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2025 DIGILAW 1794 (TS)

K. Narasimha v. Yadamma

2025-12-11

K.SUJANA

body2025
JUDGMENT : K.SUJANA, J. Challenging the judgment and decree dated 06.08.2002 passed in O.S.No.479 of 1995 by the learned IV Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, the present City Civil Court Appeal is filed. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiffs, three sisters of the defendant, filed a suit seeking partition andseparate possession of the suit schedule property, claiming each was entitled to a one-fourth share under a registered will deed dated 28.10.1978 executed by their late father, Sattaiah, who had purchased the property at Esamia Bazar, Hyderabad, in the year 1974 with his self-acquired funds and constructed rooms from his earnings. They alleged that after the death of their father in the year 1979, the defendant, collected all the rents without sharing them and refused to divide the property. 3. On the other hand, the defendant, while not disputing the relationship, contended that he had actually purchased and developed the property with his own funds in the name of his father out of affection. He alleged that the will deed was fabricated when their father was sick and bedridden, and further claimed that the plaintiffs had, for consideration of Rs.30,000/-, executed a registered release deed on 13.02.1980 relinquishing their rights. He asserted exclusive ownership and argued that the suit was barred by limitation and not properly valued. 4. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed three issues and on behalf of the plaintiffs i.e., PWs.1 and 2 were examined and Ex.A1 to A4 are marked. DW.1 was examined and Exs.B1 to B3 were marked on behalf of the defendants. 5. After examining the evidence, the trial Court, vide order dated 06.08.2002, decreed the suit holding that the property was the self-acquired property of the late Sattaiah and that the will deed Ex.A2 was genuine, granting the plaintiffs only life interest in their respective shares, with absolute ownership to pass to their children. Further, the trial Court held that the defendant failed to prove purchase under a benami arrangement but succeeded in proving execution of the release deed Ex.B1. However, the trial Court concluded that even with the release deed, the plaintiffs retained life interest under the will, making the property still partible. Further, the trial Court held that the defendant failed to prove purchase under a benami arrangement but succeeded in proving execution of the release deed Ex.B1. However, the trial Court concluded that even with the release deed, the plaintiffs retained life interest under the will, making the property still partible. The suit was decreed preliminarily for partition into four equal shares, allotting one such share to each plaintiff, subject to refund by them of the Rs.30,000/- consideration with 12% interest from the date of the release deed to realization. Aggrieved thereby, the defendant filed the present City Civil Court Appeal. 6. Heard Sri K. K. Waghray, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants as well as Sri Mahesh Raje, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the judgment of the trial court was contrary to law and facts and was therefore liable to be set aside and that the trial Court had given a finding on the proof of the will, Ex.A2, without it being proved as required under Section 68 of the Evidence Act, as none of the attesting witnesses were examined, and PW1 had even admitted that no attestors had signed the will. Despite this, the trial Court wrongly granted relief to the respondents based on the will. He further submitted that the trial Court misunderstood the description of the property in the will and erroneously considered the case of the respondents in relation to property actually in the possession of the appellants. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the trial Court failed to appreciate the plea of the appellants of suppression of facts and wrongly discarded the judgment reported in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs v. Jagannath (dead) by LRs and another, , 1994 (1) SCC 1 , the respondents received Rs.30,000/- and relinquished their rights through a registered relinquishment deed and not mentioned the same in the plaint. He further contended that the will related only to property bearing municipal No.4-7-538 to 541, whereas the self-acquired property of the appellant was bearing municipal No.4-7-542 to 545, yet relief was granted for the entire property. He further contended that the will related only to property bearing municipal No.4-7-538 to 541, whereas the self-acquired property of the appellant was bearing municipal No.4-7-542 to 545, yet relief was granted for the entire property. He submitted that the respondents, being only life estate holders without possession or enjoyment, were not entitled to seek partition, and the trial Court erred in holding that creation of life interest amounted to symbolic possession for the purpose of Court fee. He also contended that the trial Court wrongly held that the appellant admitted execution of the will under Ex.B1, as a mere reference to a document did not amount to proof of its execution, particularly in the case of a will which must be strictly proved. He further argued that the direction to refund Rs.30,000/- under Ex.B1 was unsustainable. Therefore, he prayed the Court to set aside the judgment of the trial Court by allowing this City Civil Court Appeal. 9. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that there was no illegality in the judgment of the trial Court and that the will deed was admitted by the appellant. Once the will deed is admitted, there is no need to prove the admitted facts as per Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act. He further submitted that the appellant had contended there was a relinquishment deed which was allegedly suppressed by the respondents; however, the said relinquishment deed was in fact filed by the appellant himself, but he failed to prove the same, particularly the payment of Rs.30,000/- mentioned therein. Therefore, there was no illegality in the judgment of the trial Court. He argued that it was admitted that the property belonged to the father of both parties, and thus all parties are Class-I legal heirs, each entitled to a one-fourth share in the suit property.Accordingly, he prayed the Court to dismiss the appeal. 10. In support of his contentions he relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Harjas Rai Makhija (D) Thr. Lrs v. Pushparani Jain , (2017) 01 SC CK 0088 , wherein in paragraph Nos.20 and 21, it is held as follows: “20. We agree that when there is an allegation of fraud by non-disclosure of necessary and relevant facts or concealment of material facts, it must be inquired into. Lrs v. Pushparani Jain , (2017) 01 SC CK 0088 , wherein in paragraph Nos.20 and 21, it is held as follows: “20. We agree that when there is an allegation of fraud by non-disclosure of necessary and relevant facts or concealment of material facts, it must be inquired into. It is only after evidence is led coupled with intent to deceive that a conclusion of fraud could be arrived at. A mere concealment or non-disclosure without intent to deceive or a bald allegation of fraud without proof and intent to deceive would not render a decree obtained by a party as fraudulent. To conclude in a blanket manner that in every case where relevant facts are not disclosed, the decree obtained would be fraudulent, is stretching the principle to a vanishing point. 21. What is fraud has been adequately discussed in Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy [Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy, (2010) 8 SCC 383 , paras 28 to 36 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 878] . Unfortunately, this decision does not refer to earlier decisions where also there is an equally elaborate discussion on fraud. These two decisions are Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar v. State of Maharashtra [Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 7 SCC 605 ] and State of Orissa v. Harapriya Bisoi [State of Orissa v. Harapriya Bisoi, (2009) 12 SCC 378 : (2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 719] . In view of the elaborate discussion in these and several other cases which have been referred to in these decisions, it is clear that fraud has a definite meaning in law and it must be proved and not merely alleged and inferred.” 11. The points that arise for consideration in this appeal are: i. Whether the Will deed is true, valid, and binding on the defendant? ii. Whether the plaintiff has relinquished his share in favour of his brother? iii. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to partition? iv. Whether the findings of the trial Court regarding the description, ownership, and possession of the suit property and the entitlement of the parties to 1/4 th share each are sustainable in law and on facts? v. Whether the judgment of the trial Court needs any interference? Point Nos.i to iv: 12. iii. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to partition? iv. Whether the findings of the trial Court regarding the description, ownership, and possession of the suit property and the entitlement of the parties to 1/4 th share each are sustainable in law and on facts? v. Whether the judgment of the trial Court needs any interference? Point Nos.i to iv: 12. In the light of the submissions made by both the learned counsel and upon perusal of the material available on record, the plaintiffs, who are the sisters of the defendant, filed the suit for partition of the suit schedule property, claiming that it was the self-acquired property of their father, late Sattaiah. The case of the defendant was that the property was not acquired by their father, but purchased by himself in the name of his father, that he developed and constructed upon it, and that the plaintiffs subsequently relinquished their rights under a registered release deed. 13. To establish their case, the plaintiffs relied on Exs.A1 to A4. Ex.A1 is a reply notice, Ex.A2 is a will deed, Ex.A3 is sale deed in favour of the father of the plaintiff and Ex.A4 is a legal notice, Ex.A2, executed by their father, and other supporting documents including legal notices and reply notices. The defendant relied on Ex.B1, the alleged release deed executed by the plaintiffs, and on Ex.B2, the registered sale deed in the name of late Sattaiah, Ex.B3 sale deed in favour of the defendant. The trial Court found, based on the recitals of Ex.B2, that the property bearing municipal Nos.4-7-538 to 4- 7-541 was the self-acquired property of late Sattaiah and that the defendant failed to prove purchase under a benami arrangement. 