JUDGMENT : PART I - PREFACE (a) CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY SCHEME RELATING TO LOCAL SELF INSTITUTIONS 1. The governance mechanism in India was largely with the Union of India and the States and Union Territories, under the Constitution. However, urban local self governance and organisation of Village Panchayats was an aspiration as envisaged under Article 40 of the Constitution wherein it was provided that the State shall take steps to organise village panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government. 2. The concept of self governance was initially regulated and controlled by the executive of the States. The Parliament while bringing out amendment in the Constitution inserting Part-IXA, under its objects and reasons, recognized that the system as was being followed, was pleased with many vices and could not acquire the status and dignity of responsible people bodies. 3. Accordingly, Part-IX introduce a three tier system of Panchayat Raj Institutions at Village, intermediate and district levels, while Part-IXA introduce a system of three types of municipalities based on the size of urban areas, the lowest being an area of transition from rural area to an urban area. Articles 243B and 243Q mandated institutions of local governance in the States based on ratio between population and territorial areas and number of cities. It also provided for reservation for different sections of society which deserve representation as per population. With the amendment, the governance stands distributed in between Union, States and Local Self Governance with a separate sphere of functioning as per the schedules to the Constitution. 4. While the three governance have to act in tandem with each other, the Indian federalism puts more stress on overall governance to the Union, followed by the State Government and then the local governance amongst the local bodies which, of course, has to be under the supervision of the States. The functions of the third limb of governance, namely local self governance, have been clearly outlined under Articles 243G, 243H, 243W and 243X, and Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules of the Constitution. 5. Local self governance, thus, treats a District to be a third territorial unit after the Central and the States, and local self governance for various levels under the District comprising of rural and urban areas forms the source of self governance, as envisaged in the Constitution. 5. Local self governance, thus, treats a District to be a third territorial unit after the Central and the States, and local self governance for various levels under the District comprising of rural and urban areas forms the source of self governance, as envisaged in the Constitution. The essence of democracy, thus, lies in the manner the local authorities function and, therefore, periodical elections at grassroot level become a necessary ingredient. The scope and functional structure of Panchayati Raj and municipal institutions form the basis for conducting such elections. Delimitation of territory, therefore, has an important role in identifying participation of the people at large in a particular territory in representation at Panchayats and municipalities. The State legislature has been empowered to enact laws for all the purposes as envisaged under Part-IXA of the Constitution. 6. Accordingly, the State of Rajasthan legislature enacted Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 and Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009, to which we may refer at appropriate stage of this judgment. The Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1953 and the Rajasthan Panchayat Samiti & Zila Parishad Act, 1959 were repealed and the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 was brought into force w.e.f. 23.4.1994 vide gazette notification. From time to time there have been certain amendments made. Similarly, Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959, wherein amendments had been made from time to time by the legislature in consonance with the provisions incorporated in Part IXA of the Constitution, was repealed and the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009, was enacted by the State legislature vide notification dated 11.9.2009 w.e.f. 15.9.2009, which comprehensively deal with all the aspects relating to local self governance at the level of municipalities. (b) BRIEF BACKGROUND OF PRESENT BUNCH OF LITIGATION 7. The present bunch of matters are relating to delimitation exercise undertaken or concluded by the State Government relating to the Panchayati Raj Institutions or Municipality, across the State; the ancillary issues arising thereto, the consequential action taken in pursuance thereof as well as postponement of the elections of Local Self Institutions. The writ petitions have been filed before learned Single Bench as well as PIL petition before the Division Bench of this Court at Principal Seat at Jodhpur as well as Bench at Jaipur. In relation to interim orders / interlocutory order passed by learned Single Judge, has given rise to some D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) also. 8. The writ petitions have been filed before learned Single Bench as well as PIL petition before the Division Bench of this Court at Principal Seat at Jodhpur as well as Bench at Jaipur. In relation to interim orders / interlocutory order passed by learned Single Judge, has given rise to some D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) also. 8. The then Chief Justice vide his order dated 14.07.2025 passed in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.7718/2025 and other connected matters, has directed to list the said bunch of writ petitions along with D.B. Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No.1285/2025 as well as some other cases listed before the learned Single Judge at Principal Seat as well as at Jaipur Bench. There were certain appeals preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in certain petitions pending at Principal Seat at Jodhpur, namely D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.831/2025 (State of Rajasthan and Ors. Vs. Dhanna Ram and Ors.), which too was directed to be listed together for analogous hearing. The relevant portion of order dated 14.07.2025 is reproduced below :- “When these matters come up for consideration on various issues raised pertaining to delimitation of Panchayat areas and municipal areas based on various grounds, it is brought to the notice of this Court that earlier a petition seeking direction for holding election was taken up for consideration by this Court and it was brought to the notice of the Court that number of petitions have already been filed at Principal Seat, Jodhpur and Bench Jaipur, which also challenge notification regarding constitution of Panchayat and Municipal areas and interim order has also been passed in some of the cases. That bunch of petitions, which were directed to be listed for analogous hearing, in our view, should also be taken up for consideration along with these cases, which have been listed today, to avoid conflict of orders. Learned Advocate General submits that State has filed an appeal against interim order which is pending consideration before the Principal Seat of this Court at Jodhpur. Present batch of petitions as well as D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1285/2025 and other cases are directed to be listed for analogous hearing along with these cases and D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.831/2025 (Pending before Principal Seat Jodhpur) is also required to be heard analogously in order to maintain parity. Present batch of petitions as well as D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1285/2025 and other cases are directed to be listed for analogous hearing along with these cases and D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.831/2025 (Pending before Principal Seat Jodhpur) is also required to be heard analogously in order to maintain parity. This is so because in number of petitions, which are being listed today, prayer for interim order is being made on the basis of interim order passed by the learned Single Judge in certain petitions pending at Principal Seat of this Court at Jodhpur against which writ appeal has been filed and listed for consideration. Registry is directed to connect all these petitions and list them along with D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1285/2025 and all other cases earlier directed which are listed for analogous hearing along with D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.831/2025 on 21.07.2025. Learned State Counsel shall ensure that in all Panchayat matters challenging delimitation notifications and matters connected therewith, this order is brought to the notice of learned Single Benches as and when the matters come up for consideration both at Principal Seat of this Court at Jodhpur and Bench Jaipur. A copy of this order be placed on record of each petition.” 9. Accordingly, all these cases were taken up and with the benefit of technology of using video conferencing, we were able to hear the arguments advanced by several counsels arguing cases from Principal Seat at Jodhpur as well as counsels from Jaipur. The technology was used in a manner that all the lawyers were privy to the arguments being advanced either at Jodhpur or at Jaipur and were, therefore, able to submit arguments in rejoinder. Hearing took place for several days and the judgment was reserved. (c) ISSUES INVOLVED 10. From the analytic and comparative analysis of the pleadings of the respective parties in the present bunch of the writ petitions / special appeals, broadly following issues need to be addressed by us comprehensively and relatively : Issue No.I Whether the final delimitation notifications issued under Section 101 of the Act of 1994 or Section 3 of the Act of 2009 can be challenged under the writ jurisdiction of this Court ? Issue No.II Whether the notification dated 05.05.2025 issued by the Rural Development and Panchayati Raj Department issued on the basis of notifications issued from time to time regarding delimitation for the various Panchayats and Municipal Councils laying down the new boundaries can be said to be legal and justified? Issue No.III Whether the notification issued by the State Government dated 16.01.2025 postponing elections of Gram Panchayats, where the tenure was completed and where the tenure was expiring on 21.01.2025 and appointing the outgoing Sarpanch as administrators and constituting Administrative Committees invoking Section 95 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 was just and proper? Issue No.I V Whether the consequential orders treating the post of concerned Panchayat Member/Pradhan/Municipal Corporator as vacant on account of delimitation exercise is legal and justified? Issue No.V Whether the individually duly elected person can be removed from the post and another person be appointed on his place after the said person had lost the election for holding the post? Issue No.V Whether decision of the State Government to conduct elections of all the Panchayats together after conducting delimitation exercise can be said to be legal and justified? Issue No.VI Whether the delimitation exercise could be conducted without fresh Census? Whether delimitation exercise can be conducted in an existing local body without their being any inclusion or exclusion of territories? Issue No.VII Whether the mandamus can be issued for holding elections of dissolved local bodies? Issue No. IX Whether an Administrative Officer can be appointed as Administrator in the intervening period i.e. after completion of tenure of the Municipal Body and before completion of fresh election ? Issue No. X Whether the writ petitions challenging the process of delimitation initiated under Section 101 of the Act of 1994, where final delimitation notification has not yet been passed, are maintainable ? 11. The broad issues identified above, from the pleadings of the parties across this bunch of writ petitions / special appeals, along with other connected and ancillary issues, will be addressed and decided in the category-wise adjudication undertaken by this Court in the succeeding paragraphs of this judgment. PART II – SUBMISSIONS (a) SUBMISSIONS OF PETITIONERS / APPELLANTS : 12. 11. The broad issues identified above, from the pleadings of the parties across this bunch of writ petitions / special appeals, along with other connected and ancillary issues, will be addressed and decided in the category-wise adjudication undertaken by this Court in the succeeding paragraphs of this judgment. PART II – SUBMISSIONS (a) SUBMISSIONS OF PETITIONERS / APPELLANTS : 12. S/Shri Hanuman Choudhary, Shailesh Prakash Sharma, Punit Singhvi, Pradeep Kalwania, M.S. Raghav, Prem Chand Dewanda, Sunil Kumar Singodiya and R.N. Mathur, Senior Advocate mainly advanced arguments at Jaipur Bench while Sunil Joshi, Manoj Bhandari, Ramavtar Singh Choudhary, Dinesh Kumar Joshi, Ranjeet Joshi, Varda Ram Choudhary, Moti Singh, Narayan Singh Solanki, Ganesh Ram Jat, Rajesh Joshi, Senior Advocate, J.R. Ponia, Sr. Adv. have advanced arguments from Principal Seat at Jodhpur through video conferencing and Shri Rajendra Prasad, Advocate General has argued on behalf of the State. Various counsels for the petitioners / appellants as well as counsel for the respondent – State have also submitted their respective written submissions. The arguments / contentions of the respective parties are succinctly summed up below :- 13. Shri Hanuman Choudhary, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9856/2025: Banshidhar Khandela Vs. The State of Rajasthan has submitted that the power of delimitation, inclusion/exclusion of local body, Gram Panchayat in the true spirit of the statutory provisions with a predetermined approach, the authorities have misused and misinterpreted the provisions to suit their purposes resulting in ousting of duly elected Pradhans. He submits that the objections which were received from the villagers were required to be addressed too by the District Collector and opportunity of hearing should have been provided to them before taking a final decision for issuing notification under Section 101 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. He submits that the order passed by the learned Single Judge at Principal Seat at Jodhpur in S.B. Civil Writ Peittion No.8576/2025, Dhanna Ram and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. was required to be followed and decision should have been taken in the said terms. 14. Mr. R.N. Mathur, learned Senior Advocate appearing in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.7043/2025: Sonu Kumari Vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr., submitted that the notification issued under Section 3 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 is against the spirit of Article 243 of the Constitution of India and there has been a complete non-application of Mind. 14. Mr. R.N. Mathur, learned Senior Advocate appearing in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.7043/2025: Sonu Kumari Vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr., submitted that the notification issued under Section 3 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 is against the spirit of Article 243 of the Constitution of India and there has been a complete non-application of Mind. He submits that the notification results into violation of Provisions of the Rajashtan Panchayati Raj Act as well as the Rajasthan Municipal Act. Article 243 of the Constitution, in his submission, provides for democratic governance at village as well as urban levels. Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution provides for functions of Panchayat and Twelth Schedule of the Constitution provides for functions of Municipalities. On comparison of the same, it is apparent that the factors for consideration of village development are wider and broader in nature. By limitation excluding a Gram Panchayat results in depriving the Gram Panchayat from rural development curtailing the rights of the people living in that Panchayat. He submits that firstly, in terms of Article 243Q, the rural area ought to have been first declared as transitional area and prior consultation with the Election Commissioner has not been done, more so, as it is the Election Commissioner alone who is authorized to conduct elections. He submits that the exercise has been undertaken for political considerations without due application of mind. The upliftment of rural area was required to be kept in mind before taking such decisions by the State. He relies on Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) Vs. Secretary, Governor's Secretariat reported in (2020) 6 SCC 548 and The State Of Goa Vs. Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh reported in ( 2021) 8 SCC 401 in support of his submissions. He has also invited our attention to order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Meghraj Kothari V. Delimitation Commission reported in AIR 1967 SC 669 to submit that prior consultation with State Election Commissioner is necessary and an enquiry is required to be made at the level before conducting the delimitation exercise. 15. Shri J.R. Poonia, learned Sr. Adv. appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8748/2025: Deva Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors., has apart from supporting the submissions of Mr. 15. Shri J.R. Poonia, learned Sr. Adv. appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8748/2025: Deva Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors., has apart from supporting the submissions of Mr. R.N. Mathur, Senior Advocate has advanced his submissions pointing out that judicial review can be done by this Court even after the notification has been issued and relies on the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) Vs. Secretary, Governor's Secretariat (supra) and The State Of Goa Vs. Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh (supra). 16. Shri Prem Chand Dewanda, learned counsel appearing in D.B. Civil Writ (PIL) Petition No.1285/2025: Giriraj Singh Devanda and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors., has submitted written submissions with respect to the PIL and supports his submissions on the basis of judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Mahajan Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. reported in 2022 (12) SCC 770 ; Kishansing Tomar Vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Ors. reported in 2006(8) SCC 352 ; Municipal Board, Begun and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. reported in 1991 AIR Rajasthan 14; Sau. Durgeshwari Rajesh Kale Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in 2021 (3) AIR BomR 476; Guddi and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (D.B. CWP No.2002/2020) and P.K. Kunju Vs. State of Kerala and Ors. reported in 1970 AIR Kerala 252 apart from the law as already cited hereinabove. 17. He submits that violation of Article 243E of the Constitution which mandates continuing for five years only and no longer it also mandates as per Proviso to complete the election before the expiry of tenure. He submits that postponing election by way of impugned notifications is ultra vires to the Constitution. Article 243K(1) vest Superintendent direction and control for preparation of electoral rolls and they are duty bound to complete the election before expiry of the tenure, but the State Election Commission has failed to discharge its constitutional mandate. 18. He submits that the authentication by the only Governor is lacking in the impugned notification, rendering the notification to be constitutional defective. He also submits that there is misuse of Section 17 and Section 95 of the Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. 18. He submits that the authentication by the only Governor is lacking in the impugned notification, rendering the notification to be constitutional defective. He also submits that there is misuse of Section 17 and Section 95 of the Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. Further, the outgoing Sarpanch or Ward Panch could not have been appointed as Administrator and the action is arbitrary and does not have any nexus to the objects sought to be achieved. They could not have been retained in the office and continuing of the existing body beyond five years was contrary to the mandate under Article 243E of the Constitution. Even the Administrator cannot be allowed to continue for a period exceeding six months upon dissolution of Panchayats. He submits that no reasons have been provided for postponement of Panchayat Election and the notification is clearly arbitrary exercise of power which violates Article 14 of the Constitution. There has been a usurpation of the democratic rights and violates basic structure principle. 19. Mr. Pradeep Kalwania, learned counsel appearing in D.B. Special Appeal Writ Nos.628/2025, in his written submissions challenged the inclusion of the Village Gulabbari in Gram Panchayat Parmanpura in Shahpura Block and the consequential order of the learned Single Judge rejecting his petition as premature as no final decision was taken by the Government, he argues in his D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.627/2025 that the guidelines issued by the State on 10.01.2025 and 13.02.2025 which mandated proposal of reorganization and re-demarcation to be prepared on the basis of the data of the Census of the year 2011. He submits that as per the guidelines, the minimum population should be kept at 3,000 and maximum at 5,500 and the headquarter of the newly created Gram Panchayat should be kept in the village as far as possible, to which adequate means of transportation are available so that there is easy contact with all the other villagers of the Gram Panchayat. There should be a Government Offices in the village with other facilities such as School, Panchayat Bhawan, Anganwadi Center, Patwal Bhawan, Kisan Seva Kendra and other Government Offices for which sufficient land should be available, but the Sub Divisional Officer in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner, issued order on 11.02.2025 whereby, the District Collector approved inclusion of Revenue Village Gulabbari in the newly created/proposed Gram Panchayat Parmanpura by excluding from the existing Gram panchayat Maharkhurd. In support of his submission that Village Gulabbadi should have been declared as headquarter of Gram Panchayat instead of Parmanpura, he has invited attention to the population as per Census 2011 of Village Gulabbadi was 2196 to that of Parmanpura was 1796. Gulabbadi was situated at State Highway No.37 while Village Parmanpura is situated in remote area. There is an English Medium School at Village Gulabbadi. A- Grade Veterinary Husbandry Hospital is also situated and an old Post Office whereas postel work is conducted for Parmanpura via Gulabadi. Main water tank is constructed and distance from District Headquarter is 47 Kilometer while distance of Parmanpura is 55 Kilometers. Village Gulabbadi is 25 Kilometers from the Sub- Divisional Headquarter, however, Village Parmanpura is 30 Kilometer away. He submits that there was no occasion of inclusion of Revenue Village of Gulabbari in the new Gram Panchayat Parmanpura. 20. Similar arguments had been advanced for Village Gomawali which has been included in the newly formed Gram Panchayat Trilokpura and removed from the existing Gram Panchayat Sihodi in Panchayat Samiti Srimadhopur in District Sikar. 21. Mr. Tanmay Dhand, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.6505/2025, has raised the submission as to whether the State can withdraw previous notification issued under Article 243Q of the Constitution by virtue of notification under Section 3(1) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 and revert a municipality included as transitional area to Village Panchayat. He has referred to the notification dated 24.3.2021 whereby the Revenue Village Todiya Ka Bas, Gram Panchayat Lekri, District Alwar was declared as transitional area under Article 243Q of the Constitution and included within the limits of Nagar Palika Bansur, and the new notification dated 27.3.2025 whereby the limits of Nagar Palika Bansur were altered resulting in withdrawal and revival of Village Panchayat Todiya Ka Bas, Gram Panchayat Lekri. He relies on a judgment passed in Bhanwar Lal Mundra & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (DB Civil Writ Petition No.10491/2009) decided on 13.5.2015. 22. Mr. Rajesh Kumar Sharma and Mr. Deepak Sharma, learned counsels appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos. He relies on a judgment passed in Bhanwar Lal Mundra & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (DB Civil Writ Petition No.10491/2009) decided on 13.5.2015. 22. Mr. Rajesh Kumar Sharma and Mr. Deepak Sharma, learned counsels appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos. 6721/2025 and 9804/2023 have submitted that even if a person is disqualified on account of Ward being shifted from one Panchayat Samiti to Municipality, he would continue to remain as Pradhan as the election of Pradhan is not only the part of a village of particular area which may become part of municipal council on account of delimitation, but also represents the other Gram Panchayat of concerned Panchayat Samiti. Petitioner, therefore, cannot be removed from the post of Pradhan merely because the village from where he had been elected as a Member stands dissolved and inviting attention to Sections 2(8), 17, 30, 38 of the Act of 1994, he submits that the concerned person who has been elected as Pradhan would, therefore, continue to perform work upto the period of five years. 23. Mr. Ravi Kumar Palsania and Mr. Anilendra Pandey, learned counsels who are appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos. 6988/2025, 8868/2025, 9206/2025, 9187/2025, 9427/2025, 9364/2025, 9363/2025, 9428/2025, 9424/2025, 9385/2025, 9399/2025, 10542/2025, 10541/2025, 11046/2025, 11606/2025, 9427/2025, in their written submissions have submitted that the notification dated 10.01.2025 does not indicate any reasons for reorganization of all the panchayats. In number of cases, it is submitted that the parameter of 6 kilometer distance and guidelines which were laid down for delimitation have been violated. It is submitted that there is no administrative necessity for current delimitation exercise being conducted. It is further submitted that the objection filed before the Collector have remained undecided and resultantly, the litigation have been taken before this Court. He further submits that even there were provisions under the law for allowing the delimitation. The same cannot be said to be absolute and unrestricted. The State Government cannot act arbitrarily and without giving out any reasons. The democratic set up cannot be allowed to be disturbed. It is submitted that the parameters which have been laid down for delimitation in the year 2021 like, population, nature of work of the local geographical situation ought to be taken into consideration for the purpose of constitution of Municipalites. The acts, as alleged, could not be undertaken without considering the public interest. 24. Mr. It is submitted that the parameters which have been laid down for delimitation in the year 2021 like, population, nature of work of the local geographical situation ought to be taken into consideration for the purpose of constitution of Municipalites. The acts, as alleged, could not be undertaken without considering the public interest. 24. Mr. Indresh Sharma, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.6648/2025, in his written submission has submitted the similar arguments, as noticed above, with regard to Village Sajanpuri which has been directed to be excluded while forming Nagar Palika Laxmangarh and he submits that the village ought to have been included in the urban local body. Denial of inclusion has resulted, in his submissions, derivation of civic amenities. It is his submission that other two villages who are at equal distance have been included, the State ought to have been included the Village Sajanpuri also. He submits that the action of the respondents is not in accordance with law and there has been a complete non-application of mind in laying down the standards and while taking such arbitrary decision leaving out the village to form Municipal Council Laxmangargh. Learned counsel has relied on the judgment of Champa Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. reported in AIR 2018 SC 2352 in support of his submissions. Mr. Indresh Sharma, learned counsel also appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.6191/2025, in his written submissions claims for inclusion of Village Mojpur. 25. Mr. Shailesh Prakash Sharma, learned counsel appearing in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.6124/2025, in his written submission has submitted that petitioners who were Ward Panchs of Gram Panchayat Hathikhera which consist of three villages (Revenue Villages Hathikhera, Boraj and Kajipura) elected in January 2021 for a fixed five-year term till 21.01.2006. However, in account of the notification dated 25.03.2025, the said villages have been included in the earlier Municipal Corporation, resulting in ousting of the elected members. He submits that on account of inclusion of the villages, the petitioners’ democratic mandate has been disrupted and the villages have been deprived of the rural schemes such namely MNREGA, PMAY, Bada Bandi, etc. It also increased taxation, restricts use of community land and would result in causing administrative inconvenience. He submits that on account of inclusion of the villages, the petitioners’ democratic mandate has been disrupted and the villages have been deprived of the rural schemes such namely MNREGA, PMAY, Bada Bandi, etc. It also increased taxation, restricts use of community land and would result in causing administrative inconvenience. It is his further submission that the post precedents have been ignored and submissions of the administrative authorities are required to follow uniform standards which have been continued to be followed previously on account of inclusion of the villages. It is submitted that local residents would face great amount of hardship and common lands for grazing and public purposes would be restricted. 26. In D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.4686/2025 filed by Ex-MLA Sanyam Lodha as a public interest litigation, the issues raised are essentially the same as raised in D.B. Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No. 1285/2025: Giriraj Singh Devanda Vs. State of Rajasthan. Shri Punit Singhvi, learned counsel, in his written submissions, has reiterated the submission with regard to the necessity to conduct election on or before expiry of the terms of the elected member of the Municipality in terms of Section 11(2)(i) read with Section 7 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009. Learned counsel further submits that the appointment of Administrator of the Municipality is not within the jurisdiction of the State. He relies on Suresh Mahajan Vs. State of MP (2022) 12 SCC 770 and Kishansing Tomar Vs. Municipal Corpn.: 2006 8 SCC 352 . 27. Mr. Sunil Samdariya, learned counsel appearing in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.9974/2025: Ram Kanwar Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors., in his written submissions has submitted that the guidelines dated 10.01.2025 and 13.02.2025 issued by the respondents could not have been violated and Gram Panchayats could not have been altered or created in violation of population parameters as prescribed in the aforesaid guidelines. He submits that as per guidelines dated 10.01.2025, the Government prescribed the minimum population of 3000 and maximum population of 5500 for creation of new Gram Panchayat, but they have lowered the term. It is submitted that however, 15% deviation was allowed relating to population matrix vide notification dated 13.02.2025. Policy decision requires to be adhered to strictly and he submits that the State Government cannot speak in two voices. District Collector has failed to prescribe the guidelines which provided for determinable standards. It is submitted that however, 15% deviation was allowed relating to population matrix vide notification dated 13.02.2025. Policy decision requires to be adhered to strictly and he submits that the State Government cannot speak in two voices. District Collector has failed to prescribe the guidelines which provided for determinable standards. He also relies on judgment passed by the Division Bench in the case of Gram Vikas Manch Samity, Bhinay Vs. State of Rajasthan (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.5795/2022) wherein contention of the State Government that policy is not binding, was rejected. He also relies upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “ Ms X Vs. Registrar General, High Court of Madhya Pradesh” reported in (2022) 14 SCC 187 and submitted that delimitation of Gram Panchayats, Tehsil- Viratnagar was wholly unjustified and the principles laid down in the administrative guidelines and policy were required to be adhered to. 28. Mr. Pradeep Kalwania, learned counsel appearing in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8269/2025 in his written submission has relied on judgment passed in the case of “ Kuldeep Kumar Vs. U.T. Chandigarh ( 2024 INSC 129 ) and submits that on account of political pressure, notification dated 24.03.2025 was issued extending the area of the existing municipal council, Shahpura to include Revenue Village Devan, Madho Ka Bas and Lobdawas. He submits that the action has been taken to remove the petitioner who has been elected as a Pradhan under the symbol of Indian National Congress. Learned counsel submits that there has been no declaration, declaring a new area as Municipal council Shahpura and the notification dated 24.03.2025, therefore, deserves to be quashed. He submits that merely because one part of the area of the Municipal council has been declared as surplus and included in the Municipal Corporation, the Pradhan, Smt. Pista Devi who was elected and holding in-charge was required to be consulted and could not have been removed by declaring the post of Pradhan as vacant. He submits that merely because the post of Ward Member has to be treated as dissolved on account of the concerned Panchayat having been added in the Municipal areas, the Pradhan cannot be automatically removed on account of being Member of the Said Panchayat. He submits that the altered membership of a Ward Member can be removed in terms of Section 101(5A) of the Act of 1994. He submits that the altered membership of a Ward Member can be removed in terms of Section 101(5A) of the Act of 1994. Since the Panchayat Samiti continues to remain in existence, therefore, the post of Pradhan should remain unaffected. He relies the submissions, as noticed hereinabove, on this aspects. It is further stated that the petitioner was elected as Pradhan for a period of 5 years in the year 2021 and ought to be allowed to continue on the post till she completes her 5 years tenure. Opportunity of hearing prior to delimitation order is mandatory and keeping in with the rule of audi alteram. He also relies on judgment passed in the case of Ashok Ganpat Jadhav and Anr. Vs. State Election Commission Mumbai and Ors. reported in 2000(4) ALL MR 565 as well as Kuldeep Kumar Vs. U.T. Chandigarh (supra). 29. Mr. Naveen Dhuwan, learned counsel appearing in D.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos.8670/2025, 8714/2025, 8718/2025, 9403/2025 and 9405/2025, for Gram Panchayat Bhadwasi, in his written submission reiterates what we have already noticed in the written submissions of other cases. It is submitted that when the Nagar Parishad prepared a plan for the proposed area to include in the Municipal area, the entire area of Gram Panchayat Bhadwasi was not included and only one revenue Village Jagmalpur was included. It is his submission that the Municipality also raised concern for not including of the areas, but only the villages in the periphery ought to be included, however, vide notification dated 22.04.2025 and order dated 05.05.2025, the Panchayati Raj Department has been declared that the elected representatives of the included area in municipality would be considered to be removed. He submits that the elected members ought not to be treated as removed on account of delimitation exercise. 30. Mr. Vikash Ghosalya, learned counsel appearing in D.B. Civil Writ (PIL) Petition No.9199/2025: Sanwar Mal Chaudhary and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and ors., in his written submission has submitted that creation of Ringus as Panchayat Samiti by splitting existing Panchayat Samiti Khandela, District Sikar under the process of delimitation vide notification dated 10.01.2025 is illegal, arbitrary and unjustified. He submits that as per notification dated 10.01.2025, only those Panchayat Samiti should be reconstituted if there are 40 and above Gram Panchayats of population of 2 lacks and above as per census of 2011. He submits that as per notification dated 10.01.2025, only those Panchayat Samiti should be reconstituted if there are 40 and above Gram Panchayats of population of 2 lacks and above as per census of 2011. While there are 45 Gram Panchayat under territory of Panchayat Samiti Khandela in which two Gram Panchayats have been included in the boundaries of Municipality Khandela. Nine new Gram Panchayats have been proposed by the District Collector, Sikar and total population of the Panchayat and Gram Panchayats would be 2.57022 lacs and therefore, denial is fulfilling all the criteria for reconstitution. The Block Development Officer had made a proposal to create Ringus as new Panchayat Samiti by splitting the existing Panchayat Samiti Khandela and several Gram Panchayats have also made representations for creation of a new Panchayat Samiti Ringus from the Panchayat Samiti Khandela, but the State Government has totally ignored the creation of Ringus as a new Panchayat Samiti. It is submitted to be discriminatory and arbitrary. Learned counsel has relied on Section 13(2) of the Act of 1994 and therefore, the present public interest litigation petition has been filed demanding for creation of Panchayat Samiti Ringus. 31. Mr. Nikhil Saini, learned counsel appearing in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.7043/2025: Sonu Kumari Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors., in his written submission has stated that vide notifications dated 24.03.2025, 22.04.2025 and 28.04.2025, the Revenue Village Banwas, Moi Sadda and Village Dhani Hukma have been included in Nagar Palika Singhana and the Pradhan who was elected as a member from the said Panchayats has been deemed to be removed and his charge has been handed over to respondent No.7- Smt. Sarla. The submission is similar to the as raised hereinabove alleging that there is a non-application of mind and arbitrariness in taking such decisions. It is stated that no study or survey was undertaken to exclude the Revenue Villages from Panchayat Samiti Singhana and including in Nagar Palika, Singhana. Nagar palika Singhana itself constituted by notification dated 19.04.2023 and within short span, the Revenue Villages of panchayat Samiti Singhana have been included resulting in affecting the residents of the Gram Panchayats from benefits of the rural schemes. He relies on Division Bench judgment passed in the case of Bhagwat Singh Vs. Nagar palika Singhana itself constituted by notification dated 19.04.2023 and within short span, the Revenue Villages of panchayat Samiti Singhana have been included resulting in affecting the residents of the Gram Panchayats from benefits of the rural schemes. He relies on Division Bench judgment passed in the case of Bhagwat Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.: (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.12363/2025) decided on 06.08.2025 and the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kishorchandra Chaganlal Vs. Union of India ( 2024 INSC 579 ). 32. Mr. Pradeep Kalwania, learned counsel appearing in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.9640/2025: Ganesh Ram Jat Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors., similar written submission have been filed raising same grounds and arguments which have already been noticed hereinabove with respect to assertion that a Pradhan would continue to hold the post up to 5 years inspite of his being removal as a Ward Member of the Panchayat. 33. Mr. Sunil Kumar Singodiya, learned counsel appearing in D.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos.5550/2025, 5583/2025, 6804/2025, 7762/2025, 7857/2025, in his written submissions has raised similar grounds and submissions as raised by Mr. Pradeep kalwania, learned Advocate hereinabove. He asserts that the scheme of Rules and Act would not deprive an elected Pradhan or Sarpanch from continuing his office up to statutory period of five years merely on account of inclusion of the Gram Panchayat in Municipal Board and consequential removal from the post of Member. They cannot be declared to be removed from the post of Pradhan/Sarpanch. 34. Mr. Manjeet Godara, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos.11997/2025: Randhir And Ors. Vs. The State of Rajasthan and Ors., in his written submission has submitted that the proposed inclusion of Revenue Villages Sawai Chhani and Bhairu Chhani in Gram Panchayat Gadi Chhani in spite of existing inclusion in Gram Panchayat Gadi Chhani is unjustified. He submits that Revenue Village Bhairu Chhani and Sawai Chhani are situated in the same place adjacent to each other with a common Government High Secondary School. He submits that the newly formed Gram Panchayat Bhairu with headquarter Ber is wholly unjustified as the number of villagers in two villages are more than that in Ber. Village Ber is 9 kilometer away, he, therefore, submits that the action is clearly arbitrary and with non- application of mind. 35. Mr. He submits that the newly formed Gram Panchayat Bhairu with headquarter Ber is wholly unjustified as the number of villagers in two villages are more than that in Ber. Village Ber is 9 kilometer away, he, therefore, submits that the action is clearly arbitrary and with non- application of mind. 35. Mr. Dinesh Kumar Joshi, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8576/2025: Dhanna Ram and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan filed at Principal Seat at Jodhpur, in his written submissions has submitted that Gram Panchayat Matora was having two revenue villages namely Matora and Shivnagar and the Sarpanch was from Village Matora. The Revenue Village Shivnagar was divided into Shivnagar and Mahadev Nagar. Revenue Village Matora was divided into Matora and Balaji Nagar. Vide notice dated 07.04.2025, the Revenue Village Mahadev Nagar and Shiv Nagar and Balaji Nagar was excluded from Gram Panchayat Matora and included in Hanumansagar and Lakheta and further, Revenue Village Sanwta was excluded from Hanumansagar and included in Matora, and the same was challenged by the villagers of the villages Mahadev Nagar, Shiv Nagar and Balaji Nagar before the Tehsildar, SDM and Collector Phalodi, but their voice was not heard, therefore, they challenged the same in the present petition preferred before the Court. Learned counsel submits that it was at the instance of the counsel appearing for the State that the High Court passed a direction to decide objections raised by the villagers. It is submitted that Gram Panhayat Matora having all public facilities which is only 1 to 4 kilometers away, whereas Gram Panchayat Hanumnsagar and Lakheta is far away ranging between 9 to 11 kilometer and no public facilities are available. The action of the respondents is without application of mind, whimsical, discriminatory, arbitrary and also contrary to the guidelines laid down by the State Government dated 10.02.2025. It was submitted that the action ought to be declared null and void ab initio. 