Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2025 DIGILAW 1778 (RAJ)

Rakesh, Son Of Late Munshiram Bhatnagar v. Marwadi Khatri Panchayat

2025-11-12

MANEESH SHARMA

body2025
Order : MANEESH SHARMA, J. 1. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, assailing the order dated 20.02.2021 passed by the learned Rent Tribunal, Ajmer in eviction petition No.18/2009, titled as 'Marwadi Khatri Panchayat, Ajmer & Others vs. Rakesh & Another' whereby the eviction petition filed by the respondent-landlord under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Tribunal Act, 2001 was allowed and affirmed by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, Ajmer vide order dated 08.05.2025. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that the tenanted premises was let out on 02.03.1972. The respondent-landlord filed an eviction petition under Section 9 (b), (e), (i), (j) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 in the year 2009 on the grounds of: reasonable and bona fide necessity, stating that the tenanted premises was built about 100 years ago which the respondent-landlord wants to re-develop, uplift and expand the same in the interest and benefit of the society; acquisition of alternative accommodation by tenant No.2; sub-letting; substantial damage to the property; and illegal & unauthorized encroachment by the petitioner-tenant. 3. Thereafter, the petitioner-tenant filed a reply and denied the averments made in the eviction petition. Further, the petitioner also denied all the grounds of eviction pleaded in the eviction petition. Petitioner further stated that the tenanted premises is not 100 years old and there is no need to re-develop the same, and that the respondent-landlord merely wants to use the tenanted premises for commercial purposes i.e. as a marriage hall. The petitioner further submitted that the respondent-landlord is having ample vacant space in their possession and the petitioner also denied other grounds of eviction i.e. acquisition of alternative accommodation, sub-letting, nuisance etc. Accordingly, prayed for dismissal of the eviction petition. 4. The respondent-landlord filed a rejoinder and denied the averments made in the reply and reiterated the pleadings as mentioned in the eviction petition. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, learned Rent Tribunal framed the following 6 (six) issues: 6. During the course of trial, the respondent-landlord filed affidavit of witnesses, namely Satyanarayan Arora and Om Prakash Arora, and produced documents marked as Exhibits 1 to 20. 7. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, learned Rent Tribunal framed the following 6 (six) issues: 6. During the course of trial, the respondent-landlord filed affidavit of witnesses, namely Satyanarayan Arora and Om Prakash Arora, and produced documents marked as Exhibits 1 to 20. 7. In rebuttal, the petitioners-tenants filed affidavit of four witnesses, namely Suresh Kumar, Rakesh (petitioner himself), Ravindra (petitioner himself) and Gopal Sahu, and produced documents marked as Ex A-1 to A-48. 8. After considering the pleadings of the parties and evidence led by the respective parties, learned Rent Tribunal, while allowing the eviction petition, decided all the issues in favour of the respondent-landlord. A recovery certificate was also issued in favour of the respondent-landlord vide order dated 20.02.2021. 9. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 20.02.2021, the petitioners preferred a regular first appeal under Section 19 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 before the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, Ajmer. Upon hearing both the parties, learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, while deciding the appeal, reversed the findings of Issue Nos. 2 (availability of alternative accommodation), 3 (sub-letting), and 4 (substantial damage/nuisance) against the respondent- landlord but upheld the finding of the learned Rent Tribunal on Issue No.1 regarding bona fide necessity, and dismissed the appeal vide order dated 08.05.2025. 10. It is pertinent to mention here that finding of Issue No. 5 qua set off/adjustment of Rs. 23,911/- was not assailed by the petitioner even in the memo of first appeal preferred by the petitioner. Thus, the finding of the said issue has attained finality. 11. Being aggrieved from the order dated 20.02.2021 as well as the order dated 08.05.2025, the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner - tenant. 12. The limited question posed to this Court is with regards to the findings recorded under Issue No.1 of the impugned orders dated 20.02.2021 and 08.05.2025 i.e. whether the respondent-landlord has bona fide necessity of the tenanted premises. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that both the learned Tribunals below have erred in granting a decree of eviction on the ground of bona fide necessity. He further submits that the respondents already possess ample property, whereas the petitioners occupy only a small portion (3 rooms). Therefore, granting eviction on the basis of alleged bona fide necessity is unjustified. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that both the learned Tribunals below have erred in granting a decree of eviction on the ground of bona fide necessity. He further submits that the respondents already possess ample property, whereas the petitioners occupy only a small portion (3 rooms). Therefore, granting eviction on the basis of alleged bona fide necessity is unjustified. He further submits that the respondent-landlord cannot seek a decree of eviction to develop a marriage garden or for commercial activity, to support his contention he placed reliance on a judgment of the High Court of Madras in P. Bhaskar vs. R. Karthikeyan & Another , W.P. No.19084 of 2024 and Cont. P. No.3306 of 2024 which he submits has attained finality as the Hon'ble Apex Court has dismissed the SLP preferred against the same. Therefore, he prays that the impugned orders dated 08.05.2025 and 20.02.2021 may kindly be set aside. 14. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents opposed the said submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners and supported the impugned orders and submitted that the tenanted premises, being about 100 years old, are in a dilapidated condition requiring re-development, and the landlord seeks to reconstruct the property in the interest and benefit of the society. He further submitted that both the learned Tribunals below have adequately considered the issue of bona fide necessity and have rightly ruled the said issue in favour of the landlord. To support his contention the learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in P.S. Pareed Kaka & Others vs. Shafee Ahmed Saheb , (2004) 2 SCC (Civil) 199 and Kanhaiya Lal Arya Vs. Ehshan & Ors. , SLP (C) No. 21965/2022 Therefore, he submits that the impugned order is just and proper, and does not warrant any interference by this Court. 15. Heard and considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the material available on record. 16. From a plain reading of the record, it is evident that the petition under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001, was filed in respect of the old structure constructed approximately a century ago. The case of the landlord is that the building requires demolition and reconstruction to uplift and expand the property in the interest and benefit of the society. The case of the landlord is that the building requires demolition and reconstruction to uplift and expand the property in the interest and benefit of the society. After due consideration of pleadings, evidence led by the parties i.e. AW1 and Ex. 1 to 20 as well as DW1 and Ex. A-1 to A-48, learned Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Rent Tribunal concurrently approved the bona fide need of the respondent-landlord. 17. That from the record of the case, it is evident that respondent-landlord has duly discharge the burden of proving the issue of bona fide necessity whereas the petitioner-tenant has failed to rebutted the same, that the building is not 100 years old, or that the said bona fide need is illusorily created with ulterior motive. Further, the petitioner-tenant has failed to prove their prime document i.e. Ex. A-47 by leading convincing evidence rather DW1- Suresh Kumar in his examination has stated the following: 18. Even otherwise, the only judgment relied upon by the petitioner-tenant in P. Bhaskar (Supra) is distinguishable on the facts itself as in the said case core issue was: "Whether the HR & CE Department could use the surplus funds for constructing a shopping complex in the land belonging to the temple." Whereas the present dispute is between the landlord and tenant, where the landlord is seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground that the tenanted building was built 100 years ago and now the landlord wants to demolish and reconstruct to uplift and expand the property in the interest of the society and the landlord wants to redevelop the same to cater the present needs/ for benefit of the society. 19. The contention of the petitioners that the landlord owns ample other properties and therefore does not require the suit premises is unsustainable as both the learned Tribunals recorded a concurrent finding that the petitioner failed to lead any convincing evidence in support of such contention whereas from the evidence of the respondent bona fide need is well proved. 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.S. Pareed Kaka (Supra) has reiterated the aforesaid principle, and held as under: "... 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.S. Pareed Kaka (Supra) has reiterated the aforesaid principle, and held as under: "... it is not for tenants to suggest that there was no need to demolish existing building and construct new building-Even if building was in good condition, if it was not suitable for requirement of landlord, he could demolish even a good building and put up new building to suit his requirements-" 21. Similarly, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kanhaiya Lal Arya (Supra) reiterated that it is entirely within the discretion of the landlord to decide which portion of his property he requires for his bona fide use, and the tenant cannot impose conditions on such choice. It was thus, held as under: "10.......The landlord is the best judge to decide which of his property should be vacated for satisfying his particular need. The tenant has no role in dictating as to which premises the landlord should get vacated for his need alleged in the suit for eviction." 