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Telangana High Court · body

2025 DIGILAW 18 (TS)

Ch. Rajeswar Rao v. State of Telangana

2025-01-24

N.V.SHRAVAN KUMAR

body2025
ORDER : N.V. SHRAVAN KUMAR, J. W.P. No.35189 of 2023 has been filed seeking a writ of mandamus to declare the action of the respondent No.1 in issuing the order vide G.O.Rt. No.114 dated 21.12.2023 arbitrarily rescinding the order G.O. Rt. No.51 dated 24.05.2023, which has extended the term of petitioners for a further period of two years, before completion of the said extension and without issuing any prior notice as illegal, arbitrary, unfair and against Article 14, 21 of the Constitution of India, principles of natural justice and against all settled principles of law and consequently set aside the same. 2. W.P. No.34874 of 2023 has been filed seeking a writ of mandamus calling for the records pertaining to G.O.Rt.No.114 Animal Husbandry, Dairy Development and Fisheries (AH) Department, dated 21.12.2023 rescinding the orders issued in G.O.Rt.No.51, AHDD & F (AH) Department, dated 24.05.2023 as bad, illegal and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, basides being violative of principles of natural justice; while issuing a consequential direction to the respondents to continue both the Chairman and the members of Managing Committee DLDA, Nalgonda till their term is completed on 20.07.2025 in so far as it related to the petitioner agency. 3. Since the issues fell for consideration before this Court in both the writ petitions are similar, they are being disposed of by this common order. BRIEF FACTS IN W.P. No.35189 of 2023 4. Facts giving rise to file the writ petition is that the petitioner No.1 claims to be the Chairman of the Telangana State Livestock Development Agency (erstwhile APLDA) (hereinafter called a TSLDA) and Petitioner Nos.2 to 6 are one among 9 members of TSLDA who are Chairmen of their respective District Livestock Bodies which are registered under Societies Development Association. The TSLDA was Registered under the Registration Act, 2001 with registration No.665 of 2014. 5. The Government of India in order to improve the productivity of existing livestock had taken up a massive programme of breed improvement launched under the scheme NPCBV, re-structuring breeding operations, which involves farmers organisations by establishing state level autonomous bodies. Accordingly, APLDA was formed and further TSLDA was formed. The said TSLDA has taken gigantic task to expand artificial insemination facilities, to cover entire breedable population aiming at productivity optimisation. Accordingly, APLDA was formed and further TSLDA was formed. The said TSLDA has taken gigantic task to expand artificial insemination facilities, to cover entire breedable population aiming at productivity optimisation. It is further submitted that TSLDA provides animal breeding services at farmers’ doorstep, on cost recovery basis, covering total breedable population of more than 100 lakhs cattle and buffaloes belonging to farmers spreading over all the revenue villages of the State. 6. The objectives and functions of TSLDA inter alia are to facilitate for (a) Production and procurement of quality inputs like frozen semen, Liquid Nitrogen, equipment and their timely supply, (b) Crossbreeding of cattle, up-gradation of buffaloes, maintenance and development of indigenous Germplasm in breeding tracts and assessing the breeding needs, (c) Maintenance of quality of Artificial Insemination services, (d) Standardizing methodology of Artificial Insemination and designing of training programmes, (e) Generation of self-employment of unemployed rural youth as Gopalmitras, (f) Training and positioning of the Artificial Insemination Technicians, (g) Educating the farmers on breeding activities and reproductive management and (h) Applying the latest technologies & presenting the benefits of advanced research programmes at the doorstep of farmers. 7. It is further submitted that the Executive Committee of the TSLDA constitutes (A) Members, (B) Ex-Officio Members, (C) Nominated members, (D) Member Secretary and (E) Co-Opted members. The Category A inter alia constitutes of Chairmen of all the District Livestock Development Agencies constituted in various districts of Telangana State. As per the by-laws of TSLDA there exists 9 Chairmen of DLDAS, who Constitute Members (A) Out of the said 9 members, 6 members have approached this Court vide this writ petition. The Category-A Members of the Executive Committee shall elect one among them as the Chairman of the TSLDA. Accordingly the petitioners 1 to 6 along with 3 other members who were the Chairmen of the 9 DLDAs of Telangana State has elected petitioner No.l as the Chairman of TSLDA as per the Rules and Regulations of the TSLDA. 8. It is further submitted that at District Level i.e., in DLDA’s, consists of a General Body who would elect an Executive Committee which is headed by the Chairman. The members of the milk federations, district cattle breeding associations, Zilla Mahila Samakhyas and progressive dairy farmers constitutes the General Body of the said respective DLDAs at District Level. 8. It is further submitted that at District Level i.e., in DLDA’s, consists of a General Body who would elect an Executive Committee which is headed by the Chairman. The members of the milk federations, district cattle breeding associations, Zilla Mahila Samakhyas and progressive dairy farmers constitutes the General Body of the said respective DLDAs at District Level. All the General Body members and the Executive Committee members are a representation of the participatory democracy as they represent a cross section of livestock and dairy farmers in the district. The Artificial Insemination Technicians provide artificial insemination services at the farmers’ doorstep using high Genetic Merit Frozen semen which is sourced from the ISO Certified Frozen Semen Bull Station. The frozen semen is then distributed to the field Artificial Insemination Centres by the District Artificial Livestock Development Association. The supplies of the other essential bovine breeding inputs to various districts are the prime responsibility of the DLDAs. Apart from the timely supply of Artificial Insemination inputs, the District Livestock Development Association also play a pivotal role in creating awareness among the dairy farmers on the developments in the bovine breeding sector, organizing fertility camps, calf rallies, milk yielding competitions and also distributing the High Genetic Merit bulls to remote and inaccessible tribal villages in the jurisdiction. 9. It is further submitted that upon the formation of TSLDA in 2014, initially the term of the Executive Body constituting the petitioners and other members was for five (5) years. Further, time and again, the 1 st respondent has extended the term of the Executive Body of 9 DLDA's vide various orders from time to time. Accordingly the 1 st respondent vide G.O.Rt. No.61 dated 31.05.2021 has issued an order intimating that in view of reorganisation/ formation of DLDAS in 32 District which is still underway and in prevailing Covid-19 pandemic situation, the Government had extended the term of the Chairman and Executive Committee (petitioners) of TSLDA by two years with effect from 31.05.2021 duly amending the 3.0 of Rules and Regulations of the TSLDA, until elections as held for all 32 DLDÀs as an interim measure. In pursuant to the above, the 2 nd respondent has issued an intimation vide Lr.No.1123/T4/TSLDA/2021 dated 05.06.2021 regarding the above extension period w.e.f. 31.05.2021. Accordingly, the term of the Chairman and Executive Members i.e., petitioners 1 to 6 and other 3 members were extended for two years. In pursuant to the above, the 2 nd respondent has issued an intimation vide Lr.No.1123/T4/TSLDA/2021 dated 05.06.2021 regarding the above extension period w.e.f. 31.05.2021. Accordingly, the term of the Chairman and Executive Members i.e., petitioners 1 to 6 and other 3 members were extended for two years. 10. It is further submitted that the 1 st respondent vide G.O.Rt. No.51 dated 24.05.2023 issued an order extending the term of petitioners for a further period of two years w.e.f. 31.05.2023 or till the elections are held for all DLDAS whichever is earlier. Pursuant to the above, the 2nd respondent issued letter ROC No.1123/T4/ TSLDA/2021 dated 26.05.2023 intimating the above extension w.e.f. 31.05.2023 for a further period of two years. 11. It is further submitted that the 1 st respondent without issuing any prior intimation/notice has issued impugned order vide G.O.Rt.No.11l4 dated 21.12.2023 rescinding the orders issued vide G.O.Rt. No.51 dated 24.05.2023 with immediate effect, thereby rescinding the extension of two years granted to the petitioners. Pursuant to the above, the 3 rd respondent has issued a letter ROC No.l123/TS/TSLDA/2021 dated 22.12.2023 communicating the impugned order vide G.O.Rt. No.114 dated 21.12.2023. 