36. Mr. Pradhuman Singh, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2148/2025: Rajasthan Panchayat Samiti Sadsya Sangh and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr. It was submitted that the action ought to be declared null and void ab initio. 36. Mr. Pradhuman Singh, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2148/2025: Rajasthan Panchayat Samiti Sadsya Sangh and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr. filed at Jodhpur, in his written submissions, has challenged the notifications dated 16.01.2025 and 18.01.2025 and submits that the administrative powers of the Gram Panchayats, term of which was completed on 31.01.2025, could not have been allowed to continue through their existing Sarpanch and Village Development Officer by appointing them as Administrators in terms of Section 95 of the Act, on dissolution of the Panchayati Raj Institution, the Members and the Chairperson, on the date of dissolution, may vacate their respective offices. Thus, the District Collector and the State Government cannot appoint the Sarpanch or the Village Development Officer as Administrator as they are no more holding any authority in the concerned Panchayati Raj Institution. They can, in no manner, be said to be officer or authority and they are ceased to continue on the said post. The charge of Administrator should be given to the Block Development Officer or an officer subordinate to the State Government in terms of Section 98 of the Act. Once there is completion of term, the election was required to be held at the earliest to extending and accommodating the existing Sarpanch and Village Development Officer. The matter relates to the order passed by the District Collector, Tonk with respect to Gram Panchayat Sonva, District Tonk. 37. Mr. Ramawtar Singh Choudhary, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8698/2025: Sahdev Singh Bhati and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. filed at Jodhpur, in his written submission, has challenged the letter dated 13.02.2025 proposing the re-delimitation of Wards of Municipal Board, Taranagar. He submits that the State Government had earlier issued a notification whereby, the wards had been determined on the basis of population and various other municipalities delimitation was conducted, however, there was no action for delimitation of Municipal Board,, Taranagar. It is submitted that the impugned order dated 13.02.2025 seeks delimitation of Municipality Board whose election would be conducted in October, 2025 and November, 2025. He submits that on the basis of same population, there being no change and number of 35 wards also not having been changed. It is submitted that the impugned order dated 13.02.2025 seeks delimitation of Municipality Board whose election would be conducted in October, 2025 and November, 2025. He submits that on the basis of same population, there being no change and number of 35 wards also not having been changed. There is no occasion to change the boundaries of the Wards and the same would not have any object or nexus. He submits that as per Section 6 of the Act of 2009, the number of Wards would be determined only on the basis of population as ascertained with the latest census. Municipality would be divided into number of Wards as no number of seats fixed for Municipality in terms of Sub-Section (1) of Section 6 after conducting the exercise in terms of Section 3. The action of the respondents, in his submission, is violative of all the aforesaid provisions. He relies on the order passed in the case of Jai Singh Meena Vs. State of Rajasthan (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.997/2009) . He also relies on the Division Bench judgement of Punjab and Haryana High Court relating to Municipal Council Dera Baba Nanak District Gurdaspur and an order passed by this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.3390/1990 (Azizulaha Khan Vs. State of Rajasthan) decided on 06.09.1990 . He also relies on Rajesh Kumar Sharma and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab (CWP No.7548/2023) decided on 17.10.2023 38. Mr. Devilal R. Vyas, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8858/2025: Imam and Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. and in S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos.9094/2025, 9149/2025, 9274/2025, 9386/2025, 9412/2025, 9925/2025, 10065/2025, 11023/2025, 11053/2025, 11063/2025, 11083/2025, 11087/2025, 11112/2025, 11114/2025, 11117/2025, 11314/2025, 11493/2025, 11910/2025 and 13298/2025 filed at Jodhpur, in his written submissions has submitted that there is no proper way for access to the villagers of village Rhuma Aziz Ki Basti and challenged the creation of new Gram Panchayat Harjiyaniyon Ki Dhani, wherein the said village has been included along with one other village Binjasar Dher. It is submitted that the villagers would have to first travel to Village Akaliya Dhora and thereafter, Binjram Road to the headquarters thereby covering a distance of about 11 KM. It is submitted that the villagers would have to first travel to Village Akaliya Dhora and thereafter, Binjram Road to the headquarters thereby covering a distance of about 11 KM. The Patwar Mandal, Binjasar has issued a certificate dated 17.04.2025 with regard to the distance, whereas he submits that another issue of Gram Panchayat Meethe Ka Tala showing an approximate distance 12 kilometer, the Sub Division Officer has reflected the distance to only 5.5 kilometers between the newly formed Gram Panchayat and Village Rahuma Aziz Ki Basti wherein petitioners are residents. Learned counsel submits that in spite of guidelines laid down in the circular, the respondents have failed to take notice of all the aspects. The objections have been raised, but they are not being considered. 39. Mr. Vivek Sharma, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.11516/2025: Pursottam Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. filed at Jodhpur, in his written submission claims inclusion of Village Chak 1-B-Chhoti in Municipal Council Sriganganagar which has been earlier included in municipal limits vide notification dated 19.03.2025, but is being sought to be separated vide notification dated 27.03.2025 issued by the order of DLB. The prayer is made by the counsel to quash the subsequent notification dated 27.03.2025. 40. Mr. Peerane Khan, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.11056/2025: Arbab Khan and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. filed at Jodhpur, in his written submission has challenged inclusion of Ali Khan Ki Dhani, Gram Panchayat Dedusar in a newly proposed Gram Panchayat Daulatpura. He submits that the newly proposed Gram Panchayat Daulatpura is approximately 7 kilometer away and is not connected by a proper road, and the same has been done without any form of democratic participation. 41. Mr. Jitender Singh Bhaleria, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.11010/2025: Hema Ram Vs. the State of Rajasthan and Ors. filed at Jodhpur, in his written submission has prayed to keep continue Dongre Ki Dhani in Gram Panchayat Bhaniyana, Jaisalmer, whereas the same is proposed to be included in Gram Panchayat Khinvsar-II in notice dated 07.04.2025. It is submitted that the objections were raised pointing out that the new Gram Panchayat Khinvsar is 15 kilometre away whereas the Gram Panchayat Bhaniyana is 3.5 kilometre away. It is stated that the objections were wrongly rejected, although there was a report in their favour. It is submitted that the objections were raised pointing out that the new Gram Panchayat Khinvsar is 15 kilometre away whereas the Gram Panchayat Bhaniyana is 3.5 kilometre away. It is stated that the objections were wrongly rejected, although there was a report in their favour. The power has been exercised in a colorable manner. Learned counsel also advanced the arguments commonly taken and noticed hereinabove. 42. Mr. Ikbal Khan, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.11006/2025: Jalam Singh and Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. filed at Jodhpur, in his written submission, the objection has been raised of delimitation and creation of new Gram Panchayat Harbha in place of existing Gram Panchayat Toga. It is submitted that existing Gram Panchayat Toga cannot divide the villages. The arguments as advanced earlier of being violating of the policy and guidelines laid down vide notification dated 10.01.2025 have been reiterated by the learned counsel. 43. Mr. Ramawtar Singh Choudhary, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.9669/2025: Nema Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors., and S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos........Item No.13, 31, 39, 57, 115, 121, 124, 149, 151, 176, 217, 228 and 239, filed at Jodhpur, in his written submission has raised similar objections relating to shifting/change of Village from one Gram Panchayat to another. He relies on 2020 (9) SCC 356 (Hari Krishan Mandir Trust Vs. State of Maharashtra). 44. Mr. Naman Mohnot, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.9292/2025: Ramdhan Meghwal and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. filed at Jodhpur, in his written submission has repeated the same submission as notice above. It is submitted that the interpretation of the words ownership and control of the material resources of the community and common good under Article 39 (b) of the Constitution covers not only the population falling under the newly created revenue village, but also population left behind in the village or villages out of which new village has been created. It is submitted that the name of Village Ridmalsar Purohitan was changed by letter dated 07.10.2014 to Ridmalsar only and the action of the respondent to convert revenue Village Ridmalsar Sipahiyan and Ridmalsar Purohitan is wholly unjustified. It is submitted that the name of Village Ridmalsar Purohitan was changed by letter dated 07.10.2014 to Ridmalsar only and the action of the respondent to convert revenue Village Ridmalsar Sipahiyan and Ridmalsar Purohitan is wholly unjustified. Learned counsel submits that the creation of new Village Ridmalsar Sipahiyan is only unjustified as the separation of Village Vas Sipahiyan and Naino ka Vas and they all are situated in dimension of 1 kilometre. It is submitted that the State has to consider the willingness of the residents of the village which is also required to be taken into consideration. Land of Village Ridmalsar Sipahiyan would be new scenario to form the new revenue village, it would affect the rights of the citizens. 45. Mr. Binja Ram Jajra, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.9209/2025: Sadik Khan and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. filed at Jodhpur, in his written submission, the objections regarding delimitation notice on behalf of Gram Panchayat Aduri for formation of a new Gram Panchayat were raised. It was suggested that if new Gram Panchayat is required to be made, the same would be Village Gogliwala, but the District Collector vide notice dated 07.04.2025 has proposed Gram Panchayat Village Chak 2AD, Ambedkar Nagar to be formed. It is stated that several villages are located at more distant, i.e., more than 15 kilometres away and the villagers will have to visit through the existing Gram Panchayat Aduri. It is stated that the public sentiments have not been taken into consideration, the geographical and demographical aspects have also not been considered. He relies on the judgement passed in the case of Daulat Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.: D.B. Civil Writ Petition NO.5151/1999 decided on 21.01.2000, Ram Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan (2010) : S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1027/2009 decided on 05.01.2010 and Bhupendra Pratap Singh Rathore and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (2014) and Jorawar Singh Rathore Vs. State of Rajasthan (2024) to support that the action was arbitrary and suffered from malice in law. 46. Mr. Rajat Arora, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.12405/2025: Praveen Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan and in S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos.11387/2025, 12580/2025 and 12732 filed at Jodhpur, filed his written submissions. (2014) and Jorawar Singh Rathore Vs. State of Rajasthan (2024) to support that the action was arbitrary and suffered from malice in law. 46. Mr. Rajat Arora, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.12405/2025: Praveen Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan and in S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos.11387/2025, 12580/2025 and 12732 filed at Jodhpur, filed his written submissions. Challenge has been made to the action of reorganization of Wards under Section 10 of the Act of 2009. He submits that the provisions go contrary to Section 3, 6 and 9 of the Act of 2009. He submits that neither the boundaries/limits of Municipal Council have been altered, nor there has been any change of the Census population also. Earlier, delimitation of wards for Barmer Municipal Council was conducted through gazette notification published on 27.8.2019. In view thereto, the fresh exercise of delimitation of Wards has no legal backing and appears to be on the basis of political motivation and is not based on sound reasoning. On account of redetermination and delimitation, the number of seats reserved for Women, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, would be disturbed and there is no cogent reason for undertaking the exercise of delimitation. 47. Counsel - Mr. Manish Patel has challenged the notifications also to the extent of fixing of village headquarter. It is contended that the village as has been fixed as village headquarter is not having the required adequate facilities and the entire exercise has been conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. 48. Counsel - Mr. Ranjeet Joshi while referring to a specific instance, has argued that village having the infrastructural facilities like Community Health Centre and Cooperative Bank has been shifted to another Gram Panchayat. Now the villagers of the petitioner’s village will be deprived of adequate medical facilities and thus, action of the respondents is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 49. In support of the contention regarding statutory force of the guidelines, Senior Advocate – Mr. Manoj Bhandari argued that Section 96 of the Act of 1994 provides for delegation of powers and therefore, the guidelines being delegated legislation is having the statutory force. (b) SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENTS : 50. Mr. Rajendra Prasad, learned Advocate General, has submitted with regard to the local self institutions namely the Panchayati Raj Institution and the Urban Local Bodies Institution. Manoj Bhandari argued that Section 96 of the Act of 1994 provides for delegation of powers and therefore, the guidelines being delegated legislation is having the statutory force. (b) SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENTS : 50. Mr. Rajendra Prasad, learned Advocate General, has submitted with regard to the local self institutions namely the Panchayati Raj Institution and the Urban Local Bodies Institution. He submits that the said decentralization of democracy at the grass root level and insertion thereto of Schedule XI and XII with appropriate amendments provided essentially for interesting certain aspects of administration to the grassroot level. The Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 and the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 were enacted to make the existing law consisting with the constitutional amendments. It is further submitted that irrespective of the working of these institutions for decades, it has been found by the Government and reported by the State Finance Commission that they have not been made functionally and financially viable to achieve the goals as mentioned in the amended provisions of the Constitution. It has been visualised that previously the governments did not take into account the ground realities in creation and alteration of these institutions (particularly their functional and financial viability), while the local areas which are still rural are being deprived of the schemes related to rural areas and those who have actually transitioned to urban areas are being deprived of the schemes related to urban areas. Thus, to strengthen and make the urban/rural local bodies functionally and financially efficient, the government decided to reorganise these institutions in the entire state and accordingly two different Committee of Ministers for rural and urban local bodies were constituted to finalize the proposals made in this regard by the District Collectors before the State Government issues the final notification. 51. Apart from above, it was submitted that the previous Government before the General Elections created large number of Local Bodies as well as Districts, which was apparently not conducive to the administrative efficiency and functional/financial viability. Hence, a separate committee for assessing the position of newly created Districts was also constituted, and finally 9 out of 17 newly created Districts were abolished and the position of many local bodies had to be altered. Hence, a separate committee for assessing the position of newly created Districts was also constituted, and finally 9 out of 17 newly created Districts were abolished and the position of many local bodies had to be altered. It has further been realised that assessment of number of seats in local bodies based on earlier parameters was also not working well and therefore after analysis fresh parameters were notified resulting in delimitation of wards in all the local bodies. The previous elections of local bodies were adversely affected by COVID-19 situation, elections were held in different phases and, therefore, the term of the local bodies were to expire on different dates spreading over a period of more than one year. As all the aforesaid exercises were being done, necessity for appointment of Administrators arose in urban as well as rural local bodies as the rural local bodies are very large in number, a policy decision as permitted under the law to appoint outgoing chairpersons as Administrators with other provisions was taken. Whereas in case of urban local bodies, only officers are permitted to be appointed as administrators in the interregnum, such appointments were being made. The government looking to the hardships and administrative paralysis created by holding of elections in multiple phases also decided to examine the possibility of "One State-One Election". Apart from this, as per directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, a dedicated commission for OBC reservation in these bodies has been constituted, which would submit its report. No sooner all these exercises are complete, the mandatory exercise for allotment of seats to SC/ST/OBC/Women will be fixed and then the Election Commission after finalising the election roll, would publish the election schedule. 52. Learned Advocate General has tried to delineate various arguments advanced before this court and classified the cases as under:- i. Where final notification of delimitation of local bodies have been challenged. ii. Where during the process of delimitation, proposals have been challenged without there being any final decision. iii. The appointments of former chairpersons as Administrators in Rural. Local Bodies have been challenged and on the contrary petitions seeking similar appointments in municipal bodies have been sought iv. Writ of mandamus for holding elections in local bodies where the term has expired has been sought. iii. The appointments of former chairpersons as Administrators in Rural. Local Bodies have been challenged and on the contrary petitions seeking similar appointments in municipal bodies have been sought iv. Writ of mandamus for holding elections in local bodies where the term has expired has been sought. v. Challenge to delimitation of wards of urban local bodies without there being fresh census and alteration in boundaries has been put to question. vi. In some petitions, removal of Pradhan by operation of law due to exclusion of rural areas from panchayat samiti has also been challenged. 53. While answering to above categories, the learned Advocate General has submitted objections inter alia as under: (i). This Court would not be having jurisdiction to hear the writ petitions in terms of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He relies on Article 329, Article 243O, Article 243ZG of the Constitution and Section 117 of the Act of 1994. He submits that the decision taken for delimitation once it attained finality, is not contemplated under the provisions of the Constitution and in terms of the judgements cited and referred to later on, this Court would not be entitled to consider the validity of the final notification of the delimitation. (ii). His further submission is with regard to non-application of principles of natural justice. It is his submission that most of the cases which have been brought for adjudication relating to the notice issued to the public giving out proposal for delimitation, were wholly premature. It is his further submission that if there is bar to interference to the final decision, it would apply to the process also. Learned Advocate General submits that the entire action/process being legislative in character, the petitioners could not have been within the purview of judicial review as legislative action would be beyond the scope of judicial review at the stage when the same has not been passed. (iii). He further submits that the petitions are not maintainable in absence of breach of legal/fundamental rights or failure in discharge of statutory/public duty. (iv). In the instant cases, petitioners have failed to show any legal right as to creation/alteration of boundaries local bodies ?r for that matter constituencies/wards. (iii). He further submits that the petitions are not maintainable in absence of breach of legal/fundamental rights or failure in discharge of statutory/public duty. (iv). In the instant cases, petitioners have failed to show any legal right as to creation/alteration of boundaries local bodies ?r for that matter constituencies/wards. A bare perusal of section 3, 6, 9 and 10 of Act of 2009 and Section 9 to 14 and 101 of the Act of 1994 would show that these provisions confer jurisdiction upon the Government to establish and alter the boundaries of local bodies and specifies the composition of local bodies, and empowers the Government to determine and allot seats for election and define the boundaries of constituencies in Local Bodies. None of these provisions create any right in favour of any person for self- determination in this regard. As a matter of fact, the very nature of these actions does not permit conferment of any right in large number of electorate to propose any such actions. There is no allegation of failure to perform any statutory/public duty by the government. (v). The learned Advocate General submits that the guidelines which have been issued are non statutory / executive instructions laying down the procedure to guide the concerned officials who are to conduct the exercise. Neither they create any right in favour of the writ petitioners, nor any deviation made by any officer can be said to be such where the Court would strike it down. It is his submissions that the guidelines are not enforceable in law. He relies on the provisions of Section 101(1) and 101(6) of the Act of 1994 to submit that the Government has been authorized to issue orders and directions, but the learned Advocate General, in his written submissions, further submits that the provisions contained under the guidelines are only to guide the concerned officer about the manner of making his proposal. Such guidelines could not be enforceable in law. While the provisions of Section 102 lay down the method enacting rules and if any provision is made under the Rules, the same can be enforced. He submits that as there is no prescription. It is his submission that the Government has not prescribed anything in this regard by making rules in official gazette. While the provisions of Section 102 lay down the method enacting rules and if any provision is made under the Rules, the same can be enforced. He submits that as there is no prescription. It is his submission that the Government has not prescribed anything in this regard by making rules in official gazette. The guidelines alleged to have been not followed strictly by the officers would not be a reason for this Court to interfere with the Government functioning. He relies on the definition of the word “prescribed” under Section 2(19) of the Act of 1994 and Section 32(58) of Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955. (vi). The learned Advocate General, in his written submission, further submits that the petitions have been filed even before making proposal to the Government for consideration of proposal by the Government, the same deserves to be dismissed as they are based on mere apprehension or conjectures and surmises with regard to a possible decision. He further submits that when the process of taking a final decision itself is not liable to judicial review, it would apply to the decision making process also, moreso, action having a legislative character would be ousted from the scope of judicial purview. 54. In a second set of cases where the appointment of Administrator is challenged, he submits as under: a. Section 95 (1)(b) of the Act of 1994 and Section 322(3)(b) of the Act of 2009 provides for appointment of Administrators in the event of dissolution of local bodies. Both the provisions apply to all kinds of dissolutions under the respective Acts and are not limited to premature dissolution under section 94 of Act of 1994 or 322 of Act of 2009. Dissolution can take place under section 17 and 101 of Act of 1994 also and section 7 and 3 of Act of 2009 l.e. by efflux of term or alterations, respectively. In such situations as the office bearers and members can no more continue in office, appointment of Administrators is a necessary consequence. b. The holding of elections within six months applies to only premature dissolution or to new establishment of local body and not to dissolution on completion of term. By-elections in case of premature dissolution are already scheduled and were held. b. The holding of elections within six months applies to only premature dissolution or to new establishment of local body and not to dissolution on completion of term. By-elections in case of premature dissolution are already scheduled and were held. c. Section 95(1)(b) of Act of 1994 does not mandate appointment of an officer or employee of the Government, whereas section 322 (3)(b) does. In case of section 95 term used is 'such person', and therefore anyone can be so appointed. The outgoing chairperson are the most suitable person to act as 'Administrators', by virtue of being a former public representative and having experience of administration of the concerned local body for immediate past five years. This excludes bureaucratic usurpation and applied across the board without toeing any party line. d. The large number of rural local bodies i.e. more than 11000 also makes it impractical to appoint an officer. e. This is no continuous post expiry of term, but an appointment under the Statute. f. The statutory regime being different, the plea of discrimination in case of municipal bodies is incorrect." 55. With regard to consequential removal of Pradhan due to the inclusion of rural area to any other urban local body, learned Advocate General relies on provisions of Section 3 (8) of the Act of 2009 and Section 101(d), 102(d) read with section 101(5A) and Section 30 and Section 36(5) of the Act of 1994. He also relies on judgements which shall be considered at the relevant place of the judgment. 56. The next challenge is with regard to the method and manner in which delimitation of Wards has been done, in case where there is absence of fresh Census or alteration of boundaries. He submits that Section 3 of the Act of 2009 would have no bearing in case of delimitation of constituencies, as the same refers to local bodies. He submits that Section 6(2) while makes fresh determination of constituencies (wards) mandatory, Section 6(1) authorises the fixation of number of seats from time to time, by notification in official Gazette. It is subject to sub-section 6(2) in the sense that irrespective of such fixation having been done, under Section 6(1), if the result of fresh Census has been undertaken, the refixation has to be done mandatorily. 57. It is subject to sub-section 6(2) in the sense that irrespective of such fixation having been done, under Section 6(1), if the result of fresh Census has been undertaken, the refixation has to be done mandatorily. 57. He further submits that the boundaries of wards under Section 9 and 10 of the Act of 2009 may result in refixation when: i. result of fresh Census has come under Section 6(2). ii. a new municipality has been established or its boundaries have changed under Section 3. iii. when notification u/s 6(1) has been issued changing the number of seats. iv. when the Government in its discretion and for administrative efficiency and other valid reasons, decides to change the boundaries. v. It is worthwhile to note that on reading of Sections 3, 6, 9 and 10 together, it can be understood that there is power vested in the Government without any prohibition or restriction engrafted in these provisions. vi. The notification under 6(1) in this case has actually been issued for valid reasons. 58. With respect to the Public Interest Litigation, wherein mandamus has been sought for holding elections, the learned Advocate General argues that there is no dispute about the claim of the petitioners that elections of local bodies must be held before its duration is over by virtue of Article 243-E and 243-U of the Constitution. This has been held to be mandatory. However, there are exceptions carved out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Some of them are as under: i. The Constitution does not provide a rigid/unalterable timeline of 5 years rather these provisions themselves contemplates premature dissolution of the local bodies. ii. The judgement in the case of Kishansing Tomar though clearly holds that holding of elections prior to the expiry of duration is mandatory but on careful reading it clearly recognises in para 19 and 21 that there can be exceptional circumstances requiring postponement of elections which can be man-made also. The whole crux of the issue is that elections cannot be postponed merely by yielding of situations that may be created by vested interests, to postpone the elections. Thus, if such situation arises for bonafide reasons it would be an exception to the general rule. iii. The whole crux of the issue is that elections cannot be postponed merely by yielding of situations that may be created by vested interests, to postpone the elections. Thus, if such situation arises for bonafide reasons it would be an exception to the general rule. iii. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jalgaon Municipal Council has considered these provisions and has held that the mandate of Article 243-U applies only when the nature of local bodies continues to be the same. In para 20 and 21, it has been held that any hiatus arising from conversion of a local body into another is an unavoidable event and Article 243-U cannot be applied to a case where the area of one description is converted into an area of another description. This provision means the duration of same type of municipality coming to an end and the same type of successor municipality taking over as a consequence of the term of the previous municipality coming to an end. In such situation, the argument that the whole exercise should take place before the duration of term is over, has been turned down. iv. This above noted judgment has been followed in the case of Pranoy Roy and the Hon'ble Apex Court allowed holding of elections after reconstitution exercise is over. The Hon'ble Court did not approve the directions of High Court irrespective of the exercise of reconstitution being under process. v. The aforesaid judgments have been applied by this Hon'ble Court in the case of Satish Kumar Sharma. vi. In case of DMK, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the holding of elections without competition of delimitation exercise after creation of new district is not valid. 59. Learned Advocate General further submits that from the Introductory Facts (Part -I) it is evidently clear that there is no intention to avoid elections as within short time available to Government all necessary action have been taken. Creation of democratic institutions without their functional and financial viability is of no consequence and therefore the government in its wisdom is entitled to review its situation and carry out the overall reorganisation bonafidely to make these institutions efficient. When done in the entire State the same institution as they existed previously will not be in existence and as a matter-of-fact large- scale changes have taken place in this exercise. When done in the entire State the same institution as they existed previously will not be in existence and as a matter-of-fact large- scale changes have taken place in this exercise. Thus, the position of institution themselves being of the same description would be clear on competition of the exercise and therefore in view of the aforesaid judgements, Article 243-E and Article 243-U will not have any bonafide application in the first instance. Secondly, legislative/administrative exercise for strengthening of the institutions in the entire state to achieve the goals of their creation is a valid event due to which postponement of election is permissible. Thirdly, the very fact that due to effect of COVID-19, earlier elections of local bodies were held in multiple phases and therefore resulting in multiple phases for fresh elections, which is neither a healthy situation to be perpetuated nor it would be in public interest. Thus, holding of elections simultaneously, avoiding multiple phases of elections, can also not be faulted with. 60. It is lastly argued by the learned Advocate General that it has been clearly demonstrated there have been no vested interest or malice in postponingthe elections of local whose terms have expired during the course of this exercise. it is submitted that the term of several such local bodes is yet to expire. The Government is committee to expeditiously complete all these exercises and make it convenient for the election commission to hold the election for creation for efficient institutions as soon as possible. 61. The learned Advocate General, therefore, prayed that the writ petitions be dismissed and the special appeals preferred by the State, namely D.B. SAW 627/2025, D.B. SAW 628/2025 at Jaipur Bench be dismissed and D.B. SAW 831/2025 (State of Rajasthan & ors. vs. Dhanna Ram & ors.) and other connected special appeals filed at Jodhpur be allowed. 62. Learned Advocate General, in support of his submissions, has relied on various judgements such as: Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) Vs. Secretary, Governor's Secretariat and Ors.: (2020) 6 SCC 548 State of Maharashtra and Ors. Vs. Jalgaon Municipal Council and Ors.: (2003) 9 SCC 731 State of West Bengal and Ors. Vs. Pranoy Roy and Ors.: (2015) 16 SCC 248 Atma Singh Vs. State of Punjab: AIR 1981 SC 1173 Kishansing Tomar Vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Ors.: (2006) 8 SCC 352 C.R. Jayasukin Vs. Vs. Jalgaon Municipal Council and Ors.: (2003) 9 SCC 731 State of West Bengal and Ors. Vs. Pranoy Roy and Ors.: (2015) 16 SCC 248 Atma Singh Vs. State of Punjab: AIR 1981 SC 1173 Kishansing Tomar Vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Ors.: (2006) 8 SCC 352 C.R. Jayasukin Vs. The Tamil Nadu State Election Commission and Anr.: Writ petition (Civil) No.1267/2018 Satish Kumar Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.: D.B. Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No.19007/2019 Hemant Narayan Rasne Vs. Commissioner and Administrator of Pune Municipal Corporation and Ors.: AIR Online 2022 SC 1405 Guddi Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.: D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2002/2020 C.L. Satish Babu and Ors. Vs. The State of Karnataka: ILR 2020 KAR 4839 Meghraj Kothari Vs. Delimitation Commission and Ors.: AIR 1967 SC 669 State of Rajasthan Vs. Ashok Khetoliya and Anr.: (2022) 12 SCC 185 The Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. Vs. The Notified Area Committee, Tulsipur.: AIR 1980 SC 882 Motan Das and Ors. Vs. The State of Rajasthan and Ors.:D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.20142/2024 Kanhaiya Lal Jhanwar Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.: 2016 3 WLC 443 Gram Panchayat Kathawala Vs. State of Rajasthan: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2557/1983 Mod Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr.: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.6132/1992 Association of Resident of Mhow (Rom) and Anr. Vs. Delimitation Commission of India and Ors.: AIR 2009 SC 3278 Lal Chand Asopa Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.4993/2025 Ram Prasad Vs. The State of Rajasthan and Anr.: AIR 1982 RAJ 271 Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.: (2013) 4 SCC 465 J.R. Raghupathy and Ors. Vs. State of A.P. and Ors.: (1988) 4 SCC 364 Pankaj Panwar and Ors. Vs. The State of Rajasthan and Ors.: D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8177/2025 Ram Narayan and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan: D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.1462/2019 Gani Mohd. and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.15466/2019 Gani Mohd. and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.: D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.1461/2019 Dule Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.: 2019 SCC Online Raj 3209 63. Vs. State of Rajasthan: D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.1462/2019 Gani Mohd. and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.15466/2019 Gani Mohd. and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.: D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.1461/2019 Dule Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.: 2019 SCC Online Raj 3209 63. In support of the contention that Gazette notification relating to delimitation of Panchayat area or formation of Constituencies in the said area or allotment of seats to the Constituencies is a legislative act in nature and therefore, it cannot be challenged, nor the Court would entertain such challenge under Articles 243-C, 243-K and 243-O of the Constitution of India, learned Advocate General has relied upon following judgments :- State of U.P. Vs. Pradhan Singh: 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 305 Bhupendra Singh Rathore Vs. State of Rajasthan: 2015(2) WLC (Raj.) 607 Mushe Khan and Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors: 2015(2) WLC 37 (D.B.) 64. It is also contended that redrawing of lottery resulting into change of reservation for some different categories under extraordinary circumstances cannot be faulted and therefore, challenge given in the writ petitions is not credible. Further, variation of Gram Panchayat and reservation of seats or change in different categories of draw of lottery was necessary and logical action of the State in consonance with the provisions of Section 16 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 and Rule 7 of the Election Rules of 1994, which provide for procedure for reservation. Following judgments have been relied upon in this context : Jai Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan: 2020(2) WLC (Raj.)10. Virendra Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan: 2020(2) WLC (Raj.) 198 Smt. Munesh Vs. State of Rajasthan: 2021(1) WLC (Raj.) 191 PART III – RELEVANT PROVISIONS AND ANALYSIS : (a) CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 65. Panchayat and municipalities were included in the Constitution of India through the 73 rd and 74 th Amendment Acts of 1992, respectively. The 73 rd Amendment added Part IX for Panchayats (rural local bodies) and the Eleventh Schedule, while the 74 th Amendment added Part IX-A for Municipalities (urban local bodies). These amendments gave constitutional status to these local self-governance institutions, mandating their formation and providing a framework for their powers and functions. 66. Part IX (Article 243 to 243O) of the Constitution of India provides the Constitutional Framework for composition, constitution, functions, finance, delimitation and election etc. These amendments gave constitutional status to these local self-governance institutions, mandating their formation and providing a framework for their powers and functions. 66. Part IX (Article 243 to 243O) of the Constitution of India provides the Constitutional Framework for composition, constitution, functions, finance, delimitation and election etc. relating to Panchayat at village, intermediate and district level. The Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution lists 29 subjects / functions for Panchayats to handle. Following constitutional provisions of Part IX relating to Panchayat are reproduced below :- 243A. Gram Sabha .—A Gram Sabha may exercise such powers and perform such functions at the village level as the Legislature of a State may, by law, provide. 243C. Composition of Panchayats .—(1) Subject to the provisions of this Part, the Legislature of a State may, by law, make provisions with respect to the composition of Panchayats: Provided that the ratio between the population of the territorial area of a Panchayat at any level and the number of seats in such Panchayat to be filled by election shall, so far as practicable, be the same throughout the State. (2) All the seats in a Panchayat shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the Panchayat area and, for this purpose, each Panchayat area shall be divided into territorial constituencies in such manner that the ratio between the population of each constituency and the number of seats allotted to it shall, so far as practicable, be the same throughout the Panchayat area. (3) The Legislature of a State may, by law, provide for the representation— (a) of the Chairpersons of the Panchayats at the village level, in the Panchayats at the intermediate level or, in the case of a State not having Panchayats at the intermediate level, in the Panchayats at the district level; (b) of the Chairpersons of the Panchayats at the intermediate level, in the Panchayats at the district level; (c) of the members of the House of the People and the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State representing constituencies which comprise wholly or partly a Panchayat area at a level other than the village level, in such Panchayat; (d) of the members of the Council of States and the members of the Legislative Council of the State, where they are registered as electors within— (i) a Panchayat area at the intermediate level, in Panchayat at the intermediate level; (ii) a Panchayat area at the district level, in Panchayat at the district level. (4) The Chairperson of a Panchayat and other members of a Panchayat whether or not chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the Panchayat area shall have the right to vote in the meetings of the Panchayats. (5) The Chairperson of— (a) a Panchayat at the village level shall be elected in such manner as the Legislature of a State may, by law, provide; and (b) a Panchayat at the intermediate level or district level shall be elected by, and from amongst, the elected members thereof. 243E. Duration of Panchayats, etc.