundless”. As observed by this Court in C.S.D. Swami [C.S.D. Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC 7 ] that the accused might have made statements before the investigating officer as to his alleged sources of income, but the same, strictly, would not be evidence in the case. 83. Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act makes a departure from the principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden will always lie on the prosecution to prove the ingredients of the offences charged and never shifts on the accused to disprove the charge framed against him. The legal effect of Section 13(1)(e) is that it is for the prosecution to establish that the accused was in possession of properties disproportionate to his known sources of income but the term “known sources of income” would mean the sources known to the prosecution and not the sources known to the accused and within the knowledge of the accused. It is for the accused to account satisfactorily for the money/assets in his hands. The onus in this regard is on the accused to give satisfactory explanation. The accused cannot make an attempt to discharge this onus upon him at the stage of Section 239CrPC. At the stage of Section 239CrPC, the court has to only look into the prima facie case and decide whether the case put up by the prosecution is groundless.” 100. It requires to refer herein that the ambit and scope of exercise of power of discharge, are fairly well settled which has been elaborately discussed in the preceding paragraph and as per settled proposition of law no comprehensive assessment of the materials or meticulous consideration of the possible defences need to be undertaken at this stage nor any exercise of weighing materials in golden scales is to be undertaken at this stage. The only deliberation at the stage of discharge is as to whether prima facie case was made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not. 101. Further, it is well settled that the revisional power cannot be parallelled with appellate power. The only deliberation at the stage of discharge is as to whether prima facie case was made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not. 101. Further, it is well settled that the revisional power cannot be parallelled with appellate power. The Revisional Court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as is undertaken by the Trial Court or the Appellate Court. 102. Hence, on the basis of discussion made herein above, this court is of the considered view that, there is no illegality in the impugned orders dated orders dated 25.09.2012 and 13.06.2018 passed by the learned Special Judge, PMLA Ranchi in connection with ECIR/02/PAT/09/AD. 103. Accordingly, this Court do not find any justifiable reason to interfere with the impugned orders dated 25.09.2012 and 13.06.2018, consequently, these criminal revision petitions are hereby dismissed. 104. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, also stands disposed of.