JUDGMENT : K. LAKSHMAN, J. 1. Heard Mr. Naraparaju Avaneesh, learned counsel for appellant - accused and Dr. S. Prashanth, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent. 2. This appeal is filed challenging the judgment dated 09.01.2024 in S.C. No.542 of 2016 passed by learned Fast Track Special Judge for Expeditious Trial and Disposal of Rape and POCSO Act Cases, Medchal - Malkajgiri District at Kushaiguda. 3. Vide the aforesaid judgment, the trial Court convicted the appellant - accused for the offences under Sections - 448 and 506 of IPC and Section - 4 (2) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 (for short ‘POCSO Act, 2012’) and accordingly sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000 (Rupees Five Thousand Only) and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two (02) months for the offence under Section - 4 (2) of POCSO Act, 2012. He was further sentenced to undergo six (06) months and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- (Rupees One Thousand Only) for the offence under Section - 448 of IPC and in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one (01) month. He was also sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a term of seven (07) years and to pay fine of Rs.5,000 (Rupees Five Thousand Only) for the offence under Section - 506 of IPC and in default, he shall undergo simple imprisonment of two (02) months. 4. It is the case of rape on a minor girl by the appellant herein. The case of the prosecution is that PW.2 is the victim and daughter of PW.1. PW.3 and LW.6 are her grandparents. PW.4 is the Member of Child Welfare Committee (CWC), Rangareddy District. PW.5 is the circumstantial witness: i) The accused was working as Security Supervisor and uncle in relation to the victim girl (PW.2), who was pursuing 7 th Class in St. Johns High School at Neredmet. Her father died four (04) years back. She was living along with her mother (PW.1) at Nirmal Nagar. Her mother was doing tailoring work. PW.5 is the circumstantial witness: i) The accused was working as Security Supervisor and uncle in relation to the victim girl (PW.2), who was pursuing 7 th Class in St. Johns High School at Neredmet. Her father died four (04) years back. She was living along with her mother (PW.1) at Nirmal Nagar. Her mother was doing tailoring work. ii) On 12.04.2015 in the noon time at about 14:30 hours, when the victim girl was alone at home, while her mother and brother went to Church and grandparents were also out of the house, the accused came to her house and asked her to give Aadhar Card. When the victim girl went inside the bedroom, the accused entered the room, bolted inside the door, forcibly committed rape on her and threatened her not to disclose the matter to anyone. iii) Due to fear the victim girl could not reveal the same to anyone. When she felt pain on 20.04.2015, she informed her mother. On the next day, her mother informed the matter to her in-laws. As there was no response from her in-laws, she reported the same to CWC through PW.5, who in turn lodged a complaint with the Police, Kushaiguda Police Station, who registered a case in Crime No.289 of 2015 against the appellant herein and took up the same for investigation. iv) On completion of investigation, PW.9 filed a charge sheet against the appellant herein. The same was committed to the trial Court, which has taken on file as S.C. No.542 of 2016. 5. The trial Court framed charges for the offences under Sections - 448 and 506 of IPC and Section - 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012 against the accused and then proceeded with trial. 6. During trial, PWs.1 to 9 were examined, Exs.P1 to P10 were marked and no material objects were exhibited. No evidence either oral or documentary was let in on behalf of the accused. 7. After completion of evidence on behalf of the prosecution, the accused was examined under Section - 313 of Cr.P.C. Thereafter, upon hearing both sides, the trial Court recorded conviction against the appellant herein for the aforesaid offences and accordingly imposed sentences of imprisonment in the manner stated above. Challenging the said conviction and sentences of imprisonment, the appellant preferred the present appeal: 8. Challenging the said conviction and sentences of imprisonment, the appellant preferred the present appeal: 8. Learned counsel for the appellant - accused contended as follows: i. There is no ample and cogent evidence placed by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused. ii. PWs.1 to 3 and 8 turned hostile and did not support the case of prosecution. The trial Court did not consider the said aspect. iii. There is no direct evidence and the entire case rests on circumstantial evidence. iv. Exs.P1 to P10 do not establish commission of offence as alleged by the prosecution. v. There was ten (10) days delay in lodging the complaint, which is fatal to the case of prosecution. vi. The FSL report (Exs.P3 and P4) marked through PW.8 did not support the case of prosecution for the reason that there were no external injuries found as well as external genitalia was found healthy, vagina admitted two fingers and uterus anteverted, normal size, fornices free and perineum was found intact. In view of the same, the allegation of sexual assault by the appellant does not arise. Placed reliance on The State of Jharkhand v. Shailendra Kumar Rai @ Pandav Raj , 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 890. vii. The witnesses examined by the prosecution are all circumstantial witnesses. viii. The evidence of PWs.4 and 5 did not substantiate by any other evidence and, therefore, there is every possibility of implicating the appellant falsely in the present case. ix. There are omissions, inconsistencies and improvements in the evidence of prosecution witnesses and, therefore, the evidence of prosecution witnesses cannot be believed to base for conviction against the appellant herein. Placed reliance on the decision in Krishnegowda v. State of Karnataka , (2017) 13 SCC 98 . x. The accused also disputed the age of the victim girl as there was no determination of age properly. Placed reliance on the decisions in Shah Nawaz v. State of Uttar Pradesh , (2011) 13 SCC 751 ; Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana , (2013) 7 SCC 263 and P.S. Vishnupad, District Gaya v. The State of Bihar, Crl. Appeal (D) No. 914 of 2022 decided on 28.06.2024 by Patna High Court. xi. The prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Appeal (D) No. 914 of 2022 decided on 28.06.2024 by Patna High Court. xi. The prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Placed reliance on the decision in Sushik Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah , 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 864 With the aforesaid submissions, he sought to set aside the impugned judgment recording conviction and imposition of sentences against the appellant herein. 9. On the other hand, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would submit as under: i. Though there is no direct evidence and eye-witness to the occurrence, there is circumstantial evidence which proves the guilt of the accused. In fact, the victim girl (PW.2) is the direct witness to the occurrence. ii. All the circumstances form a complete chain to connect the accused in commission of offence. iii. PW.2 - victim girl is niece of the appellant. He committed rape on her. It is heinous offence and thereafter, on consideration of the said aspects only and relying on evidence, both oral and documentary, learned trial Court rightly imposed life imprisonment on the appellant. There is no error in it warranting interference by this Court. With the aforesaid submissions, he sought to dismiss the present appeal. 