ORDER : PRADEEP SINGH YERUR, J. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. This petition is filed by the plaintiff in O.S.No.1268/2025 wherein he has sought for relief of declaration and other consequential reliefs. 3. Along with the plaint, the plaintiff filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC which is IA.No.1. It is also seen that the trial Court has not mentioned the application nor the provisions of law while passing the impugned order dated 06.11.2025. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff contends that the impugned order is illegal, perverse and arbitrary; such an order could not have been passed by the learned trial Judge. He further contends that when he has pleaded for an urgent order of ad-interim temporary injunction prior to issuance of notice to the defendants, the trial Court ought to have considered the same and passed the order, whereas the trial Court has refrained from even mentioning the provisions of law and also not made any observations with regard to the reasons for not granting the ad-interim order and has passed an order mechanically, which is not sustainable in law. 5. This Court does not find need or necessity to issue notice to respondents/defendants for the reasons that the defendants are not served with notice yet before the trial Court, and the next date of hearing is given as 30.03.2026. 6. While considering the application filed under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC the trial Court is obligated to follow the following procedure. 7. When an application is filed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC, it is the duty and obligation of the trial Court to consider the documents placed by the plaintiff before it, either along with the plaint, or otherwise including the averments made in the affidavit annexed to the application or any material that is produced along with the plaint to prima facie satisfy itself for grant or non-grant of an ad- interim order of temporary injunction. The provisions under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 is also for grant of an ad-interim temporary injunction, by dispensing notice to the defendants in view of the urgency so stated if any and to the satisfaction of the trial Court. 8. The provisions under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 is also for grant of an ad-interim temporary injunction, by dispensing notice to the defendants in view of the urgency so stated if any and to the satisfaction of the trial Court. 8. It is needless to mention that the trial Court is required to see that if the suit schedule property is in danger of being wasted, damaged, alienated or wrongfully sold in execution or defendants threatens or intends to remove or dispose of the property, or there is any threat to dispose the property or dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to the suit schedule property, then the court may issue notice to the defendants and, upon appearance of the defendants, consider and pass suitable orders. 9. The proviso to Order XXXIX Rule 3 provides that the Court has the option of either issuing notice or, in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances where the Court finds that an ad -interim order of temporary injunction is required to be granted prior to issuance of notice on the ground of urgency made out and that the delay in issuance of notice would cause hardship and inconvenience and threat of dispossession to the plaintiff with regard to the suit schedule property or any damage to the suit schedule property or to the plaintiff, the Court may grant an ad-interim order of temporary injunction prior to issuance of notice. Therefore, the proviso to Order XXXIX Rule 3 provides this extraordinary relief that could be granted prior to issuance of notice in exceptional circumstances if made out by the plaintiff. 10. In the present case on hand, the trial Court has not adverted to any of these required ingredients in its impugned order. It has merely said, "Heard the advocate for plaintiff on I.A.No.1. On hearing, I am of the opinion at this stage that, other side has to be heard before passing any ex-parte interim order. Hence, notice/summons has to go to the other side before passing any order. The plaintiff has not made out the case at this stage to grant any ex- parte interim order. Therefore issue summons and notice on I.A.No.1. R/by: 30.03.2026." 11. Hence, notice/summons has to go to the other side before passing any order. The plaintiff has not made out the case at this stage to grant any ex- parte interim order. Therefore issue summons and notice on I.A.No.1. R/by: 30.03.2026." 11. It is relevant to mention that this Court has been seeing time and again several orders passed by the trial Court in this manner where it simply says that the materials are perused, and without hearing the other side, it may not be proper to pass ex-parte order on the application and issue emergent notice to the defendants along with suit summons. This may not be the proper procedure to be followed by the trial Court when an application is filed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC where ad-interim order is pressed by the plaintiff. The trial Court is obligated and is duty bound to consider the application and the materials placed before it for either grant or refusal of the ad-interim ex- parte order. 12. If the trial Court is not inclined to grant an ad- interim ex-parte temporary injunction prior to issuance of notice to the defendants, the trial Court is duty bound to provide necessary reasoning to that effect and say so in its order rather than merely saying issue notice and that it cannot be decided prior to hearing the other side. This option is not available to the trial Court. 13. The trial Court would have to invariably advert to the contentions of the plaintiff, it may either allow it or reject it, but reasoning would have to be provided by the trial Court. It would be relevant to look to the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shiv Kumar Chadha -vs- Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others reported in (1993) 3 SCC 161 and in the case of Time City Infrastructure and Housing Limited Lucknow V/s State of U.P. and others reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 1674 as to how the trial Court has to deal with such applications. 14. It is relevant to extract the observation at paragraph Nos.32, 33, 34 and 35 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shiv Kumar Chadha - vs- Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others reported in (1993) 3 SCC 161 : "32. 14. It is relevant to extract the observation at paragraph Nos.32, 33, 34 and 35 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shiv Kumar Chadha - vs- Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others reported in (1993) 3 SCC 161 : "32. Power to grant injunction is an extraordinary power vested in the court to be exercised taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The courts have to be more cautious when the said power is being exercised without notice or hearing the party who is to be affected by the order so passed. That is why Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code requires that in all cases the court shall, before grant of an injunction, direct notice of the application to be given to the opposite-party, except where it appears that object of granting injunction itself would be defeated by delay. By the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976, a proviso has been added to the said rule saying that “where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite-party, the court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay…”. 33. It has come to our notice that in spite of the aforesaid statutory requirement, the courts have been passing orders of injunction before issuance of notices or hearing the parties against whom such orders are to operate without recording the reasons for passing such orders. It is said that if the reasons for grant of injunction are mentioned, a grievance can be made by the other side that court has prejudged the issues involved in the suit. According to us, this is a misconception about the nature and the scope of interim orders. It need not be pointed out that any opinion expressed in connection with an interlocutory application has no bearing and shall not affect any party, at the stage of the final adjudication. Apart from that now in view of the proviso to Rule 3 aforesaid, there is no scope for any argument. When the statute itself requires reasons to be recorded, the court cannot ignore that requirement by saying that if reasons are recorded, it may amount to expressing an opinion in favour of the plaintiff before hearing the defendant. 34. Apart from that now in view of the proviso to Rule 3 aforesaid, there is no scope for any argument. When the statute itself requires reasons to be recorded, the court cannot ignore that requirement by saying that if reasons are recorded, it may amount to expressing an opinion in favour of the plaintiff before hearing the defendant. 34. The imperative nature of the proviso has to be judged in the context of Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code. Before the proviso aforesaid was introduced, Rule 3 said “the court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite-party”. The proviso was introduced to provide a condition, where court proposes to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite-party, being of the opinion that the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated by delay. The condition so introduced is that the court “shall record the reasons” why an ex parte order of injunction was being passed in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In this background, the requirement for recording the reasons for grant of ex parte injunction, cannot be held to be a mere formality. This requirement is consistent with the principle, that a party to a suit, who is being restrained from exercising a right which such party claims to exercise either under a statute or under the common law, must be informed why instead of following the requirement of Rule 3, the procedure prescribed under the proviso has been followed. The party which invokes the jurisdiction of the court for grant of an order of restraint against a party, without affording an opportunity to him of being heard, must satisfy the court about the gravity of the situation and court has to consider briefly these factors in the ex parte order. We are quite conscious of the fact that there are other statutes which contain similar provisions requiring the court or the authority concerned to record reasons before exercising power vested in them. In respect of some of such provisions it has been held that they are required to be complied with but non-compliance therewith will not vitiate the order so passed. In respect of some of such provisions it has been held that they are required to be complied with but non-compliance therewith will not vitiate the order so passed. But same cannot be said in respect of the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39. The Parliament has prescribed a particular procedure for passing of an order of injunction without notice to the other side, under exceptional circumstances. Such ex parte orders have far- reaching effect, as such a condition has been imposed that court must record reasons before passing such order. If it is held that the compliance with the proviso aforesaid is optional and not obligatory, then the introduction of the proviso by the Parliament shall be a futile exercise and that part of Rule 3 will be a surplusage for all practical purposes. Proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code, attracts the principle, that if a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner or not all. This principle was approved and accepted in well-known cases of Taylor v. Taylor [(1875) 1 Ch D 426 : 45 LJ Ch 373] and Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor [ AIR 1936 PC 253 (2) : 63 IA 372 : 37 Cri LJ 897] . This Court has also expressed the same view in respect of procedural requirement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act in the case of Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare [ (1975) 1 SCC 559 : AIR 1975 SC 915] . 35. As such whenever a court considers it necessary in the facts and circumstances of a particular case to pass an order of injunction without notice to other side, it must record the reasons for doing so and should take into consideration, while passing an order of injunction, all relevant factors, including as to how the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated if an ex parte order is not passed. But any such ex parte order should be in force up to a particular date before which the plaintiff should be required to serve the notice on the defendant concerned. In the Supreme Court Practice 1993, Vol. But any such ex parte order should be in force up to a particular date before which the plaintiff should be required to serve the notice on the defendant concerned. In the Supreme Court Practice 1993, Vol. 1, at page 514, reference has been made to the views of the English Courts saying: “Ex parte injunctions are for cases of real urgency where there has been a true impossibility of giving notice of motion…. An ex parte injunction should generally be until a certain day, usually the next motion day….” 15. In the case of Time City infrastructure and Housing Limited Lucknow V/s State of U.P. and others reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 1674, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held at paragraph 5 as under: 5. Looking to the scheme of Order 39, CPC it is clear that ordinarily an order of injunction may not be granted ex parte. The opposite party must be issued a notice and heard before an injunction may be granted. Rule 3 carves out an exception in favour of granting an injunction without notice to the opposite party where it appears that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by the delay. Conferment of this privilege on the party seeking an injunction is accompanied by an obligation cast on the court to record reasons for its opinion and an obligation cast on the applicant to comply with the requirements of Clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso. Both the provisions are mandatory. The applicant gets an injunction without notice but subject to the condition of complying with Clauses (a) and (b) above said. 16. Therefore, it is a duty cast upon the trial Court while dealing with the application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC to dispose of the application on the merits of it. But nevertheless, it would have to opine and provide proper reasoning. Of course, it is not required for the trial Court to conduct a mini trial while granting or rejecting the application for the grant or rejection of an ad-interim ex- parte injunction. Nevertheless, the trial Court would have to provide reasoning either way, whether it allows or rejects the application for grant of an ad-interim temporary injunction or non grant of an ad-interim temporary injunction. Nevertheless, the trial Court would have to provide reasoning either way, whether it allows or rejects the application for grant of an ad-interim temporary injunction or non grant of an ad-interim temporary injunction. Under the circumstances in the present case, it is seen that the trial Court has not discussed any averments or the contentions of the plaintiff while passing the impugned order, except for merely issuing notice to the defendants. Under the circumstances, the impugned order is not sustainable and is neither in accordance with law. 17. Accordingly I pass the following order: ORDER The petition is disposed of. 2. The matter is remitted back to the trial Court to consider the application filed under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC and pass suitable orders within 3 days from the date of presentation of copy of this order. 3. As the matter is now adjourned to 30.03.2026, petitioner/plaintiff is permitted to advance the matter. On such application being filed for the advancement, the same shall be accepted and allowed by the trial Court. 4. The matter shall be considered for grant or rejection of the application being filed for ad-interim order of temporary injunction. Nevertheless, the trial Court shall pass reasoned order by considering the judgements of the Hon'ble Apex Court Court in the case of Shiv Kumar Chadha -vs- Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others reported in (1993) 3 SCC 161 , Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v/s Kartick Das reported in (1994) 4 SCC 225, Time City infrastructure and Housing Limited Lucknow V/s State of U.P. and others reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 1674, Ramakant Ambalal Choksi V/s Harish Ambalal Choksi and others reported in (2024) 11 SCC 351 and Vedant Fashions Pvt. Ltd., V/s Smt. Rajul Devi reported in 2014 SCC OnLine Kar 7191 while passing the orders ad-interim ex-parte and even otherwise in any further orders. 5. The trial Court shall also follow the judgment of this Court reported in WP.No.33725/2025 in the case Karnataka State Cricket Association registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 V/s Shashidhara A.V . 6. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the application or the main matter.