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2025 DIGILAW 1777 (GAU)

Union of India, Represented by the Secretary to the Govt. of India, Ministry of Railways v. Vanlallura, S/o. Vanlalhlua

2025-11-03

ROBIN PHUKAN

body2025
JUDGMENT : ROBIN PHUKAN, J. Heard Mr. S. K. Medhi, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. L.H. Lianhrima, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Ms. R. Lalruatfeli, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 7; and Ms. Linda L. Fambawl, learned Addl. Advocate General for the respondent Nos. 8 and 9. 2. In this petition, under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have challenged the order dated 22.11.2022, passed by the District Collector, Kolasib, in connection with the application filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 7 (Annexure-F) and also the consequential letter of assessment of District Collector, Kolasib, dated 23.11.2022 (Annexure-G). 3. The background facts, leading to filing of the present petition, are briefly stated as under: “The respondent Nos. 1 to 7 are the land owners of the land acquired for construction of new Railway Line by N.F. Railways from Bairabi to Sairang. Thereafter, notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘Act of 1894’, for short) was issued by the Government of Mizoram, Revenue Department, vide Memo No. ?.12011/25/2011-REV, dated 02.08.2011. Thereafter, declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was issued by the Government of Mizoram, vide Memo No. K.1200/25/2011-REV, dated 24.01.2012 followed by Award No. 1 of 2012 (Part E-Mualkhang) by the District Collector, Kolasib on 28.01.2013. By the Award No. 1 of 2012, only the value of the crops was paid to the respondent Nos. 1 to 7. Thereafter, the respondent Nos. 1 to 7, along with other land owners of the Award No. 1 of 2012 (Part E Mualkhang), had submitted an application under Section 18 of the Act of 1894 before the District Collector, Kolasib, and the same was referred to the learned Additional District Judge-III, Aizawl for further adjudication and then the application was registered as L.A. Case No. 19/2013. Thereafter, learned Additional District Judge-III, Aizawl, vide judgment and award dated 06.03.2014, passed in L.A. Case No. 19/2013, had directed the District Collector, Kolasib District to reassess the compensation payable to the petitioners in the L.A. Case (including respondent Nos. 1 to 7) by including the value of the land which is to be calculated @ Rs.25/- per sq. Thereafter, learned Additional District Judge-III, Aizawl, vide judgment and award dated 06.03.2014, passed in L.A. Case No. 19/2013, had directed the District Collector, Kolasib District to reassess the compensation payable to the petitioners in the L.A. Case (including respondent Nos. 1 to 7) by including the value of the land which is to be calculated @ Rs.25/- per sq. feet, along with 30% solatium on the market value, under Section 23(2) of the Act of 1894 and interest @12% per annum on the market value, under Section 23(1A) of the said Act, within a period of two months from the date of judgment and further directed the N.F. Railways/petitioners herein, to disburse the amount to the claimants by the District Collector, Kolasib within a period of two months thereafter. Then, the N.F. Railways deposited an amount of Rs. 13,10,56,777/-, vide cheque No. 498300, dated 27.01.2015, with the District Collector, Kolasib and same was disbursed to the claimants in the L.A. Case. Thereafter, some petitioners in L.A. Case No. 19/2013, had filed a civil miscellaneous application, being CMA No. 92/2019, arising out of L.A. Case No. 19/2013, before the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge-I, Aizawl (‘Reference Court’, for short), claiming statutory interest, under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act of 1894 for their land. Thereafter, learned Additional District and Sessions Judge-I, Aizawl, vide judgment and order dated 05.04.2019, passed in CMA No. 92/2019, directed the District Collector, Kolasib to make assessment of the amount of interest under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act of 1894, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the order and further directed the N.F. Railways to make payment of the amount, so assessed by the District Collector, Kolasib within 2 months from the date of assessment made by respondent No. 2. Thereafter, on 16.08.2022, the respondent Nos. 1 to 7 filed an application under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act of 1894, for payment of interest in respect of the Award made by the learned Reference Court in L.A. Case No. 19/2013. Then the District Collector, Kolasib, vide letter No. F.15012/14/2020-DC (K), dated 19.10.2022, had issued notice to the parties to appear before the District Collector, Kolasib for hearing. Then the District Collector, Kolasib, vide letter No. F.15012/14/2020-DC (K), dated 19.10.2022, had issued notice to the parties to appear before the District Collector, Kolasib for hearing. Thereafter, the Deputy Chief Engineer/Construction Aizawl, vide letter No. W/207/CON/B-S/Aizawl/Part E-Mualkhnag, dated 