JUDGMENT : ROBIN PHUKAN, J. 1. Heard Ms. S. Sarma, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. R.P. Sarma, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. N.N. Upadhyay, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. In this appeal, under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellants have put to challenge the judgment and decree dated 03.05.2017, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Dibrugarh ("first appellate Court" for short), in Title Appeal No. 41/2006. 3. It is to be noted here that vide impugned judgment and decree dated 03.05.2017, the learned first appellate court had affirmed the judgment and decree dated 30.06.2006, passed by the learned Munsiff No. 1, Dibrugarh ("trial Court" for short), in Title Suit No. 49/2000, where by the suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed. 4. For the sake of convenience and to avoid confusion, the parties herein are referred to in the same status as they appeared in the suit. Background Facts:- 5. The background facts, leading to filing of the RSA No. 144/2018, are adumbrated herein below:- “Late Abdul Rahim, the father of the plaintiffs was a resident of Silchar, Cachar and he came to Dibrugarh in the year 1940 and started various businesses including the contract work at Dibrugarh, under E & D Department. Thereafter, on 01.11.1969, he purchased a plot of land, measuring one Bigha, at Gabharu Pather Ward, under Dibrugarh Town Mouza and filled up the same with earth and constructed two barrack typed kutcha houses to provide accommodation to his labourers and maintain his office. Subsequently, he purchased another plot of land, measuring one Bigha, from the vendor, namely, Mazahar Hussain, in the year 1972, and the same was contiguous to the earlier plot of land and being contiguous, both the plots formed a single block. Thereafter, the name of the father of the plaintiffs, was mutated in the revenue records and the Holding Number was also re-numbered in his favour by Dibrugarh Municipal Board. Thereafter, in the year 1976, when the rooms were not required for the labourers, he leased out 2 rooms of the barrack, to one Monohar Ali and another room to Musstt. Phul Begum. When Monohar Ali vacated his part of the tenanted premises, the said room was also taken over by Musstt. Phul Begum at an enhanced rate. Thereafter, in the year 1976, when the rooms were not required for the labourers, he leased out 2 rooms of the barrack, to one Monohar Ali and another room to Musstt. Phul Begum. When Monohar Ali vacated his part of the tenanted premises, the said room was also taken over by Musstt. Phul Begum at an enhanced rate. Thereafter, due to non-payment of the bills by the Department, in the year 1977 said Abdul Rahim approached the defendant Abdur Rahman (since deceased) for a loan of Rs. 20,000/ to complete the contract work on 23.02.1977, with the condition that the Sale Deed, by which Abdul Rahim had purchased the suit land, would be kept with him as security. It was also agreed upon that whatever bills that would be received by Abdul Rahim, would be given to the defendant Abdur Rahman and the said Abdur Rahman would be entitled to a share of 2 annas per rupee of the profit of the contract job financed by him. It is the contention of the plaintiffs that their father had received a sum of Rs. 14,000/- from the defendant and after returning a sum of Rs. 2,000/-, he could not return the remaining amount of Rs. 12,000/- because of non-receipt of bills from the Government and when the plaintiff No. 1, Md. Nurul Islam, started to look after the contract work of his father and started the contract work in his name, due to financial problem he also approached the defendant Abdur Rahman for a sum of Rs. 3,000/- as a loan and thereupon, on 25.07.1977, the plaintiff No. 1 entered into a separate agreement with the defendant Abdur Rahman to return the sum of Rs. 3,000/- along with the outstanding of Rs. 12,000/- and in the new agreement, it was agreed that the defendant would be entitled to a share of Rs. 20/- per Rs. 100/- on the profit of the contract. Thereafter, in the year 1982, Abdul Rahim had to go to Silchar for some unavoidable family problem and stayed there till 1987. During that period the plaintiff No. 1, returned a sum of Rs. 8,500/- to the defendant Abdur Rahman, but could not return the entire amount, because he had to provide medical treatment to his grand-father and also to solemnize the marriage of his younger brother, namely, Tazal Islam. During that period the plaintiff No. 1, returned a sum of Rs. 8,500/- to the defendant Abdur Rahman, but could not return the entire amount, because he had to provide medical treatment to his grand-father and also to solemnize the marriage of his younger brother, namely, Tazal Islam. Thereafter, in the month of March, 1989 the plaintiff No.1 had finalized the accounts with the defendant Abdur Rahman, in presence of his father Abdul Rahim, to the effect that a sum of Rs. 15,000/- would be paid to the defendant as a full and final settlement of the dues and it was agreed that the defendant would collect the monthly rent from the tenant Musstt. Phul Begum, till the entire dues of Rs. 15,000/- is adjusted. Accordingly, said Abdur Rahman started collecting the monthly rent from the tenant Phul Begum and when Abdul Rahim realized that Abdur Rahman already took a sum of Rs. 16,810/- from Musstt. Phul Begum, instead of Rs. 15,000/- then the matter was taken up with Abdur Rahman and the same end up with exchange of some heated words and since then, his relationship with Abdur Rahman was not good. It is the further contention of the plaintiffs that from the month of November, 1996, Musstt. Phul Begum started paying monthly rent to Abdul Rahim and after his death on 07.04.1998, the plaintiffs have been receiving the rents from her, and in the month of April, 2000, they came to know that the defendant Abdur Rahman filed a title suit, being Title Suit No. 27/2000 against Musstt. Phul Begum for recovery of tenanted house and recovery of arrear rent of Rs. 9,000/- and accordingly, they had inquired about the same and came to know that the defendant Abdur Rahman claimed the ownership of the suit properties by virtue of Sale Deed, executed on 29.03.1978. They also came to know that defendant Abdur Rahman got his name mutated in the revenue records and Municipal Holding Number of the house premises, standing over their land, was also allotted in favour of Abdur Rahman. They also came to know that defendant Abdur Rahman got his name mutated in the revenue records and Municipal Holding Number of the house premises, standing over their land, was also allotted in favour of Abdur Rahman. Thereafter, the plaintiffs, being the heirs and successors of Late Abdul Rahim, filed a suit, being Title Suit No. 49/2000, praying for :- (a) declaration the Sale Deed dated 29.03.1978 in favour of the defendant and allegedly executed by Late Abdul Rahim is a fraudulent, invalid, void and inoperative deed and that the defendant did not acquire any right, title, interest by the said fraudulent deed dated 29.03.1978 on the suit land; (b) for cancellation of the Sale Deed dated 29.03.1978 registered by the Sub-Registrar, Dibrugarh; (c) for cancellation of the mutation granted on the record of rights on 27.03.1984; (d) for cancellation of mutation in the assessment Register of Dibrugarh Municipality against holding No. 45 of Gabharupathar Ward No. 18; (e) cost of the suits; (f) any other relief or reliefs as in law or equity the plaintiffs are found entitle. Thereafter, on receipt of summon, the defendant entered appearance and had filed written statement and contested the case. The plea taken by the defendant in the written statement is that the suit is not maintainable in law and in facts and it is false and baseless and it is barred by principles of limitation, waiver, estoppels, etc. and that there is no cause of action. Another stand taken by the defendant is that he had purchased the suit land from Abdul Rahim by executing a registered sale deed and thereafter, in due course of time, the suit land along with the houses standing over the suit land were mutated in his name by the Dibrugarh Municipality Board. It is also stated that Musstt. Phul Begum came to occupy the rented premises under him from April, 1989 and since then she became a defaulter and he filed the Title Suit No. 27/2000 for her eviction and recovery of arrear rent. Upon the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court had framed the following issues:- (1) Whether the suit is maintainable in law and in facts? (2) Whether the suit is barred by the principles of limitation, waiver, estoppels and acquisition? (3) Is there any cause of action? (4) Whether the plaintiff has right to sue? Upon the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court had framed the following issues:- (1) Whether the suit is maintainable in law and in facts? (2) Whether the suit is barred by the principles of limitation, waiver, estoppels and acquisition? (3) Is there any cause of action? (4) Whether the plaintiff has right to sue? (5) Whether the defendant is the bonafide purchaser of the suit land and he is the absolute owner of the suit land? (6) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any reliefs as claimed? 