10. In view above rival submissions, the point that falls for consideration by this Court is: Whether the conviction and sentences of imprisonment recorded by the trial Court for the offences under Sections - 448 and 506 of IPC and Section - 4 (2) of the POCSO Act, 2012 against the appellant herein - accused are sustainable, both on facts and in law? 11. As discussed supra, vide impugned judgment, learned trial Court convicted the appellant for the offences are under Sections - 448 and 506 of IPC and Section - 4 (2) of the POCSO Act, 2012. Section - 448 of IPC (house trespass) deals with intentionally entering or remaining in the property of another person without person, while Section - 506 of IPC (Criminal Intimidation) deals with threatening a person to cause fear of injury to person, reputation or property. Section - 4 (2) of the POCSO Act, 2012 deals with committing a penetrative sexual assault on a child below 16 years of age. 12. Section - 4 (2) of the POCSO Act, 2012 deals with committing a penetrative sexual assault on a child below 16 years of age. 12. Keeping in view the purport of the aforesaid offences, it has to be seen whether the prosecution proved the said offences against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt or not and that the trial Court was right in recording conviction on the appellant. 13. PW.1 is the mother of the victim. According to her, PW.2 is her daughter, victim girl. The appellant herein - accused is the husband of elder sister of her husband. PW.3 and LW.6 are her in-laws: i) PW.1 was examined in chief on 21.01.2021. In her chief examination, she deposed that her husband died in the year 2011 in a road accident. She has a son and daughter (PW.2 - victim girl). After the death of her husband, she along with her children is staying with her in-laws at Nirmal Nagar, Sainikpuri, Hyderabad. She is doing tailoring work in Gayathri Saree House, Sainikpuri. The accused and his wife are residing at Vayupuri and they used to come to her house frequently. ii) PW.1 further deposed that on 20.04.2015 at about 9.00 P.M., she returned home from the tailoring shop and found her daughter weeping. On her enquiry, PW.2 informed her that she is getting pain in the stomach, at vagina and showed it to her which was very reddish. On her insistence as to what happened, PW.2 told her that on 12.04.2015 in between 12.00 noon and 1.00 p.m., when she (PW.2) was alone in the house, the accused came and asked her to give her Aadhar Card and then when she went into the bed room to search for the Aadhar Card, the accused followed her into the room and bolted the door from inside. When she questioned the accused as to why he is bolting the door, he caught her and raped her. PW.1 asked the victim as to why she did not disclose the same immediately. The victim told her that the accused threatened her if she discloses the same to anyone, he would kill her. Therefore, she did not tell the same to anyone immediately. The victim also told PW.1 that the accused threatened that he would send all of them out of house. The victim told her that the accused threatened her if she discloses the same to anyone, he would kill her. Therefore, she did not tell the same to anyone immediately. The victim also told PW.1 that the accused threatened that he would send all of them out of house. iii) PW.1 further deposed that on the next day, she informed the same to her in-laws, who did not respond. Therefore, she informed the matter to her employer, Gayathri Reddy (PW.5), who called the victim and enquired. PW.5 informed the incident to the Child Welfare Committee. The victim was studying 7 th class in St. John’s School, Neredmet at the time of incident and she was aged about 14 years then. PW.1, Member of the said Child Welfare Committee, gave report to the Police, Kushaiguda, who came to them and enquired about the incident. The victim was taken to Gandhi Hospital, Secunderabad. iv) After completion of her chief-examination, at the request of learned counsel for the accused, her cross-examination was deferred. However, she was cross-examined on 09.12.2021 i.e., 10 months 18 days later. During cross-examination, PW.1 resiled from her earlier chief-examination and stated that her statement was not recorded by police and that she did not state before the police with regard to what all she deposed in her chief examination. However, she stated that there are property disputes between her family and the family of her sister-in-law. She also admitted that the accused did not commit any offence against her daughter and that under the influence of police, she stated in her chief examination against the accused to prevent them from visiting her house. She further admitted that at the instance of Gayathri Reddy (PW.5), the case was registered against the accused on the report given by PW.4. At that stage, learned Additional Public Prosecutor sought permission of the trial Court to cross-examine her as she resiled from her earlier chief examination on 21.01.2021. The trial Court permitted to cross-examine this witness. v) During cross-examination done by learned Additional Public Prosecutor, PW.1 denied the suggestion that she is deposing falsely at the instance of her parents-in-law (PW.3 and LW.6) and the accused as they demanded her for compromise of the case and that she stated the real facts before the trial Court in her chief-examination on 21.01.2021. 14. v) During cross-examination done by learned Additional Public Prosecutor, PW.1 denied the suggestion that she is deposing falsely at the instance of her parents-in-law (PW.3 and LW.6) and the accused as they demanded her for compromise of the case and that she stated the real facts before the trial Court in her chief-examination on 21.01.2021. 14. PW.2 - victim girl was examined in-chief on the very same day on which her mother (PW.1) was examined i.e., 21.01.2021. In her chief-examination, she also deposed on the same lines as that of her mother. Her cross-examination was also deferred. She was also cross-examined by learned counsel for the accused after 10 months 18 days i.e., 09.12.2021 on which date her mother - PW.1 was also cross- examined. This witness also resiled from her chief-examination. Therefore, learned Additional Public Prosecutor sought permission of the trial Court to cross-examine her and the trial Court permitted to cross-examine this witness. She denied the suggestion that she is deposing falsely at the instance of her paternal grandparents, paternal aunt (wife of the accused) and her mother and that she deposed the true facts regarding the incident on 21.01.2021. 15. PW.3 - mother PW.1 and grandmother of the victim girl (PW.2) was examined in chief on 16.12.2021 (i.e., after six days of cross-examination of PWs.1 and 2) also did not support the prosecution case and, therefore, she was declared hostile. Learned trial Court permitted learned Additional Public Prosecutor to cross- examine her. During cross-examination by learned Additional Public Prosecutor, she denied the suggestion that the accused committed penetrative sexual assault against PW.2 on 12.04.2015 during the afternoon hours and that she stated before the police as in Ex.P1 and that she is deposing false to help the accused, who is her son-in-law. i) During cross-examination by learned counsel for the accused, she admitted that PW.1 used to quarrel with her and her husband for partition of property and that PW.1 also used to beat her for the same. She and her husband used to inform the said harassment to the accused and her daughter. The accused used to pacify PW.1 that the partition of the property shall take place after the life of her husband and herself and that for the said reason, PW.1 used to lock the main gate to prevent accused and her daughter from entering their house. 16. The accused used to pacify PW.1 that the partition of the property shall take place after the life of her husband and herself and that for the said reason, PW.1 used to lock the main gate to prevent accused and her daughter from entering their house. 16. Thus, the trial Court committed an error in deferring cross-examination of PWs.1 and 2 for more than 10 months and virtually allowed the appellant - accused to gain over PWs.1 and 2 and also PW.3. 