27.10.2022, stated the District Collector, Kolasib that in the instant case, interest under Sections 34 of the Act of 1894 is not applicable. Thereafter, the District Collector, Kolasib, vide impugned order dated 22.11.2022, passed in connection with the application filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 7, held that assessment of interest under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act of 1894 shall be made from the date of possession (i.e. 01.07.2014) @ 9% till the date of payment (i.e. 19.03.2015) and directed the N.F. Railways to make payment within three months from the date of receipt of the assessment. Thereafter, the District Collector, Kolasib, vide letter No. F.15012/14/2020- DC (K), dated 23.11.2022, had sent the assessment of interest under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act of 1894, in respect of respondent Nos. 1 to 7 as per order of the District Collector, Kolasib, dated 22.11.2022, to the Deputy Chief Engineer/Construction, N.F. Railway, Aizawl. Since the value of the crops and value of the land had already been given in L.A. Case No. 19/2013, the question of payment of interest, under Section 34 of the Act of 1894, does not arise. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have approached this Court by filing the present petition.” 4. The respondent Nos. 1 to 7 have filed their affidavit-in-opposition, wherein it is stated that the petition is not maintainable and barred by the law of limitation, and that the petitioners have no locus-standi to file the present petition. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have approached this Court by filing the present petition.” 4. The respondent Nos. 1 to 7 have filed their affidavit-in-opposition, wherein it is stated that the petition is not maintainable and barred by the law of limitation, and that the petitioners have no locus-standi to file the present petition. It is stated that the letter dated 27.10.2022, was written due to misconception of law as Section 34 of the Act of 1894 is very much applicable as per provision, and that in the Award No. 1 of 2012, no value was given and therefore, the same has been superseded by the judgment and award of the learned Reference Court, wherein value of the land has been awarded to the land owners, and as such, the land owners would be entitled to receive payment of interest as per Section 34 of the Act of 1894, from the date of taking possession of their land up to the date of the judgment and award passed by the learned Reference Court. 4.1. It is also stated that the payment of market value of land to the respondents in L.A. Case No 19/2013 (Lalrohlua & Ors -vs.- State of Mizoram & 2 Ors) was in excess of the sum awarded by the District Collector which eventually attracted the entitlement of the respondents for payment of statutory interest under Section 28 of Act of 1894, and that in view of interest under Section 34 of Act of 1894, the respondents are also entitled for payment of statutory interest for non-payment of compensation prior to taking possession of their land by the acquiring authority. 4.2. It is further stated that there is nothing wrong with the impugned order dated 22.11.2022, passed by the District Collector, Kolasib and the impugned consequential letter, dated 23.11.2022, for assessment of interest/compensation by District Collector, Kolasib as they are in line with the relevant provision as well as the ruling passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 5. Mr. Medhi, learned CGC for the petitioners, submits that the petitioners are ready to pay interest under Section 28 of the Act of 1894, but they are not ready to pay the interest under Section 34 of the Act of 1894, as the same is not admissible. In support of his submission, Mr. 5. Mr. Medhi, learned CGC for the petitioners, submits that the petitioners are ready to pay interest under Section 28 of the Act of 1894, but they are not ready to pay the interest under Section 34 of the Act of 1894, as the same is not admissible. In support of his submission, Mr. Medhi has referred to a decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Sabid Ali vs. State of Assam and Ors. , reported in 2015 5 GLT 91 . Mr. Medhi further submits that in this petition, the petitioners have challenged the order of the District Collector, Kolasib, and not the judicial order passed by the learned Reference Court in CMA Case No. 92/2019. Mr. Medhi, by referring to page No. 48 of this petition, submits that the calculation made by the District Collector, Kolasib is also wrong and the date of giving effect of the order is also wrong, and the respondent Nos. 1 to 7 are not entitled to any compensation under Section 34 of the Act of 1894. In support of his submission, Mr. Medhi has referred to the following decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of (i) Jogendra Sinhji Vijay Singhji Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. reported in (2015) 9 SCC 1 , and (ii) Major General Kapil Mehra and Ors. vs. Union of India and Anr., in Civil Appeal No. 2545- 2546/2012. 