ORDER : ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE, J. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, the learned AGA appearing for respondents No.1 to 3, and the learned counsel appearing for respondents No.4 and 5. 2. This petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India assailing the order dated 26.10.1976 passed by the Land Tribunal, Savanur. 3. By the said order, the Land Tribunal granted occupancy rights in favour of respondents No.4 and 5 in respect of property bearing Sy.No.127, measuring 07 acres 25 guntas, situated in Savanur Taluk, Haveri District. 4. The petitioners claim to be the landlords, and their primary contention is that the impugned order, passed in 1976, was without issuing notice to them, as they were minors at that time. This is one of the reasons urged to contend that there is no delay in filing the petition after gaining knowledge in the year 2012 about the order dated 26.10.1976, granting occupancy rights. 5. The petitioners would contend that they came to know about the impugned order only in the year 2012, when they approached the Revenue Court for mutation of their names in the property records. The petitioners have also contented that they are residents of Dharwad and were not aware of the proceedings before the Land Tribunal, Savanur. Though the inordinate delay is one of the factors, which the petitioners have to explain before considering the writ petition on merits, the Court has shown indulgence and considered the petitioners claim on merits as well. 6. The property in question admittedly once belonged to Ningappa Shivappa Havanagi. The petitioners claim that their grandfather, Ningappa Shivappa Havangi, executed a registered Gift Deed dated 14.04.1966 in respect of two properties, namely Sy.No.127 measuring 07 acres 25 guntas and Sy.No.126, measuring 21 guntas in favour of the petitioners. Admittedly, the petitioners were minors at the time of execution of the Gift Deed and were represented by their father, Channabasappa. 7. The petitioners contend that the contesting respondents have claimed occupancy rights under a registered lease deed dated 26.07.1968, said to have been executed by Panchappa, the petitioners’ uncle (their father's brother). 8. The primary contention of the petitioners is that Panchappa could not have executed a lease deed in favour of the contesting respondents, as the property in question was gifted to the petitioners by their grandfather under the aforementioned Gift Deed. 8. The primary contention of the petitioners is that Panchappa could not have executed a lease deed in favour of the contesting respondents, as the property in question was gifted to the petitioners by their grandfather under the aforementioned Gift Deed. Thus, it is urged that entire proceeding before the Land Tribunal with notice to Panchappa is invalid, as the petitioners have not been issued any notice before passing the impugned order. 9. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, elaborating on his submissions, contends that the respondents have failed to establish that there was a valid lease in favour of the contesting respondents, inasmuch as the petitioners, who are the lawful owners of the property, did not execute any lease deed in favour of the contesting respondents. The alleged lease deed said to have been executed by the petitioners' uncle, Panchappa, is invalid under law, as Panchappa was not the lawful owner of the property in question. Thus, it is urged that the impugned orders have to be set aside and claim for occupancy has to be rejected. 10. In the alternative, it is urged that the matter be remanded to the Tribunal by setting aside the impugned order, which was passed without notice to the petitioners. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents would urge that the alleged Gift Deed dated 14.04.1966 is invalid, and was never acted upon, and there was an order cancelling the mutation based on the alleged Gift Deed. It is further submitted that the alleged donor, Ningappa, participated in those proceeding, and the mutation based on the Gift Deed was cancelled. 12. It is further urged that there was some sort of arrangement in the family, in which the property in question fell to the share of Panchappa, who thereafter executed a registered lease deed in favour of the respondents. Based on said arrangement/partition, names of the respondents were entered in the property records from 1968 onwards, and those entries continued till 01.03.1974. 13. The Land Tribunal, having considered these aspects, has rightly granted occupancy rights in favour of the contesting respondents, is the contention on behalf of the respondents. 14. In addition, it is also urged that the alleged Gift Deed is invalid, as the Gift Deed does not contain any recital relating to acceptance of the Gift. 15. 13. The Land Tribunal, having considered these aspects, has rightly granted occupancy rights in favour of the contesting respondents, is the contention on behalf of the respondents. 14. In addition, it is also urged that the alleged Gift Deed is invalid, as the Gift Deed does not contain any recital relating to acceptance of the Gift. 15. Learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents would contend that the petitioners have not made a claim based on the alleged Gift Deed and the petitioners in the earlier Writ Petition No.75037/2013 made a claim based on the Will, as such the Gift Deed has never been acted upon and the petitioners never came in possession of the property as donees. 16. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, by way of reply, would contend that the averments made in W.P.No.75037/2013 is to be understood, as having made a reference to the Gift Deed and not a Will, though the averments would refer to the Will. It is urged that there was no Will executed in favour of the petitioners, and only document executed is the registered Gift Deed dated 14.04.1966. Since the reference is made to the document of 1966, the word ‘Will’ appearing in the Writ Petition No.75037/2013 should be considered as ‘Gift’ and the word ‘Will’ appearing in the order dated 30.05.2013 in the aforementioned petition should be considered as the ‘Gift’ and not a ‘Will’. 17. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would also contend that the Gift Deed is not questioned by anyone and it is not open for the respondents to contend that the Gift Deed is not acted upon. 18. The Court has considered the contentions raised at the Bar and perused the records. 19. Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, reads as under: 122. “Gift” defined.