22. Furthermore, the Delhi High Court in The Punjab State Co-Operative Supply & Marketing Federation Limited (M/s. Markfed) Versus Amit Goel & Anr., (2013) 204 DLT 63 , has reiterated the aforesaid principle and has held as under: "40. It has been held in various cases that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement of space for his residence and the tenant cannot dictate terms to the landlord as to how else the landlord can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. It is also settled law that while deciding the question of bonafides of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself. It is further settled law that suitability has to be seen from the convenience of the landlord and his family members and on the basis of the circumstances including their profession, vocation, style of living, habits and background. Landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. Reliance is placed upon the case law titled as Sudesh Kumari Soni & Anr. Versus Prabha Khanna & Anr. reported in 153 (2008) DLT 652 Paras 24 & 25." 23. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sarla Ahuja Vs. Landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. Reliance is placed upon the case law titled as Sudesh Kumari Soni & Anr. Versus Prabha Khanna & Anr. reported in 153 (2008) DLT 652 Paras 24 & 25." 23. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Company Limited , AIR 1999 SC 100 has categorically held as under: "14.....It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself." 24. Now, on the question of whether re-development of the tenanted premises falls within the meaning of bona fide necessity, this Court is in respectful agreement with the Bombay High Court's decision in Anthony Jose Nazareth Rodrigues and others Vs. Smt. Manikbai S. Vagle and ors. , 2013 1 GoaLR 495 , wherein it was held under: 17. With regard to the next contention of Shri Nigel Da Costa Frias to the effect that the whole exercise on the part of the respondents is to do commercial business in respect of the tenanted premises and as such bona fides have not been established, the learned Tribunal has assessed the material and has come to the conclusion that the bona fides of the respondents have been established. It would be appropriate to take note of the observations of the Apex Court in the judgment reported in (2004) 5 SCC 241 in the case of P.S. Pareed Kaka and others v. Shafee Ahmed Saheb, wherein the Apex Court has observed at paras 11 and 12 thus: "11. Law is well settled on this aspect. Even if the building is in a good condition, if it is not suitable for the requirement of the landlord, he can always demolish even a good building and put up a new building to suit his requirements. It is not necessary for the landlord to prove that the condition of the building is such that it requires immediate demolition particularly when the premises is required by the landlord. It is not necessary for the landlord to prove that the condition of the building is such that it requires immediate demolition particularly when the premises is required by the landlord. Therefore, it has to be held that the finding of the trial Court cannot be sustained and the High Court on re-appreciation of the evidence, rightly so, held that the landlord has established that his need for all the four petition schedule premises is bonafide and reasonable. 12. In R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Venkatesha Gupta, one of us (R.C. Lahoti, J.) speaking for the Bench while dealing with a similar provision under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act has observed as under: (SCC paras 3, 4, 12 & 13) The building in question was located in a busy business locality. It was 30 years old constructed of stones, bricks and mortar. The roof was partially of cement sheets and partially of tiles. The building occupied only a portion of the landlord's total land. It was not dilapidated and damaged. The landlord to augment his income wanted to demolish and reconstruct new building on his entire land. The proposed new building was to be a double- storeyed modern building of cement concrete providing much more total accommodation than what is available. In such circumstances the offer of the tenant that they are prepared to pay the rent at the current rate, the one which the landlord expects on reconstruction could not be a ground to refuse eviction decree to the landlord. 