Judgment : (Sanjay S. Agrawal, J.) 1. This appeal has been preferred by the deceased’s brother under Section 372 of Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, questioning the legality and propriety of the Judgment dated 09.02.2015 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Surajpur, District- Surajpur (CG) in Sessions Trial No.115/2013, whereby, the respondents have been acquitted with regard to the offence punishable under Sections 302/34 and 201 of IPC. 2. Briefly stated, the case of the prosecution is that on 18.06.2010, a merg intimation (Ex.P/8) was lodged by one Md. Husain, before the Police Station Surajpur, stating therein, that he received the information from Saiyad Husain, the brother-in-law of the deceased- Hamida Bano around 6:30 AM, that his sister-in-law (Bhabhi) has fell down into the Well and died and, the brother of the deceased, namely, Abibul Rahman (PW-1) (wrongly been mentioned in the judgment as Habibul Rahman), also lodged the report before the Police Station, Surajpur on 18.06.2010 (though the copy of the same is not available in the case diary, but the receipt of it is there on record) wherein, an allegation was levelled against the respondents, who are husband, brother-in-law, second wife, and the mother of the second wife, respectively, that they have murdered his sister- Hamida Bano and, after the inquiry of the alleged merg intimation as well as the report lodged by the brother of the deceased, an FIR (Ex.P/7) was registered against the respondents in connection with Crime No.246/2010, for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 201 read with Section 34 of IPC. Inquest of the dead body was conducted vide (Ex.P/2) and, was sent for autopsy, which was conducted by Dr. Shashi Tirkey (PW/3), who in his report (Ex.P/5), opined the cause of death is asphyxia occurred due to throttling and accordingly, it was opined to be homicidal in nature. 3. After completing the usual investigation, the concerned Investigating Officer has submitted his charge-sheet before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surajpur, for the offence as mentioned herein-above and the matter was thereafter, committed to the learned Sessions Judge, Surajpur, where the charges have been framed against the respondents with regard to the offence punishable under Sections 302/34 and 201 of IPC, who have denied and claimed to be tried. 4. 4. In order to bring home the guilt of the respondents, the prosecution has examined as many as 9 witnesses and has exhibited 15 documents, while 3 witnesses were examined by the respondents in their defence in order to establish their plea of alibi. 5. The Trial Court, after considering the evidence led by the prosecution, arrived at a conclusion that none of the prosecution witnesses have established the fact that the respondents were with the deceased on the fateful day, and accordingly, they have been acquitted with regard to the alleged offences mentioned herein-above and being aggrieved, the instant appeal has been preferred by the brother of the deceased. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the Appellant submits that the finding of the Trial Court holding that the respondents are not involved in connection with the alleged crime, is apparently contrary to law, inasmuch as, the evidence led by the prosecution has not been scanned in its proper manner and thereby, erred in acquitting them, as such. 7. Learned Counsel appearing for State/Respondent No.5 has supported the aforesaid contention of the counsel for the Appellant, while none is present on behalf of the Accused/Respondents No.1 to 4. 8. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the entire record carefully. 9. Before considering the propriety of the judgment passed by the trial Court, acquitting the respondents from the alleged offence punishable under Section 302/34 of IPC, it would be appropriate to see the approach, which is required to be adopted, while dealing with an acquittal appeal, in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Mallappa and Others Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2024) 3 SCC 544 wherein, it has been observed in this regard at paragraphs 25 to 29 as under :- “25. We may firstly discuss the position of law regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal appeal. For, that is the foundation of this challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, unless proven guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the case ends in acquittal. The presumption of innocence gets concretized when the case ends in acquittal. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, unless proven guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the case ends in acquittal. The presumption of innocence gets concretized when the case ends in acquittal. It is so because once the Trial Court, on appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to rebut the same in appeal. 