ORDER: 1. This Writ Petition is filed seeking to quash the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal-II, Hyderabad in I.D.No. 51/2000, dated 03.02.2001 confirming the orders passed by the 1st respondent dated 21.08.1989. 2. Heard Sri. Ashok Anand Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri. Ram Mohan Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for TGSRTC appearing for the respondent No.1. Perused the material available on record. 3. Brief facts of the case are as follows: (a) The petitioner was appointed as Conductor in APSRTC on 08.03.1986. On 14.12.1987, while the petitioner was conducting service on vehicle No. 7920 in Route No 189 M, at stage No. 2 (Shapurnagar) at about 8.50 A.M., the checking officials exercised their check and found some irregularities on part of the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his spot explanation to the checking officials. The checking officials exercised another check at 13.40 hours on the same day and issued Charge Memo No. 75798/97 alleging certain irregularities for which the Petitioner submitted his spot explanation to the checking officials. Thereafter, a Charge Memo was issued to the petitioner and the petitioner submitted his explanation on 17.12.1987. (b) Thereafter, the petitioner was placed under suspension by order dated 19.12.1987. Thereafter, a Chargesheet dated 19.12.1987 was issued. The petitioner submitted his explanation to the Chargesheet on 06.01.1988. Thereafter, the 1st respondent decided to hold a domestic enquiry and appointed an Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer vide findings dated 17.03.1998 held the petitioner was guilty of charges. Accepting the findings of the Enquiry Officer on 24.05.1988, for which the petitioner had submitted his explanation on 13.06.1988, the 1 st respondent without giving the opportunity of personal hearing issued the removal order on 04.11.1988 to the petitioner. (c) Against the said order, the petitioner preferred W.P. No. 9578 of 1988 and this Court vide this Order dated 16.01.1989 set aside the removal order on the ground that the enquiry was vitiated as given the petitioner had no opportunity was given to put forth his case during the enquiry. Again, an enquiry was conducted pursuant to the orders of this Court. The petitioner appeared before the Enquiry Officer and participated in the enquiry. The Enquiry Officer conducted enquiry contrary to the rules and procedure and reported by Order dated 07.07.1989 that the charges were proved. Again, an enquiry was conducted pursuant to the orders of this Court. The petitioner appeared before the Enquiry Officer and participated in the enquiry. The Enquiry Officer conducted enquiry contrary to the rules and procedure and reported by Order dated 07.07.1989 that the charges were proved. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are improper, as they are not based on relevant record and the evidence is not at all properly appreciated. (d) Thereafter, the respondent on 02.08.1989 issued a Show-Cause Notice. The petitioner had submitted his explanation to the Show-Cause Notice. However, in a routine and mechanical manner and without appreciating the explanation, the 1st respondent passed orders in Proceedings No. 02/104(95) 187 JMC, dated 21.08.1989 removing the petitioner from service. The order of removal passed by the 1st respondent is illegal and arbitrary and contrary to the CCA regulations and also based on invalid evidence and does not stand to legal scrutiny. (e) Aggrieved by the orders of removal passed by the 1st respondent, the petitioner raised 1.D. No. 51/2000 on the file of the Industrial Tribunal-II, Hyderabad under section 2-A (2) of I.D. Act. The Respondent No.1 herein filed its counter and contested the matter. The 2nd Respondent-Industrial Tribunal passed its Award on 03.02.2001 dismissing petitioner's I.D. confirming the punishment of removal imposed by the 1 st respondent. Challenging the said Award passed by the 2nd Respondent, the present Writ Petition is filed. (f) The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the 2 nd respondent did not take the various pleas taken by the petitioner in the Claim Petition as well as Written Arguments. The specific plea of the petitioner in the claim Petition is that no enquiry was conducted as per the RTC Staff Regulations. This aspect is also considered by this Court in the earlier Writ Petition No. 9578/1988 filed by the petitioner, while setting aside the removal order dated 06.01.1989. In the said Writ Petition, this Court set aside the removal order and directed the Inquiry Officer to hold the enquiry afresh. In spite of the directions of this Court, the Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry contrary to the Rules and Procedures and submitted his report on 07.07.1989, holding that the charges against the petitioner were proved. The findings of the Enquiry Officer are improper, perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. 4. In spite of the directions of this Court, the Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry contrary to the Rules and Procedures and submitted his report on 07.07.1989, holding that the charges against the petitioner were proved. The findings of the Enquiry Officer are improper, perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the charges levelled against the petitioner are incorrect and without any basis. The Charge No.1 does not disclose any mis- conduct under the Conduct Regulations of the Corporation, much less under Regulation 28(XXXII) there is no statutory rule or instructions issued by the Corporation within the meaning of Regulation 28 (XXXII) relating to one fare stage the rule is not in practice, the two fare rule is in force, not completing the issuance of tickets within one fare stage is not a misconduct. This charge is technical in nature and does not involve any act of moral turpitude. In fact, there was heavy rush and the petitioner was not able to stand or move in the bus. In spite of all efforts, one passenger could manage to escape from petitioner's sight and was caught by the TTls while alighting the bus. Hence, there was no motive or irregularity on petitioner's side and it cannot be called as mis-conduct. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that in regard to Charge No.2 the ticket-less passenger was the pass holder and could not produce his pass at the time of check before the TTIs. In regard to Charge No.3 certain group of passengers were not willing to purchase tickets and the petitioner forcibly issued tickets to them. The leader of the batch who took the tickets, left the tickets in the air, and they were flown away, as such, the tickets could not be produced at the time of check. The same can be confirmed with the record. Hence, the petitioner is not at all guilty of the said charges. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that, with regard to Charge No.4, there was heavy rush of passengers, and as such the petitioner could not close the tray numbers at stages, as there were more than 60 passengers in the bus. The bus was Over loaded. Hence, it cannot be treated as mis-conduct. The petitioner had stated in his spot explanation that he is not at all guilty. The bus was Over loaded. Hence, it cannot be treated as mis-conduct. The petitioner had stated in his spot explanation that he is not at all guilty. Even the passengers agreed with their fault, though the TTIs threatened them to give their statements. The checking officials failed to follow the provisions of MV act, 1988 and the circular instructions issued by the Managing Director, APSRTC in OPD/32/92, dated 24.09.1991. They failed to record passenger's full name and postal address as contemplated under the rules and for no fault of the petitioner, the respondent created allegations to victimize the petitioner. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the 1 st respondent did not provide the petitioner a copy of SR 43R-Special Report as required under Rules 41, 43 of Operation Manual of the Corporation, 1982. Hence, no case can be made out against the petitioner. The charge that the petitioner violated the rules of the Corporation cannot be mechanically applied in the facts and circumstances and in the given situation explained above. In fact, there was not statutory rule or instructions issued by the Corporation within the meaning of Regulation 28, the Sub-clause 32 relating one fare stage is not a vogue and it is only two fare rule is in practice and the failure to do so is only an irregularity, but not mis-conduct. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that while passing the order of removal, the 1 st respondent did not consider petitioner's explanation. The 1 st respondent conducted the enquiry contrary to the directions of this Hon'ble Court and did not examine the concerned witnesses and evidence as such the enquiry conducted is unfair and contrary to CCCA Regulations. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the enquiry Officer held the petitioner guilty of the charges, on which a show cause notice was given to the petitioner and the petitioner submitted his explanation. In fact, no reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner to cross-examine the alleged witnesses. Enquiry officer in his findings has clearly recorded that TTI has stated that there was no mala fide intention of the Conductor, but the passengers only cheated. Though the Enquiry Officer has recorded at page No.4 of the report that the passengers left the tickets at the window and other passengers witnessed the same, but it was disbelieved by the TTI. Though the Enquiry Officer has recorded at page No.4 of the report that the passengers left the tickets at the window and other passengers witnessed the same, but it was disbelieved by the TTI. The petitioner raised the lacunas in the Enquiry in his written arguments and the respondent No.2 did not consider the same. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the 2nd respondent failed to appreciate the pleas raised before it in a proper perspective. The 2nd respondent is vested with the power under Section 11-A of I.D. Act to re-appreciate the evidence and came to a different conclusion. But, the 2nd respondent did not re-appreciate the evidence. The punishment imposed is harsh, too severe, excessive and disproportionate to the misconduct alleged. 11. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondent No.1 filed counter affidavit reiterating the facts up to filing of chargesheet and submission of explanation to that effect: (a) Since the explanation was unsatisfactory, the 1 st respondent decided to hold a domestic enquiry. The petitioner failed to attend the enquiry in spite of giving several opportunities and the notices having been displaced on the notice board. (b) The Enquiry Officer vide his findings dated 17.03.1988 held that the petitioner was guilty of the charges. Accepting the findings of the Enquiry Officer, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 24.05.1988. The explanation submitted by the petitioner on 13.06.1988 was taken into consideration while passing final order dated 04.11.1988 wherein the 1st respondent opined that the petitioner is liable to be removed from service and accordingly passed an order. (c) The petitioner preferred WP.No.9578 of 1988 and the Hon'ble High Court vide its orders dated 16.01.1989 set aside the order on the ground that the enquiry is vitiated as the petitioner had no opportunity during the enquiry. In order to afford an opportunity to the petitioner, an enquiry was conducted de novo pursuant to the order of the Hon'ble High Court. The petitioner appeared before the Enquiry Officer and participated in the enquiry and cross-examined the witnesses at length. The petitioner also availed the opportunity by submitting his statement before the Enquiry Officer, as such, the enquiry is just, fair and proper and the petitioner had availed all the opportunities during the enquiry. (d) The Enquiry Officer vide his findings dated 07.07.1989 held the petitioner guilty of the charges. The petitioner also availed the opportunity by submitting his statement before the Enquiry Officer, as such, the enquiry is just, fair and proper and the petitioner had availed all the opportunities during the enquiry. (d) The Enquiry Officer vide his findings dated 07.07.1989 held the petitioner guilty of the charges. Accepting the findings of the Enquiry Officer, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 02.08.1989. The petitioner submitted a reply on 14.08.1989. Considering the entire material on record, the respondent came to the conclusion that an order of removal is just and fair and accordingly passed an order dated 21.08.1989 removing the petitioner from service. The petitioner accepted the order of removal and kept quiet for about six years. The petitioner had raised ID No. 137 of 1995/ which was renumbered as 51/2000 only to take unjust gains from the respondent. 