6. Per contra, Mr. Lianhrima, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 7 submits that this petition is not maintainable as the assessment of compensation under Section 28 and 34 of the Act of 1894 was made by the District Collector, Kolasib, pursuant to a judgment and order passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge-I, Aizawl, vide judgment and order dated 05.04.2019, passed in CMA No. 92/2019. He also submits that CMA No. 92/2019, was registered on the basis of an application filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 7, and after hearing the parties, the learned Reference Court had directed the District Collector, Kolasib to make assessment of the amount of interest under Section 28 and 34 of the Act of 1894, and as such, the impugned order, dated 22.11.2022, was passed by the District Collector, Kolasib, on the basis of the direction issued by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge-I, Aizawl. Mr. Mr. Lianhrima also submits that it is well settled that the order passed by the learned Reference Court, which is a Civil Court, is not amenable to writ jurisdiction, either under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In support of his submission, Mr. Lianhrima has referred to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Radhey Shyam and Another v. Chhabi Nath and Others , reported in (2015) 5 SCC 423 . Under such circumstances, Mr. Lianhrima has contended to dismiss this petition, being not maintainable. 7. Having heard the submission of learned counsel for both the parties, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record, and also perused the impugned order dated 22.11.2022, and the consequential impugned letter, dated 23.11.2022. 8. The basic facts, herein this case, are not in dispute. The respondent Nos. 1 to 7 are the land owners of the land acquired for construction of new Railway Line by N.F. Railways from Bairabi to Sairang, and thereafter, vide notification, under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, was issued by the Government of Mizoram, Revenue Department on 02.08.2011. Thereafter, declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, was issued by the Government of Mizoram, vide Memo No. K.1200/25/2011-REV, dated 24.01.2012, and the same was followed by Award No. 1 of 2012 (Part E-Mualkhang) by the District Collector, Kolasib on 28.01.2013. In the said Award No. 1 of 2012, the District Collector had only awarded the value of the crops to the respondent Nos. 1 to 7. Thereafter, the respondent Nos. 1 to 7, along with other land owners of the Award No. 1 of 2012 (Part E Mualkhang) submitted an application under Section 18 of the Act of 1894, before the District Collector, Kolasib, and the same was referred to the learned Additional District Judge-III, Aizawl for further adjudication and the learned Additional District Judge-III, Aizawl had registered the same as L.A. Case No. 19/2013. 9. The said L.A. Case No. 19/2013 had culminated in pronouncement of judgment and award dated 06.03.2014, by which the District Collector, Kolasib was directed to reassess the compensation payable to the petitioners in the L.A. Case (including respondent Nos. 1 to 7) by including the value of the land which is to be calculated @ Rs.25/- per sq. 9. The said L.A. Case No. 19/2013 had culminated in pronouncement of judgment and award dated 06.03.2014, by which the District Collector, Kolasib was directed to reassess the compensation payable to the petitioners in the L.A. Case (including respondent Nos. 1 to 7) by including the value of the land which is to be calculated @ Rs.25/- per sq. feet, along with 30% solatium on the market value under Section 23(2) of the Act of 1894, and interest @12% per annum on the market value under Section 23(1A) of the said Act, within a period of two months from the date of judgment. Thereafter, the N.F. Railways had disbursed the amount of the claimants and deposited an amount of Rs. 13,10,56,777/-, vide cheque No. 498300, dated 27.01.2015, to the District Collector, Kolasib and same was disbursed to the claimants in the L.A. Case No. 19/2013. However, while passing judgment and award by the learned Additional District Judge-III, Aizawl, it has not awarded the interest under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act of 1894, and thereby compelling the respondent Nos. 1 to 7 to file another application, upon which CMA No. 92/2019, was registered and the same also culminated in passing a judgment and order, dated 05.04.2019, wherein a direction was issued to the District Collector, Kolasib to make assessment of the amount of interest under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act of 1894 within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the order and further directed the N.F. Railways to make payment of the amount, so assessed by the District Collector, Kolasib within two months from the date of assessment made by respondent No. 2. 10. 