26. No doubt, an order of acquittal is open to appeal and there is no quarrel about that. It is also beyond doubt that in the exercise of appellate powers, there is no inhibition on the High Court to re-appreciate or re- visit the evidence on record. However, the power of the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence is a qualified power, especially when the order under challenge is of acquittal. The first and foremost question to be asked is whether the Trial Court thoroughly appreciated the evidence on record and gave due consideration to all material pieces of evidence. The second point for consideration is whether the finding of the Trial Court is illegal or affected by an error of law or fact. If not, the third consideration is whether the view taken by the Trial Court is a fairly possible view. A decision of acquittal is not meant to be reversed on a mere difference of opinion. What is required is an illegality or perversity. 27. It may be noted that the possibility of two views in a criminal case is not an extraordinary phenomenon. The ‘two-views theory’ has been judicially recognized by the Courts and it comes into play when the appreciation of evidence results into two equally plausible views. However, the controversy is to be resolved in favour of the accused. For, the very existence of an equally plausible view in favour of innocence of the accused is in itself a reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution. Moreover, it reinforces the presumption of innocence. And therefore, when two views are possible, following the one in favour of innocence of the accused is the safest course of action. For, the very existence of an equally plausible view in favour of innocence of the accused is in itself a reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution. Moreover, it reinforces the presumption of innocence. And therefore, when two views are possible, following the one in favour of innocence of the accused is the safest course of action. Furthermore, it is also settled that if the view of the Trial Court, in a case of acquittal, is a plausible view, it is not open for the High Court to convict the accused by reappreciating the evidence. If such a course is permissible, it would make it practically impossible to settle the rights and liabilities in the eyes of the law. 28. In Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka (2015) 10 SCC 230 ,(SCC pp. 236-37,para 13) “13. Considering the reasons given by the trial court and on appraisal of the evidence, in our considered view, the view taken by the trial court was a possible one. Thus, the High Court should not have interfered with the judgment of acquittal. This Court in Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N. [ (2002) 9 SCC 639 ] has laid down that as the appreciation of evidence made by the trial court while recording the acquittal is a reasonable view, it is not permissible to interfere in appeal. The duty of the High Court while reversing the acquittal has been dealt with by this Court, thus: (SCC p.643, para 9) “9...…We are constrained to observe that the High Court was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. It was required to deal with various grounds on which acquittal had been based and to dispel those grounds. It has not done so. Salutary principles while dealing with appeal against acquittal have been overlooked by the High Court. If the appreciation of evidence by the trial court did not suffer from any flaw, as indeed none has been pointed out in the impugned judgment, the order of acquittal could not have been set aside. The view taken by the learned trial court was a reasonable view and even if by any stretch of imagination, it could be said that another view was possible, that was not a ground sound enough to set aside an order of acquittal.” 29. The view taken by the learned trial court was a reasonable view and even if by any stretch of imagination, it could be said that another view was possible, that was not a ground sound enough to set aside an order of acquittal.” 29. In Sanjeev v. State of H.P. (2022) 6 SCC 29 4 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court analyzed the relevant decisions and summarized the approach of the appellate Court while deciding an appeal from the order of acquittal. It observed thus: (SCC p.297, para 7) “7. It is well settled that: 7.1. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the reasons which had weighed with the trial court in acquitting the accused must be dealt with, in case the appellate court is of the view that the acquittal rendered by the trial court deserves to be upturned (see Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka (2019) 5 SCC 436 and, Anwar Ali v. State of H.P. (2020) 10 SCC 166 ). 