Order : (Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J.) 1. Heard Mr. Somkant Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. Ramakant Mishra, learned Deputy Solicitor General for the Union of India/respondent No.1 and Mr. Shailendra Shrama, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the State/respondent No.2. 2. The petitioner has challenged the illegality and validity of the impugned order dated 16.02.2017 whereby the respondent No.1 has rejected the representation filed by the petitioner for allocation of his service from State of Chhattisgarh to State of Madhya Pradesh. The petitioner has filed the instant writ petition with the following reliefs:- “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the impugned order dated 16.02.2017 (Annexure P-1) passed by the respondent no.1 and direct the respondent no.1 to reconsider the case of the petitioner within stipulated period. 10.2 Any other relief, which may be deemed, fit by this Hon'ble Court just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be provided in favour of the petitioner.” 3. Brief facts for disposal of this writ petition are that, the petitioner is an employee of Police Department and is presently working as Constable (Telecommunication) in S.P.(T/C) at Bilaspur. According to the petitioner, he is permanent resident of State of Madhya Pradesh and his wife Smt. Anjum Bano is also a Government employee in the State of Madhya Pradesh. One Mr. Ajeet Kumar Khess, who is a resident of State of Chhattisgarh, was working in the State of Madhya Pradesh as Head Constable (Radio) at Balaghat and both of them want allocation of their services to their respective States on mutual ground, they moved a joint application on 25/27.03.2008 before the State of Madhya Pradesh in this regard, which was duly supported by their affidavits. Upon receiving the said application, it was forwarded to the State of Chhattisgarh by the State of Madhya Pradesh vide its letter dated 22.04.2008. However, the said joint application of the petitioner was rejected by the Director General of Police, State of Chhattisgarh, vide its order dated 19.08.2008 on the ground that there is shortage of Police Force in the State of Chhattisgarh and if the petitioner is permitted to go to State of Madhya Pradesh on allocation, anti-naxal operation would be adversely affected. 4. 4. Being aggrieved by the said dismissal, the petitioner has moved a writ petition bearing WPS No.221 of 2011 before this Court, which was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 17.09.2013 observing while permitting the petitioner to file a fresh detailed representation before respondent No 2 within two weeks from the order dated 17.09.2013 and in the eventuality of filing any such representation by the petitioner, the same might be decided by respondent No.2 within a further period of two months in accordance with law. 5. Thereafter, on 07.02.2015, petitioner submitted a detailed representation before competent authority and after due consideration, on 16.02.2017, concerned authority/respondent No.1 rejected claim of the petitioner on the ground that "the committee noted that wife of Shri Khan was appointed after the appointed day for allocation i.e. 01.11.2000 and she was not in Government service at the time of bifurcation of State Madhya Pradesh, therefore, Committee recommended rejection of his representation", which is under challenge in the present writ petition. 6. Mr. Somkant Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the action of the respondent No.1 is illegal and arbitrary as also in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India because the authorities have allocated the services of similarly situated employees, but they have not considered the case of the petitioner. He further submits that earlier petitioner had filed a writ petition bearing WPS No.221 of 2011 before this Court, which was disposed of by this Court directing the respondent authority to consider and decide the representation of the petitioner, but the respondent No.1 has rejected the representation of the petitioner, whereas number of employees were allocated on the basis of mutual consent. It has been contended that once by letter dated 29.04.2008, the State authorities have given consent for allocation of service of the petitioner on mutual basis by the letter dated 14.08.2014, they cannot deny the petitioner as they have already given “No Objection” in favor of the petitioner for his allocation of service from Chhattisgarh to Madhya Pradesh. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred detailed representation before the respondent No.1, however, it has not considered all the aspect and passed the impugned order rejecting the representation of the petitioner, which is bad in law and therefore, the impugned order dated 16.02.2017 is liable to bed quashed. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred detailed representation before the respondent No.1, however, it has not considered all the aspect and passed the impugned order rejecting the representation of the petitioner, which is bad in law and therefore, the impugned order dated 16.02.2017 is liable to bed quashed. He placed reliance upon the judgments passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Secretary and Curator, Victoria Memorial Hall v. Howrah Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity and others reported in (2010) 3 SCC 732. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Ramakant Mishra, learned Deputy Solicitor General appearing for the Union of India/respondent No.1 supported the impugned order and submits that after 24 years of reorganization of the State of Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh, the prayer for allocation of services of the petitioner to State of Madhya Pradesh, prima facie, seems to be beyond time as by efflux of time, the prayer made by the petitioner cannot be entertained. 