10. The operative portion of the judgment and order, dated 05.04.2019, in CMA No. 92/2019, whereby a direction was issued by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge-I, Aizawl, is extracted herein below:- “ Accordingly, I find force in the application and for the reasons stated above the Respondent No.2 District Collector, Kolasib is directed to make assessment payment of interest Under Section 28 and 34 as per the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 within a period of two (2) months from date of receipt of this Order and thereafter the Respondent No. 1 (Northern Frontier Railway) is to make payment of amount so assessed by the District Collector, Kolasib (Respondent No.1) within two (2) months from the date of the assessment made by Respondent No.2.” 11. It is also not in dispute that on 16.08.2022, the respondent Nos. 1 to 7 had filed an application under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act of 1894 for payment of interest in respect of the Award made by the learned Reference Court in L.A. Case No. 19/2013. Thereafter, the District Collector, Kolasib, vide letter No. F.15012/14/2020-DC(K), dated 19.10.2022 issued hearing notice to the parties to appear before the District Collector, Kolasib. Thereafter, the Deputy Chief Engineer/Construction Aizawl, vide letter No. W/207/CON/B- S/Aizawl/Part E-Mualkhnag, dated 27.10.2022 stated the District Collector, Kolasib that in the instant case, interest under Sections 34 of the Act of 1894 is not applicable. 12. Thereafter, the District Collector, Kolasib, vide impugned order dated 22.11.2022, passed in connection with the application filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 7, held that assessment of interest under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act of 1894 shall be made from the date of possession (i.e. 01.07.2014) @9% till the date of payment (i.e. 19.03.2015) and directed the N.F. Railways to make payment within three months from the date of receipt of the assessment. 13. The operative portion of the said impugned order dated 22.11.2022, is extracted herein below:- “ Heard from both the parties and after careful examination of all the records and submissions pertaining to the instant case, it is no doubt that in the instant case the respondent do not raise objection on payment of interest u/s 28 of LA Act 1894 which is statutory in nature and entitled by the petitioners. In regard to payment of interest u/s 34 of LA Act, 1894, the court is inclined to rely on the precedence Judgment & Award dated 05.04.2019, by the reference court (Additional District & Session Judge-I, Aizawl) in CMA 92 of 2019 A/o LA Case No. 19 of 2013 (Lalrohlua & Ors vs SoM & 2 Ors) as the instant petitioners are covered by the same case in LA Case No. 19 of 2013 (Lalrohlua & Ors vs SoM & 2 Ors). This court held that the instant petitioners which fall under the same award and same case shall be treated equally and cannot be deprive from their legitimate right from one another. From the above facts and circumstances, I am satisfied to award the petitioners of the instant case statutory interest as envisaged u/s 28 and 34 of LA Act, 1894. Assessment of interest u/s 28 & 34 of LA Act, 1894 shall be made from the date of possession (i.e. 1.7.2014) @9% till the date of payment (i.e., 19.03.2015). The NF Railway is directed to make payment within 3 months from the received of the assessment.” 14. Thus, a careful perusal of the impugned order, dated 22.11.2022, passed by the District Collector, Kolasib, leaving no iota of doubt in the mind of this Court, goes to show that the same was passed pursuant to the order being passed by the learned Reference Court i.e. Additional District and Sessions Judge-I, Aizawl, in CMA No. 92/2019, arising out of L.A. Case No. 19/2013. 15. It also appears that the petitioners herein have challenged the impugned order, dated 22.11.2022, passed by the District Collector, Kolasib, awarding interest under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act of 1894, arising out of L.A. Case No. 19/2013. And thus, the order under challenge, dated 22.11.2022, was passed pursuant to the order dated 05.04.2019, passed by the learned Reference Court, in CMA No. 92/2019, and as such, challenging the order dated 22.11.2022, amounts to challenging the order dated 05.04.2019, passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge-I, Aizawl, being the Reference Court. 16. That being so, the issue to be decided first is whether this present petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India is maintainable or not. If the answer is yes, only then the requirement of directing a discussion as to the merit of the case would arise. 17. 16. That being so, the issue to be decided first is whether this present petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India is maintainable or not. If the answer is yes, only then the requirement of directing a discussion as to the merit of the case would arise. 17. This issue was dealt with by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Radhey Shyam (supra). The issue before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case was whether an order of the civil court was amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. That matter has been placed before the Bench of three Judges in pursuance of an order dated 15-4-2009 [Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2009) 5 SCC 616 ] passed by the Bench of two Hon'ble Judges to consider the correctness of the law laid down by this Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai [Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675 ] that an order of the civil court was amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 17.1. Then dealing with the same, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 27. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226. We are also in agreement with the view [ Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath , (2009) 5 SCC 616 ] of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226. 28. We may also deal with the submission made on behalf of the respondent that the view in Surya Dev Rai [ Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai , (2003) 6 SCC 675] stands approved by larger Benches in Shail [ Shail v. Manoj Kumar , (2004) 4 SCC 785 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1401] , Mahendra Saree Emporium (2) [ Mahendra Saree Emporium (2) v. G.V. Srinivasa Murthy , (2005) 1 SCC 481 ] and Salem Advocate Bar Assn. (2) [ Salem Advocate Bar Assn. (2) v. Union of India , (2005) 6 SCC 344 ] and on that ground correctness of the said view cannot be gone into by this Bench. (2) [ Salem Advocate Bar Assn. (2) v. Union of India , (2005) 6 SCC 344 ] and on that ground correctness of the said view cannot be gone into by this Bench. In Shail [ Shail v. Manoj Kumar , (2004) 4 SCC 785 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1401] , though reference has been made to Surya Dev Rai [ Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai , (2003) 6 SCC 675 ] , the same is only for the purpose of scope of power under Article 227 as is clear from para 3 of the said judgment. There is no discussion on the issue of maintainability of a petition under Article 226. In Mahendra Saree Emporium (2) [ Mahendra Saree Emporium (2) v. G.V. Srinivasa Murthy , (2005) 1 SCC 481 ] , reference to Surya Dev Rai [ Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai (2003) 6 SCC 675 ] is made in para 9 of the judgment only for the proposition that no subordinate legislation can whittle down the jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution. Similarly, in Salem Advocate Bar Assn. (2) [ Salem Advocate Bar Assn. (2) v. Union of India , (2005) 6 SCC 344 ] in para 40, reference to Surya Dev Rai [ Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai , (2003) 6 SCC 675 ] is for the same purpose. We are, thus, unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent. 29. Accordingly, we answer the question referred as follows:- 29.1. Judicial orders of the civil court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 29.2. Jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct from jurisdiction under Article 226. 29.3. Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai [ Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai , (2003) 6 SCC 675 ] is overruled. 17.2. Thus, it is well settled that an order of the civil court is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Lianhrima, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 7 has rightly pointed this out at the time of hearing and this Court finds sufficient force in his submission. 18. However, Mr. Thus, it is well settled that an order of the civil court is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Lianhrima, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 7 has rightly pointed this out at the time of hearing and this Court finds sufficient force in his submission. 18. However, Mr. Medhi, learned CGC for the petitioners, has tried to convince this Court that the petitioners have challenged the order of the District Collector, Kolasib, dated 22.11.2022, and not the order passed by the learned Reference Court, yet, the submission of Mr. Medhi left this Court unimpressed, inasmuch as the impugned order dated 22.11.2022, as quoted herein above, clearly goes to show that the said order was passed, pursuant to the order dated 05.04.2019, passed by the learned Reference Court in CMA No. 92/2019, arising out of L.A. Case No. 19/2013. 19. Notably, this petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India also. During the course of hearing, a question was put to Mr. Lianhrima, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 7 as to why the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable, though it is not maintainable under Article 226, then, placing reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam (supra), Mr. Lianhrima, submitted that the jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct and supervisory jurisdiction, and as such, the same also cannot be invoked to test the correctness of the order being passed by the District Collector, Kolasib, dated 22.11.2022. 19.1. He further submits that at best, the petitioners herein ought to have challenged the order, dated 22.11.2022, of the District Collector, Kolasib and the judgment and order, dated 05.04.2019, passed by the learned Reference Court in CMA No. 92/2019, arising out of L.A. Case No. 19/2013, by filing an appeal before this Court. 