17. PW.4, the then Member of Child Welfare Committee, Rangareddy District, deposed with regard to PW.5 referring the victim girl (PW.2) and her mother (PW.1) to her office with regard to sexual assault against PW.2. Pursuant to the said information, she directed the District Child Protection Unit Officer to enquire into the matter and submit a report to their Committee. The District Child Protection Unit Officer submitted a report to their office stating that sexual offence took place against PW.2. Basing on the said report, she along with Chairperson, CWC, Smt. Padmavathi went to the shop of PW.5 and recorded the statements of PWs.1 and 2. Thereafter, she lodge Ex.P1 - report with the police, Kushaiguda to take action against the accused. She was examined by the police: i) During cross-examination, PW.4 denied the suggestion that PW.5 never informed her over phone regarding the facts stated by her in her chief-examination and that she never referred PWs.1 and 2 to her (PW.4) office. Thus, nothing useful was elicited from PW.4 during cross-examination. 18. PW.5 deposed that she is running Gayathri Saree House at Sainikpuri, where PW.1 is working as Tailor. On 22.04.2015 in the morning hours, PW.1 came to her along with her daughter, PW.2, and informed her about commission of rape by the accused on PW.2 and threat given by him not to reveal the said incident. She made a telephone call to PW.4 and informed the said incident. PW.4 came to her shop on the same date and enquired PWs.1 and 2 on the said incident. PW.4 went to Police Station, Kushaiguda and registered a case against the accused. She was examined by the police. At the date of incident, PW.2 was aged 14 years and was studying 7 th Class: i) During cross-examination, she firmly denied the suggestion that her deposition was false. Nothing useful was elicited from her during cross-examination. 19. PW.4 went to Police Station, Kushaiguda and registered a case against the accused. She was examined by the police. At the date of incident, PW.2 was aged 14 years and was studying 7 th Class: i) During cross-examination, she firmly denied the suggestion that her deposition was false. Nothing useful was elicited from her during cross-examination. 19. The Head Mistress of St. Johns Grammar High School, Neredmet, Hyderabad, was examined as PW.6 to prove the age of the victim girl. She deposed that Ex.P2 - Bona fide Certificate and Conduct Certificate dated 21.11.2015 was issued by her in the name of victim girl stating that she is studying 7 th Class in their school during the academic year 2014-15 and as per their records, the date of birth of the victim girl is 08.12.2001. She was also examined by the police. During cross-examination, nothing was elicited from her to disprove the prosecution case. 20. PW.7 is the doctor, who treated PW.2 - victim girl. She was working as an Associate Professor, Department of Obstetrician and Gynecology, Gandhi Hospital at the relevant point of time. On 22.04.2015 at 9.30 P.M., she examined the victim girl, aged 14 years and found no external injuries. PW.2’s external genitalia was found healthy, vagina was admitting two fingers, uterus anteverted, normal size, Fornices free and perineum was found intact. She collected vaginal smears and forwarded the same to FSL Report, Hyderabad, for chemical examination. On receipt of FSL Report (Ex.P4), she gave her final opinion vide Ex.P3, dated 07.12.2015. As per FSL report (Ex.P4), dated 03.06.2015, there is evidence of sexual intercourse. Thus, prosecution examined PW.7 to prove that there was sexual assault on PW.2 - victim girl: i) During cross-examination, this witness admitted that she examined the victim girl ten (10) days after the incident. As per her report, Ex.P3, the victim was allegedly sexually assaulted on 12.04.2015 at 2.30 P.M. She admitted that generally in rape cases, hymen will be ruptured of the victim. In this case, there is no hymen. She did not observe any injuries on the vagina of the victim girl. 21. PW.8 is the panch witness for the scene of offence. Since he did not support the prosecution case, he was declared hostile. In this case, there is no hymen. She did not observe any injuries on the vagina of the victim girl. 21. PW.8 is the panch witness for the scene of offence. Since he did not support the prosecution case, he was declared hostile. During the course of cross-examination by learned In-Charge Special Public Prosecutor, this witness denied the suggestion that on 22.04.2015 at 7.30 P.M., the police conducted a panchanama and drafted sketch at H.No.6-2-33 of Nirmal Nagar and that he acted as one of the mediators for the said panchanama and sketch. 22. PW.9, the Investigating Officer, deposed with regard to his receipt of Ex.P1 - report from PW.4 and pursuant to the same, registration of a case in Crime No.289 of 2015 and issuance of Ex.P7 - FIR. He also deposed with regard to examination and recording statement of PW.4 and thereafter PWs.1 and 2 and conducting of scene of offence panchanama in the presence of PW.8 and LW.8. He further deposed about arresting the accused on 25.04.2015 at 8.00 A.M. and sending him to potency test. LW.12 examined the accused and issued Ex.P10 - potency certificate and, thereafter, he sent the accused to the Magistrate for judicial remand. He also collected Ex.P2 - bona fide certificate of PW.2. After completion of investigation, he laid charge sheet against the accused for the aforesaid offences: i) During cross-examination, nothing useful was elicited from this witness by the accused. ii) On consideration of the said evidence, both oral and documentary, learned trial Court convicted the appellant herein and imposed sentence in the manner stated above. Challenging the said judgment, the appellant preferred the present appeal. 23. The POCSO Act, 2012, is a special, victim-oriented legislation enacted to provide a robust legal framework for safeguarding children below 18 years from sexual assault and exploitation. The Act recognizes the vulnerability of minors and, therefore, imposes stringent punishments, particularly for penetrative sexual assault. Section 4(2) of the Act prescribes enhanced and severe penalties, including imprisonment for a term not less than twenty years, extending to imprisonment for life, reflecting the gravity of sexual assault on a child. The Act recognizes the vulnerability of minors and, therefore, imposes stringent punishments, particularly for penetrative sexual assault. Section 4(2) of the Act prescribes enhanced and severe penalties, including imprisonment for a term not less than twenty years, extending to imprisonment for life, reflecting the gravity of sexual assault on a child. Further, under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, 2012 once the prosecution establishes foundational facts such as the age of the victim and the occurrence of the assault, the law raises a statutory presumption of guilt against the accused, thereby strengthening the protective scheme intended for children. Courts are therefore required to adopt a sensitive and child-centric approach while dealing with offences under this special Statute. 24. The object of the POCSO Act, 2012 is to protect children from Sexual Offences. It is constitutional obligation in terms of Article - 15 (3) of the Constitution of India. 