12. The learned counsel for the respondent No.1 submits that the charges levelled against the petitioner have been proved in the enquiry. The petitioner having collected fares and having failed to issue tickets, has deprived the corporation of its legitimate revenues and therefore the punishment or removal from service imposed on the petitioner is just and fair. 13. The Tribunal having adjudicated the matter and relying on the evidences available on record, rightly dismissed the ID upholding the order of removal. Therefore, it is prayed that this Court may be pleased to uphold the order of removal. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 submits that A de nova enquiry was conducted by the disciplinary authority as directed by this Court in WP.No.9578 of 1988 providing all reasonable opportunities to the petitioner to defend his cause. The petitioner availed all the opportunities provided by the Enquiry Officer and also cross-examined the Management witnesses at length. The same can be ascertained from the depositions recorded by the Enquiry Officer. Therefore, the allegation of the petitioner that in spite of directions of this Court, the Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry contrary to the rules and procedure is false and baseless. The petitioner having collected the fare from the passengers did not issue the tickets to them only with a mala fide intention to defraud the legitimate revenue of the corporation. Therefore, the allegation of the petitioner that in spite of directions of this Court, the Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry contrary to the rules and procedure is false and baseless. The petitioner having collected the fare from the passengers did not issue the tickets to them only with a mala fide intention to defraud the legitimate revenue of the corporation. To escape from the clutches of guilt the petitioner is trying to take shelter by stating several cock and bull stories which are not supported by any iota of evidence. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 submits that it is a well settled law that there is no need to examine the passengers in the domestic enquiry. The contention of the petitioner that the Enquiry Officer in his findings has clearly recorded that TTI has stated that there was no mala fide intention of the conductor, but the passengers only cheated is false and baseless. The Enquiry Officer nowhere stated like that in his report. 16. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 submits that the Enquiry Officer had recorded at page No.4 of the report that the passengers left the tickets at the window and other passengers witnessed the same, but it was disbelieved by the TTI. He further submitted that the Enquiry Officer while considering the explanation of the petitioner for charge No.3, his contention therein was recorded at Page No. 4, but it is not the opinion of the Enquiry Officer. In fact, the opinion of Enquiry Officer in this regard, is mentioned at Page No.7 unnumbered Para 2 which is reproduced here under: "The contention of the conductor that the said passengers have refused to purchase tickets, they were insisting for concession, he did not yield to their temptation and issued tickets while collecting the requisite fare at 0.50ps, each, since they have refused to receive the tickets he has forcibly trusted them into the hands of the group leader and the leader left those tickets to wind stating that he had never purchased tickets are neither convincing nor supported by any evidences worth consideration. They are found only as after thoughts of the conductor to defend himself from the irregularities committed by him. They are found only as after thoughts of the conductor to defend himself from the irregularities committed by him. From the statement of the passengers obtained by the TTls at the spot it is very clear that they boarded the bus at Chintal and were alighting at Shapurnagar, paid Rs.2/- to the conductor at Chintal itself but the conductor has not given them tickets even they demanded there itself". 17. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 submits that since the contention of the petitioner that the leader of the passengers left the tickets to wind stating that he had never purchased tickets is not supported by any evidence, it cannot be believed. TTIs also refused the said contention of petitioner in the domestic Enquiry during cross examination. Further the alleged passengers never stated as above in their statement given to the checking officials at the time of check and the same was also witnessed by the service driver. 18. The mala fide intention of the petitioner was held proved in the domestic enquiry which was conducted in a fair and proper manner following the regulation and also principles of natural justice. Therefore, the disciplinary authority rightly inflicted the punishment of removal from service on the petitioner which was also rightly confirmed by the Tribunal and prayed to dismiss the writ petition. FINDINGS OF THE COURT: 19. In the present case, The petitioner was appointed on 08.03.1986 as a conductor. On 14.12.1987, while conducting the bus service No.7920 in route No.189 M at stage No.2 at about 08:50 AM, officials checked the bus, and the same officials checked the bus for the 2 nd time at 13:40 hours. Based on certain irregularities, a charge memo was issued by the respondents, and the petitioner submitted his explanation on 17.12.1987. Subsequently, the petitioner was placed under suspension and the enquiry Officer conducted a detailed Enquiry. 20. The version of the petitioner is that the, Enquiry Officer conducted ex-parte enquiry on 10.03.1988 which is contrary to the principles of natural justice. After submission of petitioner’s explanation to the enquiry report, the respondent No.1 issued removal order on 04.11.1988. Questioning the same, the petitioner approached this Court by way of filing W.P.No.9578 of 1988, and this Hon’ble Court set aside the removal order on the ground that the enquiry was vitiated. Petitioner was not given any opportunity to put forth his objections. After submission of petitioner’s explanation to the enquiry report, the respondent No.1 issued removal order on 04.11.1988. Questioning the same, the petitioner approached this Court by way of filing W.P.No.9578 of 1988, and this Hon’ble Court set aside the removal order on the ground that the enquiry was vitiated. Petitioner was not given any opportunity to put forth his objections. In the said circumstances, this court set aside the removal order and directed the respondents to conduct the enquiry afresh. 