20. There appears to be substance in the submissions of Mr. Lianhrima, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 7. The Act of 1894, especially Section 54, provides for an appeal, which read as under:- “ 54. Appeals in proceedings before Court. 20. There appears to be substance in the submissions of Mr. Lianhrima, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 7. The Act of 1894, especially Section 54, provides for an appeal, which read as under:- “ 54. Appeals in proceedings before Court. – Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the award, or from any part of the award, of the Court and from any decree of the High Court passed on such appeal as aforesaid an appeal shall lie to [the Supreme Court] subject to the provisions contained in section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and in Order XLV thereof.” 21. Since there is provision for appeal under the Act of 1894, this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is also not maintainable in view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sadhana Lodh vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr. , reported in (2003) 3 SCC 524 wherein a three-Judge Bench has held that where a statutory right to file an appeal has been provided for, it is not open to the High Court to entertain a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. The relevant para is quoted herein below for ready reference:- “ 6. The right of appeal is a statutory right and where the law provides remedy by filing an appeal on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged by filing a petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution on the premise that the insurer has limited grounds available for challenging the award given by the Tribunal. Section 149(2) of the Act limits the insurer to file an appeal on those enumerated grounds and the appeal being a product of the statute it is not open to an insurer to take any plea other than those provided under Section 149(2) of the Act (see National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nicolletta Rohtagi [ (2002) 7 SCC 456 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1788]). This being the legal position, the petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution by the insurer was wholly misconceived. Ltd. v. Nicolletta Rohtagi [ (2002) 7 SCC 456 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1788]). This being the legal position, the petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution by the insurer was wholly misconceived. Where a statutory right to file an appeal has been provided for, it is not open to the High Court to entertain a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. Even if where a remedy by way of an appeal has not been provided for against the order and judgment of a District Judge, the remedy available to the aggrieved person is to file a revision before the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Where remedy for filing a revision before the High Court under Section 115 CPC has been expressly barred by a State enactment, only in such case a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution would lie and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. As a matter of illustration, where a trial court in a civil suit refused to grant temporary injunction and an appeal against refusal to grant injunction has been rejected, and a State enactment has barred the remedy of filing revision under Section 115 CPC, in such a situation a writ petition under Article 227 would lie and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. Thus, where the State Legislature has barred a remedy of filing a revision petition before the High Court under Section 115 CPC, no petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would lie for the reason that a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 22. Thus, in the given factual and legal matrix and also taking note of the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, and also placing reliance upon the decisions of a three-Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Radhey Shyam (supra) and the three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sadhana Lodh (supra), this Court is of the view that the present petition is not maintainable and accordingly, the same is liable to be dismissed. 23. Since the petition is found to be not maintainable, this Court is of the view that there is no necessity to direct a discussion in to the merit of the other issues and submission of Mr. 23. Since the petition is found to be not maintainable, this Court is of the view that there is no necessity to direct a discussion in to the merit of the other issues and submission of Mr. Medhi, learned CGC for the petitioners, including the decisions referred by him concerning merit of the case. 24. In the result, this petition stands dismissed leaving the parties have to bear their own costs. However, liberty is granted to the petitioners to avail appropriate remedy, available under the law if so advised. And in the event of pursuing such a remedy, the petitioners will be entitled to claim the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, if the issue of limitation arises there.