JUDGMENT : K.SUJANA, J. Since the lis and parties involved in these appeal suits are same, these matters were heard together and are disposed of by way of this common judgment. 2. The appellant in AS.No.890 of 2010 is plaintiff and the appellants in AS.No.839 of 2010 are defendant Nos.1 and 2. Both the appeals are filed challenging the judgment dated 31.07.2010 passed in OS.No.15 of 2006 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Siddipet. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein are referred to as arrayed in OS.No.15 of 2006. 4. The brief facts of the averments made before the trial Court are that the plaintiff - Chilukuri Vinoda, filed a suit for partition and separate possession against her two brothers, Madduri Srinivas Reddy and Madduri Ravinder Reddy/ defendant Nos.1 and 2, and her mother/defendant No.3, in respect of several immovable properties situated in Gajwel and Bayyaram villages, described under Schedules A to H. She contended that the entire suit schedule properties were acquired by her late father M. Laxma Reddy, a Government school teacher who passed away on 23.10.2004, and that she was therefore entitled to a one-third share as a legal heir. Following the death of her mother/defendant No.3 during the pendency of the suit, she amended the plaint to seek a corresponding share in her mother's estate as well. 5. Defendants 1 and 2, through their written statement, opposed the claims of plaintiff and asserted that a substantial portion of the properties were acquired by them individually after discontinuing their education and initiating various businesses including Srilatha Engineering Company, Srilatha Pesticides, Parameshwari Wines, and cotton trade. They contended that some of the assets, although registered in the names of their parents, were actually purchased using personal earnings, loans, and support from in-laws. Additionally, they relied on Will dated 01-03-2006 (Ex.B1) allegedly executed by their mother, which bequeathed her properties exclusively to them. 6. During trial, the plaintiff got examined herself as PW1 and reiterated that all properties belonged to her father. Her paternal uncle was examined as PW2 and claimed that some assets were ancestral while others were self-acquired by the deceased. During cross-examination, the plaintiff conceded that her father had a limited income, was employed as a Government teacher, and had no other known sources of earnings. Her paternal uncle was examined as PW2 and claimed that some assets were ancestral while others were self-acquired by the deceased. During cross-examination, the plaintiff conceded that her father had a limited income, was employed as a Government teacher, and had no other known sources of earnings. She also acknowledged that her brothers were running independent businesses, had assets such as a tractor since the year 1994, and had been financially self-sufficient since the early 1990s. 7. In support of her case, the plaintiff marked Exhibits A1 to A25. These included vital documents such as the death certificate of the deceased father (Ex.A1), legal heir certificate (Ex.A2), and market value certificates (Exs.A3 and A4) for the suit properties. She also submitted certified copies of pahani records (Exs.A5 to A19) for agricultural lands spanning 1985 to 2002, and various ownership certificates (Exs.A20 to A23). To substantiate her claim over the wine businesses listed in Schedule H, she relied on a registered sale deed (Ex.A24) and Excise Department proceedings (Ex.A25). 8. The defendants marked Exhibits B1 to B18, primarily consisting of registered sale deeds, ownership documents, and the contested Will. Ex.B1 was the Will deed allegedly executed by defendant No.3 on 01-03-2006, bequeathing her assets to defendants 1 and 2. Exs.B2 to B9 were sale deeds relating to properties registered in the names of defendants or their parents, largely post-1990. Exs.B10 to B13 pertained to lands claimed to have been acquired by the father. Ex.B14 was the translated copy of an Urdu sale deed. Exs.B15 and B16 showed property acquisitions made by their mother as early as 1979, supporting her independent ownership. Ex.B17 was a certified copy of a sale deed from 1985, and Ex.B18 a sale deed dated 31-03-1995 showing post-1990 acquisitions by the defendants. 