8. I have heard and considered the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the respective parties and perused the documents annexed with the writ petition. 9. At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer to the provisions contained in Section 68 of the Madhya Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2000, which states as under: - “ 68. Provisions relating to services in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh.- (1) Every person who immediately before the appointed day is serving in connection with the affairs of the existing state of Madhya Pradesh shall, on and from that day provisionally continue to serve in connection with the affair of the state of Madhya Pradesh unless he is required, by general or special order of the Central Government to serve Provisionally in connection with the affairs of the state of Chhattisgarh. Provided that no direction shall be issued under this section after the expiry of a period of one year from the appointed day. (2) As soon as may be after the appointed day, the Central Government Shall, by general or special order, determine the successor state or which every person referred to in sub-section (1) shall be finally allotted for service and the date with effect from which such allotment shall take effect or be deemed to have taken effect. (2) As soon as may be after the appointed day, the Central Government Shall, by general or special order, determine the successor state or which every person referred to in sub-section (1) shall be finally allotted for service and the date with effect from which such allotment shall take effect or be deemed to have taken effect. (3) Every person who is finally allotted under the provisions of sub-section (2) to a successor state shall, if he is not already serving therein be made available for serving in the successor State from such date as may be agreed upon between the Government concerned or in default of such agreement, as may be determine by the Central Government. Provided that no direction shall be issued under this section after the expiry of a period of one year from the appointed day.” 10. In the matter of Secretary and Curator, Victoria Memorial Hall (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- “40 It is a settled legal proposition that not only administrative but also judicial order must be supported by reasons, recorded in it thus, while deciding an issue, the Court is bound to give reasons for its conclusion. It is the duty and obligation on the part of the Court to record reasons while disposing of the case. The hallmark of an order and exercise of judicial power by a judicial forum is to disclose its reasons by itself and giving of reasons has always been insisted upon as one of the fundamentals of sound administration justice- delivery system, to make know that there had been proper and due application of mind to the issue before the Court and also as an essential requisite of principal of natural justice. "The giving of reason for a decision is an essential attribute of judicial and judicious disposal of a matter before Courts, and which is the only indication to know about the manner and quality of exercise undertaken, as also the fact that the Court concerned had really applied its mind" [Vide State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar AIR 2004 SC 1794 ; and State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal & Ors. (2004) 5 SCC 573 ]. 41. Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same, it becomes lifeless. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. (2004) 5 SCC 573 ]. 41. Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same, it becomes lifeless. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. Absence of reasons renders the order indefensible/unsustainable particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before a higher forum. [Vide Raj Kishore Jha Vs State of Bihar AIR 2003 SC 4664 ; Vishnu Dev Sharma Vs State of UP (2008) 3 SCC 172 ; SAIL VS STO (2008) 9 SCC 407 ; State of Uttaranchal Vs Sunil Kumar Singh Negi AIR 2008 SC 2026 ; U.P.S.R.T.C. Vs Jagdish Prasad Gupta AIR 2009 SC 2328 ; Ram Phal Vs State of Haryana (2009) 3 SCC 513 ; and State of HP Vs Sada Ram (2009) 4 SCC 422 ]. 42. Thus, it is evident that the recording of reasons is principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making. The person who is adversely affected may know, as to why his application has been rejected.” 11. From perusal of the record would show that the petitioner joined his services in the State of Madhya Pradesh on 19.03.1999 and after bifurcation of State of Madhya Pradesh, his services were assigned to new State i.e. State of Chhattisgarh, his services were assigned w.e.f. 01.11.2000 in the State of Chhattisgarh. The petitioner and one Mr. Ajeet Kumar Khess moved joint application for their allocation of service on mutual ground, which was rejected by the Director General of Police, State of Chhattisgarh, vide its order dated 19.08.2008 on the ground that there is lack of Police Force in the State of Chhattisgarh and if the petitioner is permitted to go to State of Madhya Pradesh, anti-naxal operation would be adversely affected. Thereafter, petitioner has moved a writ petition bearing WPS No.221 of 2011 before this Court, which was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 17.09.2013 observing that the petitioner was permitted to file a fresh detailed representation, upon which, on 07.02.2015, petitioner submitted a detailed representation before competent authority and after due consideration, on 16.02.2017, concerned authority/respondent No.1 rejected claim of the petitioner. 12. 