— (1) Every Panchayat, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. (2) No amendment of any law for the time being in force shall have the effect of causing dissolution of a Panchayat at any level, which is functioning immediately before such amendment, till the expiration of its duration specified in clause (1). (2) No amendment of any law for the time being in force shall have the effect of causing dissolution of a Panchayat at any level, which is functioning immediately before such amendment, till the expiration of its duration specified in clause (1). (3) An election to constitute a Panchayat shall be completed— (a) before the expiry of its duration specified in clause (1); (b) before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution: Provided that where the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Panchayat would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any election under this clause for constituting the Panchayat for such period. (4) A Panchayat constituted upon the dissolution of a Panchayat before the expiration of its duration shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Panchayat would have continued under clause (1) had it not been so dissolved. 243G. Powers, authority and responsibilities of Panchayats. — Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by law, endow the Panchayats with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self-government and such law may contain provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities upon Panchayats at the appropriate level, subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, with respect to— (a) the preparation of plans for economic development and social justice; (b) the implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice as may be entrusted to them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule. 243K. Elections to the Panchayats. —(1) The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to the Panchayats shall be vested in a State Election Commission consisting of a State Election Commissioner to be appointed by the Governor. 243K. Elections to the Panchayats. —(1) The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to the Panchayats shall be vested in a State Election Commission consisting of a State Election Commissioner to be appointed by the Governor. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature of a State, the conditions of service and tenure of office of the State Election Commissioner shall be such as the Governor may by rule determine: Provided that the State Election Commissioner shall not be removed from his office except in like manner and on the like grounds as a Judge of a High Court and the conditions of service of the State Election Commissioner shall not be varied to his disadvantage after his appointment. (3) The Governor of a State shall, when so requested by the State Election Commission, make available to the State Election Commission such staff as may be necessary for the discharge of the functions conferred on the State Election Commission by clause (1). (4) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by law, make provision with respect to all matters relating to, or in connection with, elections to the Panchayats. 243O. Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters. — Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,— (a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under article 243K, shall not be called in question in any court; (b) no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State. 67. Part IX-A of the Constitution of India covering Article 243P to 243ZG provides for constitutional status to Municipalities and aims to establish a framework for governance in urban areas to promote greater participation of the elected representatives and ensures accountability. Part IX-A of the Constitution inter alia provides for definition, composition, constitution, functions, delimitation and elections of the Municipality. The relevant provisions are reproduced as under :- 243P. Part IX-A of the Constitution inter alia provides for definition, composition, constitution, functions, delimitation and elections of the Municipality. The relevant provisions are reproduced as under :- 243P. Definitions .—In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires,— (a) “Committee” means a Committee constituted under article 243S; (b) “district” means a district in a State; (c) “Metropolitan area” means an area having a population of ten lakhs or more, comprised in one or more districts and consisting of two or more Municipalities or Panchayats or other contiguous areas, specified by the Governor by public notification to be a Metropolitan area for the purposes of this Part; (d) “Municipal area” means the territorial area of a Municipality as is notified by the Governor; (e) “Municipality” means an institution of self-government constituted under article 243Q; (f) “Panchayat” means a Panchayat constituted under article 243B; (g) “population” means the population as ascertained at the last preceding census of which the relevant figures have been published. 243Q. Constitution of Municipalities .—(1) There shall be constituted in every State,— (a) a Nagar Panchayat (by whatever name called) for a transitional area, that is to say, an area in transition from a rural area to an urban area; (b) a Municipal Council for a smaller urban area; and (c) a Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area, in accordance with the provisions of this Part: Provided that a Municipality under this clause may not be constituted in such urban area or part thereof as the Governor may, having regard to the size of the area and the municipal services being provided or proposed to be provided by an industrial establishment in that area and such other factors as he may deem fit, by public notification, specify to be an industrial township. (2) In this article, “a transitional area”, “a smaller urban area” or “a larger urban area” means such area as the Governor may, having regard to the population of the area, the density of the population therein, the revenue generated for local administration, the percentage of employment in non agricultural activities, the economic importance or such other factors as he may deem fit, specify by public notification for the purposes of this Part. 243R. 243R. Composition of Municipalities .—(1) Save as provided in clause (2), all the seats in a Municipality shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from the territorial constituencies in the Municipal area and for this purpose each Municipal area shall be divided into territorial constituencies to be known as wards. (2) The Legislature of a State may, by law, provide— (a) for the representation in a Municipality of— (i) persons having special knowledge or experience in Municipal administration; (ii) the members of the House of the People and the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State representing constituencies which comprise wholly or partly the Municipal area; (iii) the members of the Council of States and the members of the Legislative Council of the State registered as electors within the Municipal area; (iv) the Chairpersons of the Committees constituted under clause (5) of article 243S: Provided that the persons referred to in paragraph (i) shall not have the right to vote in the meetings of the Municipality; (b) the manner of election of the Chairperson of a Municipality. 243U. Duration of Municipalities, etc.— (1) Every Municipality, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer: Provided that a Municipality shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before its dissolution. (2) No amendment of any law for the time being in force shall have the effect of causing dissolution of a Municipality at any level, which is functioning immediately before such amendment, till the expiration of its duration specified in clause (1). (3) An election to constitute a Municipality shall be completed,— (a) before the expiry of its duration specified in clause (1); (b) before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution: Provided that where the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any election under this clause for constituting the Municipality for such period. (4) A Municipality constituted upon the dissolution of a Municipality before the expiration of its duration shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued under clause (1) had it not been so dissolved. 243W. (4) A Municipality constituted upon the dissolution of a Municipality before the expiration of its duration shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued under clause (1) had it not been so dissolved. 243W. Powers, authority and responsibilities of Municipalities, etc .— Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by law, endow— (a) the Municipalities with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self-government and such law may contain provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities upon Municipalities, subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, with respect to— (i) the preparation of plans for economic development and social justice; (ii) the performance of functions and the implementation of schemes as may be entrusted to them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Twelfth Schedule; (b) the Committees with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to carry out the responsibilities conferred upon them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Twelfth Schedule. 243ZA. Elections to the Municipalities.— (1) The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to the Municipalities shall be vested in the State Election Commission referred to in article 243K. (2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by law, make provision with respect to all matters relating to, or in connection with, elections to the Municipalities. 243ZG. Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters. — Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, — (a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under article 243ZA shall not be called in question in any court; (b) no election to any Municipality shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State.] (b) PROVISIONS OF RAJ. PANCHAYATI RAJ ACT, 1994 68. Section 101 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 held as under :- " 101. Alteration in the limits of a Panchayati Raj Institution. PANCHAYATI RAJ ACT, 1994 68. Section 101 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 held as under :- " 101. Alteration in the limits of a Panchayati Raj Institution. (1) The State Government may, at any time, after one month's notice published in the prescribed manner either on its own motion or at the request made in this behalf, and by notification in the official Gazette- (a) declare the whole or a part of any local area included within the limits of a municipality to be a Panchayat Circle; or (b) include in a Panchayat Circle any such local area or a part there of or, as the case may be any local area included within the limits of another Panchayat circle; or (c) otherwise alter the limits of a Panchayat Circle by amalgamating one Panchayat Circle into another or by splitting up a Panchayat circle into two or more Panchayat Circles; or (d) exclude the whole or a part of any local area from a Panchayat Circle, whether on its ceasing to be a rural area or, as the case may be, for its being included within the limits of another Panchayat Circle. (2) Upon any action being taken under Sub-Section (1), the State Government shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, by an order published in the Official Gazette, make provision for the following, namely: - (a) that, in a case falling under Clause (a) of that Sub-section, a Panchayat shall be established for the local area declared to be a Panchayat Circle; or (b) that, in a case falling under Clause (b) of that Sub-section, the election of the members for the additional local area shall be held; or (c) that, in a case falling under Clause (c) of that sub-section the existing Panchayats shall stand dissolved and new Panchayats shall be constituted -in accordance with the provisions of this Act within a period of six months from the appointed day; or (d) that, in a case falling under Clause (d), the Panchayat shall stand dissolved or, as the case may be, the members who, in the opinion of the State Government, represent the local area excluded from the Panchayat Circle shall stand removed; Provided that for so long as a Panchayat or a new Panchayat is not established under Clause (a) or, as the case may be, under Clause (c), all power and duties of the Panchayat shall be exercised and performed by such administrator as the State Government may appoint in this behalf: Provided further that no act of a Panchayat shall be deemed invalid by reason of any vacancy of the members referred to in clause (b). (3) Upon the exclusion of any local area of a municipality and its declaration as or, as the case may be inclusion in, a Panchayat Circle under Sub-Section (1) - (a) such area shall cease to be a municipality; (b) the members of the board representing the area of the municipality so declared or included in a Panchayat Circle shall vacate their respective offices but without prejudice to their eligibility for election to the Panchayat to be constituted for such area or, as the case may be, the Panchayat, in the area whereof, such area is included; (c) the whole of the assets testing in, and of the liabilities subsisting against, the municipality so declared to be a Panchayat or, in case where only a part of a municipality is included in, or declared to be a Panchayat, such portion of the said assets and liabilities as the State Government may direct, shall develop upon the Panchayat declared for such area or upon the Panchayat in which such area of the municipality is included; (d) until new rules, notification order and bye- laws are made or issued under this Act and unless the State Government otherwise directs, all rules, notifications, orders and bye-laws applicable:- (i) to the Panchayat in which such area is included; and (ii) where the whole or a part of a municipality is declared to be a Panchayat to the area of the Panchayat Samiti which shall, by reason of the concerned area falling in the block of such Panchayat Samiti, have jurisdiction on the area so declared to be a Panchayat, shall continue to apply to the area so included or declared; (e) the Panchayat so established by inclusion of any area of a municipality thereon or by the declaration of a municipality as a Panchayat shall levy or continue to levy such of the taxes as are lawfully imposed under this Act; (f) any such area shall cease to be subject to all rules, notifications, order and bye-laws made under the Rajasthan Municipality Act, 1959 (Rajasthan Act 38 of 1959); and (g) the Panchayat in which such area is included or the Panchayat which is declared for such area and the Panchayat Saimiti and Zila Parishad respectively of the Block and District, in which the area so included or declared falls, shall exercise jurisdiction over such area and the municipality in which such area was included or, as the case may be, the municipality which was established for such area shall cease to function therein. (4) When any local area ceases to be a Panchayat and is included within the local limits of the jurisdiction of some other local authority, the Panchayat Fund and other property and rights vesting in the Panchayat shall vest in such other local authority and the liabilities of the Panchayat shall be the liabilities of such other local authority. (5) When any local area is excluded from a Panchayat Circle and included in another Panchayat Circle, such portion of the Panchayat Fund and other property vested in the Panchayat of the first mentioned Circle shall vest in, and such portion of the liabilities thereof shall be the liabilities of the other Panchayat as the State Government may, after consulting both the Panchayats, declare, by notification in the Official Gazette: Provided that the provisions of this Sub-section shall not apply in any case where the circumstances, in the opinion of the State Government, render undesirable the transfer of any portion of the Panchayat Fund or properties or liabilities. [(5A) When it is considered necessary so to do, whether as a consequence of an action taken under Sub-Section (1) or otherwise, the State Government may alter the limits of a Panchayat Samiti or a Zila Parishad area and every such case of alteration the provisions contained in the foregoing sub-sections shall mutatis mutandis apply.] (6) The State Government may, for the purpose of the foregoing sub-sections, make such orders and give such directions as it may consider necessary. (7) Save as otherwise provided in this section its provisions shall have effect, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (Rajathan Act 38 of 1959) or any other law for the time being in force. Explanation. - In this section "appointed day" means the day from which a change referred to in Sub-Section (1), takes place." 69. The scheme of Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 envisage the Panchayat at Village level, Panchayat Samiti at Block level and Zila parishad at District level. 70. Establishment of Panchayat is provided under Section 9, which read as under: " 9. The scheme of Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 envisage the Panchayat at Village level, Panchayat Samiti at Block level and Zila parishad at District level. 70. Establishment of Panchayat is provided under Section 9, which read as under: " 9. Establishment of Panchayat .- (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare any local area, comprising a village or a group of villages not included in a municipality or a cantonment board constituted under any law for the time being in force to be Panchayat Circle and for every local area declared as such there shall be a Panchayat. (2) Every Panchayat shall, by the name notified in the Official Gazette, be a body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal and shall, subject to any restrictions and conditions imposed by or under this Act or any other law, have power to acquire, by purchase, gift, or otherwise, to hold, administer and transfer property, both movable and immovable, and to enter any contract and shall, by the said name, sue and be sued. (3) The State Government may, at any time, after one month's notice published in the prescribed manner either on its own motion or at the request of the Panchayat or of the residents of the Panchayat Circle, and by notification in the Official Gazette, change the name [or place of office] of any such Panchayat." 71. Establishment of Panchayat Samiti is provided under Section 10, which read as under: " 10. Establishment of Panchayat Samiti- (1) The State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare any local area within the same district to be a block and for every block declared as such there shall be a Panchayat Samiti having jurisdictions, save as otherwise provided in this Act, over the entire block excluding such portions of the block as are included in a municipality or a cantonment board constituted under any law for the time being in force: Provided that a Panchayat Samiti may have its office in any area comprised within the excluded portion of the Panchayat Samiti. (2) Every Panchayat Samiti shall, by the name notified in the Official Gazette, be a body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal and shall, subject to any restrictions and conditions imposed by or under this Act or any other law, have power to acquire, by purchase, gift or otherwise, to hold, administer and transfer property, both movable and immovable, and to enter into any contract and shall, by the said name, sue and be sued. (3) The State Government may, at any time, after one month's notice published in the prescribed manner either on its own motion or at the request of the Panchayat Samiti or of the residents of any area within the block of the Panchayat Samiti, and by notification in the Official Gazette, change the name [or place of office] of any such Panchayat Samiti." 72. Establishment of Zila Parishad is provided under Section 11, which read as under: " 11. Establishment of Zila Parishad . (1) For every district, there shall be a Zila Parishad having jurisdiction, save as otherwise provided in this Act, over the entire district, excluding such portions of the district as are included in a municipality or a cantonment board constituted under any law for the time being in force: Provided that a Zila Parishad may have its office in any area within the excluded portion of the district (2) Every Zila Parishad shall bear the name of the district for which it is constituted and shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal and shall, subject to any restrictions and conditions imposed by or under this Act or any other law, have power to acquire, by purchase, gift, or otherwise, to hold, administer, and transfer property, both movable and immovable, and to enter into any contract, and shall, by the said name, sue and be sued." 73. Composition of Panchayat is provided under Section 12, which read as under: " 12. Composition of a Panchayat .- (1) A panchayat shall consist of:- (a) a Sarpanch; and (b) directly elected Panchas from as many wards as are determined under Sub-section (2). Composition of Panchayat is provided under Section 12, which read as under: " 12. Composition of a Panchayat .- (1) A panchayat shall consist of:- (a) a Sarpanch; and (b) directly elected Panchas from as many wards as are determined under Sub-section (2). [(2) The State Government shall, by such rules as may be framed on this behalf, determine the number of the wards, not being less than five for each Panchayat Circle, and thereupon so divide the Panchayat Circle into single-member wards that the population of each ward is, so far as practicable, the same throughout the Panchayat Circle.]" 74. From the perusal of the aforesaid provisions, it is apparent that it is the State Government which establishes a Panchayat as laid down in Section 9. The State Government would also have a power to change the name or place or office of any Panchayat. Similarly, the power is available to the State relating to Panchayat Samiti as well as to the Zila Parishad. 75. As per the aforesaid provisions, it is apparent that in a Panchayat, there would be one Sarpanch and Panch and several Panchas. The Panchayat represents the wards which may be determined for each Panchayat circle and the number of Wards would be determined by the State Government. Thus, it is the administrative discretion of the State to lay down the number of wards in a Panchayat circle, which would not be less than 5. Therefore, in a Panchayat there has to be at least 5 Panchas. Rules 3 and 4 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Election Rules, 1994 lays down the method and manner of formation of Wards and Constituencies for the Panchayat Circle at the Zila Parishad and Panchayat Samities. In terms of Rule 3(5) while dividing a Panchayat Samiti area into constituency under Section 13, officer authorised by the Government shall as far as practicable, place contiguous Panchayats in a constituency; provided that a whole village comprising a part of Panchayat circle may be placed in a different constituency if it is necessary to do so to distribute the population in the constituencies as far as practicable equally. The power thus, has been provided to the Government to divide a Panchayat Samiti area. 76. Rule 4 provides for publication of wards and constituencies which read as under: " Rule 4. The power thus, has been provided to the Government to divide a Panchayat Samiti area. 76. Rule 4 provides for publication of wards and constituencies which read as under: " Rule 4. Publication of wards of constituencies:- (1) The wards or constituencies formed under Rule 3 shall be notified by the Officer authorised by the Government by affixing statement thereof on the notice board of the office of the District Election Officer (Panchayats) and the office of Panchayat Samiti in respect of constituencies for a Parishad: on the notice board of the District Election Officer (Panchayats), the Panchayat Samiti of the Panchayat in respect of constituencies for Panchayat Samiti, and on the notice board of the Panchayat and a conspicuous place in every village of the Panchayat in respect of wards of the Panchayats. (2) Any adult inhabitant of the Panchayat area/constituency may, if he objects to anything contained in the Statement affixed under Sub-rule (1) pertaining to the ward or constituency related to the Panchayati Rai Institution of which he is a voter, submit his objection in writing to the Officer authorised by the Government within seven days from the date of affixing of such statement. (3) All objections received under Sub-rule (2) shall be affixed on the notice board of the office of the Officer authorised by the Government on the date of their receipt. After the time prescribed for receipt of objections is over, the Officer authorised by the Government under Rule 4 (2) shall forward all the statement of wards/constituencies formed under Rule 3 and the objections, if any, received under Rule 4 (2) alongwith his comments thereon to the State Government. After the time prescribed for receipt of objections is over, the Officer authorised by the Government under Rule 4 (2) shall forward all the statement of wards/constituencies formed under Rule 3 and the objections, if any, received under Rule 4 (2) alongwith his comments thereon to the State Government. (4) The State Government, or any Officer authorised by it, shall thereon consider the objections and other material before it, including the comments of the Officer authorised by the State Government under Sub- rule (2), and shall decide the objections and thereafter amend, if necessary, the statements accordingly, finally determine the wards and constituencies and shall notify the same by affixing the final statement of wards/constituencies at the following places, namely:- (a) On the notice board of the office of District Election Officer (Panchayats) and the office of the Panchayat Samiti in respect of constituencies for Zila Parishad, (b) On the notice board of the District Election Officer (Panchayats) and the notice board of Panchayat Samiti and Panchayats in respect of constituencies of Panchayat Samiti, (c) On the notice board of the Panchayat and a conspicuous place in every village of the Panchayat in respect of wards." 77. Thus, we notice that a voter adult inhabitant of a Panchayat has a right to submit his objections and the officer authorised by the State Government in terms of Sub Rule (2) would decide and finally determine the Wards. Similarly, a Panchayat Samiti having population of one lack shall consist of at least 15 constituencies and would increase by two on every fifteen thousand or part thereof increased in the population as provided under Panchayati Raj Election Rule 1994. The reservation of seats is provided under Section 15 of the Act of 1994 for the Scheduled Casts, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Classes and Women. Their percentage being in proportion to the total number of seats as well as to the population of such castes or tribes in that Panchayati Raj institutions. The reservation of seats is provided under Section 15 of the Act of 1994 for the Scheduled Casts, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Classes and Women. Their percentage being in proportion to the total number of seats as well as to the population of such castes or tribes in that Panchayati Raj institutions. The seats of backward classes would not exceed 21 to the maximum, provided that at least one seat shall be reserved for backward classes depending upon the percentage of population of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes of the said reserved seats of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes or Backward Classes, at least 50%, i.e., not less than half would be reserved for Woman candidates in the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in any Panchayati Raj institution. The Chairpersons of the Panchayati Raj Institutions namely, Sarpanch, Pradhan and Pramukh are also subject to the reservation on similar lines. Section 30 of the Act of 1994 lays down the terms of office of Members, Chairpersons and Deputy Chairpersons which provides that they would hold the office during the term of the concerned Panchayati Raj Institution. Section 30 of Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides as under: " 30. Term of office of members, Chairpersons and Deputy Chairpersons .- Except as otherwise provided in this Act - (a) the members and the Chairpersons of a Panchayati Raj Institution shall hold office during the term of the concerned Panchayati Raj Institution; and (b) the Deputy Chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution shall hold office as long as he continues to be a member of the concerned Panchayati Raj Institution" 78. Section 95 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides the consequences of dissolution of a Panchayati Raj institutions, which read as under: " 95. Consequences of dissolution .- (1) When a Panchayati Raj Institution is dissolved under this Act, the following consequences shall ensure:- (a) all the members of the Panchayati Raj Institution including the chairperson shall, on the date of dissolution vacate their respective offices but without prejudice to their eligibility for re-election or re-appointment. Consequences of dissolution .- (1) When a Panchayati Raj Institution is dissolved under this Act, the following consequences shall ensure:- (a) all the members of the Panchayati Raj Institution including the chairperson shall, on the date of dissolution vacate their respective offices but without prejudice to their eligibility for re-election or re-appointment. (b) all powers and duties of the Panchayati Raj Institution shall, during the period of dissolution, be exercised and performed by such administrator as the State Government may appoint in this behalf; and (c) all property vested in the Panchayati Raj Institution shall, during the period of dissolution, vest in the Government. (2) If it shall not be possible to reconstitute the Panchayati Raj Institution within the time specified in Clause (b) of Sec-Section (3), of Section 17 because of any stay by any competent Court or authority on any general election to the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned and the proceedings consequent thereof the consequences specified in Clauses (b) and (c) of Sub-Section (1) shall follow. (3) An order of dissolution made under Section 94 together with a statement of the reasons thereof shall be laid before the House of the State Legislature, as soon as may be, after it has been made." 79. Section 99 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides as under: " 99. Appointment of officers and staff by Government .- For the discharge of such functions in regard to the administration of Panchayats as are provided for in this Act or as may be prescribed thereunder, the State Government may appoint an Officer-in-charge of Panchayats with such designation as it may from time to time notify and such other subordinate officers and staff as the State Government may deem necessary." 80. Thus, in terms of Section 101 of the Act of 1994, the State Government is authorized to alter the limits of the Panchayati Raj Institutions, as noticed above by inclusion/exclusion. Upon such exclusion of the whole or part of Panchayat Circle or on account of inclusion in another Panchayat Circle, in terms of Section-101 Clause-2 Sub-clause (d), the Panchayat shall stand dissolved or, as the case may be, the members who, represent the local area which has been excluded from the Panchayat Circle shall stand removed. Upon such exclusion of the whole or part of Panchayat Circle or on account of inclusion in another Panchayat Circle, in terms of Section-101 Clause-2 Sub-clause (d), the Panchayat shall stand dissolved or, as the case may be, the members who, represent the local area which has been excluded from the Panchayat Circle shall stand removed. The provision is a deeming clause and upon on such inclusion or exclusion, the Rules, notifications, orders and bylaws will continue to apply unless new Rules are framed to such area so included or declared. 81. We further notice that Clause-(5A) empowers the State Government to alter the limits of Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad area where it is expedient to do so as a consequence of above and State Government would pass such necessary orders or directions as it may considered necessary in terms of Clause-(6). However, Section 102, Clause-(2), Sub-clauses (b) and (c) of the Act of 1994 empowers the State Government to frame such Rules which may provide any matter which empowers the State Government or for the guidance of the Panchayati Raj Institutions and servants and authorities in relation to the subject connected for carrying out the provisions of the Act. 82. Section 117 of the Act of 1994 lays down a bar of jurisdiction of civil courts. 83. Apart from above, it would be necessary to notice that under the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Election Rules, 1994 for each Panchayat, electoral rolls are to be prepared which are ward of constituency-wise. Rule 11 of the Rules of 1994 provides as under: " Rule 11. Preparation of electoral rolls .- (1) The Commission shall subject to the provisions of Section 18, cause to be prepared a ward or constituency-wise electoral roll in Hindi in Devnagri script for each Panchayati Raj Institution. (2)(a) The names of electors in a roll for a ward in the case of a Panchayat Circle shall be arranged in the order of the serial number of houses as may be compromised in each ward. (b) The electoral roll for constituency of Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad, shall consist of the electoral rolls for the wards or part thereof of Panchayat Circles which are comprised within the constituency concerned, which will be arranged Panchayat Circle- wise on the basis of list arranged under Clause (a) of this sub-rule. (b) The electoral roll for constituency of Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad, shall consist of the electoral rolls for the wards or part thereof of Panchayat Circles which are comprised within the constituency concerned, which will be arranged Panchayat Circle- wise on the basis of list arranged under Clause (a) of this sub-rule. (3) Whenever limits of wards or constituencies of a Panchayat Circle or Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad are revised or when a Panchayat Circle or Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad is constituted or re-constituted, such roll may be prepared afresh and shall contain names of all persons entitled to be registered after enquiry as electors under the Act, as far as possible. (4) For the purpose of preparing any roll or deciding any claim or objection to a roll, the Electoral Registration Officers and any person employed by him, shall have access to any register of births and deaths and to the admission register of any educational institution and it shall be the duty of every person in charge of any such register to give to the said officer or person such information and such extracts from the said register as he may require." 84. Thus, wherever limits of wards are revised, the electoral roll is prepared afresh after examining the persons who would be registered as electors. Thus, if there is a change of limits of a Ward, the concerned elector also losses a right of registration in the fresh electoral list and therefore, the claims and objections with regard to publication of draft rolls is provided under the said Chapter-III of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Election Rules, 1994. 85. Rule 16 of the Rules of 1994 provides for deletion of names of such persons who seize to remain as ordinarily resident of that particular area on account of change of the Wards or constituencies. Thus, the rules provided for revision of electoral rolls through an intricate procedure, whereafter the election process commences. (c) PROVISIONS OF RAJ. MUNICIPALITIES ACT, 2009 86. For the purpose of adjudication of the issues involved in the present bunch of matters, following relevant provisions of Act of 2009 are quoted below : “ 3. Delimitation of Municipalities. Thus, the rules provided for revision of electoral rolls through an intricate procedure, whereafter the election process commences. (c) PROVISIONS OF RAJ. MUNICIPALITIES ACT, 2009 86. For the purpose of adjudication of the issues involved in the present bunch of matters, following relevant provisions of Act of 2009 are quoted below : “ 3. Delimitation of Municipalities. - (1) The State Government may, by notification published in the Official Gazette, declare any local area not included within the limits of a Municipality to be a Municipality, or include any such area in a Municipality, or exclude any local area from a Municipality, or otherwise alter the limits of any Municipality and when (a) any local area is declared as, or included in, a Municipality, or (b) any local area is excluded from a Municipality, or (c) the limits of a Municipality are otherwise altered, by amalgamation of one Municipality into another or by splitting up a Municipality into two or more Municipalities, or (d) any local area ceases to be a Municipality, the State Government may, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, by an order published in the Official Gazette provide,- (i) in a case falling under clause (a), that the election of the members for the area or the additional area shall be held within a period of six months from the appointed day; (ii) in a case falling under clause (b), that the members who in the opinion of the State Government represent the area excluded from the Municipality shall be removed; (iii) in a case falling under clause (c), that until the term of the Municipality in which another Municipality is amalgamated expires under this Act, the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson and members of such another Municipality shall be deemed to be the members of the Municipality in which such another Municipality is amalgamated and where a Municipality is split into two or more Municipalities, that the members representing the area included in the newly constituted Municipality shall be deemed to be the members of such new Municipality and such new Municipality shall continue, unless dissolved sooner, until original Municipality would have continued; (iv) in a case falling under clause (d), that the Municipality shall be dissolved. 4. Power to exempt municipal board from operation of any provisions of the Act unsuited thereto. 4. Power to exempt municipal board from operation of any provisions of the Act unsuited thereto. - (1) The State Government may, by notification, and for reasons to be recorded in writing, exempt any Municipal Board from the operation of any of the provisions of this Act considered unsuited thereto, and, thereupon, the said provisions shall not apply to such Municipal Board until such provisions are applied thereto by notification. (2) While a notification under sub-Section (1) remains in force, the State Government may make rules consistent with the provisions of this Act in respect of any matter within the purview of such provisions from operation of which the Municipal Board is exempted. 6. Composition of Municipality:- (1) Subject to the provisions contained in the succeeding sub-Sections, but save as provided in the following provisions of this sub-Section, all seats in a Municipality shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from the territorial constituencies known as wards, the number of such seats, not being less than thirteen, being fixed by the State Government from time to time by notification in the Official Gazette: (a)... ... ... (b)... ... ... (2) Upon the completion of each census after the establishment of the Municipality, the number of seats shall be re-determined by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette on the basis of the population of the municipal area as ascertained at the latest census: Provided that the determination of seats as aforesaid shall not affect the existing composition of the Municipality until the expiry of its term. (3) ... ... ... 9. Division into wards. - (1) For purposes of elections, a Municipality shall be divided into such number of wards as is equal to the total number of seats fixed for the Municipality under sub-Section (1) of Section 6. (2) The representation of each ward shall be on the basis of the population of that ward and shall, as far as possible, be in the same proportion as the total number of seats for the Municipality bear to its population. 10. Determination of wards. (2) The representation of each ward shall be on the basis of the population of that ward and shall, as far as possible, be in the same proportion as the total number of seats for the Municipality bear to its population. 10. Determination of wards. - (1) The State Government shall by order determine, (a) the wards into which each Municipality shall, for the purpose of its elections, be divided; (b) the extent of each ward; (c) the number of seats, if any, reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, Scheduled Tribes and for women members of such castes and tribes and for members of the Backward Classes and women members thereof; and (d) the number of wards for women candidates. (2) The seats reserved for Scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, for Scheduled Tribes and for the Backward Classes and for women may be allotted by rotation to different wards in such manner as may be prescribed. (3) The State Government shall carry out the determination of the boundaries of the wards and allocation of seats reserved in favour of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes,the Backward Classes and women among the wards having regard to the provisions of Section 6 and also to the following provisions, namely: (a) all wards shall, as far as practicable, be geographically compact areas; (b) wards which are reserved for the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes shall be distributed to different parts of the municipal areas where the proportion of the population of such castes or tribes, as the case may be, is comparatively large; and (c) the numbering of wards shall start from the north-west corner of the local area of a Municipality. (4) The draft of the order under sub-Section (1) shall be published for filing objections thereto within a period of not less than seven days and a copy of the same shall be sent to the Municipality concerned for comments. (5) The State Government shall consider any objection and the comments received under sub-Section (4) and the draft order shall, if necessary, be amended, altered or modified accordingly, and thereupon it shall become final. 11. Election to the Municipality. - (1) The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to the Municipality shall be vested in the State Election Commission. 11. Election to the Municipality. - (1) The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to the Municipality shall be vested in the State Election Commission. (2) An election to constitute a Municipality shall be completed (i) before the expiry of its duration specified in Section 7; (ii) before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution: Provided that where the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any election under this clause for constituting the Municipality for such period. (3) For the aforesaid purpose the State Government shall on the recommendation of the State Election Commission call upon all the wards to elect members, in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules and orders made thereunder, on such date or dates as may be specified in the notification. (4) When a new Municipality is established, it shall, as far as may be, be constituted in accordance with the provisions of this Act relating to general election to a Municipality. (5) The State Government shall, when so requested by the State Election Commission, make available to the Commission such staff as may be necessary for discharge of the functions conferred on the State Election Commission by sub-Section (1). 