21. Subsequently, the respondent authorities re-conducted the enquiry giving opportunity to the petitioner and upon proving all the charges, he was removed from services. Against the said removal order, the petitioner approached the Tribunal by way of filing ID No.51 of 2000. After conducting the full fledged trial, Nil Award was passed by the Tribunal. Questioning the same, the present Writ Petition is filed. 22. The main contention of the petitioner is that the checking officials failed to follow the MV Act, 1988 and the circular instructions issued by the Managing Director, APSRTC, in OPD/32/92, dt. 24.09.1991. He further contended that the checking officials failed to record passengers’ full name and postal address as contemplated under the Rules, and that the respondent authorities did not provide him a copy of SR 43-R special report as required under Rule 41, 43 of Operation Manual of the Corporation. Ultimately, the petitioner’s contention is that no case is made out against him. 23. In the present Writ Petition a counter is filed by the respondents denying all the contentions of the petitioner. 24. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his arguments, relied upon the following judgments: 1. State Bank of India and others Vs. Mohammad Bhadruddin, (2019) 16 SCC 69 2. Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank and Others , (2009) 2 SCC 570 3. Workmen Vs. Bharat Fritz Werner(P) LTD and another , (1990) 3 SCC 565 4. Raghubir Singh Vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar , (2014) 10 SCC 301 25. In the case of Mohammad Bhadruddin (1st supra), it relates to the forged signatures of delinquent. After conducting a thorough enquiry, five charges were framed, and charge Nos.1, 2, 3 and 5 were not proved against the delinquent, though charge No.4 was proved. Raghubir Singh Vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar , (2014) 10 SCC 301 25. In the case of Mohammad Bhadruddin (1st supra), it relates to the forged signatures of delinquent. After conducting a thorough enquiry, five charges were framed, and charge Nos.1, 2, 3 and 5 were not proved against the delinquent, though charge No.4 was proved. In the case at hand, all the charges were proved against the petitioner, and it is not the case of forged signature of delinquent. Hence, the facts in the referred case are not applicable to the present set of facts. 26. In the case of Roop Singh Negi (2 nd supra) the question is whether the departmental proceedings is quasi judicial proceedings or not? After 5 years of the incident, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the applicant. In the case at hand, there is no such delay in initiating the departmental proceedings. Moreover petitioner approached the labour court after lapse of six years. Hence, this case is also not applicable to the present set of facts. 27. In the case of Bharat Fritz Werner(P) LTD (3rd supra) the charges were framed against the 19 workers that the workmen trespassed into the authorities office without permission, terrorized the officer and wrongfully confined him and refused to allow him to go. They compelled the officer to withdraw the notice dt.08.03.1978 regarding recruitment of supervisors. The facts are totally different to present set of facts. As such, it does not apply to the case on hand. 28. In the case of Raghubir Singh (4th supra), in this case the Tribunal framed additional issues regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Tribunal, which is altogether different to the present set of facts. 29. The learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and relied upon the case of State of Haryana And Another Vs. Rattan Singh , (1977) 2 SCC 491 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “3. The principal ground on which the courts below have declared the termination bad is that none of the 11 passengers have been examined at the domestic enquiry. Secondly, it has been mentioned that there is a departmental instruction that checking inspectors should record the statements of passengers, which was not done in this case. The principal ground on which the courts below have declared the termination bad is that none of the 11 passengers have been examined at the domestic enquiry. Secondly, it has been mentioned that there is a departmental instruction that checking inspectors should record the statements of passengers, which was not done in this case. The explanation of the State, as done out by the record, is that the inspector of the flying squad who had said that they had paid the fares but they declined to give such written statements. The third ground which weighed with the courts was, perhaps, that the co- conductor in the bus had supported with this evidence, the guiltlessness of the respondent. 4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passages who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The 'residuum' rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passages from American jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence - not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and wordly wisdom will accept. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence - not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and wordly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainty available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the flying squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge leveled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground." In the above case, passengers in the bus were not examined. In the said circumstances, the Three Judge Bench of Apex Court observed that, in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. In the present case, the petitioner also objected with regard to the failure to examine the passengers. Hence, the above said case supports the respondents’ contention. 