25. It is also relevant to note that procedure is prescribed under the POCSO Act, 2012 for the offences, including recording of evidence, determination of age of the child etc. 26. It is contended by learned counsel for the appellant-accused that the mother and the victim girl (PW.1 and PW.2) did not support the prosecution case during cross-examination. Even PW.3, the grandmother of the victim girl also did not support the prosecution case. He further contended that PW.8, one of the mediators for scene of offence panchanama also did not support the prosecution case. Therefore, the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Without considering the said aspects, the trial Court recorded conviction and, therefore, he sought to set aside the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant. 27. Perusal of evidence of PWs.1 and 2 would reveal that they supported the prosecution case during chief-examination conducted on 21.01.2021. They did not support the case of prosecution during cross-examination conducted on 09.12.2021 with regard to what they have deposed in their chief-examination. Thus, PW.1 and PW.2 were cross-examined after elapse of 10 months 18 days of their chief- examinations. In the meantime, according to the prosecution, they must have gained over by the accused and, therefore, they did not speak on the lines of their chief-examination. It is settled law that the mere fact that PW.1 - mother of the victim girl and PW-2 - victim girl turned hostile does not wipe out the prosecution case. In the meantime, according to the prosecution, they must have gained over by the accused and, therefore, they did not speak on the lines of their chief-examination. It is settled law that the mere fact that PW.1 - mother of the victim girl and PW-2 - victim girl turned hostile does not wipe out the prosecution case. It is also well- settled law that evidence of hostile witnesses can be relied upon to the extent it supports the prosecution. 28. PW.2 - victim girl deposed in her chief-examination and the same is as sunder: “In the year 2015, I was studying in 7th class in St. John's High School at Neredmet. 12.04.2015 was Sunday. At about 02.00 p.m., on that day, I was alone present in the house. My grandfather Ramaiah/LW6 went to his duty and grandmother Kotamma/LW5 went to the house of the accused at that time. My mother/PW1 went to Church and my brother went to his friends for playing at that time. The accused and his wife are residing at Vayupuri which is nearby our house. The accused and his wife were visiting our house frequently. On that day i.e., on 12.04.2015, at about 02.00 p.m., the accused came to our house and asked me to give my Aadhar Card. I went inside the bedroom and was searching for Aadhar Card. The accused came from my behind and bolted the door from inside and came to me and caught me. I started shouting as what he is doing. The accused shut my mouth and tried to remove my clothes. The accused removed my clothes. He removed his pant and underwear. He had sex with me by force for about half an hour. While leaving the house, the accused threatened me that if I disclose the said incident to anyone he will kill me and he will send all of us out of the house. Due to fear, I did not tell the said incident to anyone. I was getting pain at vagina. I was getting bleeding also from vagina. On 20.04.2015, I got severe pain in my vagina. On that day at about 09.00 or 09.30 p.m., my mother/PW1 returned from her duty. I was weeping then. My mother/PW1 asked me as to why I am weeping. I told my mother/PW1 about the act done by the accused. I showed my vagina to my mother/PW1. On 20.04.2015, I got severe pain in my vagina. On that day at about 09.00 or 09.30 p.m., my mother/PW1 returned from her duty. I was weeping then. My mother/PW1 asked me as to why I am weeping. I told my mother/PW1 about the act done by the accused. I showed my vagina to my mother/PW1. My mother/PW1 found a cyst at my vagina. My mother/PW1 went to my grandparents to inform the incident. But, since it was 11.00p.m., they were sleeping and, therefore, my mother/PW1 did not tell them about the incident. On the next day morning, my mother/PW1 told my grandparents about the incident. My grandparents did not respond. Hence, on 22.04.2015, my mother/PW1 informed the incident to her employer Gayathri Reddy/LW4. The said madam asked me as to what happened. I told her about the act done by the accused. The said madam called the Child Welfare people and they came and enquired with me. The Child Welfare People complained the matter to Kushaiguda Police. The police also enquired with me about the incident. A police madam took me to Gandhi Hospital, Secunderabad.” 29. PW.2 - mother of the victim girl deposed in her chief-examination and the same is as sunder: “On 20.04.2015, at about 09.00 p.m., I returned home from the tailoring shop. I found my daughter (victim) weeping. I asked her as to what happened. She told me that she is getting pain in the stomach and also at her vagina. She showed her vagina to me. The vagina was very reddish. I insisted her as to what happened. She told me that on 12.04.2015, in between 12.00 noon and 01.00 p.m., when she was alone present in the house. the accused came and asked her to give her Aadhar Card and then she went into the bed room to search for the Aadhar Card and the accused followed her into the room and bolted the door from inside and when she questioned the accused as to why he is bolting the door, he caught her and raped her I asked the victim as to why she did not disclose the same immediately. She told me that the accused threatened her that if she discloses the same to anyone, he will kill her and therefore, she did not tell the same to anyone immediately. She told me that the accused threatened her that if she discloses the same to anyone, he will kill her and therefore, she did not tell the same to anyone immediately. The victim also told me that the accused threatened that he will send all of us out of the house. On the next day morning I informed the same to my in-laws. But, my in-laws did not respond. So, I informed the matter to my employer Gayathri Reddy/LW4. Then she called the victim and enquired with her. Gayathri Reddy/LW4 informed the incident to Child Welfare Committee. My daughter (victim) was studying in 7th class in St. John's School, Neredmet at that time. She was aged about 14 years then. Vijayadevi/LW1 gave complaint to Kushaiguda Police. The police came to us and enquired about the incident. The victim was taken to Gandhi Hospital, Secunderabad.” 30. It is settled law that the testimony of a hostile witness can be relied upon by the prosecution as well as the defence. [ See: Selvamani v. The State, Rep. by the Inspector of Police , 2024 INSC 393 ]. 31. In view of the aforesaid evidence and the principle laid down in the aforesaid decision, the deposition of PW.1 and PW.2 to the extent relevant can be considered. Though PW.3 and PW.8 did not support the case of prosecution, still there is evidence of other witnesses including medical evidence to prove the case of prosecution. As discussed supra, even the evidence of PWs.1 and 2 can be relied upon to the extent it is useful to the case of prosecution. PW.2 - victim girl specifically deposed that the appellant had sex with her by force for about half an hour. The said evidence proves that the appellant - accused committed the aforesaid offences. Therefore, the said contention of learned counsel for the appellant that prosecution failed to prove the offence against the appellant cannot be countenanced. 32. It is apt to note that the Apex Court in Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab , (2015) 3 SCC 220 held as under: “51. It is necessary, though painful, to note that PW 7 was examined-in-chief on 30-9-1999 and was cross-examined on 25-5-2001, almost after 1 year and 8 months. The delay in said cross- examination, as we have stated earlier had given enough time for prevarication due to many a reason. It is necessary, though painful, to note that PW 7 was examined-in-chief on 30-9-1999 and was cross-examined on 25-5-2001, almost after 1 year and 8 months. The delay in said cross- examination, as we have stated earlier had given enough time for prevarication due to many a reason. A fair trial is to be fair both to the defence and the prosecution as well as to the victim. An offence registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act is to be tried with all seriousness. We fail to appreciate how the learned trial Judge could exhibit such laxity in granting so much time for cross-examination in a case of this nature. It would have been absolutely appropriate on the part of the learned trial Judge to finish the cross- examination on the day the said witness was examined. As is evident, for no reason whatsoever it was deferred and the cross-examination took place after 20 months. The witness had all the time in the world to be gained over. We have already opined that he was declared hostile and re-examined. 