322. Power of Government to dissolve Municipality in case of incompetency or having less than two third elected members . (5) The State Government shall, when so requested by the State Election Commission, make available to the Commission such staff as may be necessary for discharge of the functions conferred on the State Election Commission by sub-Section (1). 322. Power of Government to dissolve Municipality in case of incompetency or having less than two third elected members . - (1) If at any time the State Government is satisfied that the Municipality is not competent to perform, or persistently makes default in the performance of the duties imposed on it by or under this Act or otherwise by law, or has exceeded, or abused its powers, the State Government may, by an order published along with the reasons thereof, in the Official Gazette, declare the Municipality to be incompetent or in default, or to have exceeded or abused its powers, as the case may be, and may dissolve such Municipality as from a date to be specified in the order of dissolution: Provided that no action shall be taken under this sub-Section unless the Municipality through its Chairperson has been afforded a reasonable opportunity of submitting an explanation and of being heard, if the Municipality so desires: Provided further that no order under this sub-Section shall be passed (i) unless the State Government has drawn up a statement setting out distinctly the charges against the Municipality and sent the same for inquiry in the prescribed manner and findings to a Tribunal consisting of a Chairman and not less than two members, constituted in the prescribed manner, or (ii) otherwise than in conformity with such findings. Explanation.- If for any reason the number of vacancies in a Municipality exceeds two-thirds of the total number of seats, the Municipality shall be deemed to be not competent to perform the duties imposed on it by or under this Act. (2) The State Government shall dissolve the Municipality if at any time the number of its elected members falls short of two third of its total members. (2) The State Government shall dissolve the Municipality if at any time the number of its elected members falls short of two third of its total members. (3) When a Municipality is dissolved under sub-Section (1) or any other provision of this Act, the following consequences shall ensue: (a) all members of the Municipality including the Chairperson and the Vice-Chairperson shall, on the date specified in the order of dissolution, vacate their respective offices but without prejudice to their eligibility for re-election or re-appointment; and (b) all powers and duties of the Municipality shall, during the period of dissolution, be exercised and performed by such officer as an Administrator as the State Government appoints in this behalf. (4) An election to constitute a Municipality shall be completed before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution: Provided that where the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any election under this sub-Section for constituting the Municipality for such period. (5) A Municipality constituted upon the dissolution of Municipality before the expiration of its duration shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued under Section 7 had it not been so dissolved. (6) An order of dissolution made under this Section together with statement of the reasons thereof shall be laid before the House of the State Legislature, as soon as may be, after it has been made.” The contentions of the respective parties are to be analysed in view of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions as quoted above. PART IV – ANALYSIS & REASONING a) CATEGORIZATION OF PETITIONS 87. The common thread running through all the writ petitions concerns the delimitation of Panchayati Raj Institutions and Municipalities, which has led to the inclusion or exclusion of Gram Panchayats or municipal areas and the resulting consequences, including the postponement of elections pending such delimitation. Based on the reliefs sought in these petitions, we deemed it appropriate to classify them into different categories, group the writ petitions and special appeals accordingly, and adjudicate the matters falling in each such category, together. Based on the reliefs sought in these petitions, we deemed it appropriate to classify them into different categories, group the writ petitions and special appeals accordingly, and adjudicate the matters falling in each such category, together. For the ease of adjudication, present bunch of writ petitions / special appeals have been clubbed broadly in following categories :- i. Petitions challenging final notifications issued under Section 101 of the Act of 1994; ii. Petitions challenging final notifications issued under Section 3 of the Act of 2009; iii. Petitions challenging notices issued under Section 101 of the Act of 1994 inviting objections relating to delimitation and the process adopted in pursuance thereof; iv. Petitions challenging removal of elected representatives on account of dissolution of Gram Panchayats; v. Petitions challenging order of removal of representative members of Municipal Bodies on account of delimitation; vi. Petitions challenging appointment of the Administrator on completion of tenure of the Local Self Institutions; vii. Petitions challenging process of conducting delimitation of territorial constituencies / wards in Municipal areas without their being any inclusion or exclusion of territories of existing local bodies / without change of census; viii. Petitions seeking directions for holding of elections of Local Self Institutions; 88. In D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.831/2025: State of Rajasthan and Ors. Vs. Dhanna Ram and Ors. , challenge has been given to the order dated 23.05.2025 passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8576/2025 (Dhanna Ram and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.) , wherein learned Single Judge has directed as under: "7. Meanwhile, the competent high-level Committee of the State is directed to consider the objections qua all the writ petitions pending here, list whereof shall be supplied to them by the office of Advocate General. While doing so, the Committee shall decide the proposals so sent by the Collectors in terms of the Guidelines dated 10.01.2025 and other guidelines issued from time to time so also the issues/questions, which this Court has highlighted hereinabove." 89. In D.B. Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No. 1285/2025 (Giriraj Singh Devanda Vs. While doing so, the Committee shall decide the proposals so sent by the Collectors in terms of the Guidelines dated 10.01.2025 and other guidelines issued from time to time so also the issues/questions, which this Court has highlighted hereinabove." 89. In D.B. Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No. 1285/2025 (Giriraj Singh Devanda Vs. State of Rajasthan) , the prayer has been made seeking quashing of notification dated 16.01.2025 and directing the Election Commission to immediately declare and conduct the election programme for all Gram Panchayats in the State of Rajasthan where the tenure has concluded and commence the election process without delay and further directed the Government Officials such as Secretary Panchayat, BDO to be appointed as Administrators until the election programme is announced. 90. In D.B. Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No. 4686/2025 (Sanyam Lodha vs. State of Rajasthan & ors.) , the prayer has been made for directing the Election Commission to immediately declare and conduct the election programme for all Municipalities in the State of Rajasthan. The category-wise analysis, reasoning and conclusion of the bunch of writ petitions / special appeals is as follow :- PART (A) – PETITIONS CHALLENGING FINAL NOTIFICATION OF DELIMITATION ISSUED UNDER SECTION 101 OF THE ACT OF 1994 / SECTION 3 OF THE ACT OF 2009 91. In various writ petitions, final notification issued under Section 101 of the Act of 1994 as well as under Section 3 of the Act of 2009 regarding delimitation of Panchayat area as well as delimitation of Municipal area respectively, are challenged on various grounds. Apart from countering the averments made in the writ petition on merits, various preliminary objections were raised by the respondent regarding maintainability of the said writ petitions. The learned Advocate General submitted that in view of the constitutional as well as statutory bar of interference, the writ petitions against the final notification of delimitation are not maintainable. In view of the rival submissions, following questions emanates for adjudication by this Court. 1. Whether the writ petitions are maintainable against the final notifications of Delimitation, in view of the Bar of interference provided under Constitution of India as well as provisions of respective statutes? 2. What is the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matters relating to Delimitation notifications? 3. 1. Whether the writ petitions are maintainable against the final notifications of Delimitation, in view of the Bar of interference provided under Constitution of India as well as provisions of respective statutes? 2. What is the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matters relating to Delimitation notifications? 3. Whether the guidelines issued by the State Government for undertaking process of delimitation are statutory in nature and therefore, required to be followed strictly? 4. Whether the petitioners have locus to maintain the writ petition challenging the delimitation notification? 5. Whether the State Government is under obligation to decide the objections submitted by the petitioners regarding the proposed delimitation while adhering to the principles of audi alteram partem 6. Whether the writ petitions challenging the validity of delimitation notifications issued under Section 101 of the Act of 1994 and Section 3 of the Act of 2009 are sustainable in view of the grounds raised therein? Analysis of Question No.1 & 2: 92. Since Question No.1 & 2 are corollary to each other, hence the same are considered and decided concurrently. Questioning the maintainability of the bunch of writ petitions challenging the Notifications issued under Section 3 of the Act of 2009 as well as notifications issued under Section 101 of the Act of 1994, learned Advocate General, argued that in view of the Constitutional Bar provided under Article 243-O and 243-ZG, the said writ petitions are not maintainable. It is further argued that while maintaining the constitutional spirit respective Bar of interference is also provided under Section 117 of the Act of 1994 as well as Section 30 of the Act of 2009 in the matters of Delimitation. Thus, once a decision regarding delimitation attains finality, its validity cannot be questioned. Reliance is placed on Articles 329, 243-O, and 243-ZG of the Constitution of India as well as Section 117 of the Act of 1994 and Section 30 of the Act of 2009. 93. Articles 329, 243-O, and 243-ZG of the Constitution of India which are reproduced below :- 329. Reliance is placed on Articles 329, 243-O, and 243-ZG of the Constitution of India as well as Section 117 of the Act of 1994 and Section 30 of the Act of 2009. 93. Articles 329, 243-O, and 243-ZG of the Constitution of India which are reproduced below :- 329. Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters [Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution] 2(a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under article 327 or article 328, shall not be called in question in any court; (b) no election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature. 243-O : Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution— (a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under article 243K, shall not be called in question in any court (b) no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State. 243ZG : Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters — Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution— (a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under article 243ZA shall not be called in question in any court (b) no election to any Municipality shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State. Section 117 of the Act of 2001 reads as under :- Section 117. Section 117 of the Act of 2001 reads as under :- Section 117. Bar to interference by Courts in certain matters.- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act- (a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or wards made or purporting to be made under this Act, shall not be called in question in any Court, and (b) no election to any Panchayati Raj Institution shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under this Act. Section 30 of the Act of 2009 is reproduced as under :- “ 30. Jurisdiction of civil courts in electoral matters. - (1) No civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate upon any question relating to the delimitation of wards, the allotment of seats to such wards, preparation of electoral rolls or conduct of election. (2) No election to any Municipality shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” 94. Learned Advocate General also contended that law in this regard is well settled and the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court in various authoritative pronouncements have repeatedly held that the orders / notifications of Delimitation are in the nature of conditional legislation, thus the final notifications issued for Delamination having the effect of law made by the Parliament / State Legislature and validity of the same cannot be called in question in any Court. In view of the judgments cited and referred to subsequently, it was contended that this Court would not have the jurisdiction to examine the validity of the final notification of delimitation. 95. While referring to judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Meghraj Kothari vs Delimitation Commission; AIR 1967 SC 669 , learned Advocate General stated that final notification of Delimitation is having legislative character, thus, not open for interference by this Court 23. .... The power of the delegate is only to make an order under s. 3. Once the delegate has made that order its power is exhausted. Section 6 then steps in wherein the Parliament has declared that as soon as such an order comes into being that will have effect notwithstanding any inconsistency therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act." 24. Once the delegate has made that order its power is exhausted. Section 6 then steps in wherein the Parliament has declared that as soon as such an order comes into being that will have effect notwithstanding any inconsistency therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act." 24. Similarly it may be said here that once the Delimitation Commission has made orders under Sections 8 and 9 and they have been published under s. 10(1), the orders are to have the same effect as if they were law made by Parliament itself. 31. In this case it must be held that the order under sections 8 and 9 published under Section 10(1) the Delimitation Commission Act were to make a complete set of rules which would govern the re-adjustment of number of seats and the delimitation of constituencies. 32. In this case the powers given by the Delimitation Commission Act and the work of the Commission would be wholly nugatory unless the Commission as a result of its deliberations and public sittings were in a position to re-adjust the number of seats in the House of the People or the total number of seats to be assigned to the Legislative Assembly with reservation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the delimitation of constituencies. It was the will of Parliament that the Commission could by order publish its proposals which were to be given effect to in the subsequent election and as such its order as published in the notifica- tion of the Gazette of India or the Gazette of the State was to be treated as law on the subject. 33. In the instant case the provision of section 10(4) of the Act puts orders under Sections 8 and 9 as published under section 10(1) in the same street as a law made by Parliament itself which, as we have already said, could only be done under Article 327, and consequently the objection that the notification was not to be treated as law cannot be given effect to. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 96. In case of the judgment passed in The Tulsipur Sugar Company Ltd. Vs. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 96. In case of the judgment passed in The Tulsipur Sugar Company Ltd. Vs. The Notified Area Committee Tulsipur, reported in AIR 1980 SC 882 , the Hon’ble Apex Court, in para 18 has held that Delimitation notification declaring an area as urban area is in the nature of conditional legislation. Para 18 reads as under :- “18. We are, therefore, of the view that a notification issued under Section 3 of the Act which has the effect of making the Act applicable to a geographical area is in the nature of a conditional legislation and that it cannot be characterised as a piece of subordinate legislation. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the contention of the plaintiff that the declaration made by the Station Government under Section 3 of the Act declaring the area in which the sugar factory of the Tulsipur town area is invalid is not tenable.” 97. Following the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhupendra Pratap Singh Rathore and Ors. Vs Stated of Rajasthan, reported in 2015 (2) CurCC 303 has held as under :- “27. Keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court, in our considered view, the gazette notification Dt. 05.11.2014 relating to delimitation of Panchayat area; or formation of constituencies in the said area; or allotments of seats to the constituencies is a legislative act in nature and could neither be challenged nor the court can entertain such challenge and in view of the law declared by the Apex Court, prohibiting courts to entertain challenge in view of Art. 243-C, 243-K and 243-O in respect of the above aspects, raised by the petitioners pertaining to constitution / reconstitution/ delimitation of Panchayat areas under the gazette notification Dt. 05.11.2014 cannot be entertained by this court u/Art. 226 of the Constitution and the objection and contentions canvassed by the petitioners in view of Art. 243-C, 243-K read with 243-O coupled with law declared by the Apex Court, is wholly devoid of substance. 28. 05.11.2014 cannot be entertained by this court u/Art. 226 of the Constitution and the objection and contentions canvassed by the petitioners in view of Art. 243-C, 243-K read with 243-O coupled with law declared by the Apex Court, is wholly devoid of substance. 28. So far as the objection raised by counsel for petitioner that in the judgment cited by the Apex Court, as there was a clear prohibition of S. 10(2) of the Delimitation Act, the writ petitions are maintainable as the Delimitation Act is not applicable in the facts & circumstances of the instant case. The objections raised is of no substance for the reason that under 73rd amendment to the Constitution, while introducing Part- IX bar to interference by courts in electoral matters u/Art. 243-O(a) and corresponding amendments made in the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 while functioning for delimitation/alteration of the Panchayati Raj Institutions are regulated in terms of S. 101 of the Act, 1994 and at the same time, there is a bar to interference by courts in the matters relating to delimitation of constituencies and wards u/S. 117 of the Act, 1994 and that being so, the principles laid down by the Apex Court are applicable in the facts & circumstances of the instant case and the gazette notification Dt. 05.11.2014 being a legislative act in nature and keeping in view the bar to interference in the matters relating to the delimitation of the constituencies u/Art. 243- O(a) of the Constitution and so also S. 117 of the Act, 1994, the submission made by the petitioner suffers lack of merit. 29. In our considered view, we find substance in the preliminary objections raised by the respondents which deserve worth acceptance and keeping in view the mandate of Art. 243-O(a) of the Constitution read with S. 117 of the Act, 1994, once a notification of delimitation of constituencies Dt. 05.11.2014 has been published in the official gazette u/S. 101 of the Act, 1994, it has got the force of law and going by the effect of Art. 243-O(a), interference by courts in respect of delimitation of constituencies is barred. Such is the importance of the said notification and the non-obstante clause therein is important and become operative.” 98. Similarly in case of Mushe Khan vs State of Rajasthan, reported in MANU/RH/1342/2014 , this Court has held as under :- “12. Such is the importance of the said notification and the non-obstante clause therein is important and become operative.” 98. Similarly in case of Mushe Khan vs State of Rajasthan, reported in MANU/RH/1342/2014 , this Court has held as under :- “12. In all the cases before us, as in the writ petitions before the Division Bench at Jaipur, the draft proposals for de-limitation were issued and objections were invited. The period of objections was reduced in view of rd urgency to complete the election process before 23 January, 2015. In some of the cases, allegations have been made that the guidelines for minimum and maximum population and the distance for the Proposed headquarter have been violated. In some of the cases, it is stated that the objections were not considered. However, in none of the cases, it is that the objections were not invited or that the objections were not submitted and that no hearing was given. 13. We are in respectful agreement with the reasoning given in the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court at Jaipur in Bhupendra Pratap Singh Rathore v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (supra) and arrive at the same findings that the mandate of Article 243-O(a) of the Constitution of India read with Section 117 of the Act of 1994, creates a bar on the interference by the Courts in respect of de-limitation of constituencies. 99. In a case while dealing with the contention that opportunity of submitting objection not granted and final notification of Delimitation was issued, the learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kanhaiya Lal Jhanwar vs State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in 2016 3 WLC 443 has held as under :- “13. In the present case, a provisional voters list has been published on 13.06.2015, on which the objections were received and are pending consideration. This writ petition was filed on 23.06.2015, in summer vacations, much after the Notification of delimitation published on 30.04.2015, and the provisional voters list was also published on 13.06.2015. It is admitted that the petitioner had not filed any objections to the delimitation of the wards. This writ petition was filed on 23.06.2015, in summer vacations, much after the Notification of delimitation published on 30.04.2015, and the provisional voters list was also published on 13.06.2015. It is admitted that the petitioner had not filed any objections to the delimitation of the wards. The explanation given for not filing the objections, namely that a notice was not published in the newspapers, or by any other means, inviting objections, is, in our opinion, not satisfactory, inasmuch as the Government Order dated 01.01.2015 was published in the leading newspapers, providing for elections of Local Bodies for the year 2015-16, was within the knowledge of the petitioner. He was aware that the wards are proposed to be increased from 30 to 35. Despite being an active politician, he did not choose to either visit, or to find out from the Office of the Collector about the delimitation of the wards and the number of voters. He chose to file the writ petition after the entire period of filing the objections was over, and the delimitation Notification and the provisional voters list was also published. 14. Along with the reply, the State of Rajasthan has also filed the consents given by the Congress party and the BJP, for delimitation, which clearly suggests that sufficient opportunity was given to all concerned including the petitioner, to file the objections. No one raised any objection to the delimitation of wards in Nagar Palika, Nokha, and on which, the State has finalized the Notification. 15. We are of the view that on both the grounds, firstly that the petitioner did not file any objection despite knowledge of the period, within which the delimitation of the increased wards has to be finalized, and further on the Bar created by Article 243ZG of the Constitution of India, no interference should be made in the matter.” 100. The law so laid down in the case of Meghraj Kothari (supra) as well as The Tulsipur Sugar Company Limited (supra), has been reiterated by the Courts of law time and again and while dealing with the issues relating to Delimitation notifications and other ancillary issues and consistently held that the interference regarding actions of conditional legislative nature is clearly barred. 101. 101. Per contra, the counsels for the petitioners have argued that this Court retains the power of judicial review even after the issuance of Delimitation notifications, on the strength of judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kishorechandra Chaganlal Vs. Union of India: 2024 INSC 579 . The relevant part of the judgment is reproduced below :- 5. We, however, do not approve the view taken by the High Court that the order of delimitation of constituencies, issued in exercise of statutory powers under the Delimitation Act, is entirely insusceptible to the powers of judicial review exercisable under Article 226 of the Constitution. Although Article 329 undeniably restricts the scope of judicial scrutiny re: validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, it cannot be construed to have imposed for every action of delimitation exercise. If judicial intervention is deemed completely barred, citizens would not have any forum to plead their grievances, leaving them solely at the mercy of the Delimitation Commission. As a constitutional court and guardian of public interest, permitting such a scenario would be contrary to the Court’s duties and the principle of separation of powers. 6. This understanding is supported by a three-judge bench decision of this Court in Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. State of T.N. where the Court was called upon to interpret Articles 243O and 243ZG of the Constitution, which mirror the aforementioned Article 329. Rejecting the contention that these provisions place a complete bar on judicial intervention, it was noted that a constitutional Court can intervene for facilitating the elections or when a case for mala fide or arbitrary exercise of power is made out. Using this, the Court directed delimitation to be conducted for nine new districts. Recently, a three-judge bench of this Court in State of Goa v. Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh, affirmed the ratio of the above-cited decision while discussing principles on Article 329(a), and rejected the contention which sought to prove it as per incuriam. 7. Therefore, while the Courts shall always be guided by the settled principles regarding scope, ambit and limitations on the exercise of judicial review in delimitation matters, there is nothing that precludes them to check the validity of orders passed by Delimitation Commission on the touchstone of the Constitution. 7. Therefore, while the Courts shall always be guided by the settled principles regarding scope, ambit and limitations on the exercise of judicial review in delimitation matters, there is nothing that precludes them to check the validity of orders passed by Delimitation Commission on the touchstone of the Constitution. If the order is found to be manifestly arbitrary and irreconcilable to the constitutional values, the Court can grant the appropriate remedy to rectify the situation. 8. In order to prove that any kind of judicial intervention is fully prohibited, the respondents relied upon a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Meghraj Kothari vs. Delimitation Commission and others. A closer examination of the aforementioned case, however, would show that the Court in that case restricted judicial intervention when the same would unnecessarily delay the election process. This is writ large from the following paragraph, where the Court explicated the reason behind adopting the hands-off approach: 20. In our view, therefore, the objection to the delimitation of constituencies could only be entertained by the Commission before the date specified. Once the orders made by the Commission under Sections 8 and 9 were published in the Gazette of India and in the Official Gazettes of the States concerned, these matters could no longer be reagitated in a court of law. There seems to be very good reason behind such a provision. If the orders made under Sections 8 and 9 were not to be treated as final, the effect would be that any voter, if he so wished, could hold up an election indefinitely by questioning the delimitation of the constituencies from court to court. Section 10(2) of the Act clearly demonstrates the intention of the Legislature that the orders under Sections 8 and 9 published under Section 10(1) were to be treated as law which was not to be questioned in any court.” [emphasis supplied] 9. Hence, the aforementioned judgement does not support the respondents’ contention regarding complete restriction on judicial review. A constitutional court can undertake the exercise of judicial review within the limited sphere at an appropriate stage. 102. Hence, the aforementioned judgement does not support the respondents’ contention regarding complete restriction on judicial review. A constitutional court can undertake the exercise of judicial review within the limited sphere at an appropriate stage. 102. In view of the position of law reiterated in various authoritative pronouncements, it is well settled that the final order / notifications for Delimitation are in the nature of conditional legislation and in view of the Constitutional and statutory Bar the same are not open for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Apex Court even in the case of Kishorechandra Chaganlal (supra) has held that the scope of interference in such cases is of judicial review and only at an appropriate stage. The observations so made by the Hon’ble Apex Court, seen in the light of the Constitutional Bar, it is clear that the interference in such cases can be exercised in the rarest of rare cases where the order is found to be manifestly arbitrary and irreconcilable to the constitutional values. 103. In view of the limited scope of interference as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kishorechandra Chaganlal (supra) , it is desirable to explain the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by a High Court. The law in this regard is no more res integra. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 , has meticulously analyzed the jurisprudential development concerning the doctrine of judicial review and held that the power of judicial review is not unlimited in its sweep but is circumscribed within narrow and well-defined parameters. The Court observed that interference by the judiciary is justified only where the decision under challenge suffers from procedural irregularity or perversity. The relevant para read as follows: “71. Judicial quest in administrative matters has been to find the right balance between the administrative discretion to decide matters whether contractual or political in nature or issues of social policy; thus they are not essentially justiciable and the need to remedy any unfairness. Such an unfairness is set right by judicial review. 72. The relevant para read as follows: “71. Judicial quest in administrative matters has been to find the right balance between the administrative discretion to decide matters whether contractual or political in nature or issues of social policy; thus they are not essentially justiciable and the need to remedy any unfairness. Such an unfairness is set right by judicial review. 72. Lord Scarman in Nottinghamshire County Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment [ 1986 AC 240 , 251 : (1986) 1 All ER 199] proclaimed: ‘Judicial review’ is a great weapon in the hands of the judges; but the judges must observe the constitutional limits set by our parliamentary system upon the exercise of this beneficial power. Commenting upon this Michael Supperstone and James Goudie in their work Judicial Review (1992 Edn.) at p. 16 say: If anyone were prompted to dismiss this sage warning as a mere obiter dictum from the most radical member of the higher judiciary of recent times, and therefore to be treated as an idiosyncratic aberration, it has received the endorsement of the Law Lords generally. The words of Lord Scarman were echoed by Lord Bridge of Harwich, speaking on behalf of the Board when reversing an interventionist decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Butcher v. Petrocorp Exploration Ltd. 18-3-1991. 73. Observance of judicial restraint is currently the mood in England. The judicial power of review is exercised to rein in any unbridled executive functioning. The restraint has two contemporary manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial intervention; the other covers the scope of the court's ability to quash an administrative decision on its merits. These restraints bear the hallmarks of judicial control over administrative action. 74. Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made, but the decision-making process itself. 76. In R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p in Guinness plc [ (1990) 1 QB 146 : (1989) 1 All ER 509] , Lord Donaldson, M.R. referred to the judicial review jurisdiction as being supervisory or ‘longstop’ jurisdiction. Unless that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power. 104. Unless that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power. 104. Further, in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India , (1995) 6 SCC 749 , the Apex Court held that the scope of judicial review is restricted to reviewing the legality and propriety of the decision- making process, rather than reassessing the merits or sufficiency of the decision itself. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced hereinbelow. “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 105. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 105. Recently, the Supreme Court in the case of SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612 while reiterating the limited scope of Judicial review has observed that the scope is limited to examining whether the prescribed procedure was duly followed and not to the merits itself. The relevant para reads as follows: “24 . It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained. 106. 106. In view of the position of law well settled through various judicial pronouncements, it is clear that in the cases of challenge given to the final notification of delimitation, in the limited scope of judicial review, Constitutional Court can only examine the manifest arbitrariness or infirmities regarding the process of issuing the notifications; however, the merits of the decision cannot be examined or interfered with by this Court. Analysis of Question No.3: 107. The challenge to the final notifications of delimitation, given in most of the cases is on the ground of non-adherence of the guidelines prescribed with the notices issued under Section 101(1) of the Act of 1994. Counsel for the petitioners argued that Section 101 requires State Government to issue the notification regarding delimitation only after issuing one month’s notice “published in the prescribed manner” and under Section 101(6), State Government is empowered to make such orders and give such directions, as it may consider necessary for that purpose. Reference is also made to Section 98 of the Act of 1994, which provides for delegation of power. Counsels for the petitioners thus argued that guidelines issued by the State Government along with the one month’s notice for proposed delimitation are statutory in nature and therefore, strict compliance of the same was required to be done by the State Authorities. Any deviation from the said guidelines renders the further proceedings or even the final notification invalid. 108. Responding to the said arguments, the learned Advocate General argued that Section 101 of the Act of 1994 nowhere provides for issuance of any guideline for the purpose of delimitation. The only mandate of Section 101 is issuance of one month’s notice to be published “in prescribed manner” and the instructions contained in the said notice are only guiding principle for the administrative authorities for making proposal for delimitation of area concerned. Mere mentioning of such instructions along with the notice issued under Section 101(1) of the Act of 1994 would not enforce statutory character in the same. Mere mentioning of such instructions along with the notice issued under Section 101(1) of the Act of 1994 would not enforce statutory character in the same. Learned Advocate General contended that the phrase “in prescribed manner” used in Section 101 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 must be read in light of its definition of term “prescribed” under Section 2(xix), which means “prescribed by or under this Act.” He further submitted that Powers to make Rules as provided under Section 102 clearly provides that any matter to be prescribed under the Act must be done by way of making rules framed by the State Government and published in the Official Gazette. Learned Advocate General also relied upon the definition of the term ‘prescribed’ under Section 32(58) of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act which means prescribed by rules made under an enactment. On the strength of said provision, learned Advocate General contended that the so-called guidelines referred by the petitioners were neither issued as rules under Section 102, nor published in the Official Gazette, therefore, the same cannot be said to have statutory force. The Advocate General contended that these guidelines are merely administrative in nature, intended to guide the administrative authorities and cannot be treated as having the binding effect of law. While responding to the argument of the counsels for the petitioners regarding power of State Government to issue orders under Section 101(6) of the Act of 1994, learned Advocate General stated that there is difference between an order of statutory in nature – having force of law vis-à-vis an order passed in reference to a statutory provision. An administrative order issued in reference to a statutory provision or while exercising to a statutory power will not ipso facto make such order of statutory nature. It is thus, contended that since the instructions contained in the notice issued under Section 101 of the Act of 1994 are not enforceable under the law, therefore, no mandamus can be issued merely on the ground of non-adherence of the same. 109. To support the said arguments, learned Advocate General relied upon the judgment passed in the case of J.R. Ragupathy vs State of A.P., (1988) 4 SCC 364 . The relevant para is reproduced as under: 17. 109. To support the said arguments, learned Advocate General relied upon the judgment passed in the case of J.R. Ragupathy vs State of A.P., (1988) 4 SCC 364 . The relevant para is reproduced as under: 17. We find it rather difficult to sustain the interference by the High Court in some of the cases with location of Mandal Headquarters and quashing of the impugned notification on the ground that the Government acted in breach of the guidelines in that one place or the other was more centrally located or that location at the other place would promote general public convenience or that the Headquarters should be fixed at a particular place with a view to develop the area surrounded by it or that merely because a particular person who was an influential Member of Legislature Assembly belonging to the party in opposition had the right of representation but failed to avail of it. The location of Headquarters by the Government by the issue of the final notification under Sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Act was on a consideration by the Cabinet Sub Committee of the proposals submitted by the Collectors concerned and the objections and suggestions received from the local authorities like Gram Panchayats and the general public, keeping in view the relevant factors. Even assuming that any breach of the guidelines was justiciable, the utmost that the High Court could have done was to quash the impugned notification in a particular case and direct the Government to reconsider the question. There was no warrant for the High Court to have gone further and directed the shifting of the Mandal Headquarters at a particular place. 18. Broadly speaking, the contention on behalf of the State Government is that relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is not available to enforce administrative rules, regulations or instructions which have no statutory force, in the absence of exceptional circumstances. It is well-settled that mandamus does not lie to enforce departmental manuals or instructions not having any statutory force, which do not give rise to any legal right in favour of the petitioner.” 110. Having considered the rival submissions, this Court finds merit in the argument advanced by the learned Advocate General. It is well-settled that mandamus does not lie to enforce departmental manuals or instructions not having any statutory force, which do not give rise to any legal right in favour of the petitioner.” 110. Having considered the rival submissions, this Court finds merit in the argument advanced by the learned Advocate General. The term “in prescribed manner” used under Section 101(1) read with Section 2(xix) as well as Section 102 of the Act of 1994 clearly provides that for the purpose of infusing statutory force to any order or guidelines under the Act of 1994, the same must be laid down by way of rules made in accordance with the Act and notified in the Official Gazette. The guidelines relied upon by the petitioners have not undergone such statutory process. They are neither framed under any rule-making power nor published as rules in the Gazette, and hence, they cannot be regarded as possessing statutory character. Accordingly, the Court holds that the guidelines in question are purely administrative in nature, intended only to facilitate internal procedural compliance, lacking statutory force and thus, not enforceable under the law. Mere non-adherence of the guiding principle cannot be a valid ground to question the final delimitation notification. Analysis of Question No.4: 111. The present bunch of writ petitions are also opposed by the respondent State on the ground of locus standi of the petitioners to maintain the writ petitions. Learned Advocate General submitted that the petitioners have no enforceable right in the matters of delimitation and the process undertaken by the State was well within its legislative competence, guided by the procedure provided under the Statutes which does not create any right in favour of any individual. 