JUDGMENT : Pranjal Das, J. Heard Mr. J. Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. B. Hussain, learned counsel for the complainant/bank. 2. The petitioner invoking the powers under Section 447 BNSS is seeking transfer of N.I. Case No. 52/2023, pending in the court of learned Additional CJM, Mangaldoi, Darrang to the learned CJM, Barpeta. 3. Before proceeding further, the facts in a nutshell. The respondent Jahanara Begum is stated to have lent some money to the petitioner, amounting to Rs. 15,00,000/- and by way of returning the same amount, the petitioner issued two cheques on his Axis Bank account at Guwahati on 18- 07-2023. But upon presentation, the same cheques came to be dishonored due to stop payment by the drawer and account block situation covered in 2125. After doing the statutory formalities under the N.I. Act, the respondent, as complainant, initiated proceeding under Section 138 of the N.I. Act before the Learned Court at Mangaldoi, Darrang. 4. The primary contention of the petitioner as accused in the N.I. Act case is that due to the transactions, as part of the land transactions between the parties, two title suits are already pending in the District of Barpeta before the Court of the learned CJM, Barpeta, being T.S. No. 62 of 2023 and T.S. No. 66 of 2024. 5. It is stated and contended by the petitioner side that as connected matters, as the civil suits are pending in the District of Barpeta, therefore, the criminal proceeding under the N.I. Act arising out of the alleged cheque- bouncing should also be prosecuted in the District of Barpeta. The other contention of the petitioner side is that it will be inconvenient and expensive on his part to travel to Mangaldoi to defend the criminal proceeding under the N.I. Act. The petitioner contends that the respondent is residing at Barpeta. 6. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the petitioner seeks transfer of the case to the court at Barpeta. The learned Counsel strenuously submits that as the connected title suits are stated to be pending at Barpeta, therefore, the instant criminal litigation should also be transferred to Barpeta. He also submits regarding the inconvenience of the petitioner to defend the criminal proceeding in the court at Mangaldoi. 7. The learned Counsel strenuously submits that as the connected title suits are stated to be pending at Barpeta, therefore, the instant criminal litigation should also be transferred to Barpeta. He also submits regarding the inconvenience of the petitioner to defend the criminal proceeding in the court at Mangaldoi. 7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that the respondent/complainant is presently residing at Mangaldoi and that after issuance of the cheques, she presented it in her account in the State Bank of India at Mangaldoi and the written memo was received from the said Bank branch and therefore, she has rightly filed the complaint case in the said Jurisdictional Court and therefore, there is no case for transfer of the proceeding to the court at Barpeta. 8. Before proceeding further, the provisions of section 447 BNSS may be reproduced herein below – 447. 8. Before proceeding further, the provisions of section 447 BNSS may be reproduced herein below – 447. Power of High Court to transfer cases and appeals.-(1) Whenever it is made to appear to the High Court- (a) that a fair and impartial inquiry or trial cannot be had in any Criminal Court subordinate thereto; or (b) that some question of law of unusual difficulty is likely to arise; or (c) that an order under this section is required by any provision of this Sanhita, or will tend to the general convenience of the parties or witnesses, or is expedient for the ends of justice, it may order- (i) that any offence be inquired into or tried by any Court not qualified under sections 197 to 205 (both inclusive), but in other respects competent to inquire into or try such offence; (ii) that any particular case or appeal, or class of cases or appeals, be transferred from a Criminal Court subordinate to its authority to any other such Criminal Court of equal or superior jurisdiction; (iii) that any particular case be committed for trial to a Court of Session, or (iv) that any particular case or appeal be transferred to and tried before itself (2) The High Court may act either on the report of the lower Court, or on the application of a party interested, or on its own initiative: Provided that no application shall lie to the High Court for transferring a case from one Criminal Court to another Criminal Court in the same sessions division, unless an application for such transfer has been made to the Sessions Judge and rejected by him. (3) Every application for an order under sub-section (1) shall be made by motion, which shall, except when the applicant is the Advocate-General of the State, be supported by affidavit or affirmation. (4) When such application is made by an accused person, the High Court may direct him to execute a bond or bail bond, for the payment of any compensation which the High Court may award under sub-section (7). (4) When such application is made by an accused person, the High Court may direct him to execute a bond or bail bond, for the payment of any compensation which the High Court may award under sub-section (7). (5) Every accused person making such application shall give to the Public Prosecutor notice in writing of the application, together with a copy of the grounds on which it is made; and no order shall be made on the merits of the application unless at least twenty-four hours have elapsed between the giving of such notice and the hearing of the application. (6) Where the application is for the transfer of a case or appeal from any Subordinate Court, the High Court may, if it is satisfied that it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice, order that, pending the disposal of the application the proceedings in the Subordinate Court shall be stayed, on such terms as the High Court may think fit to impose: Provided that such stay shall not affect the Subordinate Court's power of remand under section 346. (7) Where an application for an order under sub-section (1) is dismissed, the High Court may, if it is of opinion that the application was frivolous or vexatious, order the applicant to pay by way of compensation to any person who has opposed the application such sum as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case. (8) When the High Court orders under sub-section (1) that a case be transferred from any Court for trial before itself, it shall observe in such trial the same procedure which that Court would have observed if the case had not been so transferred. (9) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect any order of the Government under section 218. 