9. The trial Court framed ten issues, including whether the plaintiff was entitled to partition, whether certain assets were acquired by the father or defendants using their own income, whether the Will was valid, and whether the debts claimed were genuine. On analyzing the evidence, the trial Court found that the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a joint family nucleus or sufficient ancestral income. It concluded that the deceased father had modest earnings from his Government employment and limited ancestral landholding, and was not in a position to fund all the properties listed. On analyzing the evidence, the trial Court found that the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a joint family nucleus or sufficient ancestral income. It concluded that the deceased father had modest earnings from his Government employment and limited ancestral landholding, and was not in a position to fund all the properties listed. However, the trial Court identified several properties as either ancestral or acquired prior to the start of the defendants’ business activities, holding them eligible for partition. These included land in Sy.No.813/A (Ex.B10) and Sy.No.92 (Ex.B11), along with minor plots in Bayyaram village and houses listed under Schedules D and G, which either stood in the father’s name or were not proved to be acquired with self-earned funds. Accordingly, it granted the plaintiff a one-third share in those properties. 10. Regarding the validity of the Will (Issue No.8), the trial Court upheld Ex.B1, stating it had been properly attested and proved through DW2 and DW3. As a result, the properties listed therein, such as lands in Sy.Nos.813/E, 400, 206, and house No.10-121/1 were excluded from partition. Similarly, the wine businesses referenced by the plaintiff were found to be personal ventures of defendants 1 and 2 and not part of the estate. The debts mentioned by the defendants were dismissed due to lack of corroborative evidence. Ultimately, the trial Court issued a preliminary decree, declaring the plaintiff entitled to a one-third share in the specific properties clearly shown to be ancestral or acquired by the father prior to the defendants’ independent acquisitions. All remaining claims were rejected. Aggrieved thereby, these appeals are filed. 11. Heard Sri K.Saketh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Smt Lakshmi Kanakavalli, learned counsel for plaintiff/appellant in A.S.No.890 of 2010, Sri L.Preetham Reddy, learned counsel for defendants/respondents in A.S.No.839 of 2010, and Sri Raja Malla Reddy, learned counsel for respondent No.19 in AS.No.890 of 2010. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant in A.S.No.890 of 2010/plaintiff, submitted that the trial Court has gravely misconstrued the well-settled principles of Hindu Law relating to Hindu Joint Family and Joint Family property, resulting in a partial dismissal of the suit and consequent miscarriage of justice. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant in A.S.No.890 of 2010/plaintiff, submitted that the trial Court has gravely misconstrued the well-settled principles of Hindu Law relating to Hindu Joint Family and Joint Family property, resulting in a partial dismissal of the suit and consequent miscarriage of justice. He further submitted that the trial Court had erroneously cast the entire burden upon the plaintiff to establish that the plaint schedule properties are joint family properties, despite the appellant having discharged her initial burden by proving the existence of a joint family nucleus. He contended that the trial Court failed to draw the legal presumption that properties acquired in the names of family members are joint family properties when such nucleus is established. He further contended that the trial Court ought not to have ventured into abstract principles of joint family law when the suit schedule properties were shown to have been acquired by the father of the plaintiff, who died intestate. 13. Learned counsel incessantly contended that the defendants, while alleging independent acquisition through agriculture and business ventures, failed to adduce any evidence of such income or capacity. He averred that defendant No.3, the mother of the plaintiff, being a housewife without any independent source of income, could not have acquired properties in her own name, nor was there any proof of stridhana, as such, contended that the trial Court erred in excluding properties standing in her name from partition on the basis of an unproved will, despite her lack of authority to deal with such properties. 14. In addition, learned counsel submitted that the defendants utterly failed to establish any independent income sufficient to acquire the properties in their names, and that on the contrary, the record demonstrates that the father of the plaintiff had acquired several immovable properties from the 1970s until 2003, in his own name and in the names of his wife and sons. He lamented that the plaintiff is therefore entitled to a one-third share in all such properties, including those covered under Exhibits B.2, B.3, B.7, B.8, B.9, B.12, B.15, B.16, and B.18, but the trial Court erred in presuming that properties standing in the names of individual members were self-acquired, and further erred in accepting Ex.B.1 will, which was never proved. He lamented that the plaintiff is therefore entitled to a one-third