112 Learned Advocate General contended that guidelines can be of two kinds. Some guidelines are beneficial in nature, as they confer certain advantages or benefits upon citizens and may thereby create enforceable rights, in respect of which writ petitions can be maintained. However, where the guidelines merely lay down procedural instructions for authorities to follow, without conferring any rights upon individuals, the latter would have no locus standi to file a writ petition alleging non-compliance with such guidelines.. Learned Advocate General placed reliance upon the judgment passed in the case of Ayubkhan Noorkhan Pathan vs State of Maharashtra, reported in 2013 (4) SCC 465. The relevant para is quoted below: 9. Learned Advocate General placed reliance upon the judgment passed in the case of Ayubkhan Noorkhan Pathan vs State of Maharashtra, reported in 2013 (4) SCC 465. The relevant para is quoted below: 9. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceeding, unless he satisfies the Authority/Court, that he falls within the category of aggrieved persons. Only a person who has suffered, or suffers from legal injury can challenge the act/action/order etc. in a court of law. A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable either for the purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal right, or when there is a complaint by the appellant that there has been a breach of statutory duty on the part of the Authorities. Therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable right available for enforcement, on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can of course, enforce the performance of a statutory duty by a public body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided that such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of such right is a condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that, the relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right. In fact, the existence of such right, is the foundation of the exercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court. The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the right of the appellant himself, who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief as regards the same. 113 Per contra, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the respondent State while issuing the said notice under Section 101 of the Act of 1994 has clearly called upon the public at large to make submissions / objections in that regard. It is stated that once in pursuance of a statutory notice, the right to file objection is granted before passing the final notification for any alteration or reconstitution of the Panchayat area, the corresponding right to approach this Court under Article 226 also arises in the event of its violation. Hence, the petitioners do have the locus to maintain the writ petitions. Hence, the petitioners do have the locus to maintain the writ petitions. Reliance is placed upon the judgment in the case of Hari Krishna mandir Trust vs. State of Maharashtra 2020 (9) SCC 356 “100. The High Courts exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, not only have the power to issue a Writ of Mandamus or in the nature of Mandamus, but are duty bound to exercise such power, where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised discretion conferred upon it by a Statute, or a rule, or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion malafide, or on irrelevant consideration.” 114. We have considered the rival submissions and observed that the one-month notice issued by the State Government expressly invites the residents of the concerned village to submit their representations regarding the proposed delimitation. It is a well- established legal principle that, even in matters of delimitation, judicial review is permissible to a limited extent and may be invoked in appropriate cases through writ petitions filed by persons such as the present petitioners. In a democratic framework, citizens cannot be precluded from approaching the constitutional courts in matters concerning the administrative or legislative actions of the Government that impact democratic governance. Both the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court have, on multiple occasions, rejected objections regarding locus standi and have entertained writ petitions challenging the delimitation process. Hence, the State’s objection concerning the petitioners’ locus standi is untenable, and a writ petition challenging delimitation cannot be dismissed solely on that ground. Analysis of Question No.5: 115. While challenging the process of delimitation, in almost all the cases, counsels for the petitioners have vehemently contended that the authorities concerned have acted in a predetermined and mechanical manner, without adhering to the principles of fair consideration. It has been urged that the objections submitted by the petitioners/villagers in response to the notice issued under Section 101 of the Act of 1994, were not objectively examined. It has been urged that the objections submitted by the petitioners/villagers in response to the notice issued under Section 101 of the Act of 1994, were not objectively examined. It is further stated that since the statutory scheme envisages receipt of objections from the villagers to be considered by the concerned District Collector and to forward the same along with his recommendations to the High-Power Committee, therefore, it is obligatory on the part of the State Authorities to grant an opportunity of hearing to the objectors and to decide the objections so submitted in pursuance of the said notice. Counsels have jointly argued that neither the principle of ‘audi alteram partem’ was followed, nor the objections were decided before making recommendations or passing the final notification. As per the counsels for the petitioners, the impugned notifications are liable to be set aside solely on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice and non-consideration of objections. 116. Per contra, learned Advocate General submitted that the petitioners have completely misconstrued the true import of Section 101 of the Act of 1994. It is contended that a close reading of Section 101 clearly shows that the only statutory requirement is issuance of a prior notice of thirty days before effecting any alteration in the boundaries of Panchayati Raj Institutions. The said provision does not provide any specific mandate for inviting the objections, requiring the authorities to adjudicate and decide the same after granting an opportunity of hearing. It is contended that the notice under Section 101 is merely in the nature of an intimation to the public, pursuant to which any person, if so advised, may submit his suggestions. The statute does not obligate the Government to record its findings and decide each objection individually. In view of the statutory scheme, it will be presumed that the competent authorities will duly consider the suggestions so received in pursuance of the notice, before taking final decision and issuing the requisite notification. 117. Learned Advocate General contended that such legislative intent of Section 101 of the Act of 1994 can also be understood in the light of the fact that for exercising similar powers for delimitation of the Municipality, even the process of issuing one month’s notice is not provided under Section 3 of the Act of 2009. 117. Learned Advocate General contended that such legislative intent of Section 101 of the Act of 1994 can also be understood in the light of the fact that for exercising similar powers for delimitation of the Municipality, even the process of issuing one month’s notice is not provided under Section 3 of the Act of 2009. Since the process of delimitation is of legislative character, there is no statutory requirement of calling upon the objection, grant of opportunity of hearing and to decide each objection. 118. This Court finds that the objections raised by the petitioners are wholly misconceived and untenable. The statutory framework clearly reflects the legislative intent, and Section 101 of the Act of 1994 does not prescribe any specific requirement for affording an opportunity of hearing or for deciding objections through a reasoned or speaking order. It is a well-established principle that delimitation constitutes a form of conditional legislation; hence, the authorities exercising such powers are neither expected nor required to function as judicial or quasi-judicial bodies. The purpose of inviting public suggestions is merely to enable the State to gather relevant material for forming its subjective satisfaction prior to issuing the final notification of delimitation. In the absence of any statutory mandate requiring the authorities to invite, adjudicate, or decide objections through a hearing process, this ground of challenge is unsustainable. 119. Our view also finds support from the following observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of The Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd vs The Notified Area Committee, Tulsipur, AIR 1980 SC 882. 9. In Bates v. Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone & Ors. the facts were these: In 1964, the British Legal Association was formed. Out of about 26,000 practising solicitors some 2,900 were members of the association. The Lord Chancellor announced on May, 1, 1972, that the scale of fees under Schedule I to the Solicitors' Remuneration Order, 1883 were proposed to be abolished and that for all conveyancing transactions the system of quantum meruit was to be applied. On June 6, pursuant to section 56 (3) of the Solicitors Act 1957, the Law Society was sent by the committee set up under section 56 (1) a draft of the order proposed to be made under section 56 (2). The draft order was published in The Law Society's Gazette on June 21. On June 6, pursuant to section 56 (3) of the Solicitors Act 1957, the Law Society was sent by the committee set up under section 56 (1) a draft of the order proposed to be made under section 56 (2). The draft order was published in The Law Society's Gazette on June 21. The association set out two circulars about the proposed order, the first at the end of May, to all solicitors, and the second on July 17, making a series of accusations against the Lord Chancellor and the Law Society. On July 11, the association sent printed submissions to the statutory committee, requesting that the order should not be approved at this juncture and that the Lord Chancellor should seek further consultations with the profession and professional organisations. On July 14, the association wrote to each member of the committee asking for further time and a deferment of the decision for two months. The Lord Chancellor's reply dated July 18, was that he saw no reason for postponing the meeting or for refraining from making the order in such terms as the committee approved. On July 18, the plaintiff as a member of the national executive committee of the association, took out a writ against all members of the statutory committee, seeking a declaration and an injunction, and on July 19, at 2 P.M. having previously notified the Treasury Solicitor of the intention, he moved the court ex parte, seeking to restrain the committee from holding the meeting which was to be held at 4.30 P.M. on that day. The motion was dismissed by Megarry, J. and we feel rightly with the following observations: "In the present case, the committee in question has an entirely different function: It is legislative rather than administrative or executive. The function of the committee is to make or refuse to make a legislative instrument under delegated powers. The order, when made, will lay down the remuneration for solicitors generally; and the terms of the order will have to be considered and construed and applied in numberless cases in the future. Let me accept that in the sphere of the so-called quasi-judicial the rules of natural justice run, and that in the administrative or executive field there is a general duty of fairness. Nevertheless, these considerations do not seem to me to affect the process of legislation, whether primary or delegated. Let me accept that in the sphere of the so-called quasi-judicial the rules of natural justice run, and that in the administrative or executive field there is a general duty of fairness. Nevertheless, these considerations do not seem to me to affect the process of legislation, whether primary or delegated. Many of those affected by delegated legislation, and effected very substantially, are never consulted in the process of enacting that legislation, and yet they have no remedy. Of course the informal consultation of representative bodies by the legislative authority is a commonplace, but although a few statutes have specifically provided for a general process of publishing draft delegated legislation and considering objections (see for example, the Factories Act 1961, Schedule 4), I do not know of any implied right to be consulted or make objections, or any principle upon which the courts may enjoin the legislative process at the suit of those who contend that insufficient time for consultation and consideration has been given. I accept that the fact that the order will take the form of a statutory instrument does not per se make it immune from attack, whether by injunction or otherwise; but what is important is not its form but its nature, which is plainly legislative". 10. We are, therefore, of the view that the maxim 'audi alteram partem' does not become applicable to the case by necessary implication. 120. Similarly, the Division Bench of this Court in D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 20142/2024 Motan Das & Ors. Vs. State & Ors. decided on 28.02.2025 , while framing specific question in this regard has held as under: “18. Further, with regard to the submission made on behalf of the petitioners regarding the failure to fulfil the principles of natural justice, specially the maxim of Audi Alteram Partem, this Court is conscious of the ratio laid down in the case of Ashok Khetoliya (supra), relevant paras of which are reproduced as follows: “11. This Court in Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. held as under: “7. This Court in Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. held as under: “7. We are concerned in the present case with the power of the State Government to make a declaration constituting a geographical area into a town area under Section 3 of the Act which does not require the State Government to make such declaration after giving notice of its intention so to do to the members of the public and inviting their representations regarding such action. The power of the State Government to make a declaration under Section 3 of the Act is legislative in character because the application of the rest of the provisions of the Act to the geographical area which is declared as a town area is dependent upon such declaration. Section 3 of the Act is in the nature of a conditional legislation. Dealing with the nature of functions of a non- judicial authority, Prof. S.A. De Smith in Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd Edn.) observes at p. 163: “However, the analytical classification of a function may be a conclusive factor in excluding the operation of the audi alteram partem rule. It is generally assumed that in English law the making of a subordinate legislative instrument need not be preceded by notice or hearing unless the parent Act so provides.” 9. We are, therefore, of the view that the maxim “audi alteram partem” does not become applicable to the case by necessary implication.” 19. This Court in light of the aforementioned, observes that in the instant case the maxim “audi alteram partem” in absence of any express provision, is not applicable merely by necessary implication and therefore, the impugned notifications do not suffer from any illegality on that count as well. Thus, the Issue (ii), as aforesaid, stands answered accordingly. Analysis of Question No.6: 121. We have examined all the writ petitions challenging the final delimitation notifications issued under Section 101 of the Act of 1994 or Section 3 of the Act of 2009, pertaining to the exclusion or inclusion of Panchayat or Municipal areas, respectively. Although the petitions present varying combinations of grounds, but there exists a substantial commonality of the issues raised across them. In this part of the judgment, the remaining factual and legal grounds assailing the final delimitation notifications shall be considered and adjudicated upon. Although the petitions present varying combinations of grounds, but there exists a substantial commonality of the issues raised across them. In this part of the judgment, the remaining factual and legal grounds assailing the final delimitation notifications shall be considered and adjudicated upon. Almost all the writ petitions raise the issue of non-compliance with the guidelines, instructions, or parameters prescribed in the delimitation notice. The submissions made by the respective counsels, both during oral arguments and in their written submissions, clearly indicate that the challenges to the final notifications are based on common grounds — such as non- adherence to distance or population criteria, inappropriate inclusion or exclusion of certain areas, failure to decide objections, denial of opportunity of hearing, and instances where Panchayat areas previously included within a Municipality have again been brought under Panchayat jurisdiction. It was further submitted that there exists no administrative necessity for undertaking the current delimitation exercise and that the same has been initiated arbitrarily, without adherence to the guiding principles laid down by the State itself. In addition to these, the petitioners have also alleged arbitrary and mala fide exercise of power, political motivation behind the decisions, non-application of mind, and that the recommendations were made without due consideration of the objections or suggestions received. Besides the challenge to the final delimitation notification itself, several petitions also question the consequential actions arising therefrom, such as, cessation of tenure of members of the affected wards, removal of a Pradhan due to exclusion of his ward from the Panchayat area, appointment of outgoing Sarpanch as Administrator, and failure to appoint the Member or Chairperson of the Municipality as Administrator. These consequential or ancillary issues, other than the main challenge to the final delimitation notification, shall be addressed in the subsequent part of this judgment. 122. While replying to the grounds of challenge on its merits, learned Advocate General reiterated that in view of the preliminary objections, the adjudication upon the merits of writ petitions is not desirable. Learned Advocate General further stated that most of the grounds of challenge such as, distance / population criteria not being followed and the location of a particular area is not suitable for proposed exclusion / inclusion etc. Learned Advocate General further stated that most of the grounds of challenge such as, distance / population criteria not being followed and the location of a particular area is not suitable for proposed exclusion / inclusion etc. are raised while referring to the guidelines, which are only in the nature of administrative instructions and since the same does not have any enforceability under the law, the challenge upon the said grounds is not sustainable. Learned Advocate General further submitted that bald allegations of political interference or arbitrary exercise of powers are levelled and the same are bereft of any substance. Further, the same involves various disputed questions of facts, which cannot be decided under the writ jurisdiction. It is further contended that the petitioners have failed to make out any ground, warranting interference of this Court within the limited scope of judicial review. 123. As already concluded, the guidelines issued along with the delimitation notice do not possess any statutory force and, therefore, are not legally enforceable. Any alleged deviation from such guidelines, by itself, without making out a deserving case for interference under limited scope of judicial review, cannot constitute a sufficient ground for this Court to interfere with the final delimitation decision. The petitioners have failed to demonstrate any procedural irregularity or violation of a statutory provision in the process adopted by the State Government while issuing the final notifications. Nor have they established that the authorities acted beyond their jurisdiction in exercising their powers relating to delimitation. It has been consistently held by the courts of law that decisions regarding delimitation fall within the domain of the State’s subjective satisfaction and are generally beyond judicial scrutiny as to their merits. Under the constitutional and statutory framework, delimitation decisions are required to be taken while holistically considering multiple factors—such as population, distance, financial viability for effective administration, future growth prospects, and other relevant considerations. Hence, such decisions must be assessed holistically, and the non-consideration of any single factor cannot, by itself, justify judicial interference with the final outcome. Moreover, there have been counter-submissions concerning the allegations related to distance and population criteria, which give rise to several disputed questions of fact. The legal position in this regard is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot enter into or adjudicate upon such factual controversies. Moreover, there have been counter-submissions concerning the allegations related to distance and population criteria, which give rise to several disputed questions of fact. The legal position in this regard is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot enter into or adjudicate upon such factual controversies. Accordingly, while this Court notes the petitioners’ concerns regarding deviation from the parameters mentioned in the guidelines, however such deviations do not constitute a legal infirmity capable of rendering the process invalid. In the present cases, the petitioners have not been able to establish any procedural irregularity, legal infirmity, or manifest arbitrariness that would offend constitutional principles. Accordingly, the limited scope of judicial review does not warrant any interference by this Court. The challenges raised by the petitioners on grounds relating to distance, population, or locational criteria are, therefore, unsustainable in law. 124. The petitioners have assailed the delimitation notification on the grounds of arbitrary exercise of power and non-application of mind. However, we find no merit in these contentions. The material on record clearly demonstrates that cogent reasons were recorded for undertaking the delimitation exercise, particularly in light of the fact that the outgoing Government had created 17 new districts in the State of Rajasthan. Subsequently, in 2024, upon re-evaluating that decision and for ensuring better administrative efficiency, 9 out of the said 17 districts were abolished and merged with the existing ones. The creation and abolition of districts not only altered the boundaries of Legislative Assembly constituencies but also impacted the territorial limits of local self-government institutions. Taking note of these changes, a three-member Cabinet Committee was constituted, and thereafter, a well-considered policy decision was taken to initiate a fresh delimitation exercise. In these circumstances, the allegation of non-application of mind is devoid of substance and unsustainable in law. Moreover, it is a settled legal position that judicial interference in matters involving such policy decisions is extremely limited. Since no element of arbitrariness has been established, this ground too must fail. 125. The petitioners’ have also made unsubstantiated allegations suggesting that the notifications were politically motivated. Apart from vague assertions, no specific instance of mala fides has been pleaded or established in the writ petitions. The argument that the final notifications resemble the recommendations of certain local representatives also holds no weight. 125. The petitioners’ have also made unsubstantiated allegations suggesting that the notifications were politically motivated. Apart from vague assertions, no specific instance of mala fides has been pleaded or established in the writ petitions. The argument that the final notifications resemble the recommendations of certain local representatives also holds no weight. Given that the process of delimitation possesses an inherent legislative character, the mere fact that public representatives offered suggestions or recommendations, does not ipso-facto render the decision invalid. 126. The observations made above finds support from the judgement passed by this Court in the case of Mod Singh and Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. reported in 1994 Supreme (Raj) 1014, wherein this Court has dealt with various similar issues, such as, nature of delimitation exercise, statutory procedural requirements, applicability of principle of natural justice, scope of interference by the Court etc, and held as under : “23. A careful perusal of these rules indicates that whenever the State Government proposes to take action u/S. 86 of the Act on its own motion, the Collector will be required to examine the proposals for including, excluding or transferring any such area and to send his report to the officer-in-charge of panchayats i.e. the Director, Gramin Vikas and Panchayati Raj. On receiving the report proposal of the Collector w/R. 342, the officer-in-charge of Panchayats is required to consider the same and send his recommendation in the matter to the State Government or such officer or authority to whom the powers of the State Government may have been delegated. If after considering the report of the Collector and the recommendation of the officer-in- charge of the panchayats, the State Government or its Delegatee proposes to include any area in a panchayat circle, exclude any area from the panchayat circle or transfer any area from one panchayat circle to another, it is required to issue a notice u/S. 86 (1) of the Act inviting objections to the proposed transfer, which term also includes the constitution, reconstitution and re-delimitation of a panchayat circle, of any area from one Panchayat Circle to another, inclusion of any area in a panchayat circle or exclusion of an area from a panchayat Circle. The objections are to be filed within a month from the date of the publication of such notice. The objections are to be filed within a month from the date of the publication of such notice. Copy of such notice issued u/S. 86 (1) of the Act is required to be pasted at a conspicuous place in each of the areas affected thereby and at the office of each Panchayats concerned and the panchayat Samiti concerned. After objections are filed in pursuance of the notice u/S. 86(1) of the Act, the State Government or its Delegatee is required to examine and consider the objections and authorised either to drop the proposal or confirm or vary the same. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the State Government or its Delegatee is not duty bound to accept either the proposal of the Collector or the recommendation of officer-in-charge of Panchayats or the draft proposal issued u/S. 86 (1) of the Act in to to even if no objection is filed. On the other hand, after considering the objections, if any, the State Government or its Delegatee is legally empowered either to drop the proposal notified u/S. 86 (1) or to confirm or vary the same. If the proposal notified u/S. 86 (1) is not dropped then the State Government shall issue a final notification, which should be published in the official gazette and such publication shall be conclusive evidence of such transfer, inclusion or exclusion of area, unless the same is subsequently cancelled or superseded. Therefore, if the final notification u/S. 86 (2) is subsequently cancelled or superseded only then the exercise u/s. 86 (1) of the Act r/w Rr. 342 to 345 of the Rules, 1961 has to be undertaken de novo and not otherwise. Therefore, I do not find any substance of force in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that since the petitioners/villagers were satisfied, with the draft proposal included in the draft notification issued u/S. 86(1) of the Act, they did not choose to file any objection and that thereafter the State Government or its Delegatee had no right to drop or vary the draft: proposal without affording them any opportunity of hearing anti without again issuing notification u/S. 86 (1) of the Act inviting objections for such a change. 24. 24. Now let us find out whether the establishment of a panchayat circle or merging a panchayat circle into another panchayat circle or inclusion of any area in a panchayat circle or exclusion of any area from a panchayat circle of transfer, which includes the constitution, re-constitution or re-delimitation of a panchayat circle, of any area from one panchayat circle to another, is a mere administrative act of the State or is a function of legislative character and whether for such an exercise, principles of natural justice apply? 25. The State Government under Sections 3 and 86 of the Act is competent and empowered to establish, constitute, reconstitute and delimit any panchayat circle and to include any area in a panchayat circle, exclude or transfer any area in a panchayat circle or from one panchayat circle to another after following the prescribed procedure. 26. In the Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd v. The Notified Arca Committee, Tulsipur ( AIR 1980 SC 882 ). the notification dated 22-5-1955 was challenged, whereby the area in which the sugar factory was situated, was declared as town area. Section 3 of the U. P. Town Area Act, 1914 made the provisions for declaration and definition of town areas. It was contended that Section 3 of the said Act by necessary implication imposed a duty on the State Government to follow the principles of natural justice. Their Lordships observed that the said contention was based on assumption that the duty imposed on the State Government was of the nature of administrative power in exercise of which the State Government should follow the principles of natural justice. Their Lordships then proceeded to examine the question as to what was the nature of function which was performed by the State Government u/S. 3, and declared in most unambiguous, clear and cogent terms that the power of the State Government to make a declaration to define a town area u/S. 3 of the said Act was in the nature of conditional legislation and that the rule of 'audi alteram partem' did not apply. 27. The Division Bench of this Court in Ms. 27. The Division Bench of this Court in Ms. J. K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Municipal Board, Nimbahera 1989 (2) RLR 589 , relying on the principle of law enunciated in Indian Express Newspaper (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 515 and Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhathija v. Collector, Thane, Maharashtra AIR 1990 SC 261 has held that the inclusion of a new area within a municipal area by the State Government is legislative in character and that in such a legislative process, principles of natural justice are not applicable. There is no provision of law or any case law to the effect that establishment, reconstitution, delimitation of a panchayat Circle, where the area included excluded or transferred is only an area of panchayat and not an area of Municipality, shall not be a function of the State legislative in character. In my considered opinion the exercise undertaken u/S. 3 and 86 of the Act r/w. Rules 342 to 345 of the Rules, 4961 amounts to a delegated legislation and principle of audi alteram partem cannot be pressed into service except to the extent provided under those provisions. Therefore, the petitioners cannot claim as a matter of right for an opportunity of hearing for all the final decisions taken by the State Government or State Delegatee in dropping the draft proposal issued u/S. 86(1) of the Act or in varying or altering the same…. 39. Therefore, when the State Government has not contravened any provisions of Rr. 342 to 345 of the Rules, 1961 and Sections 3. 86 and 87(2) of the Act, this Court cannot sit in appeal against the final decisions taken by the State Government/State Delegatees nor can it substitute its own finding as to whether which of the village area should be included in a particular panchayat circle or in which village the headquarter of a particular panchayat circle should be located or whether a particular panchayat circle, should be bifurcated into more than one panchayat circles or whether one panchayat circle should not be merged or converted into another panchayat circle and whether the name of a particular panchayat circle should be changed or not. 40. 40. From the perusal of the relevant record, I am of the considered opinion that the act of the respondents in issuing the impugned notifications has neither been unreasonable nor arbitrary nor discriminatory and those are not violative of Article 14. 41. After the repeal of the Act and coming into force of the Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, all the Panchayat circles established, constituted, reconstituted and re-delimited through impugned notification have become successor Panchayat Circles under the new Act. In exercise of the powers u/s. 119 and Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, the Election Commission has already been constituted and Panchayati Raj Rules, 1994 have also been enacted. The new wards and different panchayat circles have also been constituted and notified and the election of the Panchayat Raj are on the anvil, which are likely to be held in near future. 42. Hence for the reasons mentioned above, the impugned notifications dated 10-9-92 do not warrant any interference. The aforementioned writ petitions, therefore, deserve to be and are hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.” 127. It is also pertinent to note that the delimitation exercise was undertaken uniformly across the State, rather than in a selective or targeted manner. Hence, the claim of political motivation is without basis. Considering the totality of circumstances, none of the grounds raised in the writ petitions fall within the narrow ambit of judicial review permissible before this Court. Accordingly, the challenge given to the final delimitation notifications on such grounds is not sustainable in light of the conclusions recorded herein. 128. Counsel for the petitioners while challenging the notifications issued under Section 3 of the Act of 2009, where the rural area has been excluded from the Panchayat Circle and included in the Municipal area, has contended that the said action is against the spirit of the Article 243 of the Constitution of India. It is argued that Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution of India provides for functions of the Panchayat and Twelfth Schedule provides for functions of the Municipality. It is argued that Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution of India provides for functions of the Panchayat and Twelfth Schedule provides for functions of the Municipality. As per counsel for the petitioners, comparison of the same shows that factors provided in Eleventh Schedule are much wider than the functions of the Municipality as prescribed under Twelfth Schedule of the Constitution of India and by excluding the Gram Panchayat from the scope of the rural development and including the same in the Municipality, very spirit of Article 243 of the rural development would be curtailed. 129. Replying to the said contention, learned Advocate General has argued that same is absolutely misconceived. It is contended that if the said contention of the petitioners is accepted then, the Panchayat area would always remain as rural area and can, in no case, be upgraded to the urban area. It is further argued that inclusion of a rural area within an urban area is inherently an act aimed at promoting development; therefore, it cannot be concluded that such inclusion restricts or hinders rural development. 130. The argument so advanced on behalf of the petitioners is bereft of any substance and against the overall scheme of local self-governance as provided under the Constitution of India. Article 243Q of the Constitution of India, which provides for constitution of the Municipality, which also includes transition from rural area to urban area. The statutory provisions provided under the Act of 1994 as well as Act of 2009 also provide for exclusion of Panchayat area for its corresponding inclusion in the Municipal area. The validity / vires of the said provisions and the power to merge the rural area into municipal area are not challenged by the petitioners and in absence thereof, mere a challenge given to the notifications on such ground while exercising the said powers, is not tenable in the eye of law. 131. Counsel for the petitioner, while referring to Article 243Q of the Constitution of India, has argued that the action of respondents in issuing the notification and directly including rural area in the urban area, without first declaring the same as transitional area, is against the mandate of Article 243Q. 131. Counsel for the petitioner, while referring to Article 243Q of the Constitution of India, has argued that the action of respondents in issuing the notification and directly including rural area in the urban area, without first declaring the same as transitional area, is against the mandate of Article 243Q. It is contended that Article 243Q provides for “transitional area’ which is a stage prior to the inclusion of rural area into Municipal area and therefore, notifications issued directly to include a rural area into municipal area is against the Constitutional mandate. 132. A holistic reading of Article 243Q of the Constitution of India makes it evident that clause (1) delineates three distinct and independent categories of Municipalities, and there is no constitutional mandate requiring the declaration or formation of a transitional area as a prerequisite for incorporating a rural area into an urban area. In other words, under the constitutional framework, the declaration of a “transitional area” is not a mandatory condition precedent for including a rural area within an urban area. The intent of the framers of the Constitution is clearly reflected in clause (2) of Article 243Q, wherein the use of the term “may” indicates that the Governor, at his discretion and upon consideration of relevant factors, may constitute any area as a Municipality. Furthermore, neither the provisions of the Act of 2009 nor those of the Act of 1994 prescribe that a rural area must first be declared a transitional area or Nagar Panchayat before being included within an urban area. 133. Our view also get support from the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of " State of Rajasthan vs. Ashok Khetoliya " reported in 2022 (12) SCC 185 , wherein it was observed in Para Nos. 16, 17 & 19 as under :- "16. Since the local Government falls in Entry 5 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, therefore, it is the State Legislature alone which is competent to legislate in respect of the Municipalities with only one limitation that the provisions of the State Act cannot be inconsistent with the mandate of the scheme of Part IX-A of the Constitution. The scheme of Part IX-A of the Municipalities Act does not contemplate a separate notification under Article 243-Q of the Constitution and thereafter under Section 5 of the Municipalities Act. The scheme of Part IX-A of the Municipalities Act does not contemplate a separate notification under Article 243-Q of the Constitution and thereafter under Section 5 of the Municipalities Act. As Section 5 of the Municipalities Act is not inconsistent with any provisions of Article 243-Q of the Constitution, therefore, two notifications are not contemplated or warranted under the scheme of Part IX-A or the Municipalities Act as reproduced in the table above. 17. The State Government is competent to divide the Municipalities in the State into classes according to their income or other factors like population or importance of the local area and other circumstances as provided under Section 329 of the Municipalities Act. In terms of Section 329, a Notification was issued on 30-4-2012 determining the category of the Municipal Corporation/Municipal Council/Municipal Board. The said notification reads as under ......... 19. The above notifications would show that the State Government had exercised powers to establish Municipality in terms of Section 5 of the Municipalities Act. Such notifications cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary in any manner and were rightly issued in exercise of the statutory powers conferred on the State by the legislature." 134. Similar view has been taken by the learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8177/2025 (Pankaj Panwar vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.) decided on 06.05.2025 , wherein it is held as under :- “9. Clause 2 to Article 243Q of the Constitution of India provides that the Governor of the State shall decide what shall constitute a transitional area or a smaller urban area or a larger urban area. Itis also provided under Clause 2 that while taking a decision with respect to any such area the Governor shall have due regard to(i) population of the area, (ii) density of the population,(iii) revenue generated for local administration, (iv) percentage of employment in non-agricultural activities, (v) economic importance or (vi) such other factors as he may deem fit. Quite clearly, it is not only the population of the area which shall be the determinative factor rather there shall be host of other factors that the Governor shall take into consideration before making a declaration under Clause 2 to Article 243Q of the Constitution of India. Quite clearly, it is not only the population of the area which shall be the determinative factor rather there shall be host of other factors that the Governor shall take into consideration before making a declaration under Clause 2 to Article 243Q of the Constitution of India. We would also refer to section 3 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 which provides that the State Government may, by notification published in the Official Gazette, declare any local area not included within the limits of a Municipality to be a Municipality, or include any such area in a Municipality, or exclude any local area from a Municipality, or otherwise alter the limits of any Municipality. It is provided that the provisions under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act shall have over-riding effect notwithstanding any provision contained thereunder or in the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 or any other law for the time being in force. We may also refer to section 101 which provides that the State Government may at any time after one month’s notice published in the prescribed manner either on its own emotion or at the request made in this behalf and by a notification published in the Official Gazette (a) declare the whole or a part of any local area included within the limits of a Municipality to be a panchayat circle or (b) include in a panchayat circle and such local area or a part thereof, or as the case may be, any local area included within the limits of another panchayat circle or (c) otherwise alter the limits of a panchayat circle by amalgamating one panchayat circle into another or by splitting up a panchayat circle into two or more panchayat circles. In “Parmar Samantsinh Umedsinh v. State of Gujarat & Ors.” (2022) 15 SCC 364 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the power of the State Legislature in the light of enabling provisions in the Constitution with regard to framing of laws cannot be whittled down by way of restrictive interpretation. The Supreme Court further observed that the power of the State to legislate within its legislative competence is plenary and the same cannot be curtailed in the absence of an express limitation placed on such power in the Constitution.” 135. The Supreme Court further observed that the power of the State to legislate within its legislative competence is plenary and the same cannot be curtailed in the absence of an express limitation placed on such power in the Constitution.” 