30. The learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of V. Ramana V. APSRTC and others , (2005) 7 SCC 338 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “7. Lord Greene said in 1948 in the famous Wednesbury case (1948 (1) KB 223) that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. He said that interference was not permissible unless one or the other of the following conditions was satisfied, namely the order was contrary to law, or relevant factors were not considered, or irrelevant factors were considered; or the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken. These principles were consistently followed in the UK and in India to judge the validity of administrative action. It is equally well known that in 1983, Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Services Union v. Minister of Civil Service (called the CCSU case) summarized the principles of judicial review of administrative action as based upon one or other of the following viz., illegality, procedural irregularity and irrationality. It is equally well known that in 1983, Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Services Union v. Minister of Civil Service (called the CCSU case) summarized the principles of judicial review of administrative action as based upon one or other of the following viz., illegality, procedural irregularity and irrationality. He, however, opined that "proportionality" was a "future possibility". 11. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the Court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in the Wednesbury's case the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision for that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. 12. To put in differently unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. In the above case, the punishment given by the disciplinary authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunals. There is no scope of interference. Further, to shorten litigations, it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a regular course, if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be relevant to direct the disciplinary authority or appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. In the present case at hand, there is no shocking or disproportionate punishment to the petitioner. In this case, The petitioner was found to have irregularities not only once but twice during official checks. There is no change in the petitioner attitude. In the said circumstances, the facts referred in the above case, support the contention of the respondent authorities. 31. In this case, The petitioner was found to have irregularities not only once but twice during official checks. There is no change in the petitioner attitude. In the said circumstances, the facts referred in the above case, support the contention of the respondent authorities. 31. The learned counsel for the respondent further relied upon judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Controller, N.E.K.R.T.C. Vs. H. Amaresh , (2006) 6 SCC 187 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows: “5. The Disciplinary Authority, after perusing the details of the inquiry proceedings, replies of the respondent to the Articles of Charge and other available material, agreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and dismissed the respondent from service. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal, the respondent raised an industrial dispute under Section 10(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Labour Court, Gulbarga to which the Corporation replied. 7. The Tribunal, by its Award dated 17.12.1996, held that out of 4 charges levelled against the respondent, the 4 th charge regarding pilferage against the respondent stood proved. As regards punishment, dismissal from service was substituted with reinstatement and 75% back wages. Aggrieved by the award dated 17.12.1996, the appellant Corporation filed the writ petition before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. The learned Single Judge, by his order dated 11.09.2000, upheld the findings of the Labour Court but modified the back wages and reduced it to 25%. 9. We heard Ms. Anitha Shenoy, learned counsel appearing for the appellant Corporation. We have been taken through the pleadings, two orders passed by the Labour Court, order of learned Single Judge and of the learned Judges of the Division Bench. We have carefully perused those orders. A careful perusal of the order dated 17.12.1996 of the Labour Court would only reveal the total non-application of the mind by the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Gulbarga and the inconsistent findings rendered by the said Court. There are lot of discrepancies and mistakes in the award of the Labour Court on factual as well as legal aspects of the matter. The Labour Court at one place has observed as follows:- "Ext.M-1 goes to show that the claimant was negligent in remitting the amount. There are lot of discrepancies and mistakes in the award of the Labour Court on factual as well as legal aspects of the matter. The Labour Court at one place has observed as follows:- "Ext.M-1 goes to show that the claimant was negligent in remitting the amount. But no inference can be drawn against him that he was under the influence of intoxication, and there was shortage of fund with the claimant. The shortage of fund could be due to so many reasons. Therefore the claimant has committed some misconduct which is not simple in nature." 10. In another place, the Labour Court in para 22 has observed as under:- "I have already stated above that the Respondent has not proved charges 1 to 3. But he has proved charge 4. I have also stated above that the charge 4 is grave in nature and as such some reasonable punishment is necessary." 11. There is absolutely no precision in regard to the factual aspects and findings rendered by the Labour Court. In the said award, the Labour Court directed reinstatement of the respondent despite holding him guilty of the charge of pilferage levelled against him and directed reinstatement with back wages. In our view and as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant any dereliction of duty in this regard is highly detrimental to its financial well being and against public interest. 13. This Court in Regional Manager, RSRTC vs. Ghanshyam Sharma (3 Judges) held that the proved acts of misconduct either to a case of dishonesty or of gross negligence and bus conductors who by their actions and inactions cause financial loss to the Corporation ought not to be retained in service. 