12. It is contended that the previously issued extension order dated 31.05.2021 and 24.05.2023 would clearly indicate that the extension is for two years or till the elections are held at DLDAs. The 1 st respondent violating his previous orders has issued the impugned order dated 21.12.2023 before completion of the said two years term or without holding elections for all the DLDAs. Questioning the impugned G.O. Rt.No.114 dated 21.12.2023, the present writ petition has been filed. 13. It is further submitted that abrupt issuance of the impugned order dated 21.12.2023 cancelling the petitioners membership in the TSLDA is illegal and would inter alia have following ramifications: “a) The functions of DLDAs at District Level will be halted adversely affecting the livestock breeding and the breeding infrastructure, which would cause huge economic loss to the Dairy Farmers who are depending upon livestock. b) Adversely affect the breeding infrastructure like bovine, frozen semen, semen production station, storage and distribution network etc. c) Mismanagement of affairs of the TSLDA and DLDA resulting in loosing of employment of rural youth etc., who are dependent on the livestock rearing and agriculture. b) Adversely affect the breeding infrastructure like bovine, frozen semen, semen production station, storage and distribution network etc. c) Mismanagement of affairs of the TSLDA and DLDA resulting in loosing of employment of rural youth etc., who are dependent on the livestock rearing and agriculture. d) Would halt the programs of educating farmers on breeding activities and reproductive management affecting their business and livelihood, causing over all collapse of livestock management and the other sectors depending on the livestock.” 14. On behalf of the respondent No.1, while denying the writ averments, separate counter affidavit has been filed, inter alia, stating that the elections in the Telangana State Livestock Development Agency were for the first time held in 2016 and Sri Ch.Rajeswar Rao i.e., 1 st petitioner was elected as Chairman among the members of the Executive Committee including other petitioners. They have taken charge on 01.06.2016. The term of Chairman and the Executive Committee, as per by-law No.4.3.0 is for five years. Thereafter, the term was extended for a further period of two years by G.O.Rt. No.61 dated 31.05.2021, as an interim measure. After the expiry of the two years again the term was extended for a further period of two years vide the G.O.Rt. No.51 dated 24.05.2025. 15. It is further submitted that the TSLDA is registered Society under the Act 2001 and as per Section 14 of the Act 2001, the term of the Committee or the elected members shall not exceed six years. But in the instant case, the Committee is operating from 01.06.2016, which is beyond six years. Since, the term extended under the impugned G.O.Rt. No.51 dated 24.05.2023 is beyond six years as prescribed in the statute, the Government has rescinded the orders vide impugned G.O.Rt. No.114 dated 21.12.2023. Though there is statutory bar as per Section 14 of the Act 2001, the petitioners have been enjoying the term from 01.06.2016 to 21.12.2023, which is more than seven years, contrary to the Section 14 of the Act, 2001. 16. It is further submitted that as per by-law No.5.2.4, the Chief Executive Officer/Secretary shall be responsible for the routine management of the affairs of the agency and shall be the Chief Officer for the Administration of all matters of the agency. 16. It is further submitted that as per by-law No.5.2.4, the Chief Executive Officer/Secretary shall be responsible for the routine management of the affairs of the agency and shall be the Chief Officer for the Administration of all matters of the agency. Therefore, the petitioners have no right much less any statutory right or Constitutional right to continue and therefore the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. BRIEF FACTS IN W.P. No.34874 of 2023: 17. The petitioner in W.P. No.34874 of 2023 claims to be the Chairman of the District Livestock Development Agency (DLDA) Nalgonda. It is submitted that the Election Officer through his letter ROC No. 26/DLDA/NLG/2015 dated 22.07.2015, informed the Joint Director, Animal Husbandry Nalgonda that the petitioner got elected to the Executive Committee of the DLDA Nalgonda as the Chairman of DLDA Nalgonda and on the same day a certificate was issued by the Election Officer to that effect. 18. It is submitted that earlier the DLDA Nalgonda was registered vide Registration No.03/2010 dated 04.01.2010 and it works under overall supervision of Telangana State Livestock Development Agency (TSLDA) registered with the Registrar of Stamps and Registration Department, Hyderabad vide Registration No.665 of 2014. 19. It is further submitted that under Rule 4.4.2 of TSLDA Bye-laws, all the Chairmen of DLDA's in Telangana are members of the Executive Committee of TSLDA. The Respondent No.1 has issued G.O.Ms. No.2 (AH, DD & F) dated 05.02.2014, where Rule 4.5.0. stipulates that "The elected members shall cease to be members on the expiry of five years from the date they become member of the Executive Committee, but shall be eligible for re-appointment for another term, subject to a maximum of two consecutive terms" and whereas as per amended Rule 4.3.0. it is stated that “The term of the Chairman and Executive Committee shall be for five years from the date of election to the post”. Thus, both the Chairman and Executive Committee having got elected on 22.07.2015 were entitled to continue up to 21.07.2020 and that as per the amended rule issued in G.O.Ms. No.2 dated 05.02.2014, the elected members shall be eligible for re-appointment for another term subject to a maximum of two consecutive terms. Therefore, it is evident that the present Chairman and Executive Committee of DLDA, Nalgonda is entitled to continue for another term, without there being any election till 20.07.2025. 20. No.2 dated 05.02.2014, the elected members shall be eligible for re-appointment for another term subject to a maximum of two consecutive terms. Therefore, it is evident that the present Chairman and Executive Committee of DLDA, Nalgonda is entitled to continue for another term, without there being any election till 20.07.2025. 20. It is further submitted that as per amended by laws, the Executive Committee which got elected in the previous elections is automatically eligible for reappointment for another term subject to two consecutive terms without a break. Therefore, in the instant case it is contended that both the Chairman and Executive Committee members of DLDA, Nalgonda, who got elected by the due process of law on 22.07.2015 are eligible and are entitled to be re-appointed for another term of five years from 21.07.2020 till 20.07.2025 without conduct of elections. 21. It is further submitted that the present Executive Committee by virtue of G.O.Ms. No.2 (AHDD&F) Department dated 05.02.2014 is entitled to re-appointment to the next term of five years till 20.07.2025 without elections. Even otherwise by virtue of amendment of bye-law No.6.3.0 which is registered on 19.05.2010, the present Executive Committee is entitled to continue even after expiry of its term on 21.07.2020, till the conduct of elections to the next Executive Committee. Either way it is submitted that the petitioner is entitled to continue in the office even after expiry of the first elected term on 21.07.2020. As such, there is no legal impediment for the petitioners to continue as Executive Committee Members of DLDA Nalgonda beyond 21.07.2020. 22. It is further submitted that the respondents have not taken any steps in compliance of G.O.Ms.No.2 (AHDD&F) Department dated 05.02.2014 and also in view of the amended bye-law No.6.3.0 which enables continuation of present Executive Committee till the conduct of next elections. That with expiry of the term of office, the Respondent No.1, after much deliberation issued G.O.Rt.No.61 dated 31.05.2021, extending the term by two years w.e.f. 31.05.2021 which expired on 31.05.2023. 23. It is further submitted that earlier the petitioner filed W.P.No.9186 of 2021 seeking continuation for the second consecutive term in view of the G.O.Ms.No.2, dated 05.02.2014 when the extended period was expiring on 31.05.2023. The High court by an order dated 28.04.2023 in I.A. No.1 of 2021 in W.P.No.9186 of 2021, directed Respondent No.1 to consider for re-appointment of the petitioners therein in view of G.O.Ms. The High court by an order dated 28.04.2023 in I.A. No.1 of 2021 in W.P.No.9186 of 2021, directed Respondent No.1 to consider for re-appointment of the petitioners therein in view of G.O.Ms. No.2, dated 05.02.2014 as the extended period was expiring on 31.05.2023 within two weeks but no consideration took place till date. 24. Further the respondent No.1 issued G.O.Rt.No.51, dated 24.05.2023 extending the term of the Chairman and the Executive Committee for a further period of two years w.e.f. 31.05.2023 or till the elections are held, whichever is earlier. 