By the Court :- ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY, J. Heard the parties. 2. This Second Appeal filed under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been preferred against the judgment of concurrence dated 28.11.2014 passed by learned District Judge-I, Seraikella in Title Appeal No.36 of 2006 whereby and where under the learned first appellate court has dismissed the appeal. 3. The case of the plaintiff/appellant in brief is that the plaintiff/appellant purchased the suit land from the recorded owner by a registered sale-deed. The suit land was mutated in the name of the plaintiff. The plaintiff intending to construct a house, submitted the plan for proposed building for approval by Seraikella Municipality and the same was approved by Executive Officer on 16.12.1991. The plaintiff constructed a house leaving 2 ft. land vacate from her eastern side wall. In the year 1992, the defendant constructed a house in the adjacent plot bearing Nos.20 and 21 by purchasing the same from the vendor of the plaintiff. The case of the plaintiff is that the defendant illegally constructed a house without getting the plan approved by the Municipality and the defendant encroached 2 ft. area of land belonging to the plaintiff and raised a wall touching the wall of the plaintiff’s house and the said 2 ft. land is the scheduled land of the plaint; that is the suit land. The plaintiff protested the illegal construction by the defendant but she was restrained by the defendant to put up plaster on the wall or to white wash the eastern wall of her house. The plaintiff filed the suit with the prayer for declaration that she is entitled to go upon the side of her eastern wall for the purpose of repairing, plastering, white washing of her wall and for a mandatory injunction directing the defendant to remove the walls touching the walls of the plaintiff on either side and not to obstruct the plaintiff to go upon the eastern side of her house. 4. The defendant in his written-statement challenged the maintainability of the suit on various technical grounds and denied the all the averments made by the plaintiff in the plaint and denied any encroachment made over the suit land, on his part. 5. 4. The defendant in his written-statement challenged the maintainability of the suit on various technical grounds and denied the all the averments made by the plaintiff in the plaint and denied any encroachment made over the suit land, on his part. 5. On the basis of the rival pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed the following seven issues:- (1) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form or not? (2) Whether the plaintiff has got valid cause of action to file the suit? (3) Whether the suit is barred under the provisions of SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT ? (4) Whether the suit is barred by principles of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence? (5) Is the defendant liable to be permanently restrained from putting any obstruction in the repairing, plastering and white washing work done by the plaintiff of the eastern wall of her house? (6) Has the plaintiff left 2’ of her vacant land after her eastern wall in portion of plot No.20 and 21? (7) Is the plaintiff entitled to any relief as prayed? 6. In support of her case, the plaintiff altogether examined four witnesses besides proving the documents which have been marked as Ext.1 to Ext. 2. From the side of the defendant, six witnesses have been examined and he also proved the documents which have been marked as Ext. A to Ext. E. 7. The learned trial court first took up issue Nos.(5) and (6) together and after considering the evidence in the record came to a conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to establish her case in respect of the said two issues and while considering the issues, has also observed that the plaintiff herself has not entered the witness box and decided the issues against the plaintiff. 8. The learned trial court next took up the issue Nos.(3) and (4) together and considering the fact that since the plaintiff admits that the suit land is in possession of the defendant so, suit for mere declaration without the prayer for recovery of possession, was barred by Section 34 of the SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT and decided the issue Nos.(3) and (4) against the plaintiff. 9. The learned trial court lastly took up issue Nos. (1), (2) and (7) together and answered the same against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit. 10. 9. The learned trial court lastly took up issue Nos. (1), (2) and (7) together and answered the same against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit. 10. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court being the Munsif, Seraikella dated 23.11.2006, the plaintiff filed Title Appeal No.36 of 2006 which upon being transferred to the court of Additional District Judge-I, the learned Additional District Judge-I, Seraikella heard and dismissed the same by the impugned judgment. 11. The learned first appellate made independent appreciation of the evidence in the record by first taking up the issue Nos.(5) and (6) and after considering the evidence in the record and the submissions made by the rival parties, before it, the learned first appellate court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to establish his case in respect of issue Nos.(5) and (6) and concurred with the finding of fact in respect of both the issues, as arrived at by the learned trial court. 12. The learned first appellant court next took up issue Nos. (3) and (4) and also concurred with the finding of the learned trial court. 13. Lastly, the learned first appellate court took up the issue Nos. (1), (2) and (7) together and answered the same against the plaintiff/appellant concurring with the finding of the facts in respect of those issues by the learned trial court and dismissed the appeal. 14. (3) and (4) and also concurred with the finding of the learned trial court. 13. Lastly, the learned first appellate court took up the issue Nos. (1), (2) and (7) together and answered the same against the plaintiff/appellant concurring with the finding of the facts in respect of those issues by the learned trial court and dismissed the appeal. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Murthy & Others vs. C. Saradambal & Others reported in (2022) 3 SCC 209 and submits that therein in para-60 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has observed that re-appreciation of the evidence and reconsideration of the judgment of the trial court are necessary concomitants of the appellate court, when the appellate court affirms the judgment of the trial court and in para-62 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has relied upon its own judgment in the case of B.V. Nagesh vs. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy reported in (2010) 13 SCC 530 and has observed that the judgment of the appellate court, must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court and submits that in the impugned judgement, the appellate court has failed to discharge the duty cast upon it, in terms of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of the Civil Procedure. Hence, it is submitted that the impugned judgment and decree be set aside by framing appropriate substantial question of law. 15. Learned counsel for the appellant next relies upon the judgment of Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Ram Nandan Prasad & Another vs. Ram Bilas Yadav reported in 2001 SCC OnLine Pat 367 and submits that in that case, in a case of reversal, the Hon’ble Patna High Court has observed that the court can grant appropriate reliefs by moulding the relief, if the same arises out of the pleadings of the parties; on the basis of the evidence on record. So, dismissal of the suit on the ground that consequential relief for recovery and possession, has not been prayed for is not sustainable in law and both the courts below ought to not have held this suit, to be hit by provisions of Section 34 of SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT . 16. Having heard the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant and after carefully going through the materials available in the record, it is pertinent to mention here that it is a settled principle of law as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of G. Amalorpavam & Others v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai & Others reported in (2006) 3 SCC 224 paragraph-9 of which reads as under:-:- “9. The question whether in a particular case there has been substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC has to be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case. Non- compliance with the provisions may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void, and may be ignored if there has been substantial compliance with it and the second appellate court is in a position to ascertain the findings of the lower appellate court. It is no doubt desirable that the appellate court should comply with all the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. But if it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient. Where the appellate court has considered the entire evidence on record and discussed the same in detail, come to any conclusion and its findings are supported by reasons even though the point or determination has not been framed by the appellate court there is substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and the judgment is not in any manner vitiated by the absence of a point of determination. Where there is an honest endeavour on the part of the lower appellate court to consider the controversy between the parties and there is proper appraisement of the respective cases and weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts and the other considerations appearing on both sides is clearly manifest by the perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court, it would be a valid judgment even though it does not contain the points for determination. The object of the rule in making it incumbent upon the appellate court to frame points for determination and to cite reasons for the decision is to focus attention of the court on the rival contentions which arise for determination and also to provide litigant parties opportunity in understanding the ground upon which the decision is founded with a view to enable them to know the basis of the decision and if so considered appropriate and so advised to avail the remedy of second appeal conferred by Section 100 CPC.” (Emphasis supplied) that where there is an honest endeavour on the part of the lower appellate court to consider the controversy between the parties and there is proper appraisement of the respective cases and weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts and the other considerations appearing on both sides is clearly manifest by the perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court, it would be a valid judgment even though it does not contain the points for determination. 17. It is also a settled principle of law as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of K. Karuppuraj vs M. Ganesan reported in (2021) 10 SCC 777 paragraph-11 of which reads as under:- “11. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, if the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is considered, in that case, there is a total non-compliance of the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. The High Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it as a first appellate court; the High Court has not at all re-appreciated the entire evidence on record; and not even considered the reasoning given by the learned trial court, in particular, on findings recorded by the learned trial court on the issue of willingness. The High Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it as a first appellate court; the High Court has not at all re-appreciated the entire evidence on record; and not even considered the reasoning given by the learned trial court, in particular, on findings recorded by the learned trial court on the issue of willingness. Therefore, as such, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable and in normal circumstances we would have accepted the request of the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent to remand the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration of appeal. However, even on other points also, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is not sustainable. We refrain from remanding the matter to the High Court and we decide the appeal on merits.” that it is certainly not a mandate of law that a second appellate court will set aside the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court on a mere technical ground for non-compliance of the Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure by not enumerating the points for determination and when ever there is substantial compliance of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the First Appellate Court and First Appellate Court considered the entire evidence in the record and discussed the same in detail and came to a conclusion and its finding are supported by reasons, and such judgments are not to be set aside and remanded. 18. Now, coming to the facts of the case, as already discussed above the learned First Appellate Court has discussed the facts of the case, evidence in the record, submissions made and after discussing the same in detail, has come to its own independent finding, concurring with the finding of the learned trial court, so, in the considered opinion of this Court there is substantial compliance of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the learned First Appellate Court. 19. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that this is not a fit case where the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court is to be set aside and remanded on the ground of non- compliance of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the learned First Appellate Court. 20. 19. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that this is not a fit case where the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court is to be set aside and remanded on the ground of non- compliance of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the learned First Appellate Court. 20. So far as the contention regarding Section 34 of the SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT which reads as under, is concerned:- “ 34 . Discretion of Court as to declaration of status or right .- Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit as for any further relief: Provided that no Court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. Explanation.- A trustee of property is a “person interested to deny” a title adverse to the title of some one who is not in existence, and for whom, if in existence, he would be a trustee.” the plain reading of the proviso to Section 34 of the SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT makes it is abundantly clear that the condition precedent for a court to make the declaration in terms of the said Section 34 of the SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT , is that the plaintiff has prayed for all the reliefs, which the plaintiff was able to seek, apart from the relief of a mere declaration of title. 21. Now, coming to the facts the case; it is the admitted case of the plaintiff that the defendant is in possession of the suit land but the plaintiff has sought the prayer for declaration only and not the prayer for recovery of possession; which obviously the plaintiff was able to seek but omitted to do so for the reasons best known to her. Under such circumstances, the findings by both the courts below that the suit is barred by Section 34 of the SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT , in the considered opinion of this Court, cannot be termed to be perverse one. 22. Under such circumstances, the findings by both the courts below that the suit is barred by Section 34 of the SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT , in the considered opinion of this Court, cannot be termed to be perverse one. 22. In view of the discussions made above, this Court is of the considered view that there is absolutely no substantial question of law involved in this Second Appeal. 23. Accordingly, this Second Appeal, being without any merit, is dismissed but under the circumstances without any costs. 24. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the courts concerned forthwith.