18…. This Court in a catena of judgments held that the loss of confidence is the primary factor and not the amount of money misappropriated and that the sympathy or generosity cannot be a factor which is impermissible in law. When an employee is found guilty of pilferage or of misappropriating the Corporation's funds, there is nothing wrong in the Corporation losing confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of dismissal. In such cases, there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and interfering therefore with the quantum of punishment. The judgment in Karnataka SRTC Vs. In such cases, there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and interfering therefore with the quantum of punishment. The judgment in Karnataka SRTC Vs. B.S. Hullikatti, was also relied on in this judgment among others. Examination of the passengers of vehicle from whom the said sum was collected was also not essential. In our view, possession of the said excess sum of money on the part of the respondent, a fact proved, is itself a misconduct and hence the Labour Court and the learned Judges of the High Court misdirected themselves in insisting on the evidence of the passengers which is wholly not essential…" Aggrieved by the High Court’s Order, Special Leave Petition was filed by the Corporation. In the said Special Leave Petition, the Apex Court observed in the above paras that ‘loss of confidence or faith’ is the primary factor and not the money misappropriated and that the sympathy and generosity cannot be a factor which is impermissible in law.’ In the case on hand, once the employ’s confidence or faith is lost, the Corporation cannot operate effectively. Moreover, the Tribunal’s observations support the respondent Corporation’s contentions. 32. The learned counsel for the respondents further relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of U.P.State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Suresh Chand Sharma , (2010) 6 SCC 555 wherein it is held as follows: “15. The High Court has decided the Writ Petition only on the ground that the passengers found without tickets, had not been examined and the cash with the employee was not checked. No other reasoning has been given whatsoever by the Court. 16. In State of Haryana & Anr. Vs. Rattan Singh AIR 1977 SC 1512 , this Court has categorically held that in a domestic enquiry, complicated principles and procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 do not apply. The only right of a delinquent employee is that he must be informed as to what are the charges against him and he must be given full opportunity to defend himself on the said charges. However, the Court rejected the contention that enquiry report stood vitiated for not recording the statement of the passengers who were found travelling without ticket. The only right of a delinquent employee is that he must be informed as to what are the charges against him and he must be given full opportunity to defend himself on the said charges. However, the Court rejected the contention that enquiry report stood vitiated for not recording the statement of the passengers who were found travelling without ticket. The Court held as under: "5…We cannot hold that merely because statements of passengers were not recorded the order that followed was invalid. Likewise, the re-evaluation of the evidence on the strength of co-conductor's testimony is a matter not for the court but for the administrative tribunal. In conclusion, we do not think courts below were right in over-turning the finding of the domestic tribunal." The above case concerns to the examination of witnesses, and the same supports the contention of the respondents, which is already discussed in the above paras. 33. The learned counsel for the respondents further relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs P. GUNASEKARAN , (2015) 2 SCC 610 wherein it is observed as follows: 13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of A.P. Vs. S. Sree Rama Rao, many of the above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded thus: AIR pp.1726-27, para 7) "7.... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution as a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. 15. In State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao, the principles have been further discussed at paragraph - 21 to 24, which read as follows: (sccPP.561-63). "21.The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao. First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226. 22. Again, this Court in Railway Board, representing the Union of India, New Delhi v. Niranjan Singh said that the High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person could have reached such a finding. 22. Again, this Court in Railway Board, representing the Union of India, New Delhi v. Niranjan Singh said that the High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person could have reached such a finding. In Niranjan Singh case this Court held that the High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings of the disciplinary authority on the charge that the respondent was instrumental in compelling the shutdown of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on May 31, 1956. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that the evidence of two persons that the respondent led a group of strikers and compelled them to close down their compressor could not be accepted at its face value. The General Manager did not agree with the Enquiry Committee on that point. The General Manager accepted the evidence. This Court said that it was open to the General Manager to do so and he was not bound by the conclusion reached by the committee. This Court held that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority should prevail and the High Court should not have interfered with the conclusion. 23 . The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. (See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan). 24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do." The above case law indicates where the High Court cannot interfere into all the departmental enquiries and the Tribunal Awards until and unless the fundamental rights are affected by way of punishment. 