share in all such properties, including those covered under Exhibits B.2, B.3, B.7, B.8, B.9, B.12, B.15, B.16, and B.18, but the trial Court erred in presuming that properties standing in the names of individual members were self-acquired, and further erred in accepting Ex.B.1 will, which was never proved. Lastly, he asserted that the trial Court, having itself held that the landed properties in B-Schedule are ancestral, ought to have granted relief in respect of all items, including Schedules C, E, and F, and that apart, the F-Schedule house property, allotted by the A.P. Housing Board to the father of the plaintiff, cannot be treated as the exclusive property of Defendant No.1 merely because the sale deed was registered in his name after the father’s death. He lamented that any expenditure incurred by Defendants 1 and 2 in obtaining the sale deed must be treated as on behalf of all legal heirs, and that the findings of the trial Court that Defendants 1 and 2 carried on independent businesses are perverse, based on misreading of evidence, and unsupported by any material. Therefore, prayed this Court to allow A.S.No.890 of 2010. 15. Learned counsel for the appellants in A.S.No.839 of 2010/defendants, submitted that the burden lay squarely upon the plaintiff to prove her pleading that the suit schedule properties were the self-acquired properties of her father, late M. Laxma Reddy, and thus available for partition. He contended that the plaintiff miserably failed to discharge this burden under Section 101 CPC, as she neither made specific pleadings nor adduced evidence of her father’s financial capacity, earnings, or bank particulars to establish that he had purchased the properties with his own funds, and in the absence of such proof, the onus never shifted to the defendants, and the claim of the plaintiff is liable to be rejected in toto. 16. 16. Learned counsel incessantly contended that on the contrary, the defendants categorically pleaded and proved that the suit schedule properties were acquired with their own earnings from agriculture and business, supported by leases obtained from third parties and financial assistance from their maternal uncle, and they examined DW-2, DW-3, and DW-5 to prove Ex.B1 will deed executed by their mother in their favour; DW-4 to establish joint lease of lands in 1985 for commercial crops; DW-5 to speak to loans repaid by the defendants and the execution of the will; DW-6 to DW-9, the vendors of registered sale deeds in favour of Defendants 1 and 2; and DW-10, the attester of a sale deed in the name of their mother, where consideration was paid by Defendants 1 and 2. He asserted that the said evidence clearly demonstrates that the properties were purchased by the defendants with their own funds, whether in their names, in the name of their mother, or nominally in the name of their father. 17. In addition, learned counsel lamented that the trial Court itself recorded categorical findings at paragraphs 16 and 21 of the judgment that the plaintiff failed to prove acquisition of properties from any joint family nucleus or by her father individually, and that most of the properties were acquired by Defendants 1 and 2 after commencing their businesses, yet, despite these findings, the trial Court erroneously granted a partial decree of partition in respect of certain items under Exs.B3, B7, B8, B9, and B18, which amounts to serious irregularity and illegality. In view of the consistent evidence and pleadings, it is clear that no property was acquired by late M. Laxma Reddy with his own earnings, and all suit schedule properties are the self-acquired properties of Defendants 1 and 2. The decree granted in favour of the plaintiff is unsustainable and the suit itself is liable to be dismissed in entirety. 18. Having regard to the rival submissions made, and on going through the material placed on record, the points determined for consideration by this Court are : I. Whether the plaintiff has proved that the suit schedule properties were acquired by her late father, M. Laxma Reddy, from his own earnings or joint family nucleus, and are therefore available for partition ? II. II. Whether the defendants have established that the suit schedule properties were acquired independently from their own earnings, agricultural leases, business ventures, loans, and financial assistance, and whether Ex.B1 Will dated 01-03-2006 executed by their mother stands proved and binding ? III. Whether the trial Court was justified in granting a partial decree of partition in favour of the plaintiff despite its findings on lack of proof of joint family nucleus, and whether such decree requires modification or reversal? Point Nos. I : 19. The case of plaintiff in A.S.No.890 of 2010 rests on two planks, viz., that all suit schedule properties are the self- acquired assets of late M. Laxma Reddy; alternatively, that they are impressed with the character of joint family property on account of a sufficient and productive joint family nucleus. The trial Court, upon analyzing PW1 and PW2, recorded that the deceased father was a Government teacher with limited ancestral land (about two acres jointly with his brothers) and retired in 2001 with a monthly salary of about Rs.18,000/-. PW1 admitted the defendants were independently engaged in business activities since the early 1990s and possessed a tractor by 1994. On these admissions and the absence of bank records or particulars of savings/income capable of funding the array of acquisitions, the trial Court held that the plaintiff failed to establish either a sufficient nucleus or personal capacity of the father to fund all properties across Schedules A to H. 20. That being so, at this stage, it is imperative to note that under Section 101 CPC, the burden lay squarely on the plaintiff to affirmatively prove the foundational facts, i.e., existence of sufficient joint family nucleus at the relevant times, and linkage between such surplus and the particular acquisitions; or the father’s independent earnings sufficient to fund purchases made in different names. Mere assertions and pahanies/ownership certificates (Exs.A5–A23) did not bridge the evidentiary gap. As the trial Court correctly recapitulated, there is no presumption that properties standing in individual names are joint family properties; such presumption arises only when a sufficient nucleus at the time of acquisition is shown. Mere assertions and pahanies/ownership certificates (Exs.A5–A23) did not bridge the evidentiary gap. As the trial Court correctly recapitulated, there is no presumption that properties standing in individual names are joint family properties; such presumption arises only when a sufficient nucleus at the time of acquisition is shown. The plaintiff did establish, and the trial Court rightly accepted, the father’s acquisition of Sy.No.813/A (Ex.B10; 21- 05-1986) and Sy.No.92 (Ex.B11; 03-06-1994, and Ex.B13/B14; 11-04-1979), and certain small ancestral parcels in Bayyaram, as well as houses under Schedules D and G standing in the father’s name, all of which were rightly brought into the hotchpots for 1/3rd partition. However, beyond those items, the plaintiff did not discharge the legal burden to show that properties in the names of defendants or their mother were acquired out of the joint family surplus or father’s income. 21. As to the plea that once joint family status is established, a presumption should operate in favour of joint family character of acquisitions standing in the names of members, there is no factual substrate to trigger such presumption. The admissions of PW1/PW2 about independent businesses of D1/D2 commencing around 1991, taken with post-1990 sale deeds (Exs.B7, B8, B9, B18, B3), negate the inference of acquisition from a common surplus. Consequently, Point No. I is answered against the plaintiff: only the properties explicitly identified by the trial Court as ancestral or the father’s acquisitions prior to the defendants’ business (including Sy.No.813/A, Sy.No.92, small plots in Bayyaram, and houses under Schedules D and G) are available for partition; the rest are not. Point No. II: 22. The defendants/appellants in A.S.No.839 of 2010 pleaded and adduced evidence to show that substantial properties were purchased with their own funds after discontinuing studies and commencing various ventures (engineering spares, pesticides/seeds, wines, cotton trade), supported by agricultural leases and assistance from maternal uncle. The sale deeds post-1990 (Exs.B7, B8, B9, B18) are aligned with that business timeline. The trial Court drew a clear line: properties standing in the names of D1/D2 and acquired after the start of their businesses were not shown to have been purchased from joint family surplus and hence were treated as their self-acquisitions. The sale deeds post-1990 (Exs.B7, B8, B9, B18) are aligned with that business timeline. The trial Court drew a clear line: properties standing in the names of D1/D2 and acquired after the start of their businesses were not shown to have been purchased from joint family surplus and hence were treated as their self-acquisitions. That being so, it is seen that the plaintiff did not rebut these acquisitions with cogent proof of common funds; nor did she produce bank particulars of the father or other financial records capable of dislodging the defendants’ plea. 23. As regards the mother’s properties and Ex.B1 Will dated 01-03-2006, the trial Court found due execution and attestation proved through DW2 and DW3 (attestors), with corroboration from DW5, and excluded the bequeathed items (Sy.Nos.813/E, 400, 206, and house No.10-121/1) from partition. The plaintiff’s challenge that Defendant No.3 was a housewife sans independent income or stridhana and that the Will was unproved was rejected. Exs.B15 and B16 (11-04-1979) show acquisitions in the mother’s name long prior to the suit, lending credence to her independent ownership; Ex.B12 (1988) further supports the chain. On proof, the statutory requirements of will execution/attestation were met through examination of attesting witnesses, and no suspicious circumstances were established. That being so, this Court finds no infirmity in the findings of the trial Court on Ex.B1 and its consequent exclusion of those properties from partition. 