25. Further, as the present writ petition relates to a matter where both the learned Tribunals below have arrived at a concurrent finding qua the issue of bona fide necessity in favour of the respondent-landlord, it is apt to refer to a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rena Drego Vs. Lalchand Soni and Ors. , (1998) 3 SCC 341 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: "4. According to us, the High Court has traversed far beyond the limit of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution when the learned Single Judge reversed the decree of eviction which was based on findings of facts arrived at by the fact-finding authority upon the evidence on record. According to us, the High Court has traversed far beyond the limit of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution when the learned Single Judge reversed the decree of eviction which was based on findings of facts arrived at by the fact-finding authority upon the evidence on record. It would have been well for the High court to remind itself that it was not exercising certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution but a supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 which obliges the High Court to confine to the scrutiny of records and proceedings of the lower tribunal. By relying on fresh materials which were not before the tribunal, the High Court should not have disturbed findings of facts in exercise of such supervisory jurisdiction. it is now well nigh settled that power under Article 227 is one of judicial superintendence which cannot be used to upset conclusions of facts, however erroneous those may be, unless such conclusions are so perverse or so unreasonable that no court could ever have reached them. Way back in 1954, a Constitution Bench of this Court, in Waryam Singh and Anr. v. Amarnath and Anr., MANU/SC/0121/1954 : [1954]1SCR565 has pointed out that the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 should be exercised "most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors." (emphasis supplied) 5. The said decision was made in an appeal which considered an order passed by a Rent Control Court. Quoting the aforesaid dictum a three Judge Bench of this Court has in Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte and Anr., AIR1975SC1297 observed thus: "The power of superintendence of High Court under Article 227 being extraordinary is to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases. The power, as in the case of certiorari jurisdiction, cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which only a superior court can do in exercise of its statutory power as a court of appeal. The High Court cannot, in guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227, convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal and made the decision of the subordinate court or tribunal final on facts. The High Court cannot, in guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227, convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal and made the decision of the subordinate court or tribunal final on facts. The High Court cannot, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227, interfere with findings of fact recorded by the subordinate court or tribunal. It's function is limited to seeing that the subordinate court or tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. It cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence and appreciating it." The aforesaid position has been reiterated by the Court on subsequent occasions also (vide M/s. India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin M.A. Baker and Anr. , [1978]1 SCR 797 and Sukhbir Narain v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, AIR1987SC1645 ). 26. Thus, it is well settled that the issue of bona fide necessity has to be adjudicated according to the perspective of the landlord, and once the same has been concurrently decided by the learned Tribunals below upon a proper appreciation of evidence, it cannot ordinarily be re- appreciated and re-assessed in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 27. The learned Rent Tribunals considered the aspect of the respondent-landlord's bonafide need, and its finding was upheld by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. It is impermissible for this Court to reassess the evidence on record and reach a conclusion different from that concurrently arrived at by both the learned Tribunals below. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by the learned Rent Tribunal and learned Appellate Rent Tribunal on the issue of bonafide requirement. 28. The petitioner herein has challenged the decree and concurrent finding of both the learned Tribunals below by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The scope of a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is very limited under the supervisory jurisdiction, this Court cannot reassess the evidence. The finding of the learned Rent Tribunal and learned Appellate Rent Tribunal is on appreciation of evidence. Being a finding of fact, which is not open to interference under the supervisory jurisdiction. 29. The scope of a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is very limited under the supervisory jurisdiction, this Court cannot reassess the evidence. The finding of the learned Rent Tribunal and learned Appellate Rent Tribunal is on appreciation of evidence. Being a finding of fact, which is not open to interference under the supervisory jurisdiction. 29. After considering the entire conspectus of the case, this Court is of the view that the finding recorded by the learned Rent Tribunal and learned Appellate Rent Tribunal in both the eviction petition and the appeal, no interference is called for by exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and therefore, the present writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 30. The stay application and all pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.