9. (9) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect any order of the Government under section 218. 9. Regarding the territorial jurisdiction in cheque-bouncing cases, the provisions of Section 142 (2) of the N.I. Act may be looked at and relevant portions reproduced herein below – (2) The offence under section 138 shall be inquired into and tried only by a court within whose local jurisdiction, - (a) if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account, is situated; or (b) if the cheque is presented for payment by the payee or holder in due course, otherwise through an account, the branch of the drawee bank where the drawer maintains the account, is situated. Explanation. – For the purposes of clause (a), where a cheque is delivered for collection at any branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due course, then, the cheque shall be deemed to have been delivered to the branch of the bank in which the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account. 10. In the context of section 142(2), brought in by the amendment in 2015, the landmark case of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is the case of Bridgestone India Private Limited vs. Inderpal Singh , reported in ( 2016) 2 SCC 75 11. The law governing territorial jurisdiction in cheque-bouncing cases has been succinctly summed up by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bridgestone (supra) in paragraph 13 of the judgment, which may be reproduced herein below – “13. perusal of the amended Section 142 (2), extracted above, leaves no room for any doubt, specially in view of the Explanation thereunder, that with reference to an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 1881, the place where a cheque is delivered for collection i.e. the branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due course, where the drawee maintains an account, would be determinative of the place of territorial jurisdiction.” 12. Therefore, the answer to the question as to what would be the natural jurisdiction for preferring a proceeding under section 138 of the N.I. Act emerges from what has been laid down in paragraph 13 of Bridgestone (supra) in the context of section 142(2) of the N.I. Act. Therefore, the answer to the question as to what would be the natural jurisdiction for preferring a proceeding under section 138 of the N.I. Act emerges from what has been laid down in paragraph 13 of Bridgestone (supra) in the context of section 142(2) of the N.I. Act. 13. In the instant case, on the basis of the materials available at this stage, the cheque was presented in the account of the respondent complainant at SBI, and the return memo was issued from there due to stop payment and therefore, in terms of the aforesaid governing law, the natural jurisdiction was the court at Mangaldoi in the district of Darrang. 14. Therefore, the proceeding under Section 138 of the N.I. Act was preferred by the respondent complainant in the natural territorial jurisdiction. 15. Now, the next issue to be looked into is whether the grounds and contentions of the petitioner for transferring the case to Barpeta merits a positive consideration. Both the title suits might have arisen between the parties with regard to some land transactions and pending adjudication before the Civil Court at Barpeta. However, that would not be sufficient justification to transfer the cheque bouncing criminal proceeding from its natural jurisdiction in the district of Darrang to the district of Barpeta. 16. The other contention of the petitioner is that it would be inconvenient for him to pursue the proceeding at Darrang, when he happens to be residing at Barpeta. I do not find sufficient merit in the said contention also after having given my anxious consideration to it. 17. When the case has been filed in the natural jurisdiction, the mere contention that it would be inconvenient to pursue it there from his present location at Barpeta cannot per se be a sufficient ground, nor would it be sufficient ground in the facts and circumstances – to justify transferring the case, especially when the case has been instituted in its natural territorial jurisdiction in terms of the statutory provision and the law laid down in this regard by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. Consequently, in the facts and circumstances and in the backdrop of the aforesaid discussion – I do not find sufficient merit in this transfer petition – which accordingly stands dismissed and disposed of on the aforesaid terms. 19. 18. Consequently, in the facts and circumstances and in the backdrop of the aforesaid discussion – I do not find sufficient merit in this transfer petition – which accordingly stands dismissed and disposed of on the aforesaid terms. 19. Before parting, it may be mentioned here that if the petitioner as accused faces bona fide practical difficulty in the future in appearing before the learned trial court on every occasion, he would be at liberty to seek representation on dates where his identification is not necessary. 20. The order of stay stands vacated 21. The instant transfer petition stands disposed of accordingly.