12. It is an admitted position that whenever in a petition, the relief claimed with regard to main issue involved becomes redundant or infructuous then for other relief, the Courts may exercise its discretion and may not proceed further in case right of the petitioner or respondent got satisfied or no grievance remain pending against the respondent because of the change circumstances. The Court may use its discretion to drop the proceeding and may not proceed further in a matter even if, some relief of academic nature stand survives. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Manoj Kumar v. Union of India and others reported in (2024) 3 SCC 563 while dealing with the issue of prayer in writ petition to be unattainable due to passage of time, has held as under :- “20. We are of the opinion that while the primary duty of constitutional courts remains the control of power, including setting aside of administrative actions that may be illegal or arbitrary, it must be acknowledged that such measures may not singularly address repercussions of abuse of power. It is equally incumbent upon the courts, as a secondary measure, to address Sir Clive Lewis, Judicial Remedies in Public Law (5th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2015). HWR Wade and CF Forsyth, Administrative Law (11th edn, Oxford University Press 2014) 596-597. Peter Cane, ‘Damages in Public Law’ (1999) 9(3) Otago Law Review 489. Henry Woolf and others, De Smith’s Judicial Review (8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2018) 1026-1027. the injurious consequences arising from arbitrary and illegal actions. This concomitant duty to take reasonable measures to restitute the injured is our overarching constitutional purpose. This is how we have read our constitutional text, and this is how we have built our precedents on the basis of our preambular objective to secure justice. 21. In public law proceedings, when it is realised that the prayer in the writ petition is unattainable due to passage of time, constitutional courts may not dismiss the writ proceedings on the ground of their perceived futility. In the life of litigation, passage of time can stand both as an ally and adversary. Our duty is to transcend the constraints of time and perform the primary duty of a constitutional court to control and regulate the exercise of power or arbitrary action. In the life of litigation, passage of time can stand both as an ally and adversary. Our duty is to transcend the constraints of time and perform the primary duty of a constitutional court to control and regulate the exercise of power or arbitrary action. By taking the first step, the primary purpose and object of public law proceedings will be subserved. 22. The second step relates to restitution. This operates in a different dimension. Identification and application of appropriate remedial measures poses a significant challenge to constitutional courts, largely attributable to the dual variables of time and limited resources. 23. The temporal gap between the impugned illegal or arbitrary action and their subsequent adjudication by the courts introduces complexities in the provision of restitution. As time elapses, the status of persons, possession, and promises undergoes transformation, directly influencing the nature of relief that may be formulated and granted. 24. The inherent difficulty in bridging the time gap between the illegal impugned action and restitution is certainly not rooted in deficiencies within the law or legal jurisprudence but rather in systemic issues inherent in the adversarial judicial process. The protracted timeline spanning from the filing of a writ petition, service of notice, filing of counter affidavits, final hearing, and then the eventual delivery of judgment, coupled with subsequent appellate procedures, exacerbates delays. 25. Take for example this very case, the writ petition was filed against the action of the respondent denying appointment on 22.05.2017. The writ petition came to be decided by the Single Judge on 24.01.2018, the Division Bench on 16.10.2018, and then the case was carried to this Court in the year 2019 and we are deciding it in 2024. The delay in this case is not unusual, we see several such cases when our final hearing board moves. Appeals of more than two decades are awaiting consideration. It is distressing but certainly not beyond us. We must and we will find a solution to this problem. 26. It is in this reality and prevailing circumstance that we must formulate an appropriate system for preserving the rights of the parties till the final determination takes place. In the alternative, we may also formulate a reasonable equivalent for restitution of the wrongful action.” 14. We must and we will find a solution to this problem. 26. It is in this reality and prevailing circumstance that we must formulate an appropriate system for preserving the rights of the parties till the final determination takes place. In the alternative, we may also formulate a reasonable equivalent for restitution of the wrongful action.” 14. For the foregoing reasons, the case law cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the matter of Secretary and Curator, Victoria Memorial Hall (supra) is of no help to the petitioner as the same is distinguishable on the facts of the present case. 15. Considering the matter in its entirety as well as keeping in mind the dictum of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Manoj Kumar (Supra) as also the well settled principle of law that whenever in a petition, the relief claimed with regard to main issue involved becomes redundant or infructuous then for other relief(s), the Courts may exercise its discretion and may not proceed further, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner has failed to make out a case for interference by this Court. 16. In view of the above, I do not find any good ground to interfere with the impugned order dated 16.02.2017 as nothing survives in the matter. The writ petition lacks merit, is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost(s).