7) Whether the plaintiffs have right, title and interest over the suit land? Thereafter, taking the evidence adduced by the parties and also hearing learned counsel for both the parties, the learned trial Court, vide judgment and decree dated 30.06.2006, had dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. Being aggrieved, the plaintiffs had preferred an appeal, being Title Appeal No. 41/2006, before the learned first appellate Court and after hearing both the parties, the learned first appellate Court, vide judgment and decree, dated 03.05.2017, had upheld the decree, so passed by the learned trial Court.” 6. Being aggrieved, the plaintiffs approached this Court by filing the present second appeal, which was admitted vide order dated 11.06.2018, on the following substantial question of law:- Whether the finding of the learned Court below to the effect that the sale deed, dated 29.03.1978, was more than 22 years old and therefore, a presumption under section 90 of the EVIDENCE ACT , 1872 could be drawn in its favour is vitiated by perversity? Submissions:- 7. Ms. Sarma, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the presumption under Section 90 of the EVIDENCE ACT is available when the document is 30 years old and produced from proper custody and this presumption is not about the contents of the document concerned and notwithstanding the available presumption, the party concerned is not relieved from proving the content of the same by adducing evidence. She also submits that since the Sale Deed herein is of only 22 years old the presumption is not available and besides the content of the Sale Deed, which was admittedly not produced during the course of trial, had not been proved in accordance with the provision of Section 67 of the EVIDENCE ACT . 7.1. She also submits that since the Sale Deed herein is of only 22 years old the presumption is not available and besides the content of the Sale Deed, which was admittedly not produced during the course of trial, had not been proved in accordance with the provision of Section 67 of the EVIDENCE ACT . 7.1. Referring to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Bhutkani Nath and Others vs. Mt. Kamaleswari Nath and Another , AIR 1972 Assam and Nagaland 15 , Mr. Sarma submits that when execution of a document is challenged, its registration is not sufficient proof of its due execution and in such a case, proof of execution complying with Section 67 of the EVIDENCE ACT is required. But, due execution of the sale deed Exhibit-25/Exhibit – Ka, was not proved by the defendants. 7.2. Ms. Sarma has referred to another decision of this Court, in the case of Lourembam Heramot Singh vs. Laisram Angahal Singh and Others , AIR 1979 Gauhati 68 and submits that mere registration is not proof of execution; execution and contents must be proved in ordinary way and mere proof of admission of execution before Registrar is not enough. 7.3. Referring to another decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Balwant Singh and Another vs. Daulat Singh (Dead) by LRs. and Others , (1997) 7 SCC 137 , Ms. Sarma submits that though the property was mutated in the name of the respondents herein, yet, the mutation of property in the revenue record will not extinguish the title, nor it has any presumptive value on title. 7.4. Under such count, Ms. Sarma submits that if registration of the property in the name of the respondent/defendant was done on the basis of the sale deed, the sale deed has to be proved in accordance with Section 67 of the EVIDENCE ACT , mere registration is not enough and that the mutation of the name of the respondents in the revenue record and in the record of the Municipal Board, will not confer any right. 7.5. Referring to paragraph No. 10.9 of the judgment of the learned first appellant Court, Ms. 7.5. Referring to paragraph No. 10.9 of the judgment of the learned first appellant Court, Ms. Sarma submits that the plaintiffs did not bring any of the official witnesses from the office of the Sub- Registrar or from the Circle Office or from Dibrugarh Municipal Board to show that the registration or mutation or corrections were done following the procedure established by law. But, the defendant could not produce any such evidence to prove the sale deed and in absence of any such proof, merely exhibiting the document, which is less than 30 years old, cannot be held to be proved. 7.6. Referring to paragraph No. 11.1 of the judgment of the learned first appellant Court, Ms. Sarma submits that the P.W.3, Sri Suchomoni (sic Sushamoi) Mazumdar, in his evidence, had identified the signature of Abdul Rahim in the sale deed as Exhibit – Ka(1) and mere identification of the signature on the sale deed, by a witness, is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of Section 67 of the EVIDENCE ACT on a document which is less than 30 years old. 7.7. Ms. Sarma, further submits that in view of the two decisions of this Court and of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the finding, so recorded by the learned first appellate Court, is perverse and on such count, the same is liable to be interfered with and therefore, it is contended to allow this appeal. 8. Per-contra, Mr. Sarma, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the respondents, submits that the scope of this Court to exercise the power under Section 100 of the CPC, is circumscribed and it cannot go beyond the provision and the same is stated in several cases, including the case of Gurdev Kaur and Others vs. Kaki and Others , (2007) 1 SCC 546 , wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court is not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact and in doing so, the High Court cannot go beyond the scope of Section 100 of the CPC. And in the said case, the Apex Court had the privilege of relying upon various judgments of Privy Council and its earlier decisions. 8.1 Mr. And in the said case, the Apex Court had the privilege of relying upon various judgments of Privy Council and its earlier decisions. 8.1 Mr. Sarma has referred to another decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Madhavan Nair vs. Bhaskar Pillai , (2005) 10 SCC 553 , wherein it is stated that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent finding of facts and it is well settled that even if the first appellate court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. 8.2 Referring to another decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of H.P. Pyarejan vs. Dasappa , (2006) 2 SCC 496 , delivered on 06.2.2006, Mr. Sarma submits that the Apex Court had found serious infirmity in the judgment of the High Court and observed that it suffers from the vice of exercise of jurisdiction which did not vest in the High Court and under Section 100 of the CPC, the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the judgments of the courts below is confined to hearing on substantial questions of law and interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it invokes re-appreciation of evidence and thereafter, it has held that the impugned judgment of the High Court was vulnerable and accordingly, set aside the same. 8.3. Mr. Sarma also submits that the primary question in the instant case is that whether the Exhibit – "Ka" being Sale Deed No. 1094, dated 29.03.1978, by which the predecessor in interest of the respondents had purchased the land from the predecessor in interest of the appellants in 1978 is 30 years old. But, the date of filing of both the suits is in the year 2000 and therefore, the said sale deed is only 22 years old and as such, the question of law, as urged and framed by this Court is substantially not maintainable and there is no sufficient reason to interfere with the finding of facts of both the learned courts below and thereafter, it is contended to dismiss the same. Discussion and Findings of this Court:- 9. Discussion and Findings of this Court:- 9. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, I have carefully gone through the memo of appeal as well as the substantial question of law so framed by this Court and also perused the judgments and decrees, so passed by both the learned courts below. 10. Before a discussion is directed into the substantial question of law, so formulated herein this case, this Court deemed it appropriate to address the contention of Mr. Sarma, the learned counsel for the respondents as Mr. Sarma, who has questioned about the maintainability of this appeal, in view of concurrent finding of facts by both the learned Courts below. 11. It is well settled in catena of decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court that in second appeal, under Section 100 of the CPC, the High court cannot interfere with the concurrent finding of fact by the learned trial Court as well as the learned first appellate Court. Mr. Sarma has rightly pointed this out during the course of hearing and the decisions (i) Gurdev Kaur (supra) (ii) Madhavan Nair (supra) (iii) H.P. Pyarejan (supra) referred by him also strengthened his submission. 11.1 But, this appears to be not the absolute proposition of law. It is also well settled in the case of Krishnan vs. Backiam , reported in (2007) 12 SCC 190 and also in the case of Gurvachan Kaur vs. Salikram , (2010) 15 SCC 530 , that the first appellate court, under Section 96 of the CPC is typically the last court of fact, and if the finding is perverse, then the High Court can re-evaluate factual findings. 11.2 Again in the case of Hira Lal v. Gajjan , (1990) 3 SCC 285 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "8. … If in dealing with a question of fact the lower appellate court has placed the onus on wrong party and its finding of fact is the result substantially of this wrong approach that may be regarded as a defect in procedure. When the first appellate court discarded the evidence as inadmissible and the High Court is satisfied that the evidence was admissible that may introduce an error or defect in procedure. When the first appellate court discarded the evidence as inadmissible and the High Court is satisfied that the evidence was admissible that may introduce an error or defect in procedure. So also in a case where the court below ignored the weight of evidence and allowed the judgment to be influenced by inconsequential matters, the High Court would be justified in re-appreciating the evidence and coming to its own independent decision…." 11.3. In Kulwant Kaur vs. Gurdial Singh Mann , (2001) 4 SCC 262 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with the limited leeway available to the High Court in second appeal as under in Para 34: "34. Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity vis-a-vis the concept of justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication -- what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. In this context reference be had to Section 103 of the Code which reads as below: 103. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication -- what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. In this context reference be had to Section 103 of the Code which reads as below: 103. Power of High Court to determine issues of fact.- In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal: (a) which has not been determined by the lower appellate court or by both the court of first instance and the lower appellate court, (b) which has been wrongly determined by such court or courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Section 100 ." The requirements stand specified in Section 103 and nothing short of it will bring it within the ambit of Section 100 since the issue of perversity will also come within the ambit of substantial question of law as noticed above. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. We reiterate however, that there must be a definite finding to that effect in the judgment of the High Court so as to make it evident that Section 100 of the Code stands complied with." 14. In S.R. Tiwari v. Union of India (2013) 6 SCC 602 , after referring to the decisions of this Court, starting with Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, (1984) 4 SCC 635 , it was held at para 30: (S.R.Tewari case, SCC p. 615). "30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/ inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence" or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. [Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. (1984) 4 SCC 635 , Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 , Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P. (2009) 10 SCC 636 and Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 ]" 12. In the instant second appeal, the ground for challenging the judgment of the learned first appellate court, is "perversity" in respect of the finding, so recorded by the learned first appellate Court, that the sale deed, dated 29.03.1978, was more than 30 years old and therefore, a presumption under Section 90 of the EVIDENCE ACT , 1872 is available. And this second appeal was also admitted on the ground of "perversity" in recording a finding by the learned first appellate Court that the Sale Deed dated 29.03.1978, is of more than 30 years old, formulating a substantial question of law on the same. 12.1. Thus, in view of above, and also in view of the proposition of law laid down in the case of (i) Krishnan (supra) (ii) Gurvachan Kaur (supra), (iii) Hira Lal (supra) and (iv) Kulwant Kaur (supra), this Court is unable to record concurrence with the submission of Mr. Sarma, learned senior counsel for the respondents, that as there is concurrent finding of facts by both the learned Courts below, this Court cannot interfere with the same and take a different view, and can substitute the view of learned courts below. This Court under Section 100 of the CPC can certainly interfere with the concurrent finding of fact on the ground of "perversity" and factual finding. 13. This Court under Section 100 of the CPC can certainly interfere with the concurrent finding of fact on the ground of "perversity" and factual finding. 13. Now, let it be seen how the Courts below arrived at the finding by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/ inadmissible material or the same is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality, or is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it. In order to appreciate the same, this Court deemed it appropriate to briefly refer the relevant portion of the judgment of both the courts below as under:- Finding recorded by the learned Trial Court:- 14. The learned trial Court, having discussed the evidence of P.W.- 1-Nurul Islam, P.W.-2 - Phul Begum, PW 3 - Sushamoi Mazumdar and P.W.