135. The import of the aforementioned judgment is clear: under the statutory framework, the State Government possesses plenary powers to issue notifications for the inclusion or exclusion of any area within a Panchayat or Municipality. The State is the repository of these legislative powers, and once the State Government, in the exercise of such powers and after considering the factors specified in Article 243Q of the Constitution, issues a notification, it is not open for interference by this Court. Consequently, this ground of challenge, being inconsistent with the constitutional and statutory scheme, fails. 136. Counsel for the petitioners also argued that the impugned notifications are not sustainable as no prior consultation of the State Election Commission was done before issuing the same. Counsel for the petitioners contended that as per Articles 243K and 243ZA of the Constitution of India, the superintendence, directions and control of the respective Panchayat and Municipal elections is vested in the State Election Commission and therefore, in the matters of delimitation, prior consultation with the State Election Commission is mandatory. 137. A bare reading of the Article 243K & 243ZA provides that superintendence, direction and control of the State Election Commission is provided in preparation of electoral rolls and conduct of elections of the Panchayat / Municipality. The process of delimitation constitutes a distinct legislative function and Article 243ZA of the Constitution of India does not expressly assign any role to the State Election Commission in that regard. Therefore, in the absence of any specific provision conferring such a role, it cannot be contended that prior consultation with the State Election Commission is mandatory and non-adherence of the same would vitiate the notifications impugned. Therefore, challenge given to the notifications on the wholly baseless and misconceived. 138. Therefore, in the absence of any specific provision conferring such a role, it cannot be contended that prior consultation with the State Election Commission is mandatory and non-adherence of the same would vitiate the notifications impugned. Therefore, challenge given to the notifications on the wholly baseless and misconceived. 138. In some of the cases the notifications issued under Section 3 of the Act of 2009, for inclusion of some rural area into Municipality has been challenged on the ground that the said inclusion has been done merely while exercising powers under Section 3 of the Act of 2009, without undertaking the procedure as prescribed under Section 101 of the Act of 1994 and no corresponding notification under Section 101 is issued for excluding the Panchayat area. The counsel argued that in view of over-riding effect of provisions of Act of 1994, before taking any action for inclusion / exclusion of panchayat area the procedure prescribed under section 101 is mandatory to be followed. It is further stated that non-adherence of procedure as prescribed under section 101 has deprived the petitioner from there participative rights. 139. The contention so raised by the petitioners was vehemently opposed objected by the learned Advocate General. It is though admitted that Section 101 of the Act of 1994 provides for the powers and procedure for alteration in the limits of Panchayati Raj Institution and Section 101(7) of the Act of 1994 provides overriding effect to the provisions of the Act of 1994 over all other statues. However, in cases where under Section 3 of the Act of 2009, a rural area is proposed to be included for constitution of Municipality, the Section 101 of the Act of 1994 will not be applicable and the same can be done only by issuance of notification under Section 3 of the Act of 2009. It is contended that Section (10) of Section 3 of the Act of 2009 clearly provides that "the provisions of Section 3 shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Act of 2009 or in Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 or any other law for the time being in force." Learned Advocate General submitted that the Municipality Act, 2009 being a subsequent legislation, the overriding effect as provided under section 39(10) would prevail over the overriding effect as provided under the Act of 1994. 140. 140. In support of said contention, learned Advocate General relied upon a recent judgment passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court at Principal Seat, Jodhpur in the case of " Motan Das vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors." (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 20142/2024) and other connected writ petitions decided on 28.02.2025 . The relevant paras of the said judgment are quoted below :- "16. This Court further observes that the legality of the impugned notifications and the scope of non-interference in the instant case, depends upon the compliance with provisions of the Act of 1994and the Act of 2009. 16.1. The relevant provisions in the present case are Section 3 of the Act of 2009 and Section 101 of the Act of 1994, which are reproduced as hereunder: “3. Delimitation of Municipalities. - (1) The State Government may, by notification published in the Official Gazette, declare any local area not included within the limits of a Municipality to be a Municipality, or include any such area in a Municipality, or exclude any local area from a Municipality, or otherwise alter the limits of any Municipality and when (a) any local area is declared as, or included in, a Municipality, or (b)any local area is excluded from a Municipality, or (c) the limits of a Municipality are otherwise altered, by amalgamation of one Municipality into another or by splitting up a Municipality into two or more Municipalities... (10) Save as otherwise provided in this Section its provisions shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in this Actor in the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (Act No.13 of1994) or any other law for the time being in force.” “101. (10) Save as otherwise provided in this Section its provisions shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in this Actor in the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (Act No.13 of1994) or any other law for the time being in force.” “101. Alteration in the limits of a Panchayati Raj Institution.- (1) The State Government may, at any time, after one month's notice published in the prescribed manner either on its own motion or at the request made in this behalf, and by notification in the Official Gazette- (a) declare the whole or apart of any local area included within the limits of a Municipality to be a Panchayat Circle; or (b) include in a Panchayat Circle and such local area or a part thereof, or as the case may be,any local area included within the limits of another Panchayat Circle; or (c) otherwise alter the limits of a Panchayat Circle by amalgamating one Panchayat Circle into another or by splitting up a Panchayat Circle into two or more Panchayat Circles; ... (7) Save as otherwise provided in this section its provisions shall have effect, notwithstanding anything contained in this Actor the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (Rajasthan Act 38 of1959) or any other law for the time being in force.” 17. This Court observes that, the bone of the contention in the instant case, lies in the applicability of the Act of 1994 and the Act of 2009. The relevant provisions in the present case are Section 3of the Act of 2009 and Section 101 of the Act of 1994. Section 3 does not expressly provide for any requirement vis-a-vis notice, however, Section 101 presents the requirement of one month’s notice. 17.1. This Court further observes that both these provisions which expound different requisites contain non obstante clauses respectively, which ousts the applicability of the other Statute and corresponding relevant provisions within it. Therefore, for resolving the controversy at hand, it becomes pertinent to first answer the question as to which out of the two provisions will prevail if both of them have a non obstante clause. 17.2. Therefore, for resolving the controversy at hand, it becomes pertinent to first answer the question as to which out of the two provisions will prevail if both of them have a non obstante clause. 17.2. This Court in this regard, observes that as per the judgment rendered in the case of Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited (supra),the position of law is that, when two enactments have competing non obstante provisions and nothing repugnant, then the non obstante clause of the subsequent statute would prevail over the earlier enactments and therefore the non obstante clause in the Act of 2009 would prevail over the non obstante clause in the Act of 1994. 17.3. This Court therefore observes that, in such a scenario Section 3 of the Act of 2009 would prevail over Section 101 of the Act of 1994, and in such a case, the requirement of one month notice as enshrined under Section 101 is not necessary to be complied with." 141. In our considered opinion the issue raised by the petitioners regarding non-compliance of Section 101 of the Act of 1994 is completely answered in the judgment passed in the case of Motan Das (supra) and therefore, the said the ground of challenge to the final notifications in questions is also not tenable in the eye of law. 142. In some of the writ petitions, challenge has been given to the notifications issued for inclusion or exclusion of areas through delimitation, falling within the TSP area . Counsel for the petitioners stated that the Tribal Sub-Plan area is an area of special significance in the Constitution of India and the same is governed under Fifth Schedule of the Constitution of India. Counsel for the petitioners have also referred to the provisions of the Panchayat (Extension of Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as "PESA Act") and stated that the said Act clearly mandates the participation and consultation with the Gram Sabha in every decision relating to the TSP area. Counsel for the petitioners stated that while issuing the final notifications of delimitation, no consultation has been done with the Gram Sabha and therefore, delimitation notifications regarding such areas are against the mandate of Fifth Schedule as well as provisions of the PESA Act. 143. Counsel for the petitioners stated that while issuing the final notifications of delimitation, no consultation has been done with the Gram Sabha and therefore, delimitation notifications regarding such areas are against the mandate of Fifth Schedule as well as provisions of the PESA Act. 143. Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court at Jodhpur in the case of "Bhanwar Lal Mundra & Ors. V/s The State of Rajasthan & ors." (D. B. Civil Writ Petition No.10491/2009) decided on 13.05.2015 144. Replying to the said contention, learned Advocate General has stated that neither the constitutional provisions pertaining to the scheduled area nor the provisions of the PESA Act anywhere provide for participation of the Gram Sabha in the matters of delimitation, which are having the legislative character. Learned Advocate General has referred to Section 4 of the PESA Act, which reads as under :- " 4. Exceptions and modifications to Part IX of the Constitution. Learned Advocate General has referred to Section 4 of the PESA Act, which reads as under :- " 4. Exceptions and modifications to Part IX of the Constitution. — Notwithstanding anything contained under Part IX of the Constitution, the Legislature of a State shall not make any law under that Part which is inconsistent with any of the following features, namely:— (a) a State legislation on the Panchayats that may be made shall be in consonance with the customary law, social and religious practices and traditional management practices of community resources; (b) a village shall ordinarily consist of a habitation or a group of habitations or a hamlet or a group of hamlets comprising a community and managing its affairs in accordance with traditions and customs; (c) every village shall have a Gram Sabha consisting of persons whose names are included in the electoral rolls for the Panchayat at the village level; (d) every Gram Sabha shall be competent to safeguard and preserve the traditions and customs of the people, their cultural identity, community resources and the customary mode of dispute resolution; (e) every Gram Sabha shall— (i) approve the plans, programmes and projects for social and economic development before such plans, programmes and projects are taken up for implementation by the Panchayat at the village level; (ii) be responsible for the identification or selection of persons as beneficiaries under the poverty alleviation and other programmes; (f) every Panchayat at the village level shall be required to obtain from the Gram Sabha a certification of utilisation of funds by that Panchayat for the plans, programmes and projects referred to in clause(e); (g) the reservation of seats in the Scheduled Areas at every Panchayat shall be in proportion to the population of the communities in that Panchayat for whom reservation is sought to be given under Part IX of the Constitution: Provided that the reservation for the Scheduled Tribes shall not be less than one-half of the total number of seats: Provided further that all seats of Chairpersons of Panchayats at all levels shall be reserved for the Scheduled Tribes; (h) the State Government may nominate persons belonging to such Scheduled Tribes as have no representation in the Panchayat at the intermediate level or the Panchayat at the district level: Provided that such nomination shall not exceed one-tenth of the total members to be elected in that Panchayat; (i) the Gram Sabha or the Panchayats at the appropriate level shall be consulted before making the acquisition of land in the Scheduled Areas for development projects and before re-settling or rehabilitating persons affected by such projects in the Scheduled Areas; the actual planning and implementation of the projects in the Scheduled Areas shall be coordinated at the State level; (j) planning and management of minor water bodies in the Scheduled Areas shall be entrusted to Panchayats at the appropriate level; (k) the recommendations of the Gram Sabha or the Panchayats at the appropriate level shall be made mandatory prior to grant of prospecting licence or mining lease for minor minerals in the Scheduled Areas; (l) the prior recommendation of the Gram Sabha or the Panchayats at the appropriate level shall be made mandatory for grant of concession for the exploitation of minor minerals by auction; (m) while endowing Panchayats in the Scheduled Areas with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self- government, a State Legislature shall ensure that the Panchayats at the appropriate level and the Gram Sabha are endowed specifically with— (i) the power to enforce prohibition or to regulate or restrict the sale and consumption of any intoxicant; (ii) the ownership of minor forest produce; (iii) the power to prevent alienation of land in the Scheduled Areas and to take appropriate action to restore any unlawfully alienated land of a Scheduled Tribe; (iv) the power to manage village markets by whatever name called; (v) the power to exercise control over money lending to the Scheduled Tribes; (vi) the power to exercise control over institutions and functionaries in all social sectors; (vii) the power to control over local plans and resources for such plans including tribal sub-plans; (n) the State legislations that may endow Panchayats with powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self-government shall contain safeguards to ensure that Panchayats at the higher level do not assume the powers and authority of any Panchayat at the lower level or of the Gram Sabha; (o) the State Legislature shall endeavour to follow the pattern of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution while designing the administrative arrangements in the Panchayats at district levels in the Scheduled Areas." 145. After analysing the said contention and giving thoughtful consideration to the provisions of the PESA Act, it is clear that the participation of the Gram Sabha is mandated only for the functions as prescribed under Section 4 of the PESA Act, which deals with the resettlement, rehabilitation or development of the TSP area. In absence of any specific statutory requirement prescribed under the Constitution of India or the PESA Act, it cannot be held that the prior consultation of the Gram Sabha for the purpose of delimitation, TSP Area is mandatory. The judgments relied upon by the petitioners in Bhanwar Lal Mundra (supra) and other judgments are not related to the issue so raised, therefore, the same are not applicable in the facts of the present case. Hence, the challenge given by the petitioners to the delimitation notifications on such grounds fails. 146. In some of the writ petitions, the petitioners have challenged the final notifications on the ground that on earlier occasion, some part of the Panchayat area has been included, whereas, while issuing the notifications impugned, the said notifications were withdrawn or the rural area is again excluded from the Municipality. Counsels for the petitioners contended that said exercise clearly shows arbitrary exercise of the powers by the State authorities and the same cannot be allowed to be sustained. 147. Learned Advocate General while responding to the said challenge, has reiterated the submission regarding scope of interference of this Court in such matters. It is contended that once the State Government after thoughtful consideration of, overall factors has taken a conscious decision, the same cannot be interfered with by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reliance has been placed upon a recent judgment passed by the learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of Pankaj Panwar (supra). The relevant part of the judgment is quoted below : “3. According to the petitioners, the Sub-divisional Officer at Raniwada started the process for creating 20 wards in the erstwhile Gram Panchayat Raniwada and for that purpose a notice inviting objection was published on 27th March 2025. The petitioners have produced on record the copies of notifications pertaining to Gram Panchayats Jhakhal and Dundlod both dated02nd September 2024 to demonstrate that similar exercises were undertaken in other Gram Panchayats. The petitioners have produced on record the copies of notifications pertaining to Gram Panchayats Jhakhal and Dundlod both dated02nd September 2024 to demonstrate that similar exercises were undertaken in other Gram Panchayats. However, the said process was abruptly halted because the Government Notification dated 26th March 2025 came to be issued and thereby the previous Notification dated 20th May 2022 was withdrawn. Criticizing the Government action in withdrawing the Notification dated 20th May 2022, the petitioners have pleaded that the Gram Panchayats with lesser population such as the Gram Panchayat Jhakhal and Gram Panchayat Dundlod are left untouched whereas a decision in respect of the Gram Panchayat Raniwada has been taken in the most arbitrary manner to reverse the declaration made under the Government Notification dated 20th May 2022 that the said Gram Panchayat shall constitute a Municipal Council. 5. Mr. S.P. Sharma, the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that creation of a Nagar Panchayat or a Municipal Councilor a Municipal Corporation is not a 2- way process inasmuch as once a decision is taken to create a Municipal Council for a smaller urban area or a Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area, the said decision cannot be reversed and the newly constituted Nagar Panchayat has to be restored to its original position. 10. The impugned Notification clearly mentions that the same has been issued under the authority of the Governor of Rajasthan. The Notification dated 20th May 2022 was also issued under the authority of the Governor of Rajasthan. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act provides that a power to make rules includes a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions, if any, to add, to amend, to vary or rescind any rules so made. In “Rasid Javed & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.” (2010) 7 SCC 781 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the authority which has power to issue a notification has undoubted power to rescind or modify it in the like manner. In paragraph no. (1) of the reported judgment in “Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited& Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.” (2011) 3 SCC 193 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:- “41. In paragraph no. (1) of the reported judgment in “Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited& Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.” (2011) 3 SCC 193 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:- “41. By virtue of Sections 14 and 21 of the General Clauses Act, when a power is conferred on an authority to do a particular act, such power can be exercised from time to time and carries with it the power to withdraw, modify, amend or cancel the notifications earlier issued, to be exercised in the like manner and subject to like conditions, if any, attached with the exercise of the power. It would be too narrow a view to accept that chargeability once fixed cannot be altered. Since the charging provision in the Electricity (Supply)Act, 1948 is subject to the State Government's power to issue notification under Section 49 of the Act granting rebate, the State Government, in view of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, can always withdraw, rescind, add to or modify an exemption notification. No industry can claim as of right that the Government should exercise its power under Section 49 and offer rebate and itis for the Government to decide whether the conditions are such that rebate should be granted or not.” 11. In that view of the matter, we see no reason to interfere in this matter and, accordingly, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8177 of 2025 is dismissed.” In view of the judgment cited above, the said ground of challenge is also not sustainable. CONCLUSION 148. The conclusion emerges from the discussions made above, can be summed up as under :- i) The power of the Government in issuing delimitation notifications is in the nature of conditional legislation. ii) The scope of interference by the Constitutional Court in the matters of delimitation is limited to the scope of judicial review and the same can only be exercised in rarest of rare cases on establishment of proof of manifest arbitrariness or the decision being irreconcilable to the Constitutional values. iii) The guidelines issued along with the notices for delimitation are not statutory in nature and thus, are not enforceable in law. iii) The guidelines issued along with the notices for delimitation are not statutory in nature and thus, are not enforceable in law. iv) The final delimitation notifications once issued, cannot be interfered with merely on the ground of non-adherence of the guidelines relating to population / distance criteria alone, where the decision has been taken after holistic consideration of various factors as per the constitutional scheme. v) The writ petitions challenging the delimitation notifications cannot be dismissed merely on the ground of locus standi of the petitioners. vi) The authorities considering the objections / suggestions received in pursuance of the notices of delimitation, are not required to act as a judicial / quasi-judicial authority to decide each objections with reasoned order. vii) The principle of audi alteram partem is not applicable in the cases of delimitation. viii) In view of the discussions made above, with regard to different grounds raised by the petitioners in different writ petitions, as adjudicated above, no case for interference in the present bunch of writ petitions challenging the final notifications of delimitation issued under Section 3 of the Act of 2009 or under Section 101 of the Act of 1994, is made out. PART (B) – WRIT PETITIONS CHALLENGING PROCESS OF DELIMITATION INITIED IN PURSUANCE OF ONE MONTH’S NOTICE ISSUED UNDER SECTION 101 OF THE ACT OF 1994 149. In pursuance of conscious decision taken by the State Government to undertake the process of delimitation of the Panchayati Raj Institutions, the notifications dated 10.01.2025 as well as order dated 18.01.2025 were issued directing for issuing one month notice under Section 101 of the Act of 1994 for proposed delimitation. In pursuance of said notices, objections / suggestions have been submitted by various villagers. Upon the said objections / suggestions, reports were prepared by the concerned Sub-Divisional Officer and forwarded to the concerned District Collector. In some cases, the concerned District Collector has forwarded the record to the State Government for its consideration. 150. A large bunch of writ petitions was filed challenging the process so undertaken in pursuance of notification dated 10.01.2025 and also the proposals made in pursuance thereof. The challenge has been made on various common grounds including non-adherence of the guidelines issued along with the notice, alleged problems to be faced by the villagers, non- consideration of the objections submitted by the villagers or arbitrary exercise of powers on political considerations. 151. The challenge has been made on various common grounds including non-adherence of the guidelines issued along with the notice, alleged problems to be faced by the villagers, non- consideration of the objections submitted by the villagers or arbitrary exercise of powers on political considerations. 151. We have perused the record of all such writ petitions and found that the nature of the grounds raised in the writ petitions are of common nature apart from factual distinction of the respective cases. The issues / questions / ground of challenge involved in the said bunch of writ petitions are broadly summed-up and noted as infra. (i) After de-limitation / exclusion / inclusion of village(s), office of the proposed Gram Panchayat shall be more than 6 k.m. away from the villages. (ii) Two contiguous villages, which were part of existing gram panchayat have been included in newly proposed gram panchayat as there shall be no contiguity with the newly constituted gram panchayat or its constituent villages. (iii) The creation of new revenue villages is still in offing or subject matter of the writ petitions, in which interim orders have been passed or the notification of creation of revenue villages have been quashed, yet gram panchayat(s) has/have been proposed with inclusion of such villages. (iv) The population criteria given in the Guidelines dated 10.01.2025 is not met in the proposed gram panchayat. (v) The petitioners apprehend that there is likelihood that the Collector would agree to their proposal and send recommendation against the proposed gram panchayat yet the State Government would create such gram panchayat because of political vendetta or vested interest. (vi) Abolition of gram panchayat or its division in two gram panchayats is not permissible in the eye of law. (vii) A village having lesser population has been fixed as gram panchayat as against village with greater population. (viii) The headquarter of gram panchayat has been proposed in a village where sufficient land is not available for development of essential amenities. (ix) The headquarter of gram panchayat has been proposed in a village other than the one where sufficient development has taken place and government land is available for development of panchayat head office and other amenities, which is in defiance of the Guidelines dated 10.01.2025. 152. Record of the cases revealed that a bunch of writ petitions lead by S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8576/2025 (Dhanna Ram and Ors. Vs. 152. Record of the cases revealed that a bunch of writ petitions lead by S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8576/2025 (Dhanna Ram and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.) , the Single Bench of this Court at Principal Seat, Jodhpur has passed an interim order dated 23.05.2025 and issued directions. For ready reference, order dated 23.05.2025 is quoted below :- “2. It is informed by learned Advocate General that a three Members High Level Committee has been constituted by the State Government, which is supposed to examine the proposals sent by the respective Collectors and the proposal sent by the Collector is not final. 3. As per the Guidelines issued from time to time, the Collector is supposed to send the proposals after considering the objections raised by the residents /concerned persons. 4. All the petitioners claim to have submitted their objections. This Court has no reason to apprehend that the concerned Collectors shall not consider lawfully and objectively their objections before sending the proposals to the State Government. 5. The high-level Committee so constituted by the State Government has been assigned the task of considering the proposals so sent by the District Collectors. 6. List these cases on 07.07.2025, as jointly prayed. 7. Meanwhile, the competent high-level Committee of the State is directed to consider the objections qua all the writ petition spending here, list whereof shall be supplied to them by the office of Advocate General. While doing so, the Committee shall decide the proposals so sent by the Collectors in terms of the Guidelines dated 10.01.2025 and other guidelines issued from time to time so also the issues/questions, which this Court has highlighted hereinabove. 8. The State shall not notify the creation of gram panchayats until the adjudication made by the above referred Committee is placed for consideration of the Court.” 153. The said interim order dated 23.05.2025 has been challenged on behalf of the State Government in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.831/2025: State of Rajasthan & ors. Vs. Dhanna Ram and Ors. which will be dealt by us in the later part of the judgment. 154. While objecting the maintainability of the said writ petition, learned AG argued that the said writ petitions are liable to be dismissed solely on the ground that the same being premature. Learned Advocate General contended that the writ petitions are based upon misconceived apprehension. which will be dealt by us in the later part of the judgment. 154. While objecting the maintainability of the said writ petition, learned AG argued that the said writ petitions are liable to be dismissed solely on the ground that the same being premature. Learned Advocate General contended that the writ petitions are based upon misconceived apprehension. The basic ground of challenge in the writ petitions is in reference to the guidelines / instructions issued vide notification dated 10.01.2025, however the said guidelines are not statutory in nature and therefore having no enforceability under the law. Learned Advocate General also contended that no vested right of the petitioners are violated, hence, the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not maintainable. It is also stated that merely because objections have been filed by few of the villagers and the writ petitions are being filed by a few amongst them, cannot give rise to a presumption that the proposal of delimitation is against interest and sentiments of public at large. Learned Advocate General further stated that the procedure as provided under the provisions of Act of 1994 was duly followed and in view of the statement made before the learned Single Bench, all the proposals will be considered by a High Level Committee while keeping in mind the constitutional as well as statutory mandate. Learned Advocate General, thus, prayed for dismissal of the said bunch of writ petitions. 155. Learned Advocate General argued that, until the notification is issued, the delimitation process remains ongoing and no rights of any person are infringed; therefore, any challenge at this stage would be premature. It is contended that the scope of interference even in the cases, where final notification of delimitation is issued, is only limited to judicial review, however, entertaining the writ petition at this stage, where final notification is yet to be passed, would amount to preview of judicial review of a process in progress, which is not permissible in the eyes of law. It was further submitted that, since the delimitation process is akin to conditional legislation, entertaining such a writ petition prematurely could open a “Pandora’s box,” potentially allowing challenges to any legislation or bill that has been tabled but not yet enacted in the Legislature. 156. It was further submitted that, since the delimitation process is akin to conditional legislation, entertaining such a writ petition prematurely could open a “Pandora’s box,” potentially allowing challenges to any legislation or bill that has been tabled but not yet enacted in the Legislature. 156. We are in agreement with the objection so raised by the learned Advocate General as it has been consistently held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked prematurely, when the administrative process remains incomplete and no final order prejudicial to legal rights of any person is issued. Writ jurisdiction can only be invoked in the cases where any action has resulted in concrete and identifiable infringement / harm and not mere upon conjecture or apprehension of anticipated consequences. The law does not countenance anticipatory challenges to any administrative / legislative / judicial processes, which is still in motion. Intermediate steps in progression, do not constitute the crystallized decision warranting judicial scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution. Reliance can be placed on the case of Santosh Kumar Mallik v. State of Orissa reported in 2015 SCC OnLine Ori 75 , wherein several landmark judgments have been discussed in detail and has been held that court may dismiss a petition which appears to be at a premature stage and there exist no final action affecting the rights of the parties. The relevant para has been reproduced below: “7. The apex Court in Charan Singh v. Registrar, Co- operative Societies, Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 1821 , Dr. Sarana V. University of Lucknow, AIR 1976 SC 2428 , Chandra Shekhar v. State of Orissa, AIR 1972 SC 486 , Union of India v. A.N. Saxena, AIR 1992 SC 1233 held that the Supreme Court or a High Court may also dismiss the petition filed by the petitioner if it is filed at a premature stage and no final action adversely affecting the rights of the petitioner is taken. Ordinarily, a Court will confine its decision to the existing facts and will not enter into assumptions and inferences. If the petitioner approaches the Court at an earlier and premature stage, the Court may dismiss the petition on that ground alone without entering into the merits of the matter. 8. Ordinarily, a Court will confine its decision to the existing facts and will not enter into assumptions and inferences. If the petitioner approaches the Court at an earlier and premature stage, the Court may dismiss the petition on that ground alone without entering into the merits of the matter. 8. In Charan Singh (supra) the Managing Director of the Bank initiated departmental proceedings against the petitioner and issued a show cause notice. The petitioner challenged the legality of the proceedings by filing a petition. It was contended by the Bank that the petition was not maintainable since no final action had been taken against the petitioner. Upholding the contention, the Court observed that no punitive action had been taken against the petitioner. “It is difficult to state, apart from speculation, what the outcome of the proceedings will be”. 9. In Dr. Sarana (supra) the petitioner approached the High Court by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against the recommendation made by the Selection Committee in favour of one of the two candidates. It was not even scrutinized by the Executive Committee. It was for the Executive Committee either to accept the recommendation made by the Selection Committee or to reject it. Thus, the petition filed against such a recommendation was held to be premature.” 157. We have considered the rival contentions advanced at Bar and also perused the record of the cases. As a matter of fact, in all the said writ petitions the process of Delimitation is still underway and has not attained finality till now. The law is well settled that the writ petitions are not maintainable merely on the basis of apprehensions. Though, there is a clear constitutional bar of interference in the case of delimitation, the scope of interference is limited to the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The said power can only be exercised to check the procedural infirmity, if any, established in the decision making process and the same cannot be exercised at an intermediate stage. We are of the considered opinion that the writ petitions challenging the process of delimitation, where the final notification is not yet passed, are premature. 158. In large number of writ petitions, the ground of challenge is violation of the guidelines relating to distance criteria / population criteria. We are of the considered opinion that the writ petitions challenging the process of delimitation, where the final notification is not yet passed, are premature. 158. In large number of writ petitions, the ground of challenge is violation of the guidelines relating to distance criteria / population criteria. As held above, the guidelines so issued along with the notice under Section 101 of the Act of 1994 are not statutory in nature and only administrative instructions providing guiding principles for considering the proposals of delimitation by administrative authorities. Therefore, the challenge given in the present bunch of writ petitions on such grounds is not sustainable in the eye of law. 159. The other grounds raised in the writ petitions involve various disputed questions of fact, which cannot be decided under writ jurisdiction by this Court. Even as per the constitutional as well as statutory scheme, it is within the domain of the authorities to consider and decide the proposals of delimitation and this Court cannot shift its opinion in such matters. 160. During the course of arguments, learned Advocate General has maintained the stand of the State Government, as recorded in the Para 2 & 3 of the order dated 23.05.2025 that the proposals sent by the concerned District Collector will be considered by a High Level Committee constituted for that purpose. This Court cannot presume at this stage that the said proposals will not be considered by the Committee in an objective manner keeping in view of the constitutional mandate. In this view of matter, no interference of this Court at this stage, in said bunch of writ petitions is called for. 161. Arguing in relation to D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 831/2025 (State of Rajasthan & ors. Vs. Dhanna Ram & Ors.) as well as other Special Appeals, challenging the interim order dated 23.05.2025, learned Advocate General argued that the directions contained in para 7 and 8 of the said order dated 23.05.2025 amounts to transgressing the powers of judicial review of the legislative functions of the State Government. Learned Advocate General contended that learned Single Judge has failed to consider that the notices issued under Section 101 are only in the nature of intimation to the public at large; the representations submitted in pursuance thereof are in only in the form of suggestions and the proposals forwarded by the District Collector are recommendatory in nature. Learned Advocate General contended that learned Single Judge has failed to consider that the notices issued under Section 101 are only in the nature of intimation to the public at large; the representations submitted in pursuance thereof are in only in the form of suggestions and the proposals forwarded by the District Collector are recommendatory in nature. The directions contained in the order dated 23.05.2025, for adjudicating the objections and to place the decision before the High Court for scrutiny is against the constitutional and statutory scheme. Learned Advocate General further submitted that there is no provisions requiring for adjudication of objection submitted in pursuance of notice for delimitation, therefore, the directions contained in para 7 and 8 of the order dated 23.05.2025 are not sustainable. 162. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners have argued that as a matter of fact, the order dated 23.05.2025 has been passed with the consent of the learned Advocate General and therefore, such consent order cannot be allowed to be challenged. Learned counsels for the writ petitioners stated that order dated 23.05.2025 is required to be maintained as it is and writ petitioners will be satisfied, if the directions contained in the said order is allowed to be followed in its true letter and spirit. 163. We have considered the submissions made at bar and found that on bare reading of the order dated 23.05.2025, it is clear that the statement / consent of the learned Advocate General is recorded in para 2 and 3 of the said order and the same are limited to the extent that as per the guidelines, the Collector is supposed to send the proposals after considering the objections raised by the residents / concerned persons and a three Members High Level Committee has been constituted to examine the proposals so sent by the respective Collectors. There is no consent given on behalf of the learned Advocate General regarding the directions contained in para 7 and 8 of the said order and therefore, present special appeals to the extent of challenging the said directions are very much maintainable. 164. There is no consent given on behalf of the learned Advocate General regarding the directions contained in para 7 and 8 of the said order and therefore, present special appeals to the extent of challenging the said directions are very much maintainable. 164. We are of the considered opinion that once it is clearly stated before the learned Single Bench that the proposals sent by the District Collector are not final and even the learned Single Judge has recorded its finding in Para 4 of the said order that “This Court has no reason to apprehend that concerned Collectors shall not consider lawfully and objectively their objections before sending proposals to the State Government”, there was no justification available in issuing further directions as contained in para 7 and 8 of the order dated 23.05.2025. 165. As discussed in the earlier part of this Judgment, the process of delimitation is in the nature of conditional legislation and the authority undertaking the same i.e. three Members High Level Committee in the present case, is not supposed to act as a judicial or quasi-judicial authority. Similarly, the representations made by the villagers are only in the form of the suggestions and there is no statutory requirement to adjudicate the objections and decide each such objections with reasoned order. As held above, the recommendations made or decision taken by the committee are not amenable to writ jurisdiction except within the limited scope of judicial review. Therefore, the directions contained in para 7 and 8 of the order dated 23.05.2025 cannot be allowed to sustain. However, it is expected from the State Government to comply with the statement made before the learned Single Judge as recorded in Para 2 and 3 of the said order. 166. We have also considered D.B. Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No.9199/2025 (Sanwar Mal Choudhary & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.), wherein the petitioners have alleged that the District Collector, Sikar, while forwarding the final proposal to the State Government, failed to include the name of Reengus as a new Panchayat Samiti and confined the recommendation only to the reconstitution of Khandela Panchayat Samiti, thereby ignoring the proposal made by the Block Development Officer and the representations submitted by several Gram Panchayats. Per contra, learned Advocate General submitted that the delimitation exercise is undertaken strictly in accordance with law and after due consideration of all relevant factors. Per contra, learned Advocate General submitted that the delimitation exercise is undertaken strictly in accordance with law and after due consideration of all relevant factors. It was contended that the proposal for creation of Reengus Panchayat Samiti did not satisfy the criteria of population and administrative viability as per the prescribed norms, and therefore, was not recommended. It was further argued that the matter falls within the realm of administrative discretion, and unless malafide or manifest arbitrariness is shown, judicial interference is unwarranted. It is further argued that even otherwise, the process of consideration for reconstituting the Panchayat Samiti is still not finalized, therefore, no interference at this stage is called for. 167. As held above, the interference of this Court at this premature stage is not called for. The disputes as raised in the writ petition regarding adequacy and viability of creation of Reengus as a Panchayat Samiti cannot be decided by this Court. As directed above, all the pending proposals regarding delimitation shall be considered by the High Level Committee. PART (C) - WRIT PETITIONS CHALLENGING PROCESS OF DELIMITATION / ALTERATION OF WARD BOUNDARIES IN ABSENCE OF ANY CHANGE IN CENSUS DATA OR VARIATION IN THE NUMBER OF WARDS 168. The bunch of writ petitions led by S.B. Civil Writ petition No.8698/2025 (Sahdev Singh Bhati & Ors. V. State of Rajasthan & Ors.) was filed before this Court at Principal Seat, Jodhpur challenging the proposals relating to the reorganization of ward boundaries under the Act of 2009, where there had been no change in the census or number of wards. The matter was being heard by the learned Single Judge, and by way of an interim order dated 11.06.2025, the respondent - State was restrained and prohibited from proceeding any further in respect of the proposal or scheme formulated and communicated by the District Collector or the concerned Municipal Authorities for altering or reorganizing the territorial precincts of the wards and the corresponding number of voters enrolled therein. Aggrieved with the said interim order, the respondent - State has preferred special appeal being D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.1005/2025 (State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs Narayan Singh Solanki & Ors.) . Aggrieved with the said interim order, the respondent - State has preferred special appeal being D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.1005/2025 (State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs Narayan Singh Solanki & Ors.) . In light of the foregoing, this Court deems it appropriate and expedient to synchronously and concurrently entertain and adjudicate upon all the connected writ petitions along with the Special Appeal Writ so as to avoid contradictory decisions and to secure uniformity of judicial pronouncements in the matter. 169. Learned counsel for petitioners contend that, in absence of a fresh census enumeration, the figures derived from the 2011 Census alone are admissible and in absence of any change in the census, the initiation or undertaking of any delimitation regarding boundaries of the existing municipal wards is impermissible and constitutes a clear violation of Section 3 of the Act of 2009. 170. It is further contended that none of the contingencies enumerated in clauses (a) to (d) of Section 3(1) of the Act of 2009 have occurred, and therefore, the conditions precedent for invoking the provisions of Section 3(2) are not satisfied. Additionally, no statutory notification altering or changing the municipal boundaries has been issued by the competent authority. Consequently, any proposal, scheme, or initiative put forth by authorities to modify, alter, or re-determine the territorial composition and boundaries of the wards is patently arbitrary, lacks statutory sanction, and is devoid of legal foundation. 171. Learned counsel for petitioners also contend that pursuant to the mandate contained in Section 6 of the Act of 2009, the total number of wards to be constituted within a municipality must be ascertained and determined exclusively on the basis of the population data as recorded in the latest Census. Additionally, learned counsel submitted that in a case involving an almost identical factual matrix, the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in Rajesh Kumar Sharma v. State of Punjab, 2023 SCC OnLine P&H 7307 , had elaborately considered the legal position and quashed the delimitation exercise undertaken by the respondents therein, having found the same contrary to Rule 4 of the Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972, applicable in the State of Punjab, which is pari materia to statutes of the Act of 2009. 172. 172. Learned Advocate General relied upon the note sheet (Annx- R/3) at page 178, which records that the entire issue was considered and a decision was taken to alter the territorial boundaries of the wards. It was stated that, after following Sections 6, 9, and 10, Section 3 was not relevant in the present case. The note further clarifies that the eventualities spelled out in Sections 3 and 6 are set out in the Act as guiding principles, but there is no prohibition against changing boundaries from time to time . Therefore, the boundaries of the wards were altered in the exercise of administrative power. 173. Learned Advocate General further submitted that in cases where there is no fresh Census or alteration of boundaries, Section 3 of the Act of 2009 has no bearing on the delimitation of constituencies. While Section 6(2) makes the fresh determination of constituencies (wards) mandatory, Section 6(1) authorizes the fixation of the number of seats from time to time by notification in the Official Gazette. Section 6(1) is subject to Section 6(2) in the sense that, irrespective of any prior fixation, if a fresh Census has been undertaken, refixation of seats must be carried out mandatorily. Therefore contending that the reading Sections 3, 6, 9, and 10 together demonstrates that the Government possesses the power to change boundaries without any statutory prohibition or restriction. 174. The preliminary objection raised by the respondent - State, contending that the writ petition is premature as it challenges a mere notification without any consequential adverse action, is devoid of merit. It is a settled principle that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution can be invoked not only upon actual infringement of a right but also where there exists a clear violation of the statutory provisions. This Court, upon due consideration of the issue involved, finds persuasive merit in the reasoning adopted by the learned Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Rajesh Kumar Sharma (supra), which elaborately examined an almost identical factual and legal situation. The principles laid down therein, holding that a delimitation exercise undertaken in contravention of the governing statutory provisions cannot be sustained. In view of the similarity of facts and the sound reasoning adopted in the said decision, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present writ petition is maintainable. The principles laid down therein, holding that a delimitation exercise undertaken in contravention of the governing statutory provisions cannot be sustained. In view of the similarity of facts and the sound reasoning adopted in the said decision, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present writ petition is maintainable. The relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference: “15. The challenge in the present writ petition is to the delimitation process on the ground of colourable exercise of power and arbitrariness by the authorities as the mandate of Rule 4 of the Rules of 1972 is completely throttled in the impugned delimitation exercise. Neither there is any alteration in the municipal limits nor there is any increase in the population. As such, the entire exercise is a nullity and suffers from incurable defect. The respondents have completely departed from the procedure prescribed under the Rules of 1972 by creating tailor-made wards only suitable to a few to ensure their success in elections, which has resulted in disturbing the level playing field to give undue advantage to a select few. ... 18. The delimitation of the wards is provided under Rule 4(ii). The delimitation can only be done; (a) if the municipal limits are altered; (b) if there is an increase in the population of the Municipality; (c) if there is an abnormal variation of population or voting figures in some of the wards, which require such re-adjustment. Admittedly, there is no alteration in the Municipal limits and perusal of the record indicates that there is no increase in the population in the subsequent impugned delimitation. The number of wards as well as the total population remains the same, as discussed in detail in preceding paragraph No. 15. Thus, the non-compliance of the Rule 4 is writ large. “ 175. The reliance placed by learned Advocate General on the judgment in Dule Singh Vs. State of Raj. reported in 2019 SCC OnLine Raj 3209 does not withstand since a careful reading of the Act of 2009 and the Act of 1994 reveals that the provisions of Sections 3 and 6 of the Act of 2009 clearly make the process of delimitation contingent upon the population figures as recorded in the relevant census, whereas Sections 12, 13, and 14 of the Act of 1994 contain no such reference or dependence on census data. 176. 176. In this context, the interpretation put forth by the learned Advocate General with respect to the scope and operation of Sections 3 ,6, 9 ,10 of the Act of 2009 is found to be wholly misconceived. This Court finds no support of the arguments advanced by the learned Advocate General for such interpretation, which runs contrary to the expressed language and legislative intent underlying the Act. 177. The statutory framework under the Act of 2009, particularly Sections 3 and 6(2), makes it manifest that any redetermination of wards or reservation of seats must be based upon the population figures ascertained in the last concluded census. In absence of a fresh census or any variation contemplated under clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 3, no alteration in the territorial limits or number of wards could lawfully be undertaken. Mere use of words “time to time” does not give unbridled power to the State Government to change the boundaries of the Municipal wards at any point of time without there being any change in census or change in the number of wards or change in the territorial boundaries of the Municipality concerned. The exercise in question, therefore, appears to travel beyond the boundaries of statutory competence. Accordingly, this Court is not inclined to uphold the legality of the procedure so adopted by the authorities, as the same appears to have been undertaken in deviation from and in disregard of the mandatory provisions contained in the Act of 2009. PART (D) - WRIT PETITIONS CHALLENGING REMOVAL OF PANCHAYAT SAMITI MEMBERS / PRADHAN ON THE GROUND THAT THEIR RESPECTIVE ELECTORAL WARD IS INCLUDED WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF A MUNICIPALITY. 178. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that even if a person becomes disqualified on account of a ward being shifted from a Panchayat Samiti to a Municipality, he would nevertheless continue to hold the office of Pradhan, as the election of a Pradhan does not pertain solely to a single village or area that may subsequently fall within a Municipality due to delimitation, but represents all the Gram Panchayats within the concerned Panchayat Samiti. Therefore, the petitioners cannot be removed from the post of Pradhan merely because the village from which they were elected as a members, now stands dissolved. Therefore, the petitioners cannot be removed from the post of Pradhan merely because the village from which they were elected as a members, now stands dissolved. Reliance was placed upon Sections 2(8), 8, 17, 30, and 38 of the Act of 1994 to contend that a person elected as Pradhan continues to discharge his duties for a full term of five years. 179. Learned Advocate General argued that Section 101(5A) provides that the provisions relating to certain principles shall be applied mutatis mutandis to the Panchayats; therefore, reference to the definition of “members” in this context is not justified, as membership ceases automatically by operation of law. Section 30 contains a non obstante clause under the Act and hence, the tenure of office is not dependent solely upon the tenure of the Panchayati Raj Institution. Section 36(5) further provides that a Pradhan must vacate office if he ceases to be a member of the Panchayati Raj Institution. 180. With regard to the consequential removal of a Pradhan due to the inclusion of a rural area into another urban local body, learned Advocate General relied upon the provisions of Section 3(8) of the Act of 2009, and Sections 101(1)(d),101(2)(d) read with Section 101(5A), as well as Sections 30 and 36(5) of the Act of 1994. He also placed reliance on judgment passed in the case of Ram Prasad vs. State of Rajasthan and Lal Chand Asopa vs. State of Rajasthan (S.B. CWP No. 4993/2025) 181. Having considered the submissions of the parties and the relevant statutory provisions, this Court finds that the contention raised by the petitioners lacks merit. The petitioners’ argument that the office of Pradhan continues for a full term despite the ward or area from which he was originally elected being transferred from the Panchayat Samiti to a Municipality, is untenable. 182. The statutory provisions of the Act of 1994 relevant for the adjudication of the instant dispute are reproduced hereunder: “ 30. Term of office of Members, Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson.- Except as otherwise provided in this Act- (a) the Members and the Chairpersons of a Panchayati Raj Institution shall hold office during the term of the concerned Panchayati Raj Institution; and (b) the Deputy Chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution shall hold office as long as he continues to be a member of the concerned Panchayati Raj Institution. 36. 36. Resignation of Sarpanch, Up-Sarpanch, Panch, Pradhan, Up-Pradhan,Pramukh, Up-Pramukh and Members of Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad.- (1) The Sarpanch, Up-Sarpanch or Panch may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Vikas Adhikari. (2) A member holding office as Pradhan of the Panchayat Samiti may resign his office at any time by writing under his hand addressed to the Pramukh, Zila Parishad and the Up-Pradhan or a member of a Panchayat Samiti may resign his office at any time by writing under his hand addressed to the Pradhan, Panchayat Samiti. (3) The Pramukh may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Divisional Commissioner, and the Up-Pramukh or a member, Zila Parishad may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Pramukh. (4) Every resignation under Sub-secs. (1), (2) and (3) shall take effect on the expiry of fifteen days from the date of its receipt by the authority aforesaid unless withdrawn within this period of fifteen days. (5) Every Up-Sarpanch, Pradhan, Up-Pradhan, Pramukh and Up-Pramukh shall vacate the office if he ceases to be a member of Panchayat or, as the case may be, a Panchayat Samiti or a Zila Parishad. 183. The said provisions are required to be read along with Section 3 of the Act of 2009, relevant part of which is quoted below : “3. Delimitation of Municipalities. - (1) ... ... ... (2) ... ... ... (3) ... ... ... (4) ... ... ... (5) ... ... ... (6) ... ... ... (7) ... ... ... 183. The said provisions are required to be read along with Section 3 of the Act of 2009, relevant part of which is quoted below : “3. Delimitation of Municipalities. - (1) ... ... ... (2) ... ... ... (3) ... ... ... (4) ... ... ... (5) ... ... ... (6) ... ... ... (7) ... ... ... (8) When an area comprised in a village is specified as, or when any area is excluded from the village and included in, a municipal area, then with effect from the date on which such area is so specified or is so included, the following consequences shall ensue, namely: - (a) such area shall cease to be a village; (b) the Municipality in which such area is included or the Municipality declared for such area shall exercise jurisdiction over such area and the panchayat established for such area shall cease to function therein; (c) until elections are held under sub-Section (1) or the term of the Municipality expires under this Act, whichever is earlier, the Sarpanch, Up-Sarpanch and the panch or panchas representing the area of the village so included in, or declared as a Municipality shall be deemed to be the additional members of the Municipality in which such area of the village is included or the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson and the members respectively of the Municipality declared for such area, as the case may be; (d) the whole of the assets vesting in, and of the liabilities subsisting against, the panchayat so declared to be a Municipality or in case where only a part or whole of a village is so included in a Municipality, such portion of the said assets and liabilities as the State Government may direct, shall devolve upon the Municipality declared for such area or upon the Municipality in which such area of the village is so included; (e) the Municipality so established by the inclusion of any area of a village therein or by the declaration of a village as a Municipality, shall levy or continue to levy such of the taxes as are lawfully imposed under this Act; (f) any such area shall cease to be subject to all rules, notifications, orders and bye-laws made under the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (Act No.13 of 1994). (9) ... ... ... (10) ... ... (9) ... ... ... (10) ... ... ...” A bare reading of Section 30 of the Act of 1994, read with the non obstante clause therein and the provisions of Section 36(5), clearly establishes that a Pradhan must vacate office on ceasing to be a member of the Panchayati Raj Institution. 184. Furthermore, the automatic cessation of membership occurs by operation of law, when the area represented by the Pradhan is removed from the jurisdiction of the Panchayat Samiti pursuant to delimitation or inclusion within a Municipality under the Act of 2009. The principle of mutatis mutandis application under Section 101(5A) of the Act of 1994 further supports this legislative intent. Moreover, the applicability of Section 3(8)(c) of the Act of 2009, which is expressly confined to the Sarpanch, Up-sarpanch, and Panchas of a Gram Panchayat, who are deemed to become the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson and members, respectively, of the successor Municipality in certain circumstances. This provision does not extend to the members of a Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad. In the absence of any analogous transitory provision for the Members and Pradhan of a Panchayat Samiti, the petitioners cannot claim immunity from the cessation of his term as Pradhan. 185. The authoritative decision in Lal Chand Asopa v. State of Rajasthan confirms that upon such territorial reorganization, the office of Pradhan held by a member elected from the affected area stands terminated, precluding any continuation on the basis that the Pradhan represents the entire Panchayat Samiti. Thus, the petitioners cannot continue to hold the office, once the ward has ceased to be part of the Panchayat Samiti and the petitioners’ contention to the contrary is accordingly rejected. The relevant portion of the judgment in Lal Chand Asopa (supra) is extracted hereinbelow for ready reference: “36. Upshot of publication of notification dated 07.11.2024 is, that the entire block of Gram Panchayat, Napasar stood excluded from Panchayat Samiti, Bikaner. There is no dispute about the fact that the Panchayat Samiti, Bikaner used to comprise of 21 wards, out of which ward nos.9 and 10 were from Gram Panchayat, Napasar. Since revenue area of Napasar itself has ceased to remain a revenue area or panchayat area and has become an urban area and declared as a Municipality, these wards (ward nos.9 and 10) have ceased to exist by operation of law. 37. Since revenue area of Napasar itself has ceased to remain a revenue area or panchayat area and has become an urban area and declared as a Municipality, these wards (ward nos.9 and 10) have ceased to exist by operation of law. 37. Since the entire area of Gram Panchayat, Napasar has ceased to remain as panchayat area and converted to municipal area, Section 101(2)(d) of the Act of 1994 comes into play which correspond to clause(d) of sub- section(1) of Section 101 of the Act of 1994. A simple reading of such provision suggests that in such eventuality, the Panchayat shall stand dissolved and the members, who represent the local area excluded from the Panchayat Circle shall stand removed. 38. The provision contained in Section 101(2)(d) not only deals with the members of a Gram Panchayat but also provides that the members who represent the local area excluded from Panchayat Circle shall stand removed. Hence, the petitioner who was elected from Ward No.9 so also other member, namely Kishan who was elected from Ward No.10 of such Panchayat Samiti (representing Napasar - excluded from Panchayat Circle) have to be given adieu, as a fallout of issuance of the impugned notification(s)/orders. 42. This Court also does not find any substance in petitioner’s contention based on clause (c) of sub- section(8) of Section 3 of the Act of 2009 that his term should also be saved. Section 3(8)(c), which is a transitory provision clearly confines it applicability to the Sarpanch, Up-sarpanch and the Panch or Panchas of the Gram Panchayat and provides that they shall be Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson and the members of the Municipality of such area. This provision does not apply to members of Panchayat Samiti and Zila Parishad at all. Since, neither any transitory provision of like nature could be made nor the same has been provided for Members and Pradhan of Panchayat Samiti, the petitioner cannot claim immunity from cessation of his term on the post of Pradhan.” 186. Upon a comprehensive consideration of the rival submissions, statutory provisions and judicial precedents, this Court concludes that statutory framework under the Act of 1994 and the Act of 2009 unequivocally provides that when an area is excluded from the jurisdiction of a Panchayat Samiti and included within a Municipality, the Pradhan / Member of Panchayat Samiti representing such area automatically cease to hold office by operation of law. Therefore, the petitioners cannot claim to continue in office after exclusion of their respective areas from the Panchayat Samiti. 187. While challenging the removal of Pradhan, in some writ petitions, the challenge has also been given to the consequent appointment of a candidate as Pradhan, who earlier lost the elections on the said post. Counsel for the petitioners stated that in case of removal of Pradhan, the charge was required to be given to the Up-Pradhan, whereas, due to political motives, the charge has been given to a defeated candidate. Replying to the said contention, learned Advocate General stated that in all the cases, on removal of a Panchayat Samiti Member, the charge has been given strictly in accordance with law and it is only in the cases, where the seat of Panchayat Samiti Member was reserved for a particular category, such as, female or reserved category, then as per the statutory mandate, the charge could not have been given to the Up-Pradhan / Up-Zila Pramukh, rather, the same has to be given to a member belonging to the same category. 188. The petitioners have failed to showcase that any infirmity or illegality or violation of statutory provisions in such action of the State Government. In this view of the matter, the said challenge also fails. PART (E) - WRIT PETITIONS CHALLENGING ORDERS PASSED BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT APPOINTING THE OUTGOING SARPANCH AS ADMINISTRATOR OR WRIT PETITIONS SEEKING APPOINTMENT OF ONGOING CHAIRPERSON OF MUNICIPALITY AS ADMINISTRATOR 189. In this part, we will deal the question as to whether the appointment of an outgoing Sarpanch as an Administrator under Section 95(1)(b) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, is a legally valid exercise of statutory power, especially when the analogous provision for Urban Local Bodies (Section 322 of the Act of 2009) designates government officials for such roles ? 190. Learned counsels for the petitioners while challenging the appointment of administrators, have argued that upon the completion of the tenure of a Gram Panchayat, the Sarpanch has been appointed as the Administrator, whereas, in the case of a Municipality, a Government official has been appointed as the Administrator. 191. Learned counsel for another petitioners submitted that the appointment of an Administrator for a Municipality does not fall within the jurisdiction of the State Government. Reliance has been placed upon the judgments delivered in Municipal Board, Begun and ors. Vs. 191. Learned counsel for another petitioners submitted that the appointment of an Administrator for a Municipality does not fall within the jurisdiction of the State Government. Reliance has been placed upon the judgments delivered in Municipal Board, Begun and ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors reported in 1991 AIR Rajasthan 14; Kishansingh Tomar vs. Municipal Corporation reported in (2006) 8 SCC 352 and Sau. Durgeshwari Rajesh Kale vs State of Maharashtra and ors. reported in 2021 (3) AIR BomR 476 Moreover, learned counsels for the petitioners have argued that the outgoing Sarpanch or Ward Panch could not have been appointed as Administrators, and that such action is arbitrary and bears no nexus to the object sought to be achieved. It was contended that the continuation of the existing body beyond its tenure of five years is contrary to the mandate contained in Article 243E of the Constitution of India. It was further submitted that even an Administrator cannot be permitted to continue for a period exceeding six months after the dissolution of a Panchayat. 192. Learned Advocate General has argued that the power to appoint Administrators is strictly in consonance with Section 95 of the Panchayati Raj Act and Section 320 of the Municipalities Act. Under the Panchayati Raj Act, the power of appointment of an Administrator is not confined only to Government officers. He further submitted that Section 95(1)(b) of the Act of 1994 and Section 322(3)(b) of the Act of 2009 provide for the appointment of Administrators in the event of dissolution of local bodies. Both these provisions apply to all kinds of dissolutions under their respective Acts and are not limited merely to premature dissolutions under Section 94 of the Act of 1994 or Section 322 of the Act of 2009. It was contended that dissolution may also occur under Sections 17 and 101 of the Act of 1994, and under Sections 7 and 3 of the Act of 2009, i.e., either by efflux of term or by alteration of boundaries. In such situations, since the office-bearers and members cease to hold office, the appointment of Administrators becomes a necessary consequence. It was further submitted that the requirement of holding elections within six months applies only in cases of premature dissolution or establishment of a new local body, and not to dissolution on completion of the regular term. In such situations, since the office-bearers and members cease to hold office, the appointment of Administrators becomes a necessary consequence. It was further submitted that the requirement of holding elections within six months applies only in cases of premature dissolution or establishment of a new local body, and not to dissolution on completion of the regular term. The by-elections in cases of premature dissolution have already been scheduled and conducted. 193. Learned Advocate General further pointed out that Section 95(1)(b) of the Act of 1994 does not mandate that the Administrator must be a Government officer or employee, whereas Section 322(3)(b) of the Act of 2009 does contain such a stipulation. Under Section 95, the term used is “such person,” which implies that any suitable individual may be appointed. It was argued that the outgoing Chairpersons are the most appropriate persons to be appointed as Administrators, being former public representatives with experience in the administration of the concerned local body for the preceding five years. Such an arrangement, it was submitted, prevents bureaucratic usurpation and ensures uniform application across the board without political bias. 194. For proper appreciation, relevant provisions of above-mentioned statutes are reproduced below: “ 243E. Duration of Panchayats, etc. —(1) Every Panchayat, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. (2) No amendment of any law for the time being in force shall have the effect of causing dissolution of a Panchayat at any level, which is functioning immediately before such amendment, till the expiration of its duration specified in clause (1). (3) An election to constitute a Panchayat shall be completed— (a) before the expiry of its duration specified in clause (1); (b) before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution: Provided that where the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Panchayat would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any election under this clause for constituting the Panchayat for such period. (4) A Panchayat constituted upon the dissolution of a Panchayat before the expiration of its duration shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Panchayat would have continued under clause (1) had it not been so dissolved. 95. Consequences of dissolution. (4) A Panchayat constituted upon the dissolution of a Panchayat before the expiration of its duration shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Panchayat would have continued under clause (1) had it not been so dissolved. 95. Consequences of dissolution. - (1) When a Panchayati Raj Institution is dissolved under this Act, following consequences shall ensue:- (a)all the members of the Panchayati Raj Institution including the Chairperson shall, on the date of dissolution vacate their respective offices but without prejudice to their eligibility for re-election or re-appointment. (b)all powers and duties of the Panchayati Raj Institution shall, during the period of dissolution, be exercised and performed by such administrator as the State Government may appoint in this behalf; and (c)all property vested in the Panchayati Raj Institution shall, during the period of dissolution, vest in the Government. (2) If it shall not be possible to reconstitute the Panchayati Raj Institution within the time specified in Clause (b) of Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 17 because of any stay by any competent court or authority on any general election to the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned and the proceedings consequent thereof the consequences specified in Clause (b) and (c) of Sub-sec. (1) shall follow. (3) An order of dissolution made under Sec. 94 together with a statement of the reasons thereof shall be laid before the House of the State Legislature, as soon as may be, after it has been made. 322. Power of Government to dissolve Municipality in case of incompetency or having less than two third elected members. (1) shall follow. (3) An order of dissolution made under Sec. 94 together with a statement of the reasons thereof shall be laid before the House of the State Legislature, as soon as may be, after it has been made. 322. Power of Government to dissolve Municipality in case of incompetency or having less than two third elected members. - (1) If at any time the State Government is satisfied that the Municipality is not competent to perform, or persistently makes default in the performance of the duties imposed on it by or under this Act or otherwise by law, or has exceeded, or abused its powers, the State Government may, by an order published along with the reasons thereof, in the Official Gazette, declare the Municipality to be incompetent or in default, or to have exceeded or abused its powers, as the case may be, and may dissolve such Municipality as from a date to be specified in the order of dissolution: Provided that no action shall be taken under this sub- Section unless the Municipality through its Chairperson has been afforded a reasonable opportunity of submitting an explanation and of being heard, if the Municipality so desires: Provided further that no order under this sub-Section shall be passed (i) unless the State Government has drawn up a statement setting out distinctly the charges against the Municipality and sent the same for inquiry in the prescribed manner and findings to a Tribunal consisting of a Chairman and not less than two members, constituted in the prescribed manner, or (ii) otherwise than in conformity with such findings. Explanation.- If for any reason the number of vacancies in a Municipality exceeds two-thirds of the total number of seats, the Municipality shall be deemed to be not competent to perform the duties imposed on it by or under this Act. (2) The State Government shall dissolve the Municipality if at any time the number of its elected members falls short of two third of its total members. (2) The State Government shall dissolve the Municipality if at any time the number of its elected members falls short of two third of its total members. (3) When a Municipality is dissolved under sub-Section (1) or any other provision of this Act,the following consequences shall ensue: (a) all members of the Municipality including the Chairperson and the Vice-Chairperson shall, on the date specified in the order of dissolution, vacate their respective offices but without prejudice to their eligibility for re-election or re-appointment; and (b) all powers and duties of the Municipality shall, during the period of dissolution, be exercised and performed by such officer as an Administrator as the State Government appoints in this behalf. (4) An election to constitute a Municipality shall be completed before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution: Provided that where the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any election under this sub-Section for constituting the Municipality for such period. (5) A Municipality constituted upon the dissolution of Municipality before the expiration of its duration shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued under Section 7 had it not been so dissolved. (6) An order of dissolution made under this Section together with statement of the reasons thereof shall be laid before the House of the State Legislature, as soon as may be, after it has been made.” 195. The petitioners’ challenge, which is predicated on Article 243E of the Constitution, is untenable. The role and capacity of an elected member of a Panchayat are fundamentally distinct from those of an administrator appointed under a statute. Article 243E, which governs the duration of a duly elected Panchayat, has no applicability to an appointment made to fill an administrative vacuum. 196. The constitutional mandate under Article 243E to hold elections within six months primarily governs cases of premature dissolution or formation of new local bodies. Where the term expires naturally, the appointment of an Administrator, even one who is a former office bearer, to administer the body temporarily is permissible and does not breach constitutional or statutory provisions. The petitioners’ reliance on judgments such as Municipal Board, Begun (supra); Kishansingh Tomar (supra) and Sau. Where the term expires naturally, the appointment of an Administrator, even one who is a former office bearer, to administer the body temporarily is permissible and does not breach constitutional or statutory provisions. The petitioners’ reliance on judgments such as Municipal Board, Begun (supra); Kishansingh Tomar (supra) and Sau. Durgeshwari Rajesh Kale (supra) is inapposite, given these cases arose from very different circumstances and legal issues. 197. The appointment of administrators is governed by Section 95 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. The said provision confers discretionary power upon the State to appoint "such administrator as the State Government may appoint in this behalf". The State has exercised this statutory power and provided a rational justification for appointing the outgoing office-bearers, citing their institutional knowledge and experience as crucial for maintaining administrative continuity. The petitioner's allegation of the action being arbitrary and tainted with mala fides is wholly misconceived, especially in light of the fact that this measure has been implemented as a uniform, state-wide policy, thereby negating any suggestion of arbitrariness or improper motive. 198. Conversely, Section 322(3)(b) of the 2009 Act mandates the appointment of a “such officer” as Administrator for Municipalities. This deliberate distinction reflects a rational legislative intent considering the differing administrative structures and needs of these local bodies. It is a cardinal principle of statutory interpretation that where the language of a provision is plain, clear, and unambiguous, effect must be given to its ordinary and grammatical meaning, as the legislative intent is best discerned from the express words used. The legislature, in its wisdom, has conferred discretionary power upon the State Government to appoint an officer as it deems fit, and to read it in any other manner such as precluding the appointment of a Government officer would amount to rewriting the statute, which is impermissible. Therefore, the appointment of the said Government officer is squarely in conformity with the explicit mandate of the statute. In this view of the matter, the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner are rejected. 199. The contention that the appointment of Government officers as Administrators in Urban Local Bodies renders the appointment of Administrators in Panchayati Raj Institutions, as per the impugned notifications, arbitrary or unjustified, cannot be accepted. In this view of the matter, the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner are rejected. 199. The contention that the appointment of Government officers as Administrators in Urban Local Bodies renders the appointment of Administrators in Panchayati Raj Institutions, as per the impugned notifications, arbitrary or unjustified, cannot be accepted. The Urban Local Bodies and the Panchayati Raj Institutions constitute distinct and separate classes, as is evident from the provisions of the Constitution as well as the respective enactments governing their composition, functions, and administration. Consequently, the nature of appointments made in Urban Local Bodies and Panchayati Raj Institutions cannot be equated, and the differentiation in the method adopted stands on reasonable classification founded on intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. 200. In view of the above discussion, this Court holds that in the present cases, the orders of appointment of Administrator are in accordance with the provision of the Act of 1994 and Act of 2009 and do not violate constitutional or statutory provisions, therefore, the interference of this in these cases is not called for. PART (F) - WRIT PETITIONS CHALLENGING / SEEKING DIRECTION FOR FIXING OF VILLAGE HEADQUARTER 201. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the guidelines issued by the State on 10.01.2025 and 13.02.2025 have been disregarded. It was submitted that these guidelines mandate that headquarters of a newly created Gram Panchayat should, as far as possible, be established in a village with adequate means of transportation to ensure convenient access for all residents of the Gram Panchayat concerned. It was further contended that the designated village must have government offices and other essential facilities, including a School, Panchayat Bhawan, Anganwadi Center, Patwar Bhawan and Kisan Seva Sadan, for which sufficient land ought to be available. However, it is submitted that in the present matter, the prescribed 6 km distance parameter and other foundational guidelines for delimitation have been violated. The petitioners assert that there was no administrative necessity to conduct the current delimitation exercise, rendering it arbitrary. 202. However, it is submitted that in the present matter, the prescribed 6 km distance parameter and other foundational guidelines for delimitation have been violated. The petitioners assert that there was no administrative necessity to conduct the current delimitation exercise, rendering it arbitrary. 202. Learned Advocate General countering the petitioner’s contentions, submitted that the provisions of Sections 101(1) and 101(6) of the Act of 1994 manifest that the Government is empowered to issue orders and directions; however, learned Advocate General further submitted that the provisions contained in the guidelines are only meant to guide the concerned officers regarding the manner of preparing proposals, and therefore, such guidelines cannot be treated as having statutory force. 203. It was further contended that Section 102 of the Act lays down the procedure for framing rules, and unless any provision is made under such Rules and published in the Official Gazette, it cannot be enforced. As there exists no such prescription, the Government has not framed any rules in this regard. Consequently, non-compliance with the guidelines by the officers cannot be a ground for this Court to interfere with the functioning of the Government. Learned Advocate General also relied upon the definition of the term " prescribed " under Section 2(19) of the Act of 1994 and Section 32(58) of the General Clauses Act, 1955. 204. It is to be noticed that in the case of J. R. Raghupathy v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in AIR 1988 SC 1681 , the matter involved the State of Andhra Pradesh's decision on locating Mandal headquarters, which the High Court had interfered with by directing a different location based on its own assessment of public convenience. Hon’ble Supreme Court overturned this, ruling the High Court's intervention as patently illegal. It was held that guidelines issued by the government to its officers for determining such locations are merely administrative instructions and do not possess statutory force unless published as law. Consequently, these guidelines do not create enforceable legal rights for citizens, and a writ of mandamus cannot be issued to enforce them. The Court emphasized that the ultimate decision-making authority rests with the government, which is entitled to deviate from its own guidelines for reasons of administrative convenience. The judiciary cannot act as an appellate authority to evaluate the comparative merits of different locations for an administrative headquarters, as such a function falls squarely within the executive's domain. The Court emphasized that the ultimate decision-making authority rests with the government, which is entitled to deviate from its own guidelines for reasons of administrative convenience. The judiciary cannot act as an appellate authority to evaluate the comparative merits of different locations for an administrative headquarters, as such a function falls squarely within the executive's domain. 205. In the present batch of petitions, the challenge is premised upon the alleged non-adherence to the guidelines dated 10.01.2025 and 13.02.2025, which lay down certain criteria regarding population, distance from headquarters and the availability of public facilities. The arguments advanced by the learned Advocate General, citing Sections 101 and 102 of the Act of 1994, find strong support in the abovementioned case of Raghupathy (supra). These guidelines, having not been framed and published as "rules" under the prescribed statutory procedure, remain within the domain of executive guidelines / instructions. Their purpose is to provide a uniform framework for the authorities preparing proposals, not to create a rigid and inflexible legal mandate that can be challenged in the court upon every minor deviation. Therefore, the decision-making process for reorganisation and the selection of a Gram Panchayat headquarters is an intricate administrative function, dependent on a multitude of factors that include administrative convenience, geographical contiguity, public accessibility and local demands. It is not the province of this Court, in the exercise of its powers of judicial review, to undertake a comparative evaluation of the merits of one village over another for being designated as a headquarters. To do so would be to effectively step into the shoes of the executive and substitute the Court's own wisdom for that of the administration, a path that is impermissible in law. 206. Further reliance is placed upon the judgment rendered in the case of Mod Singh and others v. State of Rajasthan and another (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6132 of 1992) , decided on 23.12.1994. For ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are quoted below: “35. In D. B. Civil Special Appeal No. 854/ 93, Suraj Mai Meena v. State of Rajasthan decided on 7-11-1994 by this Court at Jaipur Bench, earlier, there existed Gram Panchayat, Fusod consisting of 12 villages with its Head Quarter at Fusod. The said panchayat circle also included villages Shanawada and Ron. In D. B. Civil Special Appeal No. 854/ 93, Suraj Mai Meena v. State of Rajasthan decided on 7-11-1994 by this Court at Jaipur Bench, earlier, there existed Gram Panchayat, Fusod consisting of 12 villages with its Head Quarter at Fusod. The said panchayat circle also included villages Shanawada and Ron. Thereafter, the State Government vide Its notification dated 10-9- 92 bifurcated the said Gram Panchayat, Fusod into two Gram Panchayats one with the Headquarter at village Dungarli and other in village Shanawada and village Ron was included within the jurisdiction of Gram Panchayat, Shanawada. The residents of village Ron filed a writ petition for a direction to the State Government to establish the headquarter of Gram Panchayat, Shanawada at village Ron. That writ petition was dismissed by the S. B. The Division Bench dismissing the Special Appeal held that the court cannot direct the State Government to have the headquarter of a Gram Panchayat at a particular place and if at all, the petitioner was aggrieved, he could make representation to the State Government and it was for the State Government to consider that matter and not for the Court. 36. In S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5009/94 "Kantilal v. State ", the villagers of Todi Chhoti which was included in Gram Panchayat, Saranpur, challenged the State notification dated 10-9-92 on the ground that their village was 10 kms. away from the headquarter, Saranpur and, as such, their village should not be included in that panchayat circle. This Court by its order dated 26-10-1994 dismissed the said writ petition holding that provisions of the Act authorised the State Government to constitute the Panchayat and that simply because a particular village was situated 10 kms., away from the headquarter, the inclusion of that village in the Gram Panchayat cannot be said to be mala fide act or arbitrary act on the part of the State Government.” 207. Accordingly, this Court holds that non-observance or deviation from the guidelines does not vitiate impugned delimitation process or the determination of the Gram Panchayat headquarters. The petitioners, therefore, fail to establish any illegality or procedural infirmity warranting interference in the exercise of powers of judicial review. PART (G) - WRIT PETITIONS SEEKING DIRECTIONS TO DECLARE / HOLD THE ELECTIONS. 208. In D. B. Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No.4686/2025 [Sanyam Lodha Vs. The petitioners, therefore, fail to establish any illegality or procedural infirmity warranting interference in the exercise of powers of judicial review. PART (G) - WRIT PETITIONS SEEKING DIRECTIONS TO DECLARE / HOLD THE ELECTIONS. 208. In D. B. Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No.4686/2025 [Sanyam Lodha Vs. State of Rajasthan] as well as D.B. Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No. 1285/2025 (Giriraj Singh Devanda vs. State of Rajasthan) , apart from the other prayers, the principally directions have been sought to hold the elections of Municipalities and Panchayati Raj Institutions, respectively, immediately on completion of tenure of concerned local body. 209. Learned counsels for the petitioners have argued that Article 243E of the Constitution of India provides the duration of Panchayat shall be for five years only and 243E (3) provides that an election to constitute a Panchayat shall be completed before the expiry of its tenure. Further, Article 243K(1) vests the State Election Commission with the power of superintendence, direction, and control over the preparation of electoral rolls, and obliges it to complete elections before the expiry of the tenure. Similarly, tenure of five years is provided for municipalities under Article 243U of the Constitution of India and 243U(3) requires completion of election of municipalities before expiry of its duration. Similar power of Superintendence and control regarding conduct of election to the municipalities is provided to the State Election Commission under Article 243ZA of the Constitution of India. Counsels for the petitioners submitted that postponing the elections by issuing the impugned notification is ultra vires to the Constitutional provision. It is also contended that the State Election Commission has failed to discharge this constitutional mandate. Counsels further submitted that in no eventualities the tenure of the Panchayati Raj Institution or Municipalites can be extended nor the elections can be postponed beyond the durations provided under the Constitution of India. 210. In support of the said contention, reliance was placed upon the judgment passed in the case of Suresh Mahajan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr reported in (2022) 12 SCC 770 Relevant part of the judgment is reproduced below :- “7. Thus, all concerned are obliged to ensure that the newly elected body is installed in every local body before the expiry of 5 (five) years' term of the outgoing elected body. Thus, all concerned are obliged to ensure that the newly elected body is installed in every local body before the expiry of 5 (five) years' term of the outgoing elected body. Even in case of dissolution before the expiry of five period, where an Administrator is required to be appointed by the State, that regime cannot be continued beyond 6 (six months by virtue of relevant provisions in the respective State legislation(s). 8. This constitutional mandate is inviolable. Neither the State Election Commission nor the State Government or for that matter the State Legislature, including this Court in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India can countenance dispensation to the contrary. 11. In any case, the ongoing activity of delimitation or formation of ward cannot be a legitimate ground to be set forth by any authority much less the State Election Commission - to not discharge its constitutional obligation in notifying the election programme at the opportune time and to ensure that the elected body is installed before the expiry of 5 (five) years term of the outgoing elected body. If there is need to undertake delimitation -which indeed is a continuous exercise to be undertaken by the concerned authority - it ought to be commenced well-in-advance to ensure that the elections of the concerned local body are notified in time so that the elected body would be able to take over the reigns of its administration without any disruption and continuity of governance (thereby upholding the tenet of Government of the people, by the people and for the people). In other words, the amendment effected to the stated enactments cannot be reckoned as a legitimate ground for protracting the issue of election programme of the concerned local bodies. 12. Therefore, we direct the State Election Commission by way of interim order, to issue election programme without any further delay on the basis of the wards as per the delimitation done in the concerned local bodies when the elections had become due consequent to expiry of 5 (five) years term of the outgoing elected body or before coming into force of the impugned Amendment Act(s) whichever is later. On that notional basis, the State Election Commission ought to proceed without any exception in respect of concerned local bodies where elections are due or likely to be due in the near future without waiting even for the compliance of triple test by the State Government for providing reservation to Other Backward Classes. We have no manner of doubt that only such direction would meet the ends of justice and larger public interests consistent with the constitutional mandate that the local self-government must be governed by the duly elected representatives uninterrupted except in case of its dissolution before expiry of the term on permissible grounds. 18. To put it differently, completion of delimitation exercise or be it triple test formality, as the case may be, can wait if not completed well before the expiry of five years' term of the outgoing elected body, including giving enough time to the Election Commission to complete the election process within such time. Thus, the declaration of election programme cannot be delayed by the Election Commission on that account. For, it would inevitably result in creating hiatus situation upon expiry of 5 (five) years' term of outgoing elected body. Such an eventuality needs to be eschewed by all the duty-holders. A priori, it is not only a constitutional obligation of the State Election Commission but also of the State Government including of the constitutional courts.” 211. Further reliance has been placed upon the judgment passed in the case of Kishan Singh Tomar vs. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad reported in (2006) 6 SCC 352 . The relevant part of the judgment is quoted below :- “21. It is true that there may be certain man-made calamities, such as rioting or breakdown of law and order, or natural calamities which could distract the authorities from holding elections to the Municipality, but they are exceptional circumstances and under no circumstance the Election Commission would be justified in delaying the process of election after consulting the State Govt. and other authorities. But that should be an exceptional circumstance and shall not be a regular feature to extend the duration of the Municipality. Going by the provisions contained in Article 243-U, it is clear that the period of five years fixed thereunder to constitute the Municipality is mandatory in nature and has to be followed in all respects. and other authorities. But that should be an exceptional circumstance and shall not be a regular feature to extend the duration of the Municipality. Going by the provisions contained in Article 243-U, it is clear that the period of five years fixed thereunder to constitute the Municipality is mandatory in nature and has to be followed in all respects. It is only when the Municipality is dissolved for any other reason and the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any elections for constituting the Municipality for such period.”. 212. Replying to the said contentions, learned Advocate General argued that there is no dispute regarding the constitutional mandate regarding elections of local bodies and the same must ordinarily be held before the expiry of their tenure by virtue of Articles 243E and 243U of the Constitution of India. However, in various authoritative pronouncements, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has recognized certain exceptions, some of which are outlined as follows : i) The Constitution does not provide a rigid or unalterable five-year timeline. The provisions themselves contemplate the possibility of premature dissolution of local bodies. ii) In Kishan Singh Tomar case, while it is held that holding elections prior to the expiry of tenure is generally mandatory, the judgment, on a careful reading of paragraphs 19 and 21, recognizes that exceptional circumstances, including man-made situations, may necessitate the postponement of elections. The crux is that elections cannot be postponed merely due to situations created by vested interests. If the situation arises for bona fide reasons, it constitutes a valid exception to the general rule. iii) In the Jalgaon Municipal Council case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the mandate of Article 243U applies only when the nature of local bodies remains unchanged. Paragraphs 20 and 21 clarify that any hiatus arising from the conversion of a local body into another is unavoidable, and Article 243U cannot apply where an area of one description is converted into an area of another description. This implies that the tenure requirement applies only to a local body of the same type and its immediate successor of the same type. Consequently, the argument that the entire electoral exercise must be completed before the expiry of the previous term was rejected. This implies that the tenure requirement applies only to a local body of the same type and its immediate successor of the same type. Consequently, the argument that the entire electoral exercise must be completed before the expiry of the previous term was rejected. This position was reiterated also in the case of Pranay Roy, where the Supreme Court allowed elections to be held after the reconstitution exercise was completed, declining to follow the High Court’s directions despite the ongoing reconstitution. 213. Learned Advocate General stated that the State Government is alive to the Constitutional requirements and also committed to hold the elections of the local bodies at the earliest. However, submitted that there are bonafide and compelling reasons behind the conscious decision taken by the State Government for postponing the elections, awaiting the completion of Delimitation exercise. Learned Advocate General stated that the said grounds clearly falls within exceptions carved out or approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various cases while dealing with cases of similar circumstances. To substantiate the said argument, learned Advocate General has relied upon following judgments. 214. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Vs. Secretary, Governor's Secretariat & ors. reported in (2020)6 SCC 548 has held as under :- “10. It, thus, emerges that before the election process could begin as per the State Election Commission's Press Release dated 2-12-2019, the State of Tamil Nadu increased the number of districts from 31 to 39 and also restructured various talukas. However, with regard to posts of Chairman and Vice-Chairman of District Panchayat Councils, elections are still sought to be held only for 31 posts. This resultant incongruity has prompted the appellants to file these applications with prayers to strike down the Notification dated 2-12- 2019; hold elections for the entire State comprising all 39 revenue districts; and conduct such local body elections only after completion of all legal formalities i.e. after delimitation of the newly carved districts. A specific direction has also been prayed for, to compel the respondents to first carry out delimitation, reservation, rotation processes and fulfil all other legal requirements before notifying or conducting elections of any panchayat at the village, intermediate or district level. 11. A specific direction has also been prayed for, to compel the respondents to first carry out delimitation, reservation, rotation processes and fulfil all other legal requirements before notifying or conducting elections of any panchayat at the village, intermediate or district level. 11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at a considerable length and after an in-depth analysis of various statutory provisions as well as the constitutional scheme under Part IX which envisages democratisation of grass-root level administration, we are of the view that, as per Article 243-B, panchayats have to mandatorily be constituted in a State at the village, intermediate and district levels. Article 243-C requires the State, as far as is practicable, to maintain a similar ratio between the population residing within the territory of a particular panchayat and the number of seats allocated to it, across all panchayats in the State. Further, each panchayat must be divided into territorial constituencies and per Article 243-D, seats in proportion to their population must be reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in each panchayat. 12. It is, thus, clear that the constitutional object of Part IX cannot be effectively achieved unless the delimitation exercise for constitution of local bodies at all levels is properly undertaken. Such exercise in the State of Tamil Nadu must keep in view the criteria for delimitation of wards prescribed under the Tamil Nadu Local Bodies Delimitation Regulations, 2017 (formulated under the Tamil Nadu Delimitation Commission Act, 2017), which criteria must itself not be contrary to Article 243-C read with Article 243B(1) of the Constitution. 13. Noticing how at the completion of the delimitation process there were only 31 revenue districts, but despite a subsequent increase in number of districts to 39, no fresh delimitation exercise has been undertaken, it is clear that the State Government cannot fulfil the aforestated constitutional mandate. There is no identified data elucidating population proportions and, hence, requisite reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes cannot be provided for, both in re village panchayat wards or Chairman/Vice-Chairman of District bodies. We, hence, have no doubt that the election process as notified by the State Election Commission on 2-12-2019, in respect of the newly constituted nine districts cannot be held unless fresh delimitation exercise in respect thereto is first completed. We, hence, have no doubt that the election process as notified by the State Election Commission on 2-12-2019, in respect of the newly constituted nine districts cannot be held unless fresh delimitation exercise in respect thereto is first completed. The State Government cannot justify holding local body elections of these nine districts by relying upon this Court's order dated 18-11-2019 [C.R. Jayasukin v. T.N. State Election Commission, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1664] as the said order itself mandates notification of elections only after completing “all legal formalities”. On the basis of said observations, the Hon’ble Apex Court in para 15 of the said judgment, has directed to first complete the Delimitation process and then to hold the elections within specified period. “15. For the reasons aforestated, these applications are allowed in part and disposed of with the following directions: 15.1. The Respondent authorities shall hold elections to all Panchayats at village, intermediate and district levels, except those in the following nine reconstituted districts: i. Kancheepuram ii. Chengalpattu iii. Vellore iv. Thirupathur v. Ranipet vi. Villupuram vii. Kallakurichi viii. Tirunelveli ix. Tenkasi; 15.2 The Respondents (including the Delimitation Commission) are directed to delimit the nine newly constituted districts in accordance with law and thereafter hold elections for their panchayats at the village, intermediate and district levels within a period of four months; 15.3 There shall be no legal impediment against holding elections for Panchayats at the village, intermediate and district levels for rest of the districts; 15.4 State Election Commission shall notify elections for the panchayats at village, intermediate and district levels in respect of all districts except the nine reconstituted districts as per the details given in direction ‘a’ above.; 15.5 While conducting elections, the respondents shall provide proportionate reservation at all levels, in accordance with the Rule 6 of Tamil Nadu Panchayats (Reservation of Seats and Rotation of Reserved Seats) Rules, 1995.” 215. Reliance is also placed upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State Of Maharashtra & Ors vs Jalgaon Municipal Council & Ors reported in (2003) 9 SCC 371 . The relevant paras of this judgment are quoted below :- “Q.1. Whether any hiatus between abolition of Municipal Council and constitution of Municipal Corporation is violative of Constitution Part IXA? 20. The relevant paras of this judgment are quoted below :- “Q.1. Whether any hiatus between abolition of Municipal Council and constitution of Municipal Corporation is violative of Constitution Part IXA? 20. The High Court has held that keeping in view the object and purpose of enacting Parts IX and IXA of the Constitution which intended to achieve the Gandhian dream of local self-government it is necessary that before the term of Municipal Council comes to an end the Municipal Corporation should be available and in existence so as to take over the administration of the urban area from the Municipal Council. There should be no interregnum or hiatus between the dissolution of the Municipal Council and the date of Municipal Corporation coming into existence; for such hiatus would necessarily involve a government officer being appointed an administrator and that will be subversive of the principles of democracy and local self- governance. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner- respondents placed reliance on the provisions of Article 243U(3)(a) which mandates that an election to constitute a 'municipality' shall be completed before the expiry of its duration specified in clause (1) of Article 243U which is 5 years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. A municipality for the purpose of Part IXA is defined by clause (e) of Article 243P as meaning an institution of self-government constituted under Article 243Q. Article 243Q speaks of such three institutions, namely, Nagar Panchayat, Municipal Council and Municipal Corporation. All the three are included within the definition of 'municipality'. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the steps for constitution of Municipal Corporation should be planned and scheduled, well in advance of time of the date by which the term of existing Municipal Council is coming to an end so as to see that successor municipality, i.e. Municipal Corporation proposed to be constituted, is ready to take over from the municipality, i.e. Municipal Council proposed to be abolished without there being any hiatus in-between necessitating the appointment of an administrator to take charge in the interregnum of the two events. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted on the other hand that the process of conversion of an area from Municipal Council to Municipal Corporation would necessarily involve a hiatus which is an unavoidable necessity. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted on the other hand that the process of conversion of an area from Municipal Council to Municipal Corporation would necessarily involve a hiatus which is an unavoidable necessity. Both the learned counsel read out several provisions of Part IXA of the Constitution and the two relevant statutes trying to cull out the underlying scheme each in support of their respective submissions. 21. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at length on this aspect we are of the opinion that the said hiatus is an unavoidable event which must take place in the process of conversion of Municipal Council into a Municipal Corporation. Reliance on Article 243U by the learned counsel for the respondents in this context is misconceived. The use of expression 'a municipality' in sub-Article (3) of Article 243U in the context and in the setting in which it is employed suggests and means the duration of the same type of municipality coming to an end and the same type of successor municipality taking over as a consequence of term of the previous municipality coming to an end. Article 243U cannot be applied to a case where the area of one description is converted into an area of another description and one description of municipality is ceased by constituting another municipality of a better description. Article 243U(3) cannot be pressed into service to base a submission on that an election to constitute a municipal corporation is required to be completed before the expiry of duration of a municipal council.” 216. Learned Advocate General also referred to para 15 and 21 of the judgement passed in the case of “ Kishan Singh Tomar Vs. Municipal Corporation Ahmednagar reported in (2006) 8 SCC 352 “15. The counsel for the respondents contended that due to multifarious reasons, the State Election Commission may not be in a position to conduct the elections in time and under such circumstances the provisions of Article 243-U could not be complied with stricto sensu.... 21. It is true that there may be certain man-made calamities, such as rioting or breakdown of law and order, or natural calamities which could distract the authorities from holding elections to the Municipality, but they are exceptional circumstances and under no circumstance the Election Commission would be justified in delaying the process of election after consulting the State Govt. and other authorities. and other authorities. But that should be an exceptional circumstance and shall not be a regular feature to extend the duration of the Municipality. Going by the provisions contained in Article 243-U, it is clear that the period of five years fixed thereunder to constitute the Municipality is mandatory in nature and has to be followed in all respects. It is only when the Municipality is dissolved for any other reason and the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any elections for constituting the Municipality for such period.” 217. Counsel for the State has relied upon the judgment passed in the case of “ State Of West Bengal Vs Pranoy Roy And Ors” reported in (2015)16 SCC 248 . Relevant para of the same is reproduced below :- “8. We find from the impugned judgment of the High Court that the High Court has directed holding of the elections primarily on the ground that once the term was coming to an end, the exercise of reconstitution of the municipal bodies should have started by the State Government much earlier and it has initiating this process at the fag end or after the term was over shows lack of bona fides on the part of the Government. To that extent the High Court may be right. However, at the same time we feel that it should not have been a ground to direct to hold the elections within a period of two months as the same is not going to serve any useful purpose. Even if elections are held, the term of the new bodies so constituted shall hardly last for few weeks or few months. The moment the said municipal bodies are reconstituted, the term of the new members, as per the proposed election, would come to an end and fresh elections will have to be held. Therefore, holding of the elections, at this stage would not be of any use.... 10. This Court in (2003) 9 SCC 731 titled State of Maharashtra and Others vs. Jalgaon Municipal Council & Others though emphasise that the elections of the Municipal Corporations should be conducted before the expiry of the term of the existing tenure, but at the same time it noted certain exceptional circumstances under which such elections could be deferred. 10. This Court in (2003) 9 SCC 731 titled State of Maharashtra and Others vs. Jalgaon Municipal Council & Others though emphasise that the elections of the Municipal Corporations should be conducted before the expiry of the term of the existing tenure, but at the same time it noted certain exceptional circumstances under which such elections could be deferred. One of the circumstances specifically taken note of by the Court was reconstitution of the municipal bodies as is clear from the following passage (21 & 41) in the said judgment: ..... 11. Mr. Diwan, learned senior counsel appearing for the State Commission, though resisted the petition initially, but after some arguments he fairly states that in view of the aforesaid ground and having regard to the statement given by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants that there would be reconstitution of these bodies by 15th June, 2015, the State Commission is ready to wait till the end of June, 2015 so that fresh election process in respect of reconstituted municipal bodies is undertaken after the said reconstitution exercise is complete within the time undertaken. 12. Even after there is a reconstitution of the municipal bodies, the State Government will have to determine the number of wards in terms of Section 8 of the West Bengal State Commission Act, 1994. It is stated at the Bar by Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel, that this would also be accomplished by 30.6.2015. 13. The Stages which are required for holding the election thereafter are (1) to delimit municipal areas into the ward as per Sections 3 and 29 of the West Bengal Municipal Elections (Reservation of seats) Rules; (2) determination of reservation of seats and (3) issuance of Notification for holding the election under the relevant statutes. These steps are to be taken by the State Election Commission as primacy to hold the election rests with the State Election Commission. 14. Thus, after the exercise is completed in the manner mentioned above, by 30.6.2015, by the State Government, the State Commission shall start its exercise for holding election in the manner mentioned above immediately thereafter. At that time if the State Commission needs police force to conduct fair and impartial election it can always send requisition for this purpose to the Central Government.” 218. As per learned Advocate General, the judgment passed in the case of Atma Singh Vs. At that time if the State Commission needs police force to conduct fair and impartial election it can always send requisition for this purpose to the Central Government.” 218. As per learned Advocate General, the judgment passed in the case of Atma Singh Vs. State of Punjab also requires relevance in the present case. The “7. The whole purpose of delimitation of municipalities into wards is to ensure that every citizen should get a fair representation in the municipalities. When a municipality is re-constituted by the inclusion of any local area within the limits of a municipality under Sub- section (3) of Section 5 or by the exclusion of any local area from the limits of a municipality u/s 7, i.e. when there is an alteration of the limits of the municipality, there must of necessity be a division of the re- constituted municipality into new wards without which the elections cannot be held. There can be no disenfranchisement of a part of the electorate of a municipality. The question was dealt with at some length by the Gujarat High Court in Bhaichandbhai Maganlal Shah Vs. The State of Gujarat, 8 Guj LR 210: ( AIR 1967 Guj 105 ) and it was observed: It must follow logically and inevitably from this proposition that the Constitution of wards dividing the whole of the municipal district is a sine qua non of a valid election. If no wards at all are constituted in the municipal district, the machinery of election cannot go through and equally the machinery of election cannot go through if wards are constituted in respect of a part of the municipal district and the other part is not divided into any ward or wards. In such a case there would be lists of voters for the wards which are constituted out of a part of the municipal district but there would be no lists of voters so far as the other part of the municipal district is concerned and no one from that part would be qualified to vote or to stand as a candidate for the election and no Councillors being elected by that part, there would be no representation of that part on the municipality. Where such a situation arises, it is difficult to see how the Municipality can be said to be a Municipality for the whole of the municipal district within the meaning of Section 9. We approve of the view taken by the Gujarat High Court. 8. There can be no dispute with the principle that the State Government without re-constituting a municipality into new wards, cannot proceed to hold an election of councillors, when there is an extension of the municipal limits, but the difficulty is about the applicability of that principle to the facts of the present case. There is no denying the fact that the effect of the stay order passed by the learned Single Judge staying the operation of the notification issued under Sub- section (3) of Section 5 was to put the said notification in abeyance, with the result that the local areas to which it related were not brought within the municipal limits. It is also an undisputed fact that the stay order passed by the learned Single Judge was in force from August 2, 1978 to October 23, 1978. It is, however, urged that with the dismissal of the writ petition by the learned Single Judge on October 23, 1978, the impugned notification was brought into effect and, therefore, the State Government could not proceed with the election without delimitation of wards and preparation of fresh electoral rolls. We are afraid, the contention cannot be accepted.” 219. While considering the rival submissions made at Bar, it is clear that even while taking into account the Constitutional mandate of holding the election before the expiry of term of local bodies, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various cases while taking note of exceptional circumstances, has permitted the postponement of the elections. Pendency of the Delimitation process is also considered as one such exceptional circumstance and while considering the same, the Hon’ble Apex Court has issued direction to first complete the process of Delimitation and then to hold the elections. We are in agreement with the contention of the learned Advocate General that the facts of the present case also akin to the judgments as relied upon on behalf of the State and the reason for issuing the notification for appointment of Administrator / postponement of election in the peculiar facts and circumstances of present case cannot be said to be unjustified or arbitrary. 220. 220. The respondent-State, while justifying its action of deferment of elections to various Panchayati Raj Institutions and Urban Local Bodies, has primarily contended that the State has undertaken a massive and complex exercise for the complete reorganisation and restructuring of these local self-governing bodies across the entire State. It is submitted that this exercise was necessitated by a number of factors, including the haphazard creation and elevation of municipalities by the previous government without ensuring their financial viability, and the administrative and financial strain caused by staggered election cycles, a situation exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The State has highlighted its policy decision, reflected in the budget presented on 10.07.2024, to constitute a High-Level Committee to recommend the restructuring and delimitation of these bodies and to examine the feasibility of a ‘One State, One Election’ model to save public resources. 221. The record indicates that the State Government has taken concrete steps to actualize this policy. A series of meetings of the Cabinet Sub-Committees and a High-Level Expert Committee were held to review the creation of new districts, divisions and the overall structure of rural and urban local bodies. Pursuant to these recommendations, the State has not only abolished certain newly created districts but has also issued detailed guidelines and timelines for the reconstitution and delimitation of Village Panchayats, Panchayat Samitis, Zila Parishads and Municipalities. The State's argument is that this comprehensive overhaul will result in large-scale alteration of territorial jurisdictions, dissolution of some existing bodies, creation of new ones, and changes in the very character of these institutions from rural to urban and vice-versa. 222. Consequently, the State contends that holding elections for the existing local bodies, whose form, nature, and territorial limits are subject to imminent and substantial change, would be a futile and wasteful exercise. It is argued that such elections would be for a very brief term and would squander significant public funds and administrative resources. Furthermore, any election would have to be preceded by a fresh delimitation of wards, revision of electoral rolls and determination of reservations for various categories, including for OBCs, for which an independent commission is also being constituted as per the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Furthermore, any election would have to be preceded by a fresh delimitation of wards, revision of electoral rolls and determination of reservations for various categories, including for OBCs, for which an independent commission is also being constituted as per the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The State submits that this entire reorganisation is being conducted in the larger public interest to strengthen these institutions financially and functionally, and it is committed to holding the elections expeditiously as soon as this bona fide exercise is completed. 223. Having perused the detailed contentions and the plethora of documents submitted by the respondent-State, this Court finds merit in the justification provided for the inability to adhere to the statutory election schedule. The decision to undertake a complete reorganisation of local bodies is a significant policy matter falling within the executive domain. The series of actions taken, from the formation of high-level committees to the issuance of statutory notifications and timelines for delimitation, demonstrates that the State is not merely seeking to postpone elections indefinitely but is actively engaged in a complex, large-scale administrative restructuring. The reasoning that it would be contrary to public interest to expend vast resources on elections for institutions that may cease to exist or be fundamentally altered in the near future is rational and persuasive. The underlying objective, particularly holding the elections simultaneously, represents a futuristic and economically prudent approach. Such a synchronized electoral cycle may result in substantial savings of public funds, minimization of administrative stasis caused by the recurrent imposition of the Model Code of Conduct, and the optimal deployment of state machinery. Thus, this Court concludes that exercise of the State appears to be bona fide and aimed at achieving long-term systemic improvements in local self-governance, however, looking to the constitutional mandate, this Court deems it proper to issue appropriate directions to the State Government to hold the elections of the Local Self Institutions without any unnecessary delay and to conduct and conclude the same in a time bound manner. FINAL DIRECTIONS 224.1 In view of the adjudication made and conclusion drawn in Part-A of the judgment, the writ petitions challenging the final notifications issued under Section 3 of the Act of 2009 as well as Section 101 of the Act of 1994, are dismissed. FINAL DIRECTIONS 224.1 In view of the adjudication made and conclusion drawn in Part-A of the judgment, the writ petitions challenging the final notifications issued under Section 3 of the Act of 2009 as well as Section 101 of the Act of 1994, are dismissed. 224.2 In view of the adjudication made and conclusion drawn in Part-B of the judgment, D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.831/2025 (State of Rajasthan and Ors. Vs. Dhanna Ram and Ors.) and other special appeals challenging the interim order dated 23.05.2025 to the extent of Para 7 & 8 of the same, are allowed. All the writ petitions challenging the process of delimitation initiated in pursuance of the notices issued under Section 101 of the Act of 1994, are dismissed. It is directed that the concerned District Collectors shall send the proposal for delimitation to the state Government and the three members high-level committee constituted for the purpose of examining the same, shall take final decision upon the proposals for delimitation so sent by the concerned District Collectors in an objective manner. The State Government shall complete the entire exercise of delimitation on or before 31.12.2025. 224.3 In view of the adjudication made and conclusion drawn in Part-C of the judgment, the writ petitions challenging the process of delimitation/change of boundaries of the municipal wards in absence of change of census or change in the number of wards or change in the territorial boundaries of the municipality, are allowed. The respondents are directed not to effect any change in the internal boundaries of the municipal wards in such cases. Consequently, D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.1005/2025 (State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs Narayan Singh Solanki & Ors.) filed for challenging the interim order dated 11.06.2025, is hereby dismissed. 224.4 In view of the adjudication made and conclusion drawn in Part-D of the judgment, the writ petitions challenging removal of Panchayat Samiti Member / Pradhan, on account of delimitation of respective areas / wards, are hereby dismissed. 224.5 In view of the adjudication made and conclusion drawn in Part-E of the judgment, the writ petitions relating to appointment of the administrator, are dismissed. 224.6 In view of the adjudication made and conclusion drawn in Part-F of the judgment, the writ petitions praying for fixing/nominating the village headquarter are dismissed. 224.5 In view of the adjudication made and conclusion drawn in Part-E of the judgment, the writ petitions relating to appointment of the administrator, are dismissed. 224.6 In view of the adjudication made and conclusion drawn in Part-F of the judgment, the writ petitions praying for fixing/nominating the village headquarter are dismissed. 224.7 In view of the adjudication made and conclusion drawn in Part-G of the judgment, D. B. Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No.4686/2025 [Sanyam Lodha Vs. State of Rajasthan] as well as D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1285/2025 (Giriraj Singh Devanda vs. State of Rajasthan & ors.) praying for a direction for holding the elections of Municipality or Panchayati Raj Institutions, respectively, are disposed of with a direction to the State Government that after completing the delimitation exercise, elections of all the Local Self Bodies i.e. Panchayats as well as Municipality, shall immediately be conducted simultaneously and the entire exercise for such elections shall be completed on or before 15.04.2026. 224.8 To promote the spirit of ‘Save Paper – Save Environment’, the Registry of this Court is directed that, while placing a copy of this judgment in concerned files as well as while processing applications for issuance of certified copies of this judgment pertaining to any specific writ petition or special appeal, it shall issue a certified copy comprising the first page of the judgment, the relevant page showing the cause title of the respective writ petition/special appeal, and the full text of the judgment beginning from Page No.288 of this judgment. 224.9 Stay applications and all pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. 224.10A copy of this judgment shall be kept in each connected file.