25. It is further submitted that consequent to formation of new districts, no reorganisation of District Livestock Development Agencies in 32 districts took place till date, neither elections were conducted, nor even contemplated till date as such no need arose to end the term of the existing Executive Committees of DLDA's abruptly when their extended term as per G.O.Rt.No.51, dated 24.05.2023 would expire on 31.05.2025, less than 1½ year away. It is further submitted that the Committee of DLDA, Nalgonda is not nominated by the State and they were duly elected and are entitled to continue for another term by virtue of G.O.Ms.No.2, dated 05.02.2014. Further, the Respondent No.1 without issuing notice to the affected parties and in a span of seven months had rescinded G.O.Rt.N.114, dated 21.12.2023 without assigning any reasons. 26. It is further submitted that in utter disregard and ignoring the earlier proceedings pending before this High Court in W.P.No.9186 of 2021, Respondent No.1 issued impugned G.O.Rt.No.114, dated 21.12.2023 ending the term without any lawful excuse giving immediate effect paving way for appointment of Person-in-Charge of their choice when the Chairman and Managing Committee entitled to be in the office till 20.07.2025 and even according to G.O.Rt.No.51, dated 24.05.2023 entitled to continue in the office till 31.05.2025 and that as on today petitioner is continuing as Chairman and rest of the Committee Members as Managing Committee of DLDA, Nalgonda and Respondent No.l may appoint at anytime a Person-in-Charge to the DLDA, Nalgonda. 27. On behalf of the respondent No.2, Telangana State Livestock Development Agency (TSLDA), represented by its Chief Executive Officer, while denying the writ averments, filed counter affidavit, inter alia, stating that vide G.O.Rt. No.114, dated 21.12.2023, the Government of Telangana State has rescinded the extension term of the Chairman DLDA and TSLDA along with executive committee members. 27. On behalf of the respondent No.2, Telangana State Livestock Development Agency (TSLDA), represented by its Chief Executive Officer, while denying the writ averments, filed counter affidavit, inter alia, stating that vide G.O.Rt. No.114, dated 21.12.2023, the Government of Telangana State has rescinded the extension term of the Chairman DLDA and TSLDA along with executive committee members. Hence, the petitioner has mislead the High Court by representing himself as the Chairman DLDA Nalgonda, as he is no more the Chairman of the DLDA. 28. It is submitted that the amended By-Law No.6.3.0 under G.O.Ms.No.2 dated 05.02.2014 enabling continuation of the Executive Committee is specifically denied and as per the said By Law, the term of the Committee is only five years. It is further submitted that the Elections in the District Livestock Development Association were for the first time held in 2015 and the Petitioner was elected as Chairman in the year 2015 and took charge on 22.07.2015. The term of Chairman and the Executive Committee, as per by-law No.4.3.0 is for five years and that their term was extended for a period of two years vide G.O.Rt.No.61 dated 31.05.2021, as an interim measure. After the expiry of the two years, again the term was extended for a further period of two years vide G.O.Rt.No.51 dated 24.05.2023. 29. It is further submitted that the TSLDA is Registered Society under Societies Registration Act, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act 2001’) and as per Section 14 of the Act 2001, the term of the Committee or the elected members shall not exceed six years. But in the instant case, the Committee is operating from 22.07.2015, which is beyond six years. Since, the term extended under the G.O.Rt.No.51 dated 24.05.2023, is beyond six years as prescribed in the statute, the Government has rescinded the orders vide G.O.Rt.No.l14 dated 21.12.2023. It is further submitted that though there is statutory bar as per Section 14 of the Act 2001, the petitioners have been enjoying the term from 22.07.2015 to 21.12.2023, which is more than eight years, contrary to Section 14 of the Act, 2001. 30. It is further submitted that though there is statutory bar as per Section 14 of the Act 2001, the petitioners have been enjoying the term from 22.07.2015 to 21.12.2023, which is more than eight years, contrary to Section 14 of the Act, 2001. 30. That as per by-law No.5.2.4, the Chief Executive Officer/Secretary shall be responsible for the routine management of the affairs of the agency and shall be the Chief Officer for the Administration of all matters of the agency, and presently Chief Executive Officer is managing the affairs of the Society as such, the petitioners have no right much less, any statutory right or Constitutional right to continue. 31. On behalf of the petitioner a reply affidavit has been filed stating that the petitioner challenged the impugned G.O. Rt.No.114, dated 21.12.2023 issued by the respondent No.1 whereas the counter affidavit has been filed by the respondent No.2, who has no knowledge of the Government, as to under which circumstances the impunged G.O. is issued. The petitioner would further submit that the respondent No.2 has nowhere averred that she was authorised by the respondent No.1 to file the counter affidavit. It is further submitted that Section 14 of the Act has no relevance and was erroneously referred and whereas Section 32(7)(a)(ii) empowers the State Government to extend the term beyond three years with no ceiling. Therefore the Government is empowered to extend the term of office beyond six years even. 32. On behalf of the respondent No.1, while denying the writ/reply averments, additional counter affidavit has been filed, inter alia, stating that all the activities of the agency mentioned in the by-law No.1.5.1 to 1.5.19 are being performed by the Chief Executive Officer i.e., the 2nd respondent herein. As per by-law No.5.2.4, the Chief Executive Officer/Secretary of the agency shall perform the duties and shall be responsible for the routine management of the affairs of the agency and the Chief Officer is responsible for the administration of all the matters of agency and shall deal with all the business activities of the agency. The details of the Chief Executive Officers from the date of rescinding the Executive Committee is furnished: S l.No. Name of the Officer Duration 1. Dr. G.Manjuvani From 21.12.23 to 19.02.24 2. Dr. S.Ramchander 20.02.2024 to 31.05.24 3. Dr. Ch.Malleswari 01.06.24 to till date 33. The details of the Chief Executive Officers from the date of rescinding the Executive Committee is furnished: S l.No. Name of the Officer Duration 1. Dr. G.Manjuvani From 21.12.23 to 19.02.24 2. Dr. S.Ramchander 20.02.2024 to 31.05.24 3. Dr. Ch.Malleswari 01.06.24 to till date 33. Further, as per by-law No.6.1.1, the ultimate authority in all matter relating to the administration of the agency will be the General Body of TGLDA, who shall meet at least once in a year to evaluate the actions of the Executive Committee in respect of matters delegated to it under the approval of annual by-laws. The General Body of TGLDA also deals with budget, annual account and statements on the working of the Agency. As per by-law No.6.7.0 in the absence of Chairman, a member duly allowed by other members present will take the Chair. 34. It is further submitted that the General Body of TGLDA apart from Members includes Ex-Officio Members (1. Principal Secretary to Government, AH, DD&F Department, 2. Milk Commissioner/ Managing Dircctor, TDDC Limited. 3. Director of Research, PVNRT Veterinary University, Hyderabad. 