34. The learned counsel for the respondents further relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation V. Gajadhar Nath , (2022) 3 SCC 190 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows: “7. In a judgment reported as U.P. SRTC. v. Suresh Chand Sharma, this Court set aside the order of the High Court wherein the writ petition was allowed holding that the passengers without tickets have not been examined and cash with the employee was not checked. In a judgment reported as U.P. SRTC. v. Suresh Chand Sharma, this Court set aside the order of the High Court wherein the writ petition was allowed holding that the passengers without tickets have not been examined and cash with the employee was not checked. This Court relied upon the judgment of this Court in Rattan Singh and found that the punishment of dismissal from service was not disproportionate to the proved delinquency of the employee. 8. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court to which the learned Single Bench was bound in a judgment reported as U.P. SRTC. v. Rajendra Prasad allowed the appeal of the employer wherein the Tribunal returned a finding that 16 passengers who were without tickets at the time of inspection were not examined. Therefore, the punishment order was set aside being in contravention of the principles of natural justice. The Division Bench of the High Court held as under: (SCC OnLine All paras 24 & 37). “24. In view of the above, we find no substance in the argument raised by the learned counsel for the claimant/respondent to the effect that the passengers were required to be examined during enquiry and accordingly, we hold that the finding with regard to examination of passengers given by the Tribunal is perverse being contrary to the Law and being so is unsustainable. It is also for the reason that the enquiry officer after examining the witnesses including claimant/respondent held that the charge levelled against the claimant/respondent found proved. 37. Further, in the present case, claimant/respondent-Rajendra Prasad is a conductor of the bus and he was entrusted with the duty to collect the ticket from the passengers travelling in the bus and deposit the same with the Corporation however in the present case, from the material on record, the position which emerges out is to the effect that he collected the fair from 16 passengers/persons but did not deposit the same.” 10. We find that the order of the Tribunal and that of the High Court are clearly erroneous and not sustainable in law. The representative of the employer has not been cross-examined on the question that he has not inspected the bus on 12.11.1998. He has deposed that when he tried to record the statements of the passengers, the conductor misbehaved with him and used unruly words. The representative of the employer has not been cross-examined on the question that he has not inspected the bus on 12.11.1998. He has deposed that when he tried to record the statements of the passengers, the conductor misbehaved with him and used unruly words. Even that part of the statement has not been disputed in the cross- examination. Therefore, the fact that the Inspector was not able to record the names and addresses of the passengers cannot be said to be unjustified. Since the passengers are low-fare paying passengers, they might have been hesitant to get involved in the issues of any action against the conductor. The Inspector had found that 17 passengers were not issued tickets and such statement of the Inspector has also not been disputed in the cross- examination. The Tribunal or the High Court could not reject the evidence led by the employer in respect of misconduct of the workman before the adjudicator. Still further non-lodging of FIR cannot be the circumstance against the witness examined by the employer. The initiation of criminal proceedings against an employee or not initiating the proceedings has no bearing to prove misconduct in departmental proceedings” This case is also concerns to the examination of the bus passengers’ which was already delt with in the above paragraphs. 35. In the case of Divisional Controller, KSRTC (NWKRTC) vs A.T. Mane , (2005)3 SCC 254 , wherein the Hon’ble apex court observed as follows: “ 5 . In this appeal, the Shri R.S. Hegde, learned counsel appearing for the appellant corporation contended that the Labour Court having come to the conclusion that the inquiry was just and fair could not have come to the conclusion that it was necessary for the corporation to have examined the passengers for the purpose of establishing its charge against the respondent. He also contended that the corporation had produced before the Labour Court a list of prior such misconduct committed by the respondent on similar charges. A copy of the said list is annexed to this appeal as annexure P-1 wherein it is noticed the respondent prior to the order of dismissal in this case was charged number of times for offences of non-issuance of tickets or issuance of tickets of lesser denomination and collecting the correct fare from the passengers and not remitting the same to the corporation. The list shows for the above said offences the respondent has been given various punishments including censure, reprimand, fine, stoppage of increment etc. Learned counsel also submitted that the view of the Labour Court and the learned single Judge that the misconduct alleged against the respondent could only be established by the examination of passengers is impracticable because as in the present case and quite often the misconduct comes to light only when the vehicle comes back to the depot after dropping the passengers and at the time of depositing the collection for the day if surprise check is made at that time and such misconduct is detected and it is next to impossible for the corporation to trace the passengers and bring them before the inquiry officer to establish their case, that is why the corporation has from its regulation made it mandatory that the conductor should at no point of time carry more than Rs.5/- as their personal money and if they are found in excess of that same will indicate that the excess money in question was collected by non- issuance of tickets or issuance of tickets of lesser denomination. In such circumstances, it was not necessary or possible for the appellant-corporation to have examined the passengers to establish the guilt of the respondent. He also submitted that the finding of the Labour Court and the learned single Judge that the punishment is disproportionate to the misconduct is wholly misconceived. Learned counsel relied on a judgment of this Court in support of this contention of his in the case of Karnataka SRTC Vs. B.S. Hullikatti. That was also a case where a conductor concerned had committed similar misconduct 36 times prior to the time he was found guilty and bearing that fact in mind this Court held thus: (SCC p.576, para 5). "Be that as it may, the principle of res ipsa loquitur, namely, the facts speak for themselves, is clearly applicable in the instant case. Charging 50 paise per ticket more from as many as 35 passengers could only be to get financial benefit, by the Conductor. This act was either dishonest or was so grossly negligent that the respondent was not fit to be retained as a Conductor because such action or inaction of his is bound to result in financial loss to the appellant corporation." 