-4 - Safia Khatoon, and also of D.W.1- Abdur Rahman, had held that: the introspection of evidence on record of PW 1 to PW 4 and DW 1, it appears that the plaintiffs claimed the suit land to purchase the suit land by their father Abdul Rahim and Phul Begum was heir tenant. Ext. 2 the copy of the sale deed to purchase the land and Ext. 7, Ext. 54 and 55 are land revenue paid receipt, Ext. 40 to 53 are the rent receipt issued to Phul Begum, Ext. 5 the money receipt, Ext. 3 jamabandi. Ext 1 and 2, the certified copies of sale deed and Ext 3 the certified copy of jamabandi. The plaintiffs have stated nowhere in the plaint or in the evidence that primary evidences i.e. the original of the sale deed are of within reach. No explanation is given for non production of the said deed. Jamabandi Ext. 3 is also not duly produced. In spite of absence of primary evidence Abdul Rahim cannot be said that he is the owner of the suit land as the defendant has rebutting the ownership of the land till he purchased in the year 1978 by a registered sale deed. 14.1. The learned trial Court also held that: DW 1 Abdul Rahim, the defendant has stated in his evidence that he purchased the suit land vide registered sale deed No.94 of 1978, Ext. Ka(1) is the said sale deed. 14.1. The learned trial Court also held that: DW 1 Abdul Rahim, the defendant has stated in his evidence that he purchased the suit land vide registered sale deed No.94 of 1978, Ext. Ka(1) is the said sale deed. DW 1 has also stated that the suit land was mutated in his name Ext. Ka(2) is the Jamabandi (certified copy). Ext. Ka (3) to Ka (1) the rent receipts, Ex. Ka 12 to Ka (62) the municipality tax paid receipts, Ext Ka (63), the municipality holding. The sale deed namely Ext. Ka (1) is original one. 14.2. The learned trial Court also held that: the plaintiffs PW 1 stated that the sale deed is a forged one. Though the plaintiffs' side has stated that the sale deed is a forgery one but, they have done nothing except stating that the sale deed was forged. Sec. 102 of EVIDENCE ACT provides - "The burden of proof in a suit or in a proceeding lies on that person who wholly fails if no evidence at all were given on either side. Again Sec. 103 of EVIDENCE ACT provides: "The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is providing by any one that the proof of that fact shall be on any particular person." 14.3. The learned trial Court had also held that: "here in this case the plaintiffs have stated that Abdul Rahim did not execute the sale deed Ext. Ka (1), and it is a forgery one. But the plaintiffs have done nothing to prove that it was a forgery one. Rather, PW 3 Suchmoi Majumdar has admitted in his evidence that the signature on the sale deed Ext. Ka (1) is of Abdul Rahim, the father of the plaintiffs. PW 2 Phul Begum has also stated that she paid rent of the house over the suit land from 1989 to 1996. But, the plaintiffs failed to prove that the Phul Begum was asked to pay rent to Abdur Rahman by Abdul Rahim for realization of debt. No documentary evidence is given by the plaintiffs in this regard. The plaintiffs' side has stated in their evidence (PW 1) that they do not know the holding number of the house over the suit land, as they pay tax. No documentary evidence is given by the plaintiffs in this regard. The plaintiffs' side has stated in their evidence (PW 1) that they do not know the holding number of the house over the suit land, as they pay tax. Rather, the defendant side has exhibited the municipality tax paid receipts. Ext. Ka (12) to Ext. Ka (62) shows the possession of the defendant over the suit land also clear." 14.4. Thereafter, the learned trial Court had held that: "Sec. 110 of EVIDENCE ACT provides "when the question is whether any lessor is owner of anything of which he shown to be in possession the burden of proving that he is the owner is on the person who affirms that he is the owner." In their case instant, the plaintiffs' sides fail to prove that the suit land is in their possession. Possession has an evidentiary value and creates a presumption. The man in possession starts with a presumption of title in his favour. While the municipality holding is the name of the defendant document, receiving the rent from the tenant, paid land revenue and also paid municipality tax, so possession by the defendant over the suit land is not rebuttable." 14.5. The learned trial Court also held that: "considering above all aspects, I come into correlation that the plaintiffs have no right, over the suit land. Accordingly, the issue (issue No. 7) is decided against the plaintiffs." 14.6. Thereafter, the learned trial Court had decided all the issues in against the plaintiffs and had passed the following order:- Order:- 1. The suit of the plaintiffs is dismissed. 2. The suit is disposed of on contest with no cost. 3. Let decree be prepared accordingly. Finding recorded by the learned first appellate Court:- 15. It also appears that the learned first appellate Court, in respect of the main issue i.e. whether the Sale Deed No.1094 of 1978 was forged or not, had recorded its finding as under:- "10.7. In the case in hand, admittedly the registration of the sale deed was executed in the year 1978 and thereafter the mutation/corrections in the revenue/municipal records were done. As the plaintiffs challenged the sale deed and mutation etc. it is their duty to produce the convincing materials so that the sale deed and other corrections were done without following the procedure established by law. 10.8. As the plaintiffs challenged the sale deed and mutation etc. it is their duty to produce the convincing materials so that the sale deed and other corrections were done without following the procedure established by law. 10.8. The P.W's in their evidence reiterated that their predecessor Abdul Rahim did not execute the Sale deed in favour of the original defendant Abdul (sic Abdur) Rahman. Similarly, the D.W.s also in their oral evidence contended that the land was sold by Abdul Rahim. It is the established principle of law that documentary evidence precedes oral evidence. And, therefore, the Court is bound to decide the issue on the basis of documents as produced by the parties. 10.9. The plaintiffs did not bring any of the official witnesses from the office of the Sub- registrar or from the Circle Office or from Dibrugarh Municipal Board to show that the registration or mutation or corrections were done without following the procedure established by law. The defendant (SIC-plaintiffs) could not produce any such evidence to rebut the presumption on the sale deed. In the absence of any such proof, in my considered view, the document which is more than 30 years old, cannot be held as a forged one. 11. The learned Senior Advocate referred to a decision of the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in the case of Bhutkani Nath and others vs. Mt. Kamaleswari Nath, AIR 1972, Assam & Nagaland, 15 wherein the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court held in para 6 - "It is, however, well settled that when the execution of a document is being challenged, the certificate of registration alone will not be sufficient proof of the due execution of the document. The registration does not dispense with the necessity of proof of execution when the same is denied. It is true that a sale deed is not required by law to be attested, even then, proof of execution of a sale deed, when it is denied, will have to be furnished as in the case of any other document/s under Section 67 of the EVIDENCE ACT ." 11.1. On perusal of the evidence it appears that the P.W.3- Sri Suchomoi Mazumdar, in his evidence identified the signature of Abdul Rahim in the sale deed as Exhibit Ka (1). On perusal of the evidence it appears that the P.W.3- Sri Suchomoi Mazumdar, in his evidence identified the signature of Abdul Rahim in the sale deed as Exhibit Ka (1). Identification of the signature on the sale deed by an independent witness is sufficient to comply with the requirement of Section 67 of the Indian EVIDENCE ACT on a document which is more than 30 years old. It is put on record that the original sale deed is lying exhibited as Ext. 9 in the connected Title Suit No. 27 of 2000. 11.2. Apart from the above, it is transparent on the record that Musstt. Phul Begum who has been in occupation of the two rooms standing over the suit land paid rent to Abdul (sic Abdur) Rahman from 1989 to 1996 (with a variation of month) and that aspect has been broadly discussed in the connected Title Appeal No. 39/06. The plaintiffs contended that their father Abdul Rahim entrusted Abdul (sic Abdur) Rahman to collect rents from the tenant Phul Begum. The same is supported by Phul Begum in her evidence also, but there is no written document in this regard in between the parties. To the contrary, the defendant side contended that Phul Begum was a tenant under Abdur Rahman and since she failed to pay the rents from the month of September, 1996, she is a defaulter. For that reason the Title Suit No. 27/2000 and subsequent Title Appeal No. 39/06, are already registered and disposed off simultaneously wherein it has been concluded that the said Phul Begum was a tenant under the defendant Abdul Rahim and not under the predecessor of the plaintiffs Abdur Rahman. To maintain brevity, the details are not discussed herein. 