52. It is settled in law that the testimony of a hostile witness can be relied upon by the prosecution as well as the defence. In re- examination by the Public Prosecutor, PW 7 has accepted about the correctness of his statement in the court on 13-9- 1999. He has also accepted that he had not made any complaint to the Presiding Officer of the court in writing or verbally that the Inspector was threatening him to make a false statement in the court. It has also been accepted by him that he had given the statement in the court on account of fear of false implication by the Inspector. He has agreed to have signed his statement dated 13-9-1999 after going through and admitting it to be correct. It has come in the re- examination that PW 7 had not stated in his statement dated 13- 9-1999 in the court that recovery of tainted money was not effected in his presence from the accused or that he had been told by the Inspector that amount has been recovered from the accused. He had also not stated in his said statement that the accused and witnesses were taken to the Tehsil and it was there that he had signed all the memos. 53. He had also not stated in his said statement that the accused and witnesses were taken to the Tehsil and it was there that he had signed all the memos. 53. Reading the evidence in entirety, PW 7's evidence cannot be brushed aside. The delay in cross-examination has resulted in his prevarication from the examination-in-chief. But, a significant one, his examination-in-chief and the reexamination impels us to accept the testimony that he had gone into the octroi post and had witnessed about the demand and acceptance of money by the accused. In his cross-examination he has stated that he had not gone with Baj Singh to the Vigilance Department at any time and no recovery was made in his presence. The said part of the testimony, in our considered view, does not commend acceptance in the backdrop of entire evidence in examination in- chief and the re-examination. xxx xxx xxx 57. Before parting with the case we are constrained to reiterate what we have said in the beginning. We have expressed our agony and anguish for the manner in which trials in respect of serious offences relating to corruption are being conducted by the trial courts: 57.1. Adjournments are sought on the drop of a hat by the counsel, even though the witness is present in court, contrary to all principles of holding a trial. That apart, after the examination-inchief of a witness is over, adjournment is sought for cross examination and the disquieting feature is that the trial courts grant time. The law requires special reasons to be recorded for grant of time but the same is not taken note of. 57.2. As has been noticed earlier, in the instant case the cross-examination has taken place after a year and 8 months allowing ample time to pressurise the witness and to gain over him by adopting all kinds of tactics. 57.3. There is no cavil over the proposition that there has to be a fair and proper trial but the duty of the court while conducting the trial is to be guided by the mandate of the law, the conceptual fairness and above all bearing in mind its sacrosanct duty to arrive at the truth on the basis of the material brought on record. If an accused for his benefit takes the trial on the path of total mockery, it cannot be countenanced. If an accused for his benefit takes the trial on the path of total mockery, it cannot be countenanced. The court has a sacred duty to see that the trial is conducted as per law. If adjournments are granted in this manner it would tantamount to violation of the rule of law and eventually turn such trials to a farce. It is legally impermissible and jurisprudentially abominable. The trial courts are expected in law to follow the command of the procedure relating to trial and not yield to the request of the counsel to grant adjournment for non-acceptable reasons. 57.4. In fact, it is not at all appreciable to call a witness for cross-examination after such a long span of time. It is imperative if the examination- in chief is over, the cross-examination should be completed on the same day. If the examination of a witness continues till late hours the trial can be adjourned to the next day for cross- examination. It is inconceivable in law that the cross-examination should be deferred for such a long time. It is anathema to the concept of proper and fair trial. 57.5. The duty of the court is to see that not only the interest of the accused as per law is protected but also the societal and collective interest is safeguarded. It is distressing to note that despite series of judgments of this Court, the habit of granting adjournment, really an ailment, continues. How long shall we say, “Awake! Arise!”. There is a constant discomfort. Therefore, we think it appropriate that the copies of the judgment be sent to the learned Chief Justices of all the High Courts for circulating the same among the learned trial Judges with a command to follow the principles relating to trial in a requisite manner and not to defer the cross-examination of a witness at their pleasure or at the leisure of the defence counsel, for it eventually makes the trial an apology for trial and compels the whole society to suffer chicanery. Let it be remembered that law cannot be allowed to be lonely; a destitute.” 33. Relying on the said judgment, the Apex Court also taken a similar view in Rajesh Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh , (2022) 12 SCC 200 . 34. Let it be remembered that law cannot be allowed to be lonely; a destitute.” 33. Relying on the said judgment, the Apex Court also taken a similar view in Rajesh Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh , (2022) 12 SCC 200 . 34. Referring on the aforesaid two judgments in Selvamani 7 the Apex Court held that the testimony of a hostile witness can be relied upon by the prosecution as well as the defence. In the present case, mere fact that PW.1 – mother of the victim girl and PW.2 - victim girl turned hostile does not wipe out the prosecution case and that evidence of hostile witnesses can be relied upon to the extent it supports the prosecution. In the said judgment, the Apex Court also observed thus: “13. In the present case also, it appears that, on account of a long gap between the examination- in-chief and cross examination, the witnesses were won over by the accused and they resiled from the version as deposed in the examination- in-chief which fully incriminates the accused However, when the evidence of the victim as well as her mother (PW-2) and aunt (PW-3) is tested with the FIR, the statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC and the evidence of the Medical Expert (PW-8), we find that there is sufficient corroboration to the version given by the prosecutrix in her examination-in-chief. 14. Insofar as the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the judgment of this Court in the case of Rai Sandeep alias Deepu (supra) is concerned, the said case can be distinguished, inasmuch as in the said case except a minor abrasion on the right side of the neck below jaw, there were no other injuries on the private part of the prosecutrix, although it was allegedly a forcible gang rape. As such, the said judgment would not be applicable in the present case.” 35. As discussed supra, in the present case, learned trial Court recorded the examination-in-chief of PW.1 and PW.2 on 21.01.2021 and their cross-examination on 09.12.2021. Thus, it appears on account of a long gap between the examination-in-chief and cross- examination, PW.1 and PW.2 were won over by the accused and they resiled from the version as deposed in the examination-in-chief, which fully incriminates the accused. The said aspect was also considered by the Apex Court in Selvamani (supra). 