14. The principal contention of the appellant was that the trial Court erred in holding that Ex.A2 stood proved without examining attesting witnesses as required under Section 68 of the Evidence Act, and that the plaintiffs suppressed Ex.B1. Reliance was placed by the appellant in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (cited supra), and contended that suppression of material documents amounts to fraud. On the other hand, the respondents relied on Harjas Rai Makhija (cited supra) stating that mere concealment or non-disclosure, without intent to deceive, would not render a decree fraudulent. 15. Reliance was placed by the appellant in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (cited supra), and contended that suppression of material documents amounts to fraud. On the other hand, the respondents relied on Harjas Rai Makhija (cited supra) stating that mere concealment or non-disclosure, without intent to deceive, would not render a decree fraudulent. 15. On examining the record, it is observed that the plaintiffs, in their plaint, categorically pleaded that the defendant, with mala fide intention, fraudulently obtained their signatures and refused to give their shares. The trial Court rightly held that this cannot be treated as suppression of material facts so as to attract the principle in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (cited supra). The principle in the case of Harjas Rai Makhija (cited surpa) squarely applies to the present case that mere non-disclosure without proof of intent to deceive will not render the decree fraudulent. 16. Further, the plaintiffs filed the suit for partition claiming that the suit schedule property is the self-acquired property of their late father, Sri Sattaiah, and therefore they are entitled to their respective shares therein. The appellant/defendant, on the other hand, contended that the plaintiffs had already executed a registered relinquishment deed, Ex.B1, in his favour and, consequently, had no subsisting right to seek partition. 17. A perusal of Ex.B1 shows that the said relinquishment deed was executed by the plaintiffs. However, the plaintiffs have categorically pleaded that the said document was obtained from them under misrepresentation and without understanding its contents. In view of such plea, the burden squarely lies on the defendant to prove that the said relinquishment deed was executed voluntarily by the plaintiffs after receiving the consideration of Rs.30,000/-, as recited therein. Except for his own oral assertion, the defendant has not adduced any independent evidence to establish payment of the said consideration or to prove voluntary execution of Ex.B1. It is also relevant to note that the defendant, being an RTC employee, failed to produce any material to show that he had the financial capacity to pay the said amount at the relevant point of time. The plaintiffs, being women and housewives with limited understanding of legal formalities, have explained that their signatures were obtained on the pretext of registration of documents pertaining to their respective shares. Hence, the finding of the trial Court that Ex.B1 stood proved cannot be sustained. 18. The plaintiffs, being women and housewives with limited understanding of legal formalities, have explained that their signatures were obtained on the pretext of registration of documents pertaining to their respective shares. Hence, the finding of the trial Court that Ex.B1 stood proved cannot be sustained. 18. As regards the will deed, Ex.A2, though none of the attesting witnesses were examined as required under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, the fact remains that the property stands in the name of late Sattaiah under Ex.B2, the registered sale deed, and there is no acceptable evidence from the defendant to show that he purchased the same benami in the name of his father. Even if Ex.A2 is excluded from consideration, the plaintiffs and the defendant, being Class-I legal heirs of late Sattaiah, are each entitled to an equal one- fourth share in his self-acquired property. Consequently, the property bearing Municipal Nos.4-7-538 to 541 at Esamia Bazar, Hyderabad, being the admitted self-acquired property of late Sattaiah, is liable to be partitioned among the parties. However, with regard to the property bearing Municipal Nos.4-7-542 to 545, the defendant has produced material to show that those properties were acquired by him in his individual capacity vide Ex.B3, and therefore, the plaintiffs have no right or share therein. 19. The contention of the appellant that the suit was undervalued for the purpose of court fee is without merit, as the plaintiffs, being co-owners of the property bearing Municipal Nos.4-7-538 to 541, are deemed to be in joint and symbolic possession thereof, and the court fee paid under Section 34(2) of the A.P. Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act is proper. 20. Insofar as the direction of the trial Court requiring the plaintiffs to refund the amount of Rs.30,000/- with interest to the defendant is concerned, since the execution of Ex.B1 and payment of the said amount have not been satisfactorily proved, such direction is unsustainable and is accordingly set aside. 21. Accordingly, this City Civil Court Appeal is allowed in part, confirming the preliminary decree for partition in respect of the property bearing Municipal Nos.4-7-538 to 541, while setting aside the decree insofar as it relates to Municipal Nos.4-7-542 to 545, which shall remain the exclusive property of the appellant/defendant. The direction for refund of Rs.30,000/- with interest is also set aside. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.