11.3. In view of foregoing discussions, considering the 'preponderance of probability' into account, I am of the considered view to hold that the plaintiffs/ appellants have failed to discharge their burden to prove that the sale deed No. 1094/78 was a forged one. Similarly, I am of the considered view to hold that the plaintiffs have no right, title or interest over the suit land, rather, the defendant Abdur Rahman is the bona-fide purchaser thereof. 16. Thus, it appears that both the learned courts below had arrived at their respective findings based upon the following facts and circumstances. Similarly, I am of the considered view to hold that the plaintiffs have no right, title or interest over the suit land, rather, the defendant Abdur Rahman is the bona-fide purchaser thereof. 16. Thus, it appears that both the learned courts below had arrived at their respective findings based upon the following facts and circumstances. (i) In view of Section 103 of the EVIDENCE ACT , the burden of proof of a particular fact lies upon the person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence and the plaintiffs had done nothing to prove that Exhibit – ‘Ka’, which is the Sale Deed No. 1094 of 1978, is a forged document. (ii) The defendant had proved the Sale Deed-Exhibit-25/Exhibit – ‘Ka’ (iii) P.W.3-Sri Suchomoi Mazumdar had identified the signature of Abdul Rahim in the sale deed as Exhibit Ka (1) and that identification of the signature on the sale deed by an independent witness is sufficient to comply with the requirement of Section 67 of the Indian EVIDENCE ACT . (iv) That Exhibit-25/Exhibit-Ka (1) is more than 30 years old. (v) The original sale deed is lying exhibited as Ext. 9 in the connected Title Suit No. 27 of 2000. (vi) The plaintiffs could not state the Holding Number of the house over the suit land, whereas the defendant side has exhibited the municipality tax paid receipts as Exhibit – Ka (12) to Exhibit – Ka (62), which shows the possession of the defendant over the suit land. 17. Thus, the finding of the learned first appellate Court that document i.e. Sale Deed, dated 29.03.1978, is more than 30 years old and the same cannot be held as a forged one and that the original Sale Deed is lying as Exhibit-9, in connection with Title Suit No. 27 of 2000, had influenced the outcome of the first appeal, by which, it had upheld the dismissal of the suit of the plaintiffs by the learned trial court. 17.1. However, the record of learned Courts below reveals that the alleged Sale Deed was executed in the year 1978. And the Title Suit No. 49/2000 was instituted in the year 2000. And at the time of institution of the suit, the document was only of 22 years old. 17.1. However, the record of learned Courts below reveals that the alleged Sale Deed was executed in the year 1978. And the Title Suit No. 49/2000 was instituted in the year 2000. And at the time of institution of the suit, the document was only of 22 years old. That being so, the finding of the learned first appellate Court that Exhibit- 25/Exhibit-Ka is more than 30 years old and as such, it cannot be held to be forged, is not based upon any admissible evidence, as is apparent from the impugned judgment of the learned first appellate Court. While admittedly the original copy of the said Sale Deed was not produced before the learned trial court in the Title Suit No. 49/2000, as is apparent from the finding the learned first appellate Court that the same is lying as Exhibit-9 in the connected Title Suit No. 27 of 2000. Moreover, the Sale Deed No. 1094 dated 29.03.1978, was never exhibited as Exhibit – 9 in Title Suit No. 27/2000. Thus, in view of the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (i) Hira Lal (supra) and in (ii) Kulwant Kaur (supra) the finding of the learned first appellate Court appears to be a perverse finding. 17.2. It is worth mentioning in this context that the presumption under Section 90 of the EVIDENCE ACT is available when the document is proved to be 30 years old and is produced from proper custody which the Court in any particular case considers proper and the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purport to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person's handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested. This presumption is only in respect of genuineness of a document (i.e., existence or handwriting), not truth of contents. Therefore, besides truth, the contents of the documents also have to be proved by cogent evidence. 17.3. This Court in Paramesh Sarmah & Ors. Vs. Islamali & Ors., 2000 (3) GLT 4536 in para-9 has held as under: "9. This presumption is only in respect of genuineness of a document (i.e., existence or handwriting), not truth of contents. Therefore, besides truth, the contents of the documents also have to be proved by cogent evidence. 17.3. This Court in Paramesh Sarmah & Ors. Vs. Islamali & Ors., 2000 (3) GLT 4536 in para-9 has held as under: "9. The condition on which the execution of a document may presume for:- (1) That it must have been existed for 30 years or more; (2) It must be produced in court from proper custody. The document must be in appearance free from suspicion and doubt; (3) It must be in a handwriting of a person and should not be anonymous. Generally there is no presumption about recitals in ancient document, but in special circumstances a recital of consideration, legal necessity, etc., may be presumed under S. 90...................." 17.4. Further, in case of Huidrom Achou Singh Vs. Thokchom Ningol Ningthemcha Ongbi Idempishak Devi and others , 1986 (1) Gau LR 98, dealing with Section 90 of the EVIDENCE ACT held as under:- " Section 90 of the India EVIDENCE ACT deals with presumption as to documents thirty years old. Under it where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that, the signature and every other part of such document which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person's handwriting and, in case of document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the person by whom it purports to be executed and documents are said to be proper custody if they are in the place in which; and under the case of the person with whom, they would naturally be ; but no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin, or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. The content of a document has different aspects. So far as handwriting is concerned, under Section 90 the presumption is that it was written by the scribe. So far as the truth of the contents is concerned, it is to be proved by evidence. The content of a document has different aspects. So far as handwriting is concerned, under Section 90 the presumption is that it was written by the scribe. So far as the truth of the contents is concerned, it is to be proved by evidence. This section was designed to meet situations of varying character, where passage of time might have obliterated the proof of the genuineness of any disputed document and wide powers are conferred on the Court. The Section only says that the Court may raise the presumption mentioned in it, not that it must do so, and the expression "may presume" ought generally to be construed in the more rigorous of the senses allowed by Section 4 of the Act. The presumption is rebuttable. The Court must examine the surrounding circumstances tending to establish the connection of the party producing the document with the person with whom the document should naturally have been." 17.5. Moreover, this presumption is not available when document is a certified copy. Reference in this context can be made to a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lakhi Baruah vs. Padma Kanta Kalita , (1996) 8 SCC 357 , wherein with regard to admissibility in evidence of thirty years old documents produced from proper custody, it was observed as under:- "16. So far as applicability of presumption arising from Section 90 of the EVIDENCE ACT , 1872 in respect of copy of the old document is concerned, the