4. Chief Executive Officer, Society for Elimination of Rural Poverty); Nominated Members (1. Nominee of Government of India from the Department of AH and Dairying, 2. Chairman/Managing Director of one private Diaries, handling more than 75000 Lt/Day, 3. Representative of SLBC); Co-Opted Members/ Special Invitees (No Voting Power) (Representation of other institutions involved in / promoting livestock development in the State such as women dairy societies, DWACRA groups, Input organizations, Philanthropic Organizations, NGOs etc) and Member Secretary (Chief Executive Officer, TGLDA). SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONERS 35. The learned Senior Counsel Sri B.Chandrasen Reddy would submit that the 1 st respondent has issued G.O.Rt. No.61 dated 31.05.2021 wherein it is narrated that in the circumstances stated by the Chairman, TSLDA and in view of the re-organisation/formation of the District Livestock Development Agencies in 32 district which is still underway and in prevailing Covid-19 pandemic situation, Government extended the term of the Chairman and Executive Committee of the Telangana State Live Stock Development Agency by two years with effect from 31.05.2021 duly amending the Rule 4.3.0 of the Rules and Regulations of Telangan State Livestock Development Agency, until elections are held for all 32 District Livestock Development Agencies as an interim measure. Thereafter, the 1st respondent issued another G.O.Rt. Thereafter, the 1st respondent issued another G.O.Rt. No.51 dated 24.05.2023, while taking the reference of earlier issued G.O.Rt. No.61 dated 31.05.2021 and had extended the term of the Chairman and Executive Committee of the Telangana State Live Stock Development Agency for a further period of two years with effect from 31.05.2023, or till, the elections are held for all District Livestock Development Agencies, whichever is earlier, which would mean the term of the Chairman and Executive Committee has been extended up to 31.05.2025. Subsequently, the 1 st respondent had issued the impugned G.O.Rt. No.114 dated 21.12.2023 wherein, while referring to the G.O.Rt. No.51 dated 24.05.2023, has rescind the orders issued in G.O.Rt. No.51 dated 24.05.2023 with immediate effect consequently, personnel engaged on contract/outsourcing/hire basis etc., as the personal staff of said Chairpersons/Members were terminated forthwith and the Government employees drafted as personal staff as PA/PS/OSD etc., in their office were repatriated forthwith. 36. The learned Senior Counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to the Rules and Regulations of the Telangana State Livestock Development Agency and submitted that as per the Rule 4.3.0, the term of the Chairman and Executive Committee shall be for five years from the date of election to the post and as per Rule 5.2.4, the Chief Executive Officer/Secretary shall perform the duties directed to be performed by the Agency; and shall be responsible for the executive administration of the Agency. He shall be the Chief Officer for the administration of all matters of the Agency and would deal with all the business activities of the Agency and also execute instruments, otherwise negotiate as the case may be, within the powers delegated to him and as may be authorised by the executive committee. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that if the impugned G.O.Rt. No.114 dated 21.12.2023 has been given effect, the objectives and the functions of the TSLDA cannot be met as such, the farmers, who are depending on dairy would be affected and the very purpose meeting the objectives of TSLDA would be defeated. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that if the impugned G.O.Rt. No.114 dated 21.12.2023 has been given effect, the objectives and the functions of the TSLDA cannot be met as such, the farmers, who are depending on dairy would be affected and the very purpose meeting the objectives of TSLDA would be defeated. Further, all the General Body members and the Executive Committee members are a representation of the participatory democracy as they represent a cross section of livestock and dairy farmers in the district and play a pivotal role in creating awareness among the dairy farmers on the developments in the bovine breeding sector, organising fertility camps, calf rallies, milk yielding competitions and also distributing the High Genetic Merit bulls to remote and inaccessible tribal villages in the jurisdiction and whereas, the 2 nd respondent, Chief Executive Officer, only takes care as per the proceedings of the Agency and the Executive Committee and he has to perform the duties as directed by the Agency and is only responsible for management of the affairs of the Agencies. Hence, the petitioners may be continued in their respective posts. 37. The learned Senior Counsel further submits that the Agency cannot be terminated and as of now there is no Agency. SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED ADDL.ADVOCATE GENERAL FOR THE RESPONDENTS: 38. Per contra, the learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents would submit that the 1st petitioner was elected as Chairman and petitioners No.2 to 6 as members of the Telangana State Live Stock Development Agency. The petitioners have taken charge on 01.06.2016 and as per the bye-law No.4.3.0 their term is for a period of five years. After the expiration of the term, it was extended for a period of two years by way of G.O.Rt.No.61 dated 31.05.2021 as an interim measure in view of the re-organisation/formation of District Livestock Development Agencies in 32 districts which is still underway and also in view of prevailing Covid-19 Pandemic situation. After expiry of the said two years, again the term was extended for a further period of two years vide G.O.Rt. No.51 dated 24.05.2023. Thereafter, the respondent No.1 issued G.O.Rt. No.114 dated 21.12.2023 rescinding the G.O.Rt. No.51 dated 24.05.2023 with immediate effect thereby rescinding the term of the Chairman and Executive Committee. After expiry of the said two years, again the term was extended for a further period of two years vide G.O.Rt. No.51 dated 24.05.2023. Thereafter, the respondent No.1 issued G.O.Rt. No.114 dated 21.12.2023 rescinding the G.O.Rt. No.51 dated 24.05.2023 with immediate effect thereby rescinding the term of the Chairman and Executive Committee. He would further submit that the Telangana State Live Stock Development Agency is a registered Society under the Societies Registration Act, 2001 and as per the Section 14 of the said Act, the term of the Committee or the elected members shall not exceed six years. 39. He would further submit that in the instant case, the Committee is operating from 01.06.2016, which is beyond six years. Since the term extended under the impugned G.O.Rt. No.51 dated 24.05.2023 is beyond six years as prescribed in the Statute, the Government has issued the G.O.Rt. No.114 dated 21.12.2023 rescinding the G.O.Rt. No.51 dated 24.05.2023 with immediate effect thereby rescinding the term of the Chairman and Executive Committee. The learned Additional Advocate General would further submit that the petitioners have been enjoying the term from 01.06.2016 to 21.12.2023 which is more than seven years and the same is ex-facie contrary to Section 14 of the Act, 2001 and that they have no right much less any statutory right or constitutional right to continue in view of the statutory bar under Section 14 of the Act, 2001. 40. To substantiate the case of the respondents, the learned Additional Advocate General has placed reliance on the following judicial pronouncements. 41. In the case of Om Narain Agarwal and others Vs. Nagar Palika Shahjahanpur 1993 (2) SCC 242 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that right of nominated members is governed by statute and the nominated members are not entitled to any notice as their removal depends on the pleasure of' the Government and that their removal does not put any stigma on their performance or character, and such removal of nominated members is purely on political consideration. Therefore, there is no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 42. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishna S/o Bulaji Borate Vs. State of Maharashtra and others , 2001 (2) SCC 441 has held specifically that once doctrine of pleasure is invoked or applicable, there is no question of giving opportunity before removal and principles of natural justice is not applicable. 42. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishna S/o Bulaji Borate Vs. State of Maharashtra and others , 2001 (2) SCC 441 has held specifically that once doctrine of pleasure is invoked or applicable, there is no question of giving opportunity before removal and principles of natural justice is not applicable. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further relied and fortified the view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in " Om Narain Agarwal and others Vs. Nagar Palika Shahjahanpur " 43. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of B.P. Singhal Vs. Union of India and another , [ 2010 (6) SCC 331 ] , while dealing with exercise of doctrine of pleasure in matters of withdrawal of pleasure in case of Governors held that loss of confidence will be a very relevant criteria for withdrawal of pleasure in case of Ministers and Attorney General. It was further held that the doctrine of pleasure enables removal of a person holding office at the pleasure of the authority, without any obligation to give notice or hearing and without assigning any reasons or disclose any cause for the removal or withdrawal of pleasure, but can only be for valid reason. In Para 80 of the said Judgment while dealing with the scope of judicial review, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that withdrawal of pleasure in case of Minister or Attorney General, loss of confidence may be relevant ground and their ideology being out of sync with the policies or ideologies of Government may also be a ground and that Judicial Review of withdrawal of pleasure is virtually nil in case of Minister or Attorney General. 