7.2. With an order of acquittal by the trial court, the normal presumption of innocence in a criminal matter gets reinforced (see Atley v. State of U.P. (1955) SCC OnLine SC 51) 7.3. If two views are possible from the evidence on record, the appellate court must be extremely slow in interfering with the appeal against acquittal (see Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412 )” 10. In view of the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court, it is necessary to examine the facts and the evidence as led by the prosecution in order to ascertain as to whether the findings recorded by the trial Court, acquitting the respondents from the commission of the alleged offence, are perverse or would deserves to be upheld. 11. From perusal of the record, it appears that the Respondent No.1- Afajal Husain Ansari, the husband of the deceased-Hamida Bano, Respondent No.2-Md. Saiyad, the brother-in-law of the deceased, Respondent No.3- Nijibunnisha, the second wife of the deceased’s husband and Respondent No.4- Guljari Bibi, the mother of the said second wife of the deceased’s husband, have been charge-sheeted with regard to the offence punishable under Sections 302/34 and 201 of IPC. According to the prosecution, a merg intimation (Ex.P/8) was lodged by one Md. Husain, wherein it was informed to the Police Station, Surajpur, that he received the information from the brother-in-law of the deceased, namely, Md. According to the prosecution, a merg intimation (Ex.P/8) was lodged by one Md. Husain, wherein it was informed to the Police Station, Surajpur, that he received the information from the brother-in-law of the deceased, namely, Md. Saiyad Husain that his sister-in-law (Bhabhi) Hamida Bano, has fell down into the Well and died, and it also appears from the receipt of the complaint lodged by the deceased’s brother, namely, Abibul Rahman that the respondents have pushed his sister (deceased) into the Well and have committed her murder. 12. In order to establish the aforesaid allegation, Abibul Rahman (PW/1), the brother of the deceased- Hamida Bano, was examined, who has stated at Para-4 that, he had received the information from his deceased sister that, the brother-in-law of her and second wife of husband, namely, Najibunnisha, used to quarrel with her and anything could be done with her. Perusal of his further statement, particularly Para-8, would show that Respondent No.2- Md. Saiyad, who was the brother of the deceased’s husband, was living separately and, it reveals further from Para-11 of his testimony, that he received the information from the mother of the deceased’s husband and sister of him, namely-Soiba, that on the fateful day, Respondent No.4-Guljari Bibi, who is the mother of the second wife of said Afajal Husain, was at his house on the date of incident, but in order to prove the said fact, they i.e. mother of said Afajal Husain and his sister- Soiba, were not examined. It, thus, appears from his (PW/1) testimony that the Respondent No.2, who is the brother-in-law of the deceased was living separately, and the Respondent No.4 Guljari Bibi, was not found at his (Afajal Husain) house on the fateful day. 13. Shakil Ahmad (PW/9), who was also the brother of the deceased Hamida Bano, has admitted the fact that Respondent No.2-Md. Saiyed, the brother-in-law of his sister, was living separately from his said brother Afajal Husain. 13. Shakil Ahmad (PW/9), who was also the brother of the deceased Hamida Bano, has admitted the fact that Respondent No.2-Md. Saiyed, the brother-in-law of his sister, was living separately from his said brother Afajal Husain. Pramod Sharma (PW/8) was the investigating officer and, it was stated by him at Paragraph 9 that during the inquiry, he was informed by one Surendra Prasad Gupta, that the husband of the deceased, namely, Afajal Husain was with him at the wedding party at village Kelhari and returned back to the village-Devnagar on the next day morning around 5:45 AM and, the version of him was found to be corroborated by said Surendra Prasad Gupta, who was examined as (DW/1). 14. It appears further from the statement of Jibrakul Ansari (DW/2) that on the fateful day, he had gone to Surajpur along with the Respondent No.2-Md. Saiyad, the brother-in-law of the deceased, by his motorcycle for attending the marriage of one Jitendra Dubey and, according to Nasiruddin (DW/3), who is the father of second wife of said Afajal Husain, that on the fateful day, his daughter, i.e. the second wife of Afajal Husain, was at his home at village Sonpur, along with his wife, for looking after her daughter, who was ill. 15. It, thus, appears from perusal of the evidence led by the prosecution as well as by the defence witnesses that, none of the respondents were at home on the said fateful day and their plea of alibi was, thus, found to be corroborated from their testominies. That apart, no cogent and reliable evidence has been led by the prosecution, so as to hold that on the fateful day, the respondents were at home. In view thereof, it cannot be said that the respondents are involved in any manner in connection with the alleged crime and the trial Court has, therefore, not committed any illegality in acquitting the respondents from the commission of the alleged offence, so as to call for any interference in this appeal. 16. The appeal being devoid of merit is, accordingly, dismissed.