36. Thus, it appears on account of a long gap between the examination-in-chief and cross- examination, PW.1 and PW.2 were won over by the accused and they resiled from the version as deposed in the examination-in-chief, which fully incriminates the accused. The said aspect was also considered by the Apex Court in Selvamani (supra). 36. It is also contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the age of the victim girl (PW.2) was not determined, that the Investigating Officer did not collect any evidence on the said aspect and that the Investigating Officer did not follow the procedure laid down under POSCO Act, 2012 and, therefore, on this ground alone, conviction can be set aside. 37. In this regard, the prosecution examined PW.6, the Head Mistress of St. Johns Grammar High School, Neredmet. In the said school, the victim girl studied 7 th class during the academic year 2014-15. PW.6 has produced bona fide and conduct certificate of PW.2 - victim girl and the same was marked as Ex.P2. In Ex.P2, the date of birth of the victim girl is mentioned as 08.12.2001. The incident occurred on 12.04.2015. Thus, as per Ex.P2, the age of the victim girl as on the date of incident was 13 (Thirteen) years four (04) months four (04) days as on the date of incident. Though suggestions were made to PW.6 that contents of Ex.P2 are not true and correct, that she issued Ex.P2 at the instance of police officials and that the victim girl is not studying in their school etc., the same were denied by her. Except that, there is no other evidence produced by the accused to disprove Ex.P2. Thus, the evidence of PW.6 cannot be brushed aside. 38. It is apt to note that under POCSO Act, 2012 and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (for short ‘J.J. Act’), age of child-victim is to be determined Section - 94 of the J.J. Act, when the age of the victim is doubtful, the Statutory procedure laid down under J.J. Act is applicable to determine age of the victim. The Court/Special Court must follow the hierarchy of proof (school/matriculation certificate/birth certificate/medical test), and must record written reasons for its determination. 39. Section - 94 of the J.J. Act deals with ‘Presumption and determination of age’ it is relevant and the same is extracted as under: “94. The Court/Special Court must follow the hierarchy of proof (school/matriculation certificate/birth certificate/medical test), and must record written reasons for its determination. 39. Section - 94 of the J.J. Act deals with ‘Presumption and determination of age’ it is relevant and the same is extracted as under: “94. Presumption and determination of age. (1) Where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under section 14 or section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age. (2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining— (i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof; (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board: Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date of such order. (3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person.” 40. Even, PW.5, in whose Saree House, the mother of the victim girl was working at the relevant point of time also deposed with regard to the age of the victim girl. In fact, after the incident, PW.1 and PW.2 approached her and disclosed about the aforesaid incident. She is familiar with them. Even, PW.5, in whose Saree House, the mother of the victim girl was working at the relevant point of time also deposed with regard to the age of the victim girl. In fact, after the incident, PW.1 and PW.2 approached her and disclosed about the aforesaid incident. She is familiar with them. During cross-examination, no suggestion was put to her with regard to the age of the victim girl, though there is a reference in her chief-examination. Therefore, her evidence also cannot be brushed aside. 41. PW.7, the doctor, who examined the victim girl, also deposed with regard to the age of victim girl as 14 years. Even in Ex.P3, medical report, the doctor mentioned the age of the victim girl as 14 years. There was no suggestion by the accused to PW.7 with regard to the age of the victim girl. Thus, there is no rebuttal evidence to disbelieve the evidence of PW.7. 42. PW.9 - Investigating Officer also deposed with regard to his examination of the aforesaid witnesses and collection of Ex.P2 - bona fide and conduct certificate from the school of PW.6. The accused did not put a suggestion with regard to age of the victim girl during cross-examination of this witness. Thus, the evidence of this witness also cannot be brushed aside. 43. In Shah Nawaz (supra) the Apex Court held as under: “19) The documents furnished above clearly show that the date of birth of the appellant had been noted as 18.06.1989. Rule 12 of the Rules categorically envisages that the medical opinion from the medical board should be sought only when the matriculation certificate or school certificate or any birth certificate issued by a corporation or by any Panchayat or municipality is not available. We are of the view that though the Board has correctly accepted the entry relating to the date of birth in the mark sheet and school certificate, the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court committed a grave error in determining the age of the appellant ignoring the date of birth mentioned in those documents which is illegal, erroneous and contrary to the Rules. 20) We are satisfied that the entry relating to date of birth entered in the mark sheet is one of the valid proof of evidence for determination of age of an accused person. 20) We are satisfied that the entry relating to date of birth entered in the mark sheet is one of the valid proof of evidence for determination of age of an accused person. The School Leaving Certificate is also a valid proof in determining the age of the accused person. Further, the date of birth mentioned in the High School mark sheet produced by the appellant has duly been corroborated by the School Leaving Certificate of the appellant of Class X and has also been proved by the statement of the clerk of Nehru High School, Dadheru, KhurdO-Kalan and recorded by the Board. The date of birth of the appellant has also been recorded as 18.06.1989 in School Leaving Certificate issued by the Principal of Nehru Preparatory School, Dadheru, Khurd-O- Kalan, Muzaffarnagar as well as the said date of birth mentioned in the school register of the said school at S. No. 1382 which have been proved by the statement of the Principal of that school recorded before the Board. Apart from the clerk and the Principal of the school, the mother of the appellant has categorically stated on oath that the appellant was born on 18.06.1989 and his date of birth in his academic records from preparatory to Class X is the same, namely, 18.06.1989, hence her statement corroborated his academic records which clearly depose his date of birth as 18.06.1989. Accordingly, the appellant was a juvenile on the date of occurrence that is 04.06.2007 as alleged in the FIR dated 04.06.2007.” 