24. The defendants’ claims regarding bank loans and other debts were rejected for want of sufficient proof; that rejection does not affect the core conclusions on title/acquisition. In sum, Point No. II is answered in favour of the defendants: their post-1990 acquisitions stand as self-acquired, and Ex.B1 Will is valid and binding to exclude the mother’s bequeathed properties from partition. Point No. III: 25. The grievance of both sides targets the trial Court’s selective inclusion and exclusion. The plaintiff contends that the trial Court erred in excluding properties in the names of D1/D2 and their mother, whereas, the defendants contend that the trial Court erred in granting partition in respect of items like Exs.B3, B7, B8, B9, B18 despite findings on lack of joint family nucleus. 26. On perusing the paragraphs 15–26 of the order of trial Court, it is noted that the trial Court had distinguished the father’s acquisitions and small ancestral items (brought into partition) from defendants’ later self-acquisitions’ (excluded). 26. On perusing the paragraphs 15–26 of the order of trial Court, it is noted that the trial Court had distinguished the father’s acquisitions and small ancestral items (brought into partition) from defendants’ later self-acquisitions’ (excluded). The operative portion grants 1/3rd share in Sy.No.813 (Ac.4-05; Ex.B10), Sy.No.92 (Ac.1-06; Ex.B11), specified small ancestral extents in Bayyaram, and Schedules D and G houses/plot standing in the father’s name; all other claims were rejected. 27. With regard to the plaintiff’s contention concerning the A.P. Housing Board LIG-68 property, Ex.A21 reflects ownership in the father’s name, but the registered sale deed (Ex.B2; 18-05-2005) stands in the name of D1 post-allotment. The trial Court treated Schedule F as not available for partition, implicitly accepting that defendants paid the consideration to perfect title post-allotment. In light of the admitted timeline (father’s demise 23-10-2004; business capacity of D1/D2; absence of proof of family funds used), this Court finds no ground to disturb the same. Any expenditure by D1/D2 after the father’s death cannot, without proof of common funds, transmute the property into a partible estate, and the mere initial allotment in the father’s name does not override the registered conveyance in favour of D1. 28. As to the wines businesses under Schedule H, Ex.A25 shows off-take particulars, but the defendants’ case that licenses were cancelled and, in any event, businesses were their personal ventures is consistent with PW admissions of independent business activity and the absence of proof of joint family funding. As such, the trial Court rightly excluded these from partition. The plaintiff’s assertion of joint family nature, without granular financial proof, does not warrant a contrary conclusion. 29. That apart, the defendants’ stand that the trial Court contradicted itself by granting shares in properties like Exs.B3, B7, B8, B9, B18 is not borne out by the decree. The trial Court, while discussing those exhibits to classify acquisitions by D1/D2, ultimately excluded post-1990 acquisitions in their names from partition. The properties actually decreed for partition correspond to the father’s acquisitions and ancestral parcels and the houses/plot standing in the father’s name (Schedules D and G). There is no operative inconsistency necessitating modification. Accordingly, this point is answered. 30. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the firm opinion that the partial decree stands entirely justified on the evidentiary record and legal principles governing burden and joint family nucleus. There is no operative inconsistency necessitating modification. Accordingly, this point is answered. 30. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the firm opinion that the partial decree stands entirely justified on the evidentiary record and legal principles governing burden and joint family nucleus. No enlargement of the plaintiff’s entitlement is warranted; conversely, no curtailment of the decree in her favour is called for. There are no merits in these appeals, and the same are liable to be dismissed. 31. Accordingly, these Appeal Suits are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall also stand closed.