44. The learned Additional Advocate General would further submit that the petitioners were all nominated by the earlier Government and their ideology is not in sync with the policies or ideologies of present Government and that the loss of confidence in them by the present Government is the reason for their removal from their nominated posts and the withdrawal of pleasure does not put any stigma on their performance and character, further aspect of the contravention of statutory provision as stated supra viz., in Para 8 was also one of the reasons for rescinding of orders of extension as period of tenure had surpassed the six years period as mandated by statute. 45. 45. The learned Additional Advocate General would further submit that an identical Writ Petition was filed before this Court vide W.P. No.1598 of 2024 seeking to declare G.O.Rt. No.158 Agricultural and Co-operation Department dated 12.01.2024 and consequent proceedings dated 12.01.2024 issued by the Director of Agriculture Marketing Hyderabad as arbitrary, discriminatory, Whimsical, voilative under Article 14 of the Constitution of India and against principles of natural justice and consequently to set aside the same. The issue involved in the said W.P. No.1598 of 2024 was “whether the State Government has power to terminate members of a committee including Chairman and Vice-Chairman nominated under Section 5 of the Telangana (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 2024 at the pleasure of the Government under Section 5 (11). It is further submitted that after hearing both the sides this Court by considering the Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Om Narain Agarwal Vs. Nagar Palika Shahjahanpur (reported in 1993 (2) SCC 242 ), Krishna Vs. State of Maharastra (reported in 2001 (2) SCC 441 ) and B.P Singhal Vs. Union of India (reported in 2010 (6) SCC 331 ) and also considering the Counter filed by the official respondents stating that the petitioners therein were all nominated by the earlier Government and their ideology is not in sync with the policies/ideologies of the present Government and that loss of confidence in them by the present Government is the reason for removal from their nominated posts and withdrawal of pleasure does not put in stigma on their performance and character, this Court after considering the Judgments and Counter filed as sated supra was pleased to dismiss the W.P. No.1598 of 2024 by an order dated 03.05.2024 with a specific finding that “in view of the categorical reasons put forth by the respondents coupled with the above discussed settled proposition of law along with the power to withdraw the pleasure in terms of Section 5 (11) of the Act, this Court is of the considered view that the State Government has power to terminate members of the committee including Chairman and Vice-Chairman nominated under Section 5 at the pleasure of the Government under Section 5 (11) of the Act.” 46. It is further submitted that aggrieved by the same Writ Petitioners therein filed a Writ Appeal vide W.A. Nos.766, 772, 775, 783, and 810 of 2014 and the Division Bench of this Court was pleased to dismiss the said Writ Appeals by way of common Judgment dated 08.07.2024 on the ground that “in the instant case, the appellants have not challenged the validity of section 5 (11) of the Act”. 47. Eventually, the learned Additional Advocate General would submit that the present Writ Petition is squarely covered by the orders passed by the Division Bench of this Court. 48. The learned Additional Advocate General refers to paras 11, 12 and 13 in the case of Om Narain Agarwal (one supra) which reads as under: “11. Section 39 deals with resignation by a member of the Board. Section 40 provides the grounds for removal of a member of the Board. Sub-section (5) of Section 40 deals with suspension of a member. From a perusal of the above provisions it is clear that the term of an elected or nominated member is coterminous with the term of the Board. The normal term of the Board is five years, but it may be curtailed as well as extended. If the term of the Board is curtailed by dissolution or supersession, the term of the member also gets curtailed. Similarly, if the term of the Board is extended, the term of the member is also extended. Apart from the curtailment of the term of a member of the Board by dissolution or supersession of the Board itself, the term of a member also gets curtailed by his resignation or by his removal from office. Section 40 specifically provides the grounds under which the State Government in the case of a city, or the prescribed authority in any other case, may remove a member of the Board. The removal under Section 40 applies to elected as well as nominated members. In respect of a nominated member, power of curtailment of term has now been given to the State Government under the fourth proviso to Section 9 added after the third proviso through the amending Act of 1990. The removal under Section 40 applies to elected as well as nominated members. In respect of a nominated member, power of curtailment of term has now been given to the State Government under the fourth proviso to Section 9 added after the third proviso through the amending Act of 1990. In the cases before us, we are concerned with the removal of nominated members under the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act and we are not concerned with the removal as contained in Section 40 of the Act. The right to seek an election or to be elected or nominated to a statutory body, depends and arises under a statute. The initial nomination of the two women members itself depended on the pleasure and subjective satisfaction of the State Government. If such appointments made initially by nomination are based on political considerations, there can be no violation of any provision of the Constitution in case the legislature authorised the State Government to terminate such appointment at its pleasure and to nominate new members in their place. The nominated members do not have the will or authority of any residents of the Municipal Board behind them as may be present in the case of an elected member. In case of an elected member, the legislature has provided the grounds in Section 40 of the Act under which the members could be removed. But so far as the nominated members are concerned, the legislature in its wisdom has provided that they shall hold office during the pleasure of the Government. It has not been argued from the side of the respondents that the legislature had no such power to legislate the fourth proviso. The attack is based on Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. 12. In our view, such provision neither offends any Article of the Constitution nor the same is against any public policy or democratic norms enshrined in the Constitution. There is also no question of any violation of principles of natural justice in not affording any opportunity to the nominated members before their removal nor the removal under the pleasure doctrine contained in the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act puts any stigma on the performance or character of the nominated members. It is done purely on political considerations. It is done purely on political considerations. In Dr Rama Mishra case [ Writ Petition No. 11114 of 1990, Order dated December 9, 1991] the High Court wrongly held that the pleasure doctrine incorporated under the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act was violative of the fundamental right of equality as enshrined in Article 14 and Article 15(3) of the Constitution. We are unable to agree with the aforesaid reasoning of the High Court. Clause (3) of Article 15 is itself an exception to Article 14 and clauses (1) and (2) of Article 15 of the Constitution. Under Article 14, a duty is enjoined on the State not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. Article 15(1) provides that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Article 15(2) provides that “no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainments; or (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public”. 13. Thereafter Article 15(3) provides that “nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children”. This means that in case any special provision is made for women, the same would not be violative on the ground of sex which is prohibited under clauses (1) and (2) of Article 15 of the Constitution. Thus, the special provision contained for nominating one or two women members as the case may be provided in Section 9 of the Act would be protected from challenge under clause (3) of Article 15 of the Constitution. It may also be worthwhile to note that the provision of pleasure doctrine incorporated by adding the fourth proviso does not, in any manner, take away the right of representation of women members in the Board, but it only permits the State Government to keep the nominated women members of its own choice. It may also be worthwhile to note that the provision of pleasure doctrine incorporated by adding the fourth proviso does not, in any manner, take away the right of representation of women members in the Board, but it only permits the State Government to keep the nominated women members of its own choice. The High Court in Dr Rama Mishra case [ Writ Petition No. 11114 of 1990, Order dated December 9, 1991] took a wrong view in holding that the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act was violative of Article 15(3) of the Constitution under an erroneous impression that this provision in any manner curtailed the representation of women members in the Board. We are not impressed with the reasoning given by the High Court that the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act in any manner deprived the fundamental right of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. It is well established that the right of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution applies to equals and not to unequals. The nominated members of the Board fall in a different class and cannot claim equality with the elected members. We are also not impressed with the argument that there would be a constant fear of removal at the will of the State Government and is bound to demoralise the nominated members in the discharge of their duties as a member in the Board. We do not find any justification for drawing such an inference, inasmuch as, such contingency usually arises only with the change of ruling party in the Government. Even the highest functionaries in the Government like the Governors, the Ministers, the Attorney-General and the Advocate- General discharge their duties efficiently, though removable at the pleasure of the competent authority under the law, and it cannot be said that they are bound to become demoralised or remain under a constant fear of removal and as such do not discharge their functions in a proper manner during the period they remain in the office.” In the case of Krishna (two supra) at paras 8, 9 and 10 which reads as under: “ 8. In the present case, the appellant was appointed under sub-section (2) of Section 4 read with clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 4 and was removed by order dated 9-2-2000 under Section 6 of the Act. In the present case, the appellant was appointed under sub-section (2) of Section 4 read with clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 4 and was removed by order dated 9-2-2000 under Section 6 of the Act. Having considered the submissions for the parties and after perusing the language of the sections, we have no hesitation to hold, that the field of Section 6 and Section 10 are separate. The removal spoken under Section 6 is removal without any stigma while the removal under Section 10 is removal with penal consequences attaching stigma. If submission for the appellant is accepted, viz., Section 6 empowers and Section 10 lays down the conditions and procedure to remove, then removal of trustee could only be for penal consequences and not otherwise. If that be so, there could be no reason to enact Section 6 as Section 10 covers such cases. It is significant, the removal under Section 6 is confined only to such trustees who are covered under clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 4 and who are also nominated by the State Government. Rights of trustees falling under the aforesaid clause (e) are rights created under a statute and hence that very creator can always limit or curtail such right. In such cases, if a trustee is removed, he cannot project any grievance that no opportunity was given to him. If any right which is creature of statute, is limited or curtailed by that very statute, in the absence of any other right under that very statute or the Constitution of India, such trustee cannot claim any right based on the principle of natural justice. 9. The removal spoken of here neither casts any stigma nor leads to any penal consequences. This clearly reveals the doctrine of pleasure which is implicit in this section. In any statute expression of the will of the legislature may be explicit or it may be implicit. It is open for the courts, while interpreting any provision to spell or read with other provisions of the statute if so intended to read implicitly, in the absence of any explicit words that subserve the intent of the legislature. 10. In any statute expression of the will of the legislature may be explicit or it may be implicit. It is open for the courts, while interpreting any provision to spell or read with other provisions of the statute if so intended to read implicitly, in the absence of any explicit words that subserve the intent of the legislature. 10. In the present statute Section 6 refers to the trustee falling under clause (e), sub-section (1) of Section 7 refers to trustees falling under clauses (b) and (c) and sub-section (2) refers to trustees falling under clause (d) and sub-section (3) refers to trustees falling in clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 4 and Section 10 refers to cases of removal of trustees by way of stigma, and Section 11 refers to the disability of such removed trustees. In view of this we have no hesitation to hold that the removal of trustee under Section 6 is based on the principle of the doctrine of pleasure. We may only strike a note here if the legislature would have used some other words for the word “removed” for expressing curtailment of the tenure of such trustee in Section 6, this possible confusion would not have arisen.” In the case of B.P. Singhal (three supra) at paras 70 and 80, which reads as under: “70. We have however already rejected the contention that the Governor should be in sync with the ideologies of the Union Government. Therefore, a Governor cannot be removed on the ground that he is not in sync or refuses to act as an agent of the party in power at the Centre. Though Governors, Ministers and the Attorney General, all hold office during the pleasure of the President, there is an intrinsic difference between the office of a Governor and the offices of Ministers and the Attorney General. The Governor is the constitutional head of the State. He is not an employee or an agent of the Union Government nor a part of any political team. On the other hand, a Minister is a hand-picked member of the Prime Minister's team. The relationship between the Prime Minister and a Minister is purely political. Though the Attorney General holds a public office, there is an element of lawyer-client relationship between the Union Government and the Attorney General. On the other hand, a Minister is a hand-picked member of the Prime Minister's team. The relationship between the Prime Minister and a Minister is purely political. Though the Attorney General holds a public office, there is an element of lawyer-client relationship between the Union Government and the Attorney General. Loss of confidence will therefore be a very relevant criterion for withdrawal of pleasure, in the case of a Minister or the Attorney General, but not a relevant ground in the case of a Governor. 80. The extent and depth of judicial review will depend upon and vary with reference to the matter under review. As observed by Lord Steyn in Daly [R. Daly v. Secy. of State for the Home Department, (2001) 2 AC 532 : (2001) 2 WLR 1622 : (2001) 3 All ER 433 (HL)] , in law, context is everything, and intensity of review will depend on the subject-matter of review. For example, judicial review is permissible in regard to administrative action, legislations and constitutional amendments. But the extent or scope of judicial review for one will be different from the scope of judicial review for the other. Mala fides may be a ground for judicial review of administrative action but is not a ground for judicial review of legislations or constitutional amendments. For withdrawal of pleasure in the case of a Minister or an Attorney General, loss of confidence may be a relevant ground. The ideology of the Minister or Attorney General being out of sync with the policies or ideologies of the Government may also be a ground. On the other hand, for withdrawal of pleasure in the case of a Governor, loss of confidence or the Governor's views being out of sync with that the Union Government will not be grounds for withdrawal of the pleasure. The reasons for withdrawal are wider in the case of Ministers and Attorney General, when compared to Governors. As a result, the judicial review of withdrawal of pleasure, is limited in the case of a Governor whereas virtually nil in the case of a Minister or an Attorney General.” ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION: 49. Heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri B.Chandrasen Reddy for the petitioners and the learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents and perused the material made available on the record. 50. Heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri B.Chandrasen Reddy for the petitioners and the learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents and perused the material made available on the record. 50. As could be seen from the proceedings, this Court on 04.09.2024 observed as under: “Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in both the writ petitions submits that after termination of G.O.Ms.No.114 dated 21.12.2023, as of now, there is no new agency or committee representing Telangana State Livestock Development Agency and elections has also not been conducted. Learned senior counsel would further submit that at present the agency which is being run by respondent No.2 and he is not competent to deal with the issues with regard to dairy farmers. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submits that till date there is no complaint filed in running the agency by any of the farmer and that the Government is taking steps to issue notification for the Elections of the Telangana State Livestock Development Agency, which would improve the functioning of the said agency. It is further submitted that any agency or any Committee cannot exceed its period beyond 6 years as per Section 14 of the Societies Registration Act, 2001 . For facilitating the benefit of farmers, this Court deems it is appropriate that agency should be represented by a committee or elected members as expeditiously as possible. Learned Additional Advocate General seeks time to get instructions as to when the notification for the elections of Telangana State Livestock Development Agency shall be issued by the Government. Post the matter on 10.09.2024.” 51. For better appreciation, it is imperative to extract the relevant provision of the Act, particularly Section 14 of the Societies Registration Act, 2001 , which reads as under: ‘14. Committee of the Society - (1) Every society shall elect a Committee, consisting of not less than three members of the society, by a resolution passed by a majority of the members present and entitled to vote at an annual general body meeting of the society held under section 20. (2) The term of the Committee or of its members so elected shall be a period not exceeding six years as may be specified in the bye-laws. (2) The term of the Committee or of its members so elected shall be a period not exceeding six years as may be specified in the bye-laws. Provided that a member who has completed a term as an elected member is eligible for re-election as a member of Committee, if the bye-laws so permit; (3) Every society shall maintain a register showing the names, addresses and occupations of the persons, who are members of the committee and shall file with the Registrar; (i) a copy of the register within a period of fourteen days from the date of election of the members of the first Committee; and (ii) a notice of every change in the members of the Committee within a period of fourteen days from the date of such change.” 52. From the above, it is clear that notwithstanding anything contained in any provisions of the Act, the term of the Committee or of its members so elected shall be a period not exceeding six years as may be specified in the bye-laws, provided that a member who has completed a term as an elected member is eligible for re-election as a member of Committee, if the bye-laws so permit. 53. The main contention of the petitioners is that the impugned G.O.Rt. No.114 dated 21.12.2023 is arbitrarily issued rescinding the orders in G.O.Rt.No.51 dated 24.05.2023, which has extended the term of petitioners for a further period of two years, without any prior notice and that the same is in violation of the extension of their extended term of two years i.e., up to 24.05.2025. Further it is submitted that issuance of the impugned order dated 21.12.2023 abruptly cancelling the petitioners membership in the TSLDA is illegal and would have ramifications of functions of DLDAs at District Level which will be halted adversely and thereby affect the livestock breeding, which would cause huge economic loss to the Dairy Farmers who are depending upon livestock and lead to mismanagement of affairs of the TSLDA and DLDA resulting in loosing of employment of rural youth etc., who are dependent on the livestock rearing and agriculture and would halt the programs of educating farmers on breeding activities and reproductive management affecting their business and livelihood, causing over all collapse of livestock management and the other sectors depending on the livestock. 54. 54. Having seen from the TSLDA Rules and Regulations at 4.3.0, the term of the Chairman and Executive Committee shall be for five years from the date of election to the post and the elections in the DLDA for the first time was held in the year 2015 and the petitioners were elected as a Chairman and the Executive Committee in the year 2015 and have taken over charge. The term of the Chairman and the Executive Committee, as per bye law No.4.3.0 is for the period of five years. Their term was extended for a period of two years by way of G.O.Rt. No.61 dated 31.05.2021, as an interim measure. After the expiry of the two years again the term was extended for a further period of two years vide the G.O.Rt. No.51 dated 24.05.2023. 55. Further, as per Section 14 of the Act, 2001, the term of the Committee or the elected members shall not exceed six years. But in the case on hand, the Committee is operating from 22.07.2015, which is beyond six years. Since the term extended under the G.O.Rt. No.51 dated 24.05.2023 is beyond six years, as prescribed in the statute, the Government has rescinded the orders vide G.O.Rt. No.114 dated 21.12.2023. Though there is statutory bar as per Section 14 of the Act 2001, the petitioners are enjoying the term from 22.07.2015 to 21.12.2023, which is more than eight years and the same is contrary to Section 14 of the Act, 2001. 56. At this juncture, it is not out of place to mention that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and another Vs. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co.Ltd. , , [(1996) 4 Supreme Court Cases 453] had categorically held that the power conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked for directing the authorities to act contrary to law. The relevant para No.10 is extracted as under: “ 10. According to these sub-sections, a claim for refund or an order of refund can be made only in accordance with the provisions of Section 27 which inter alia includes the period of limitation mentioned therein. The relevant para No.10 is extracted as under: “ 10. According to these sub-sections, a claim for refund or an order of refund can be made only in accordance with the provisions of Section 27 which inter alia includes the period of limitation mentioned therein. Mr Hidayatullah submitted that the period of limitation prescribed by Section 27 does not apply either to a suit filed by the importer or to a writ petition filed by him and that in such cases the period of limitation would be three years. The learned counsel refers to certain decisions of this Court to that effect. We shall assume for the purposes of this appeal that it is so, notwithstanding the fact that the said question is now pending before a larger Constitution Bench of nine Judges along with the issue relating to unjust enrichment. Yet the question is whether it is permissible for the High Court to direct the authorities under the Act to act contrary to the aforesaid statutory provision. We do not think it is, even while acting under Article 226 of the Constitution. The power conferred by Articles 226/227 is designed to effectuate the law, to enforce the rule of law and to ensure that the several authorities and organs of the State act in accordance with law. It cannot be invoked for directing the authorities to act contrary to law. In particular, the Customs authorities, who are the creatures of the Customs Act, cannot be directed to ignore or act contrary to Section 27, whether before or after amendment. Maybe the High Court or a civil court is not bound by the said provisions but the authorities under the Act are. Nor can there be any question of the High Court clothing the authorities with its power under Article 226 or the power of a civil court. No such delegation or conferment can ever be conceived. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the direction contained in clause (3) of the impugned order is unsustainable in law. When we expressed this view during the hearing Mr Hidayatullah requested that in such a case the matter be remitted to the High Court and the High Court be left free to dispose of the writ petition according to law.” Further, referring the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Reji Thomas and others Vs. When we expressed this view during the hearing Mr Hidayatullah requested that in such a case the matter be remitted to the High Court and the High Court be left free to dispose of the writ petition according to law.” Further, referring the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Reji Thomas and others Vs. State of Kerala and others , [(2018) 16 Supreme Court Cases 778] held that once the mechanism provided under the Statute provides for a time schedule for preferring an election petition, in the absence of a provision in the Statute for enlarging the time under any given circumstances, no Court, whether the High Court under Article 226 or the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 32, 136 or 142 of the Constitution can extend the period in election matters. Relevant para No.10 reads as under: “ 10. Section 69 of the Act is the mechanism provided by the State Legislature as contemplated under Article 243-ZK(2) of the Constitution of India. Once the mechanism provided under the statute provides for a time schedule for preferring an election petition, in the absence of a provision in the statute for enlarging the time under any given circumstances, no court, whether the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Articles 32, 136 or 142 of the Constitution can extend the period in election matters. In the matter of limitation in election cases, the Court has to adopt strict interpretation of the provisions. This Court in Smita Subhash Sawant v. Jagdeeshwari Jagdish Amin [Smita Subhash Sawant v. Jagdeeshwari Jagdish Amin, (2015) 12 SCC 169 : (2016) 1 SCC (Civ) 411] , though in a different context, has held at para 33 that: (SCC p. 178) “33. … In the absence of any provision made in the Act for condoning the delay in filing the election petition, the Chief Judge had no power to condone the delay in filing the election petition beyond the period of limitation prescribed in law.” 57. … In the absence of any provision made in the Act for condoning the delay in filing the election petition, the Chief Judge had no power to condone the delay in filing the election petition beyond the period of limitation prescribed in law.” 57. Insofar as the contention of the petitioners with regard to the aforesaid ramifications, as per the bye law No.5.2.4, the Chief Executive Officer/Secretary shall be responsible for the routine management of the affairs of the agency and shall be the Chief Officer for the Administration of all matters of the agency and the respondents in their counter affidavit have categorically submitted that presently the Chief Executive Officer is looking over the affairs of the Society. It is also categorically submitted that as per by law No.6.1.1, the ultimate authority in all matters relating to the administration of the agency will be the General Body of TGLDA, who shall meet at least once in a year to evaluate the actions of the Executive Committee in respect of matters delegated to it under the bylaws. The General Body of TGLDA also deals with approval of annual budget, annual account and statements on the working of the Agency. As per by-law No.6.7.0, in the absence of Chairman, a member duly allowed by other members present will take the Chair. The General Body of TGLDA apart from members includes Ex-officio Members, Nominated Members, Co-opted Members/Special Invitees and the Member Secretary (Chief Executive Officer). In view of the above, there will not be any such ramifications as contended by the petitioners. 58. Coming to the aspect of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, it is pertinent to note that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Om Narain (supra) held that right of persons nominated governed by statute and not the Constitution and nominated members constitute a separate class whose induction and removal depend upon pleasure of State Government which is based on political considerations. Further, nominated members are also not entitled to any pre-removal opportunity in compliance with natural justice principles and their removal does not put any stigma on their performance or character and such removal of nominated members is purely on political consideration. Therefore, there is no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 59. Further, nominated members are also not entitled to any pre-removal opportunity in compliance with natural justice principles and their removal does not put any stigma on their performance or character and such removal of nominated members is purely on political consideration. Therefore, there is no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 59. Further, in the case of Krishna (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that once the doctrine of pleasure is invoked or applicable, there is no question of giving opportunity before removal and principles of natural justice is not applicable. 60. Further, in the case of B.P. Singhal (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with invocation of doctrine of pleasure in relation to Governors has held that the doctrine of pleasure can be invoked only for valid reasons. 61. In the instant case, the petitioners have not made out any case as to how the fundamental rights are infringed. It is further to be noted that the respondents have categorically submitted in their counter affidavit that the petitioners were all nominated by the earlier Government and their ideology is not in sync with the policies of ideologies of the present Government and that the loss of confidence in them by the present Government is the reason for their removal from their nominated posts and the withdrawal of pleasure does not put any stigma on their performance and character, further aspect of the contravention of statutory provision was also one of the reasons for rescinding of orders of extension as period of tenure had surpassed the six years period as mandated by statute. 62. Further, having gone through the material made available on the record, it is to be seen that an identical issues were considered by this Court in W.P. No.1598 of 2024 that was filed seeking to declare G.O.Rt. No.158 Agricultural and Cooperation Department dated 12.01.2024 and consequent proceedings dated 12.01.2024 issued by the Director of Agriculture Marketing, Hyderabad, wherein this Court held that “…. the State Government has power to terminate the Members of the Committee including Chairman and Vice-Chariman nominated under Section 5 at the pleasure of the Government under Section 5 (11) of the Act. No.158 Agricultural and Cooperation Department dated 12.01.2024 and consequent proceedings dated 12.01.2024 issued by the Director of Agriculture Marketing, Hyderabad, wherein this Court held that “…. the State Government has power to terminate the Members of the Committee including Chairman and Vice-Chariman nominated under Section 5 at the pleasure of the Government under Section 5 (11) of the Act. Therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief in the present writ petition and accordingly the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed.” Subsequent thereto, an appeal in W.A. No.766 of 2024 and batch was preferred wherein the Division Bench of this Court, while considering the various judicial pronouncements had concurred with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge. 63. At this juncture, it is not out of place to point out that on the earlier occasion on 04.09.2024, the learned Additional Advocate General sought time to get instructions as to when the notification for the elections of Telangana State Livestock Development Agency shall be issued by the Government however, no such instructions have been placed before this Court so far. 64. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side, this Court is of the considered view that the reliefs sought for by the petitioners in W.Ps. No.35189 and 34874 of 2023 cannot be granted for the aforesaid reasons and there is no reason to interfere with the impugned G.O. Rt. No.114 dated 21.12.2023 issued by the 1st respondent. However, it is appropriate to direct the respondents/Government to take immediate steps to issue notification for the elections of Telangana State Livestock Development Agency for effective implementation of the aims and objectives of the Telangana State Livestock Development Agency, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of three months, from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 65. Accordingly, these writ petitions are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.