44. In P. Yuvaprakash v. State , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 846 , the Apex Court having considered Section - 34 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and Section - 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, held as under: “13. It is evident from conjoint reading of the above provisions that wherever the dispute with respect to the age of a person arises in the context of her or him being a victim under the POCSO Act, the courts have to take recourse to the steps indicated in Section 94 of the JJ Act. It is evident from conjoint reading of the above provisions that wherever the dispute with respect to the age of a person arises in the context of her or him being a victim under the POCSO Act, the courts have to take recourse to the steps indicated in Section 94 of the JJ Act. The three documents in order of which the Juvenile Justice Act requires consideration is that the concerned court has to determine the age by considering the following documents: “(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof; (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board” ” 45. In Rajni v. State of Uttar Pradesh , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1183 , the Apex Court held that documentary evidence, like school certificate or birth certificate must generally be given primacy over medical opinion when it comes to age determination, if the documentary proof is valid and credible. The same was also reiterated by the Apex Court in Hansraj v. State of U.P. , 2025 INSC 1211 . 46. In Birka Shiva v. The State of Telangana , 2025 INSC 863 , the Apex court observed that while a school certificate or school-issued birth certificate is admissible under law (e.g. under Evidence Act, 1872), its contents do not automatically have probative valu e . What matters is whether the source of the information has been properly tested i.e., who furnished the date of birth, on what basis, and whether that person was examined as a witness. 47. In view of the aforesaid legal proposition, in the present case, the prosecution has examined PW.5 - Headmistress of the School, when the PW.2 - victim girl studied and marked Ex.P2 - bona fide and conduct certificate to prove the age of the victim girl as below 14 years. There is no rebuttal evidence adduced by the accused. It is settled law that if the victim is a minor then though there is consent or lack of consent is irrelevant. 48. There is no rebuttal evidence adduced by the accused. It is settled law that if the victim is a minor then though there is consent or lack of consent is irrelevant. 48. Section - 2 (d) of the POCSO Act, 2012 defines “child”, which means any person below the age of eighteen years. In this case, since the victim girl is below 14 years, she comes within the meaning of ‘child’ as defined under Section - 2 (d) of the POCSO Act, 2012. In the light of the same, the contentions of learned counsel for the appellant - accused that the age of the victim girl is not 14 years and that no procedure was followed for determination of her age etc., are unsustainable. 49. Another contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant is that the statement of victim girl in POCSO Act Case shall be recorded by a woman Police Officer not below the rank of Sub- Inspector, whereas in the present case, PW.9, the Investigating Officer being a Male Officer recorded the statement of the victim girl without following the procedure laid down under POCSO Act, 2012 and, therefore, the entire investigation conducted by the Investigating Officer is against the procedure laid down under POCSO Act, 2012 and, therefore, the same would be vitiated. Without considering the said aspect, learned trial Court recorded conviction against the appellant and on this ground alone, conviction has to be set aside. 50. In the light of the aforesaid submission, it is apt to note that Section - 24 (1) of the POCSO Act, 2012 says the statement of a child “shall be recorded at the residence of the child or at a place where she usually resides or at the place of her choice and “as far as practicable” by a woman police officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector. The purpose of the Section is to ensure comfort and protection of the child. If a male Officer records the statement without causing intimidation and with safeguards, the investigation is not vitiated. The said requirement is directory, not mandatory. A bsence of a woman officer does not by itself destroy the prosecution case. If the child’s mother, father, guardian, or trusted person was present during the recording, the legislative intent of protection and comfort is fulfilled. The said requirement is directory, not mandatory. A bsence of a woman officer does not by itself destroy the prosecution case. If the child’s mother, father, guardian, or trusted person was present during the recording, the legislative intent of protection and comfort is fulfilled. In this case, PW.9, the Investigating Officer examined the victim girl and recorded her statement in the presence of her mother (PW.1) and PW.5. An irregularity in investigation does not vitiate the trial unless prejudice to the accused or victim is proved as held by the Apex Court in C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu , (2010) 9 SCC 567 . 51. In view of the above, recording of a victim’s statement in a POCSO case by a male Investigating Officer is not fatal , and does not vitiate the proceedings, as long as the child was comfortable and not coerced; a guardian/support person was present; the statement is voluntary; no prejudice is shown by defence. This is a curable irregularity, not a substantive illegality. Therefore, the said contention of learned counsel for the appellant is also not sustainable. 52. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is apt to note that a conviction can still be based on medical evidence, circumstantial evidence, and official witnesses when they are reliable and cogent. In this case, as per the evidence of PW.7, the doctor and report given by her vide Ex.P3, there is evidence of sexual intercourse. Medical evidence is an independent, expert and reliable piece of evidence, not affected by the hostility of lay witnesses. When medical evidence is consistent with prosecution case and rules out accidental or self- inflicted injury, it can sustain conviction under Section - 4(2) POCSO Act, 2012, which prescribes minimum 20 years to life imprisonment. Even the evidence of PW.9, Investigating Officer is reliable and corroborates medical evidence. The evidence of PW.9 with regard to sending the victim girl for medical examination, conducting scene of offence panchanama obtaining medical report and arrest of the accused consistent, unimpeached and c orroborates the medical evidence. 53. As already discussed above, hostility of panch witnesses does not affect the case when the Investigating Officer properly proves the scene of offence panchanama. The victim girl’s hostility is due to pressure or intimidation. In sexual offences, especially involving minors, victims frequently turn hostile due to threats, social stigma, or pressure from the accused. 53. As already discussed above, hostility of panch witnesses does not affect the case when the Investigating Officer properly proves the scene of offence panchanama. The victim girl’s hostility is due to pressure or intimidation. In sexual offences, especially involving minors, victims frequently turn hostile due to threats, social stigma, or pressure from the accused. Therefore, hostility does not break the chain of circumstances , especially when medical evidence is strong and corroboration. 54. In this case, c ircumstantial evidence forms a complete chain in the manner that the appellant - accused’s presence at the victim’s house; medical findings of sexual assault; Investigating Officer’s evidence proving prompt complaint, scene of offence and medical referral. Thus, we hold that the circumstances reasonably and firmly point only to the accused and exclude all other hypotheses. Therefore, the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and the appellant - accused failed to rebut the same. Having considered all the said aspects, the trial Court imposed sentences for the offences under Sections - 448 and 506 of IPC in the manner stated above, and there is no illegality in it. 55. With regard to offence under Section - 4 (2) of the POCSO Act, 2012, whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child below sixteen years of age shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life of that person and shall also be liable to fine. The trial Court imposed life imprisonment on the appellant - accused for the said offence. 