earliest decision of the Indian Court was made in 1880 in Khetter Chunder Mookerjee v. Khetter Paul Sreeterutno [ILR (1879-1880) 5 Cal 886 : 6 CLR 199]. Later on, in the decisions of various High Courts the presumption under Section 90 was also made applicable to the certified copy. The Privy Council, upon review of the authorities, however, did not accept the decision rendered in Khetter [ILR (1879-1880) 5 Cal 886: 6 CLR 199] and other decisions of the High Court, where the presumption was attached also to copies, as correct. It was indicated that in view of the clear language of Section 90 the production of the particular document would be necessary for applying the statutory presumption under Section 90 . It was indicated that in view of the clear language of Section 90 the production of the particular document would be necessary for applying the statutory presumption under Section 90 . If the document produced was a copy admitted under Section 65 as secondary evidence and it was produced from proper custody and was over thirty years old, then the signature authenticating the copy might be presumed to be genuine; but production of the copy was not sufficient to justify the presumption of due execution of the original under Section 90 . In this connection, reference may be made to the decisions in Seethayya v. Subramanya Somayajulu [(1928-29) 56 IA 146: AIR 1929 PC 115 ] and Basant Singh v. Brij Raj Saran Singh [ AIR 1935 PC 132 : 1935 All LJ 847 : 39 CWN 1057 : 62 IA 180] . In view of these Privy Council decisions, disproving the applicability of presumption under Section 90 to the copy or the certified copy of an old document, in the subsequent decisions of the High Courts, it has been consistently held by different High Courts that production of a copy or a certified copy does not raise the presumption under Section 90 . 17. The position since the aforesaid Privy Council decisions being followed by later decisions of different High Courts, is that presumption under Section 90 does not apply to a copy or a certified copy even though thirty years old; but if a foundation is laid for the admission of secondary evidence under Section 63 of the EVIDENCE ACT , 1872 by proof of loss or destruction of the original and the copy which is thirty years old is produced from proper custody, then only the signature authenticating the copy may under Section 90 be presumed to be genuine. 18. In the facts of this case, the presumption under Section 90 was not available on the certified copy produced by the defendants and, in our view, the High Court is justified in refusing to give such presumption in favour of the defendants. We may also indicate that it is the discretion of the court to refuse to give such presumption in favour of a party, if otherwise, there is occasion to doubt due execution of the document in question. We may also indicate that it is the discretion of the court to refuse to give such presumption in favour of a party, if otherwise, there is occasion to doubt due execution of the document in question. The plaintiffs' definite case was that the deed of sale in favour of Holiram was a forged and fabricated document. In the aforesaid facts, there was a requirement to produce the original copy so that the question of due execution by Plaintiff 1 could have been contested by the parties. 18. As held herein above, in the instant case the Sale Deed No.1094 is of dated 29.03.1978. And the Title Suit No. 49/2000 was filed in the year 2000, and as such the Sale Deed was of only 22 years old. And that being so, the presumption under Section 90 of the EVIDENCE ACT , is not available here in this case. 19. Notwithstanding, the Sale Deed being 22 years old or of 30 years old, so far as the truth of the contents of the Sale Deed is concerned, the same has to be proved by evidence as discussed herein above and as held in the case of Huidrom Achou Singh & Another (supra) . Now, what left to be seen is whether the parties had succeeded in proving the same. 20. It is to be noted here that in the case of Anil Rishi vs. Gurbaksh Singh , (2006) 5 SCC 558 , Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the burden of proof, has held as under:- "8. The initial burden of proof would be on the plaintiff in view of Section 101 of the EVIDENCE ACT , which reads as under: 101. Burden of proof.- Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person." 9. In terms of the said provision, the burden of proving the fact rests on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative issues and not the party who denies it. The said rule may not be universal in its application and there may be an exception thereto. In terms of the said provision, the burden of proving the fact rests on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative issues and not the party who denies it. The said rule may not be universal in its application and there may be an exception thereto. The learned trial court and the High Court proceeded on the basis that the defendant was in a dominating position and there had been a fiduciary relationship between the parties. The appellant in his written statement denied and disputed the said averments made in the plaint. 20.1. In the instant case, it is the plaintiffs, who had taken a stand that the Sale Deed No. 1094 Exhibit - 25/Exhibit- "Ka" is a forged document and as such, the burden of proof, under Section 101 of the EVIDENCE ACT , lies upon them. It is not in dispute that the plaintiffs had examined as many as four witnesses and they are- P.W.-1, namely, Nurul Islam, P.W.-2-namely, Phul Begum, PW 3 - namely, Shushamoi Mazumdar and P.W.-4 - namely, Safia Khatoon and also exhibited as many as 26 documents, including the alleged Sale Deed, as Exhibit-25, and indisputably the same is a certified copy. All the four witnesses, in no uncertain term, had testified that the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs, namely, Abdul Rahim had never sold the suit land to the defendant, namely, Abdur Rahman and that the Sale Deed No. 1094 of 1978 is a fraudulent document and also the defendant had fraudulently muted the land in his name and also by misrepresentation had mutated the municipality holding number. And their evidence could not be rebutted in cross-examination. 20.2. Thus, the evidence of the witnesses of the plaintiffs and the documents, exhibited by them, especially i.e. the Sale Deeds No. 1383/1969 and 1708/1972, Jamabandi, Copy of Assessment Register and Land Revenue paying receipt, which were marked as Exhibit-1, 2, 3 and 4 to 6, goes a long way to establish the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs over the suit land. Further, from the counterfoil of Rent Receipts, being Exhibit- 9 to 24, also established letting out of the rooms over the suit land by Abdul Rahim, the father of the plaintiffs, to P.W.2- Musstt. Phul Begum, and collecting rent from her. Further, from the counterfoil of Rent Receipts, being Exhibit- 9 to 24, also established letting out of the rooms over the suit land by Abdul Rahim, the father of the plaintiffs, to P.W.2- Musstt. Phul Begum, and collecting rent from her. Thus, the initial burden of proof, which would be on the plaintiffs, in view of Section 101 of the EVIDENCE ACT , as held in the case of Anil Rishi (supra), stands discharged by the plaintiffs. 20.3. It is also the evidence of the plaintiffs that while mutating the land and municipal holding number in the name of the defendant, no notice was issued, as required under Section 52 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 and Section 83(2) of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956 was not followed. Section 52 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 provides for the Procedure on application for registration, which read as under:- (1) On receiving an application under Section 50 or section 51, the Deputy Commissioner shall if he considers there are sufficient grounds for proceeding with the application, publish a notice requiring persons who object to the registration of the name of applicant, or who dispute the nature or extent interest in respect of which registration is applied have in a written statement of their objections, appear on a day to be specified in the notice not being less than one month from the date thereof. (2) If the application alleges that the applicant has acquired possession of the estate, or share in an estate in respect of which he applies to be registered by transfer from any person, a copy of the notice shall be served on the alleged transfer or, if he is dead, upon his heirs. 20.4 . Further, Section 83(2) of Assam Municipal Act, 1956 provides as under:- (2) The Board shall give at least one month's notice to any person interested in any alteration which the Board proposes to make under clauses (a),(b), (c) or (d) of sub- section (1) and of the date on which the alteration will be made. 20.5. Notably, these provisions are mandatory in nature. 20.5. Notably, these provisions are mandatory in nature. And since the mandatory requirements of laws had admittedly not been followed herein this case, during mutation and there is no explanation forthcoming for the same and this non-adherence to the mandatory provisions also strengthened the contention of the plaintiffs and their witnesses that the alleged Sale Deed is a fraudulent document and the defendant had fraudulently and by misrepresentation had muted the land in his name and also mutated the municipality holding number. 20.6. The initial burden of proof, thus, having been discharged by the plaintiffs, now, in view of Section 102 of the EVIDENCE ACT , the onus shifts on to the defendant to adduce rebutting evidence to meet the case so made out by the plaintiffs. In holding so, this Court derived authority from the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anil Rishi (supra), wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- "19. There is another aspect of the matter which should be borne in mind. A distinction exists between burden of proof and onus of proof. The right to begin follows onus probandi. It assumes importance in the early stage of a case. The question of onus of proof has greater force, where the question is, which party is to begin. Burden of proof is used in three ways : (i) to indicate the duty of bringing forward evidence in support of a proposition at the beginning or later; (ii) to make that of establishing a proposition as against all counter-evidence; and (iii) an indiscriminate use in which it may mean either or both of the others. The elementary rule in Section 101 is inflexible. In terms of Section 102 the initial onus is always on the plaintiff and if he discharges that onus and makes out a case which entitles him to a relief, the onus shifts to the defendant to prove those circumstances, if any, which would disentitle the plaintiff to the same. 20.7. Further, in the case of R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated in the following terms : "29. 20.7. Further, in the case of R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated in the following terms : "29. In a suit for recovery of possession based on title it is for the plaintiff to prove his title and satisfy the court that he, in law, is entitled to dispossess the defendant from his possession over the suit property and for the possession to be restored to him. However, as held in A. Raghavamma v. A. Chenchamma [ AIR 1964 SC 136 ] there is an essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof: burden of proof lies upon a person who has to prove the fact and which never shifts. Onus of proof shifts. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. In our opinion, in a suit for possession based on title once the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability so as to shift the onus on the defendant it is for the defendant to discharge his onus and in the absence thereof the burden of proof lying on the plaintiff shall be held to have been discharged so as to amount to proof of the plaintiff's title." 20.8. In view of above legal proposition, now, what left to be seen is whether the defendant had succeeded in establishing due execution of the Exhibit – 25/Exhibit-Ks, so as to rebut the evidence of the plaintiffs. 20.9. As discussed in the foregoing para, it is the categorical contention of Ms. Sarma, learned counsel for the appellants, that mere exhibiting a document is not sufficient and contents of the same have to be proved in accordance with Section 67 of the EVIDENCE ACT . The decision of a Division Bench of this Court, referred by Ms. Sarma in the case of Bhutkani Nath (Supra) , also strengthened her submission. 20.10. It is to be noted here that in the case of Bhutkani Nath (Supra) , a Division Bench of this Court has held that when execution of a document is being challenged, the certificate of registration alone will not be sufficient proof of the due execution of the document. Registration does not dispense with the necessity of proof of execution when the same is denied. Registration does not dispense with the necessity of proof of execution when the same is denied. It is true that a sale deed is not required by law to be attested. Even then, proof of execution of a sale deed, when it is denied, will have to be furnished as in the case of any other document under Section 67 of the EVIDENCE ACT . 20.11. Again in the case of Lourembam Heramot Singh (Supra) referred by Ms. Sarma, this Court had held that the execution or authorship of a document is a question of fact and may be proved like any other fact and registration does not make a private document a public document and the Court is not bound to treat the registration endorsement as a conclusive proof of fact of execution and though a certified copy is as good as the original and correctness of certified copies is presumed, mere registration is not a proof of its execution. Execution and contents of a certified copy shall have to be proved according to law in the ordinary way and there must be some evidence to show that the execution and genuineness of a document were proved. Mere registration of a document is not, by itself, sufficient proof of its execution. Again, mere proof of admission of execution before the Registrar does not satisfy the requirements of Section 67 of the EVIDENCE ACT , which requires that the signature of the executants must be proved to be in his handwriting. More than a mere admission of a signature is needed to amount to admission of execution of a document. Thereafter, it had held that applying these principles to the evidence on record, it is found that it was not proved that the sale deed was signed by Tompok Singh and as such, the lower appellate Court has not committed any error in holding that the execution of the document was not proved accordingly to law. Besides, this finding is one of fact and is not amenable to interference in Second Appeal. 20.12. Besides, this finding is one of fact and is not amenable to interference in Second Appeal. 20.12. In the case of Narbada Devi Gupta vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal & Another , (2003) 8 SCC 745 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit is not enough, as execution of a document has to be proved by admissible evidence, however, where documents produced are admitted by the signatories thereto and thereafter they are marked as exhibits, no further burden to lead additional evidence to prove the writing and its execution survives. Relevant para is quoted herein below for ready reference:- "16. Reliance is heavily placed on behalf of the appellant on the case of Ramji Dayawala & Sons (P) Ltd. [ (1981) 1 SCC 80 ]. The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the ‚evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue?. The situation is, however, different where the documents are produced, they are admitted by the opposite party, signatures on them are also admitted and they are marked thereafter as exhibits by the court. We find no force in the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that as the mark of exhibits has been put on the back portions of the rent receipts near the place where the admitted signatures of the plaintiff appear, the rent receipts as a whole cannot be treated to have been exhibited as admitted documents." 