7. This act was either dishonest or was so grossly negligent that the respondent was not fit to be retained as a Conductor because such action or inaction of his is bound to result in financial loss to the appellant corporation." 7. The fact the respondent was carrying Rs.93/- in excess of the amount is a fact proved. This itself is a misconduct over and above that the courts below ought not to have insisted on examination of the passengers. Since the respondent did not have any explanation for having carried the said excess amount, this omission also is / was sufficient to hold the respondent guilty. 9. From the above it is clear once a domestic tribunal based on evidence comes to a particular conclusion normally it is not open to the appellate tribunals and courts to substitute their subjective opinion in the place of the one arrived at by the domestic tribunal. In the present case, there is evidence of the inspector who checked the bus which establishes the misconduct of the respondent. The domestic tribunal accepted that evidence and found the respondent guilty. But the courts below misdirected themselves in insisting on the evidence of the ticketless passengers to reject the said finding which, in our opinion, as held by this Court in the case of Rattan Singh (supra) is not a condition precedent. We may herein note that the judgment of this Court in Rattan Singh has since been followed by this Court in Devendra Swamy vs. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation. 10. Since the only ground on which the finding of the domestic tribunal has been set aside being the ground that concerned passengers are not examined or their statement were not recorded, in spite of there being other material to establish the misconduct of the respondent, we are of the opinion, the courts below have erred in allowing the claim of the respondent. In our opinion, the ratio laid down in the above case of Rattan Singh applies squarely to the facts of this case. 11. In the instant case also there is the evidence of the inspector who conducted the checking which establishes the misconduct of the respondent based on which a finding was given that the respondent was guilty of the misconduct alleged. Based on the said finding, the disciplinary authority has punished the respondent by an order of dismissal. 11. In the instant case also there is the evidence of the inspector who conducted the checking which establishes the misconduct of the respondent based on which a finding was given that the respondent was guilty of the misconduct alleged. Based on the said finding, the disciplinary authority has punished the respondent by an order of dismissal. But the Labour Court, and the learned single Judge rejected the said finding and set aside the punishment imposed solely on the ground that the evidence of the passengers concerned was not adduced and their statements were not recorded by the inspector which as stated in the Rattan Singh's case is not a condition precedent. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the courts below have erred in interfering with the finding of fact on an erroneous basis. 13. This Court in the case of B.S. Hullikatti held in a similar circumstances that the act was either dishonest or was so grossly negligent that the respondent therein was not fit to be retained as a conductor. It also held that in such cases there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and thereby interfere with the quantum of punishment.” In the above case, the employee was found guilty of misappropriation of Corporation’s Funds. There is nothing wrong losing confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of dismissal from service. In such cases, there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial Forums and interfering thereafter with the quantum of punishment. In the case at hand, no generosity can be shown against the petitioner as he was found irregular in issuing tickets twice in a day. Moreover, as seen from the records, there is abnormal delay of 06 years in approaching the Tribunal, which can also be considered one of the lapses on the part of the petitioner. 36. In view of the above discussion and rationale laid down in the case laws, and once the petitioner is found in not issuing tickets, as such, rule of ‘issue and start’ is violated by him. As seen from the evidence of TTIs available in the record, it is very clearly and clinchingly established that the misconduct on the part of the petitioner. As seen from the evidence of TTIs available in the record, it is very clearly and clinchingly established that the misconduct on the part of the petitioner. It is also settled law that once misappropriation is established, Courts cannot interfere unless and until the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate. In the present case, in view of the irregularities committed by the petitioner, the respondent Corporation has lost its confidence and trust on him, as such, he cannot be reinstated into service, and it would be a burden on the Corporation. If such a person is continued in the Corporation, it sets a bad precedent for other employees. Wherever the employee’s act cause financial loss to the departments, they have no right to continue in the employment. If any monetary loss is incurred as a result of the employee’s conduct, if the enquiry is not conducted correctly, and wherever there is an infringement of fundamental rights, the Courts can interfere. In the present case at hand since the conduct of the petitioner is at threat to the Corporation, enquiry was re-conducted at his instance and as there is no infringement of fundamental right of the petitioner, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the Award passed by the Tribunal in I.D.No.51 of 2000 dated 03.02.2001. As such, the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed. 37. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this Writ Petition, shall stand closed.