ORDER : (Order of the Court was made by Dr.Anita Sumanth J.) The appellants, a Company and its Managing Director, are D1 and D2 in C.S.No.607 of 2008. The parties are referred to as per the rank in the present appeal. The prayer in that suit was for recovery of monies due under three hire purchase agreements. 2. Admittedly, the appellants did not contest the suit and the suit came to be decreed exparte on 07.07.2010. Thereafter, an application was filed by the appellants in A.No.1707 of 2022 seeking condonation of delay of 4245 days in setting aside of the exparte decree. The learned single Judge allowed the same on 05.08.2022 on condition that a sum of Rs.20.00 lakhs be deposited to the credit of the suit, which order was complied with. 3. The plaintiff in suit/respondent in this appeal filed O.S.A.No.240 of 2022 challenging order dated 05.08.2022, which came to be allowed on 19.10.2022. The present appellants took the matter in further appeal before the Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) Diary No.13903 of 2023, which confirmed the order in OSA, by their judgment dated 04.08.2023. 4. It is thereafter that CMP No.4532 of 2025 has come to be filed seeking condonation of delay of 4487 days to challenge judgment and decree dated 07.07.2010. 5. We have heard the detailed submissions of Mr.R.Thiagarajan, learned counsel for the petitioners/appellants and Mr.V.P.Raman, learned counsel for the respondent. 6. The question that arises for our consideration is as to whether sufficient cause has been made out by the petitioners in seeking condonation of delay of 4487 days in filing the Original Side Appeal. 7. C.S.No.607 of 2008 had been instituted on 29.09.2006 and numbered on 02.07.2008 seeking recovery of a sum of Rs.68,49,602/- with interest at the rate of 36% per annum from date of plaint till date of realisation and for costs. The amount, as on date, is stated to be in excess of a sum of Rs.5.00 crores. The suit was decreed exparte on 07.07.2010. 8. Our attention is drawn to the fact that the cause list, at the time when the appellants were set exparte, had specifically noted that D1 and D2 had refused notice which ultimately had came to be affixed in their premises on 06.10.2009. Hence, the conduct of the appellants in the suit was one of non-cooperation. 9. 8. Our attention is drawn to the fact that the cause list, at the time when the appellants were set exparte, had specifically noted that D1 and D2 had refused notice which ultimately had came to be affixed in their premises on 06.10.2009. Hence, the conduct of the appellants in the suit was one of non-cooperation. 9. An Execution Petition came to be filed by the respondent in E.P.No.108 of 2019 and notice was issued to the present appellants. At that juncture, they filed an application in A.No.1707 of 2022 seeking condonation of delay of 4245 days in setting aside the exparte decree dated 07.07.2010. The learned single Judge allowed that application on 05.08.2022 upon condition that the appellants deposit a sum of Rs.20.00 lakhs to the credit of the suit, which condition was instantly complied with. 10. In OSA No.240 of 2022 filed by the respondent challenging the order of the learned single Judge, the Division Bench has noted the specific defence that the suit had been barred by limitation. 11. The Division Bench also specifically records the position that, in the application filed seeking setting aside of the exparte decree, the appellants had conceded that they had knowledge of being set exparte in the suit on 24.06.2010 itself. Paragraph 3 of the affidavit filed in the application seeking to set aside the exparte decree reads as follows: 3. I have not received any notice issued in the suit. On 24.06.2010 I was informed by my counsel that a case filed by the respondent has appeared in the list in which it has been stated that D1 and D2 refused and affixed on 06.10.2009.' 12. This aligns with the cause list produced before us, wherein at page 60, the suit is listed as item 6 and there is an endorsement to the effect 'D1 & D2 refused & affixed on 06.10.2009'. Hence, the Division Bench concluded that there was no justification for such a substantial delay when the parties were well aware of having been set exparte on 24.06.2010 itself. Hence, the appeal was allowed by the Division Bench on 19.10.2022, which order has been confirmed by the Supreme Court on 04.08.2023. 13. The present appeals are now a second innings before us, where the appellants seek to file an appeal against the original judgment and decree. They have relied upon the following judgments in support of their case. Hence, the appeal was allowed by the Division Bench on 19.10.2022, which order has been confirmed by the Supreme Court on 04.08.2023. 13. The present appeals are now a second innings before us, where the appellants seek to file an appeal against the original judgment and decree. They have relied upon the following judgments in support of their case. 1. Inder Singh V. The State of Madhya Pradesh , Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.6145 of 2024 dated 21.03.2025. 2. Koushik Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society V. Ameena Begum and another , 2023 SCC Online SC 1662 3. N. Mohan V. R. Madhu , AIR 2020 Supreme Court 41 4. Bhivchandra Shankar More V. Balu Gangaram More and others , (2019) 6 SCC 387 14. There is no dispute or quarrel on the legal position that the remedy of setting aside of the exparte decree, and appellate remedy are two distinct and different avenues available to an aggrieved party. Hence, there would be nothing that would stand in the way of an aggrieved party who has been unsuccessful in seeking condonation of delay in setting aside of exparte decree, from making yet another attempt, albeit by showing sufficient cause for the delay, if any, in pursuing the appellate remedy. 15. The above position has been settled in the judgment in Bhivchandra Shankar More (supra) in the following terms: 10. A conjoint reading of Order IX Rule 13 CPC and Section 96(2) CPC indicates that the defendant who suffered an ex-parte decree has two remedies:- (i) either to file an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC to set aside the ex-parte decree to satisfy the court that summons were not duly served or those served, he was prevented by “sufficient cause” from appearing in the court when the suit was called for hearing; (ii) to file a regular appeal from the original decree to the first appellate court and challenge the ex-parte decree on merits. 11. It is to be pointed out that the scope of Order IX Rule 13 CPC and Section 96(2) CPC are entirely different. In an application filed under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, the Court has to see whether the summons were duly served or not or whether the defendant was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from appearing when the suit was called for hearing. In an application filed under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, the Court has to see whether the summons were duly served or not or whether the defendant was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from appearing when the suit was called for hearing. If the Court is satisfied that the defendant was not duly served or that he was prevented for “sufficient cause”, the court may set aside the ex- parte decree and restore the suit to its original position. In terms of Section 96(2) CPC, the appeal lies from an original decree passed ex- parte. In the regular appeal filed under Section 96(2) CPC, the appellate court has wide jurisdiction to go into the merits of the decree. The scope of enquiry under two provisions is entirely different. Merely because the defendant pursued the remedy under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, it does not prohibit the defendant from filing the appeal if his application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC is dismissed. 12. The right of appeal under Section 96(2) CPC is a statutory right and the defendant cannot be deprived of the statutory right of appeal merely on the ground that the application filed by him under Order IX Rule 13 CPC has been dismissed............... 16. However what we are to see is whether, in preferring the appeal with delay, there has been any negligence in taking action or lack of bonafides imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. 17. We are of the categoric view that the appellants fail on both counts. On the question of sufficient cause, the appellants were well aware that they had been set exparte on 24.06.2010 itself. In such an event, there is absolutely no justification in the elapse of 12 years in filing the application to set aside the exparte decree. 18. Moreover, it is on the ground of delay that the proceedings concluded adverse to the appellant in the first round. The delay as on date is far more. Since that very reason has not appealed to the Division Bench and thereafter to the Supreme Court, we see no change in circumstances to warrant a different conclusion now. 19. The appellants had not made out a case to justify the intervening delay of 4245 days in approaching this Court for setting aside the exparte decree and the adverse circumstances are compounded now, when the delay stands amplified to 4487 days. 19. The appellants had not made out a case to justify the intervening delay of 4245 days in approaching this Court for setting aside the exparte decree and the adverse circumstances are compounded now, when the delay stands amplified to 4487 days. 20. Coming to the aspect of bonafides, the stand of the appellant in the first round was set out in paragraph 3 of affidavit dated 21.03.2022, extracted at paragraph No.11 supra. However, in affidavit dated 19.01.2023 filed now, seeking condonation of delay of 4487 days, the appellants make a volte-face and state at paragraph 6, that the decree passed on 07.07.2010 came to their knowledge only when notice in E.P.No.108 of 2019 was served on them. This is a clear mis-statement. Thus, apart from lack of diligence, the appellants are also seen to have been taking contradictory and conflicting stands. 21. We draw support in this regard from the judgment in Esha Bhattacharjee V. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy , (2013) 12 SCC 649 .where the Supreme Court has culled the principles applicable in the context of condonation of delay. Apart from the settled proposition that sufficient cause should be made out by the aggrieved party, and reiterating that, normally a liberal and justice-oriented approach should be preferred, the Court holds that the question of bonafides is a relevant factor in deciding whether delay is liable to be condoned. 22. In view of the discussion as above, we have no hesitation in concluding that the appellants have not established their bonafides as in affidavit dated 19.01.2023, they have chosen to suppress that they were aware of the exparte decree on 24.06.2010 itself, which fact stands clearly revealed from A.No.7107 of 2022 filed earlier. 23. For the aforesaid reasons, the Miscellaneous Petition and the Original Side Appeal in the SR stage are dismissed. No costs. 24. At this juncture, Mr.R.Thiagarajan, learned counsel for the petitioners requests that the the court fee paid may be refunded in terms of Section 66 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 in the name of the second appellant. The request is acceded to and the Registry is directed to do the needful in this regard.