20.13. Thus, while the submission of Ms. Sarma, learned counsel for the appellants, are considered in the light of the given factual and legal matrix, this Court finds substance in the same. Also, this Court is inclined to record concurrence to her submission that mutation of the property in the revenue record, neither extinguishes title to the property nor it has any presumptive value on title as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Balwant Singh (Supra) , so referred by Ms. Sarma. 20.14. Also, this Court is inclined to record concurrence to her submission that mutation of the property in the revenue record, neither extinguishes title to the property nor it has any presumptive value on title as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Balwant Singh (Supra) , so referred by Ms. Sarma. 20.14. In the instant case, having perused the evidence of D.W.1, Abdur Rahman, it appear that in his evidence he stated that he purchased the suit land from Abdul Rahim, vide Sale Deed No. 1094, dated 29.03.1978, and took possession and got mutated the suit land in his name and he has been paying the land revenue and he also rented the house over the suit land to Musstt. Phul Begum and he received the rent from her. He also stated that he did not issue notice to the plaintiffs in the mutation case. Thus, it appears that he had only deposed having exhibited the Sale Deed as Exhibit – Ka(1), copy of Jamabandi as Exhibit – Ka(2), Rent Receipts as Exhibit – Ka(3), Municipality Tax Paid Receipts as Exhibit – Ka(12) to Ka(62) and Municipality Holding as Exhibit – Ka(63). 20.15. But, it is well settled in the case of Bhutkani Nath (Supra) and Lourembam Heramot Singh (Supra) and also in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta (supra) that mere exhibiting a document is not sufficient and also registration of the document does not satisfy the requirement of Section 67 of the EVIDENCE ACT , which requires the signature of the executants must be proved in his handwriting. 20.16. In the instant case, the D.W.1 has failed to produced the original Sale Deed. He has also failed to prove the signature of the executants, i.e. the father of the plaintiffs, and the contents thereof. His deposition before the learned trial Court, in para No.9 of his evidence in affidavit, is quoted herein below, for ready reference and also for proper appreciation of the dispute projected in this regular second appeal :- "I have filed all the relevant documents including the sale deed, copy of Jamabandi, Revenue Receipts etc. which has been exhibited from Exhibit-1 to Exhibit-63(1), which has been exhibited in the suit from Ka-1 to Ka-63(1) and also in T.S. No. 27/2000." 20.17. which has been exhibited from Exhibit-1 to Exhibit-63(1), which has been exhibited in the suit from Ka-1 to Ka-63(1) and also in T.S. No. 27/2000." 20.17. However, from the impugned judgment of the learned first appellate Court and of the learned trial Court it appears that the original Sale Deed is also exhibited in Title Suit No. 27/2000, as Exhibit-1 with the signature of the predecessor of the plaintiffs, namely, Abdul Rahim as Exhibit-1(1) to 1 (6). But, the record of the learned trial Court never shows that the Sale Deed was ever produced and exhibited during the trial in Title Suit No. 49/2000, though it was marked as Exhibit-Ka. 21. Now, what left to be seen is - whether this Court can read the evidence of the defendant and consider the documents, so adduced and exhibited in the T.S.No.27/2000, as the evidence and exhibit herein this case, while the record of that T.S. No. 27/2000, was not formally called for in the present appeal, inspite of the evidence of the defendant in para No.9 of his evidence in affidavit, that the Sale Deed, copy of Jamabandi, Revenue Receipts etc. which has been exhibited from Exhibit-1 to Exhibit-63(1), and which has been exhibited in the suit from Ka-1 to Ka-63(1) and also in T.S. No. 27/2000. 22. This issue came before Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mitthulal vs. State of M.P. , (1975) 3 SCC 529 , wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court, in para No.4, has held as under:- 4........................ .......................... "This was clearly impermissible to the High Court. It is difficult to comprehend as to how the High Court could decide the appeal before it by taking into accounts evidence recorded in another case, even though it might be what is loosely called a cross case. It is elementary that each case must be decided on the evidence recorded in it and evidence recorded in another case cannot be taken into account in arriving at the decision. Even in civil cases this cannot be done unless the parties are agreed that the evidence in one case may be treated as evidence in the other........." 22.1. It is elementary that each case must be decided on the evidence recorded in it and evidence recorded in another case cannot be taken into account in arriving at the decision. Even in civil cases this cannot be done unless the parties are agreed that the evidence in one case may be treated as evidence in the other........." 22.1. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the Sale Deed No. 1094 of the year 1978, based upon which the defendant has claimed having purchased the suit land from the predecessor in interest of the present plaintiffs, namely, Abdul Rahim has been proved in accordance with law. As emphasized in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta (supra ), the said Sale Deed ought to have been proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the evidence of those persons, who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. 22.2. The defendant had failed to examine the writer of the deed and also the two witnesses, namely, Advocate Safiqur Rahman and another Advocate, namely, Gobind Ch. Durah, who were the witnesses, of execution of the said Sale Deed. 22.3. He had also failed to examine any officials of the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Dibrugarh and any officials from the Municipal Board of Dibrugarh. And admittedly, also at the time of mutation of the suit property in the name of the defendant, no notice has been issued to the plaintiffs, though there is a requirement of Section 52 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Sale Deed No. 1094, of the year 1978, Exhibit –25 in the Title Suit No. 49/2000, had not been proved in accordance with the law. 22.4. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Sale Deed No. 1094, of the year 1978, Exhibit –25 in the Title Suit No. 49/2000, had not been proved in accordance with the law. 22.4. Further, the finding of the learned first appellate Court that- P.W.3 - Sri Suchomoni (sic Sushamoi) Mazumdar had identified the signature of Abdul Rahim in the sale deed as Exhibit Ka (1) and that identification of the signature on the sale deed by an independent witness is sufficient to comply with the requirement of Section 67 of the Indian EVIDENCE ACT , also appears to be perverse in as much as P.W.3, Sushamoi Mazumdar had admitted in his evidence that Exhibit – 11(1) to 16(1) is of Abdul Rahim, and Exhibit-17(1) to Exhibit 39(1) are not the signature of Abdul Rahim the father of the plaintiffs, meaning thereby the signature of Abdul Rahim over the Exhibit-25 /Exhibit-Ka, could not be proved by him. As discussed herein above, Exhibit-25/Exhibit-"Ka" was never shown to P.W.3 herein at the time of his examination. 23. Under the given facts and circumstances, this Court of the considered opinion that finding of the learned Courts below to the effect that the Sale Deed, dated 29.03.1978, was more than 30 years old and therefore, a presumption under Section 90 of the EVIDENCE ACT , 1872 could be drawn in its favour, is vitiated by perversity. 24. Thus, the substantial question of law, so formulated by this Court, flows out of the impugned judgment and decree of the learned first appellate Court and in view of the given factual and legal matrix, as discussed herein above, the same has to be answered in affirmative and accordingly, the same stands answered. 25. In the result, this second appeal stands allowed. The impugned judgment and decree of the learned first appellate court, and of the learned trial Court stands set aside and quashed. Resultantly, the suit of the plaintiffs' stands decreed granting the relief(s) being sought for in the plaint. 26. Send down the record of the learned Courts below with a copy of this judgment and order.