56. As discussed above, the victim was a minor girl. The act involved penetrative sexual assault is heinous one, invoking minimum punishment. The brutality and traumatic impact on a child warrants the maximum punishment. 57. In State of M.P. v. Udham , 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1378 , the Apex Court held as under: “12. Sentencing for crimes has to be analyzed on the touch stone of three tests viz., crime test, criminal test and comparative proportionality test. Crime test involves factors like extent of planning, choice of weapon, modus of crime, disposal modus (if any), role of the accused, anti-social or abhorrent character of the crime, state of victim. Sentencing for crimes has to be analyzed on the touch stone of three tests viz., crime test, criminal test and comparative proportionality test. Crime test involves factors like extent of planning, choice of weapon, modus of crime, disposal modus (if any), role of the accused, anti-social or abhorrent character of the crime, state of victim. Criminal test involves assessment of factors such as age of the criminal, gender of the criminal, economic conditions or social background of the criminal, motivation for crime, availability of defense, state of mind, instigation by the deceased or any one from the deceased group, adequately represented in the trial, disagreement by a judge in the appeal process, repentance, possibility of reformation, prior criminal record (not to take pending cases) and any other relevant factor (not an exhaustive list).” 58. In Accused ‘X’ v. State of Maharashtra , (2019) 7 SCC 1 the Apex Court held as under: “48. Before analyzing this case, we need to address the issue of the impact of reasoning in the sentencing process. The reasoning of the trial court acts as a link between the general level of sentence for the offence committed and to the facts and circumstances. The trial court is obligated to give reasons for the imposition of sentence, as firstly, it is a fundamental principle of natural justice that the adjudicators must provide reasons for reaching the decision and secondly, the reasons assume more importance as the liberty of the accused is subject to the aforesaid reasoning. Further, the appellate court is better enabled to assess the correctness of the quantum of punishment challenged, if the trial court has justified the same with reasons. The aforesaid principle is fortified not only by the statute under Section 235 (2) of CrPC but also by judicial interpretation. Any increase or decrease in the quantum of punishment than the usual levels need to be reasoned by the trial court. However, any reasoning dependent on moral and personal opinion/notion of a Judge about an offence needs to be avoided at all costs.” 59. In State of M.P. v. Saleem alias Chamaru , (2005) 5 SCC 554 , while considering the case under Section 307 of IPC, the Apex Court held as under: “6. However, any reasoning dependent on moral and personal opinion/notion of a Judge about an offence needs to be avoided at all costs.” 59. In State of M.P. v. Saleem alias Chamaru , (2005) 5 SCC 554 , while considering the case under Section 307 of IPC, the Apex Court held as under: “6. Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed, etc……. 7. After giving due consideration to the facts and circumstances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate sentence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime has been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of really relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by the court. Such act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has been very aptly indicated in Dennis Councle Mc Gautha v. State of California, 402 US 183 that no formula of a foolproof nature is possible that would provide a reasonable criterion in determining a just and appropriate punishment in the infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity of the crime. In the absence of any foolproof formula which may provide any basis for reasonable criteria to correctly assess various circumstances germane to the consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in the facts of each case, is the only way in which such judgment may be equitably distinguished. 8. The object should be to protect society and to deter the criminal in achieving the avowed object of law by imposing appropriate sentence. It is expected that the courts would operate the sentencing system so as to impose such sentence which reflects the conscience of the society and the sentencing process has to be stern where it should be. 9. Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on the social order in many cases may be in reality a futile exercise. It is expected that the courts would operate the sentencing system so as to impose such sentence which reflects the conscience of the society and the sentencing process has to be stern where it should be. 9. Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on the social order in many cases may be in reality a futile exercise. The social impact of the crime e.g. where it relates to offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping, misappropriation of public money, treason and other offences involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency which have great impact on social order and public interest, cannot be lost sight of and per se require exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing meager sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be result wise counterproductive in the long run and against societal interest which needs to be cared for and strengthened by a string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system. 10. The court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the society to which the criminal and victim belong. The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should "respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminal.” 60. The same was also followed by the Apex Court in Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra , (2012) 2 SCC 648 . 61. Thus, the evidence let in by the prosecution on an analysis of the same, it is clear that the materials placed on record, including the medical evidence, the initial testimony of the victim and her mother, and the consistent evidence of PW.4, PW.5, PW.7, the doctor and PW.9, the Investigating Officer, conclusively establish that the minor victim was subjected to penetrative sexual assault, attracting the rigour of Section 4(2) of the POCSO Act, 2012. 62. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the legal proposition in the present case, accused is the uncle of the PW.2 - victim girl . Her father is no more. 62. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the legal proposition in the present case, accused is the uncle of the PW.2 - victim girl . Her father is no more. She is staying with her widowed mother, who is eking out her livelihood by working with PW.4 as Tailor. Taking advantage of the said conditions of PW.2 and PW.1 and loneliness of PW.2, the appellant had sexual intercourse with her for half an hour and threatened her. It is a heinous offence, he won over PWs.1, 2 and 3. 63. On consideration of the said aspects only, learned trial Court imposed life imprisonment on the appellant. There is no error in it. 64. For the foregoing discussion, this appeal is dismissed confirming the conviction and sentence of imprisonment recorded by learned Fast Track Special Judge for Expeditious Trial and Disposal of Rape and POCSO Act Cases, Medchal - Malkajgiri District at Kushaiguda, vide judgment dated 09.01.2024 in S.C. No.542 of 2016. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed.