Order : SUNIL BENIWAL, J. 1. Heard on stay application. 2. The petitioners have preferred the present writ petition with the following prayers:- (i) The respondents may kindly be directed to allow the scheme for increase of seats from 200 to 250 for UG Course in academic session 2025-2026 under the guideines and regulations of 2023 and grant the same to the petitioner for the Academic Sessions 2025-26. (ii) The order/communication dated 16.09.2025 may kindly be declared illegal to the extent of not granting 50 seats (i.e. 250 seats) and the same may kindly be quashed with all consequential directions. (iii) The order dated 11.10.2025 (Annex.27) as well as order dated 12.11.2025 (Annex.30) may kindly be quashed and set aside. (iv) The respondents may kindly be directed to allow the petitioner to participate in counselling to be conducted by the respondent No.5 (State Counselling Board) for the academic session 2025-26 with intake capacity of 250 U.G. M.B.B.S. seats. 2. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. M.S. Singhvi, assisted by Mr. Hemant Ballani and learned Senior Counsel Mr. Vikas Balia, assisted by Mr. Sudhanshu Kalla, appearing on behalf of petitioners, submit that the petitioners were granted permission to establish MBBS College with intake capacity of 150 seats from the Academic Session 2014-15 by the respondents vide order dated 15.07.2014. The permission for undertaking Post-Graduate Course was granted with an intake capacity of 96 seats in 12 departments in the Academic Year 2021-22, which was enhanced to 150 seats for the Academic Year 2024-25. It is submitted that on 19.12.2024, National Medical Council (MARB) issued public notice inviting applications for the establishment of new colleges for MBBS Course and revise intake capacity of existing colleges. Pursuant to the said public notice, the petitioners applied for enhancement of U.G. Seats from 150 to 250 for the Academic Year 2025-26 on 18.01.2025. The applications filed by the petitioners seeking enhancement of the seats were partly allowed by order dated 16.09.2025, whereby the intake capacity was enhanced from 150 seats to 200 seats instead of 250 seats as sought by the petitioners. Being aggrieved of the same, the petitioners preferred an appeal on 17.09.2025 under Section 28 (5) of the National Medical Commission Act, 2019 (for short, ‘the Act of 2019’). The appeal filed by the petitioners came to be decided on 11.10.2025. Being aggrieved of the same, the petitioners preferred an appeal on 17.09.2025 under Section 28 (5) of the National Medical Commission Act, 2019 (for short, ‘the Act of 2019’). The appeal filed by the petitioners came to be decided on 11.10.2025. Against the said order, the petitioners preferred second appeal on 13.10.2025 and the petitioners were heard on 22.10.2025 and the second appeal came be dismissed by the impugned order date 12.11.2025. 3. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Singhvi, while arguing the stay application, made the following submissions:- (i) The original application, first appeal and the second appeal were purposefully decided after inordinate delay and the impugned order has been passed on 12.11.2025 at the time when the counseling is over and the mop-up round is going on. The very purpose of delaying such proceedings was to frustrate the cause of the petitioners. (ii) The petitioners fulfilled all the requisite norms to have an intake capacity of 250 undergraduate seats for MBBS Course, however, the deficiencies of not having clinical material, the petitioners have been denied enhancement of balance 50 seats. (iii) If the interim order as prayed for is not granted and the petitioners are not allowed to have additional intake capacity of 150 seats, as desired, the very purpose of filing the writ petition would be frustrated. (iv) The petitioners have invested crores of rupees in establishing infrastructure and as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the infrastructure, if established is not put to use, it amounts to sheer waste. Reliance has been placed on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Manoj Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors. [Civil Appeal No.2679/2024, decided on 20.02.2024] while contending that the Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing with the appointment matter, observed that litigation may take long time but finally get decided, however, Constitutional Courts could not loos the sight of the reality and prevailing circumstances and, therefore, appropriate mechanism should be formulated for preserving the rights of the parties till the final determination takes place. Further reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Dr. M.K. Shah Medical College and Research Center Vs. Union of India & Anr. Further reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Dr. M.K. Shah Medical College and Research Center Vs. Union of India & Anr. [2022 SCC OnLine Del 938] and submitted that the Delhi High Court, while considering the approach of respondents in belatedly dealing with the application just to frustrate the cause should not come in the way in considering the cases of the institutes, if they are able to satisfy that the requisite norms are fulfilled for enhancement of the seats. (v) While making such submissions, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submits that the respondents purposefully delayed the proceedings and on account of which the petitioners have to approach this Court at the last moment. Had the respondents would have decided the application and appeal in time, then perhaps the petitioners would have been in a position to get the matter finally decided. (vi) Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Medical Council of India Vs. Chairman, S.R. Educational and Charitable Trust & Anr. [ (2020) 17 SCC 717 ]. While referring to para No.28 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized importance of the time line for the purpose of granting admission. (vii) As far as deficiency of clinical material is concerned, it was found to be adequate as per the standard assessment form, whereas deficiency of clinical material is one of the reason for not allowing enhancement of additional 50 seats, which further shows that the impugned order has been passed without there being any additional material and that being so, there was no ground on the basis of which the authorities could have made such observations. Based on such submissions, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submit that the interim protection is required to be granted in the present writ petition and the petitioners may be, on the provisional basis, be allowed to students of additional intake capacity of 50 seats for the UG MBBS Course. 4. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel Mr. Bharat Vyas, Additional Solicitor General, assisted by Ms. Niti Jain, appearing for respondent No.1, submits that the delay cannot be attributed to the respondents. As a matter of fact, the delay was on the part of the petitioners. 4. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel Mr. Bharat Vyas, Additional Solicitor General, assisted by Ms. Niti Jain, appearing for respondent No.1, submits that the delay cannot be attributed to the respondents. As a matter of fact, the delay was on the part of the petitioners. The respondents have by and large adhere to the time line. The first appeal so also the second appeal was decided within time line provided in the Regulation and, therefore, the allegations as levelled by the petitioners are incorrect. 4.1 Section 28 of the Act of 2019 provides for six months’ time to decide the original application. The application was submitted on 18.01.2025 and the same came to be decided on 16.09.2025. May be there was delay in deciding the application but even in such cases, remedy was available with the petitioners to immediately file an appeal after expiry of six months, as provided in the provision itself. That being so, even petitioners were not vigilant and preferred appeal after the decision on the original application on 16.09.2025. Therefore, the delay cannot be attributed solely on the respondents. In these circumstances, the petitioners cannot be allowed to raise such objections. 4.2 The interim order should not be granted by the courts, which amounts to final relief. While referring the prayer made in the writ petition so also in the stay application, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, submits that as a matter of fact, any interim order granted in the present writ petition would amount to grant of final relief. Whether the petitioners have sufficient infrastructure to seek infrastructure of additional 50 seats or not, is to be decided in the writ petition and, therefore, mere submission of counsel for the petitioners at this stage, without there being any reply on behalf of the respondents, cannot be made basis of considering it to be adjudication on the issue. 4.3 Learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1 further submitted that it is not a case where the original application has been rejected in toto. As a matter of fact, the petitioners were seeking enhancement of 100 seats and out of that, considering the infrastructure, the application was partly allowed and the petitioners have been allowed to have an intake capacity of additional 50 seats. As a matter of fact, the petitioners were seeking enhancement of 100 seats and out of that, considering the infrastructure, the application was partly allowed and the petitioners have been allowed to have an intake capacity of additional 50 seats. If the writ petition is allowed, then the petitioners would certainly be entitled to have additional 50 seats in the next academic session. However, such relief cannot be granted at this stage. Any interim protection would further lead to complication as the students admitted against the said 50 seats would claim equity based on the interim protection if the Court is inclined to grant. 5. Learned counsel Mr. Siddharth Tatia, appears on advance copy, appears on behalf of respondent Nos.2 to 4, also opposed the grant of interim order at this stage and seeks time to file reply. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. There is no dispute to the fact that the issue as to whether the respondent-authority was justified in denying additional intake capacity of 50 seats to the petitioners is to be decided after hearing the parties and while deciding the writ petition. At this stage, what is to be seen is as to whether interim order as prayed in the present writ petition can be granted, more particularly looking to the main prayer in the writ petition. It is to be noted that prayer made in the writ petition is almost identical to what has been sought in the stay application. There is no doubt that in the present case, second appeal was filed immediately after the decision on the first appeal on 13.10.2025. The parties were heard on 22.10.2025 and the second appeal could have been decided earlier, however, unfortunately same came to be decided on 12.11.2025. Learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, may be right in submitting that this had virtually made the petitioners remediless as there was hardly any time left to challenge the said order and seek final adjudication on merit. This argument, at the first instance, may appear to be appealable, however, it is also to be seen that if the interim order is not granted at this stage, the writ petition would not render infructuous. This argument, at the first instance, may appear to be appealable, however, it is also to be seen that if the interim order is not granted at this stage, the writ petition would not render infructuous. As a matter of fact, if the writ petition is finally heard and allowed, then petitioners would be eligible to have additional intake capacity of 50 seats for the subsequent academic year. 7.1 Another issue, which requires consideration at this stage is with regard to grant of interim order, more particularly considering the prayer made in the writ petition. The petitioners have prayed for interim order for allowing them to participate in the mop-up round for filling up of additional 50 seats, which is subject matter of the present writ petition. If such relief is granted, may be on provisional basis, then the students admitted against those 50 seats would certainly put their career at stake and based on the interim order, if they continue, they would certainly claim equity. IF the writ petition is heard and finally decided and is allowed, then certainly such admission would be regularised, however, in reverse case, the future of those students would certainly be an issue of concern and visualising that eventuality, this Court does not deem it appropriate to pass such interim order, which virtually amounts to grant of final relief. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Medical Council of India Vs. JSS Medical College & Ors. [ AIR 2012 SC 726 ] considered such issue and in para Nos.10 and 11, observed as under:- “10. Without adverting to the aforesaid issues and many other issues which may arise for determination, the High Court, in our opinion, erred in permitting increase in seats by interim order. In normal circumstances the High Court should not issue interim order granting permission for increase of the seats. High Court ought to realize that granting such permission by an interim order has a cascading effect. By virtue of such order students are admitted as in the present case and though many of them had taken the risk knowingly but few may be ignorant. In most of such cases when finally the issue is decided against the College the welfare and plight of the students are ultimately projected to arouse sympathy of the Court. It results in very awkward and difficult situation. In most of such cases when finally the issue is decided against the College the welfare and plight of the students are ultimately projected to arouse sympathy of the Court. It results in very awkward and difficult situation. If on ultimate analysis it is found that the College’s claim for increase of seats is untenable, in such an event the admission of students with reference to the increased seats shall be illegal. We cannot imagine anything more destructive of the rule of law than a direction by the court to allow continuance of such students, whose admissions is found illegal in the ultimate analysis. This Court is entrusted with the task to administer law and uphold its majesty. Courts cannot by its fiat increase the seats, a task entrusted to the Board of Governors and that too by interim order. In a matter like the present one, decisions on issues have to be addressed at the interlocutory stage and they can not be deferred or dictated later when serious complications might ensue from the interim order itself. There are large number of authorities which take this view and instead of burdening this judgment with all those authorities it would be sufficient to refer to a three Judge Bench decision of this Court in the case of Medical Council of India v. Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences, (2004) 6 SCC 76 , in which it has been held as follows: “14. In the normal circumstances, the High Court ought not to issue an interim order when for the earlier year itself permission had not been granted by the Council. Indeed, by grant of such interim orders students who have been admitted in such institutions would be put to serious jeopardy, apart from the fact whether such institutions could run the medical college without following the law. Therefore, we make it clear that the High Court ought not to grant such interim orders in any of the cases where the Council has not granted permission in terms of Section 10-A of the Medical Council Act. If interim orders are granted to those institutions which have been established without fulfilling the prescribed conditions to admit students, it will lead to serious jeopardy to the students admitted in these institutions.” 11. For all these reasons we are of the opinion that the interim order passed by the High Court is unsustainable. If interim orders are granted to those institutions which have been established without fulfilling the prescribed conditions to admit students, it will lead to serious jeopardy to the students admitted in these institutions.” 11. For all these reasons we are of the opinion that the interim order passed by the High Court is unsustainable. Any observation made by us in this judgment is for disposal of the present appeal and shall have no bearing on the merits of the case. Further, as the matter pertains to increase in seats in educational institution, we deem it expedient that the High Court considers and disposes of the case on merit expeditiously.” 7.2 The submissions made by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents that delay cannot be attributed solely on the respondents is also having force in it. It is to be noted that as per the provisions of Section 28 of the Act of 2019, if the original application is not decided within a period of six months, the applicant can immediately file appeal for early disposal of the application. In the present case, the petitioners submitted applications on 18.01.2025 and six months expired on 18.07.2025 and the petitioners did not choose to file appeal despite knowing the importance of time line, more particularly considering the fact that counseling was about to commence for the academic year 2025-26. This further indicates that the petitioners were not vigilant enough about the enhancement of the seats. The Delhi High Court, while dealing with the same issue in the case of Shrinivas G Educational and Research Institute of Medical Science & Anr. Vs. National Medical Commission & Ors. [WP(C) No.14939/2025, decided on 6.11.2025] observed as under:- “77. Lastly, the petitioners’ contention that the alleged delay by the NMC in issuing the impugned Letter of Disapproval has frustrated the appellate remedy, as counselling is underway, cannot be accepted for two reasons. Firstly, petitioners’ plea of being left without remedy due to delay is untenable on a plain reading of Section 28 (5), which provides that where no decision is taken within a span of six months of submitting a scheme, an appeal can be preferred after the lapse of said six months. Indubitably, the petitioners failed to avail this remedy. Firstly, petitioners’ plea of being left without remedy due to delay is untenable on a plain reading of Section 28 (5), which provides that where no decision is taken within a span of six months of submitting a scheme, an appeal can be preferred after the lapse of said six months. Indubitably, the petitioners failed to avail this remedy. Secondly, the justification put forth for not ventilating the said grievance through an appeal is that there were repeated assurances from NMC officials that an order on the application would be issued imminently. This Court finds such a submission to be unsubstantiated and, in any event, legally insufficient. Oral assurances, even if presumed to have been given, cannot be accepted as a valid ground for not availing remedy of statutory appeal, an efficacious mode available to the petitioners to speed-up the process of approval of their application/scheme.” 8. In view of the above, the stay application stands dismissed. 9. Issue notice. Issue notice of the stay application as well. 10. Notices need not be issued to respondent Nos.1 to 4 as they are represented by their respective counsel. 11. Notices be issued to respondent Nos.5 and 6 only, returnable within four weeks.