- “Gift” is the transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee. 20. Annexure-A is the copy of the Gift deed dated 14.04.1966. There is no recital in the Gift Deed to hold that the donees have accepted the possession of the properties, which is said to have been gifted to the petitioners. Admittedly, the petitioners were minors when the alleged Gift Deed was executed. 20. Annexure-A is the copy of the Gift deed dated 14.04.1966. There is no recital in the Gift Deed to hold that the donees have accepted the possession of the properties, which is said to have been gifted to the petitioners. Admittedly, the petitioners were minors when the alleged Gift Deed was executed. The minors’ guardian should have accepted the possession of the properties on behalf of the minors. That recital is not forthcoming. 21. Of course, it is true that even in the absence of any such recital, it is permissible to adduce evidence to show that the Gift was accepted by the donees. However, no such evidence or circumstance is forthcoming to hold that the petitioners have accepted the gift. Though it is urged that opportunity is not yet given to the petitioners to lead evidence relating to acceptance of the gift and said contention though prima facie appears to be correct, on consideration of the materials on record, the Court is of the view that even on earlier occasions, the petitioners have not made any claim based on the gift deed. 22. At this juncture, it is relevant to notice Annexure-R8, the order passed by the authority under the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. In terms of the said order, donees names were not entered in the property records, as the Revenue Authority refused to enter the names of donees in view of the objection filed by the petitioners’ father. Said order is passed after hearing the alleged donor. 23. It appears from the events that have occurred in 1968, as recorded in Annexure-R8, that there was a bit of unrest among the family members of the donor, as the petitioners’ grandfather allegedly made an attempt to transfer the property in the names of the minors. 24. Accepting the objection filed by the petitioners’ father, the mutation is cancelled in terms of order at Annexure-R8. In the said order, it is recorded that the donor has admitted in the cross-examination that he has not gifted the property bearing Sy.No.126 and 127. It is also relevant to notice that the order passed by the Revenue Authority was not called in question either by the alleged donor or by the father of the petitioners. That order has attained finality. 25. It is also relevant to notice that the order passed by the Revenue Authority was not called in question either by the alleged donor or by the father of the petitioners. That order has attained finality. 25. At this juncture, it is also relevant to notice that it appears that a trial is held by the revenue officials based on the objection to the alleged gift deed. It is also relevant to notice that the jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities to decide on the validity of the registered document is authoratively decided in around the year 2002 to 2004. In 1960s there were no authoritative judgments relating to the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities of the scope of enquiry in mutation proceedings based on registered documents. Thus, the Court has to attach some importance to the said order at Annexure-R8 in the peculiar facts of the case which are discussed below. 26. It is relevant to notice that one more registered Deed was executed in the year 1968, creating lease in favour of the contesting respondents No.4 and 5, in respect of the petition property. Said lease deed is also not called in question. Said lease deed was executed by Panchappa, the uncle of the petitioners. 27. Though the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would urge that the property could not have been leased, given the fact that the property is already gifted in favour of the petitioners, it is required to be noticed that the gift deed has not given effect to as noticed in Annexure-R8. 28. The contention that the gift deed was not acted upon also appears to be correct, as the petitioners filed a petition in W.P.No.75037/2013, claiming right over the property under a Will. It appears that even the petitioners accepted the order rejecting the mutation based on the alleged gift deed. Though it is urged that the averment in the Writ Petition No.75037/2013 relating to the Will is a typographical error, said error is not rectified even when the petition was disposed of by making reference to the alleged Will. Even in the petition, there is no such pleading that the petitioners erroneously averred the gift deed as a Will. 29. Though it is urged that the averment in the Writ Petition No.75037/2013 relating to the Will is a typographical error, said error is not rectified even when the petition was disposed of by making reference to the alleged Will. Even in the petition, there is no such pleading that the petitioners erroneously averred the gift deed as a Will. 29. It is also relevant to notice that though the registered lease deed was executed in the year 1968, and though the name of the tenant came to be entered in the property records in Column No.12 as a tenant, the said entry is not questioned by the petitioners or anybody in the family of the petitioners. 30. It is indeed true that the petitioners were minors when the lease deed was executed in 1968, and it is also true that when the proceedings were initiated in 1976 under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, the petitioners were minors. Thus, the petitioners could not have raised the dispute in 1968, when the lease deed was executed or in 1976 when the proceedings were initiated. However, what happened thereafter is relevant. 31. Form No.10 was issued in 1980. The Court would presume that the property records were changed pursuant to Form No.10 in the year 1980. Both petitioners and respondents have not produced the records immediately after 1980, and it is stated that the records are destroyed. 32. Under these circumstances, based on Form No.10, which was issued in 1980, the Court would presume that entries were also changed both in Column Nos.9 and 12 pursuant to Form No.10. This entry is not questioned by the petitioners. The petitioners claim that they were unaware of the entries up to the year 2011. 33. It is extremely difficult to believe that the petitioners were unaware of the entries for such a long period when the contesting respondents' names were entered in the year 1980, pursuant to Form No.10. It is also difficult to assume that the contesting respondents having got their names entered in the property records pursuant to Form No.10 in 1980, kept quite and remained away from the property till 2012. 34. It is also noticed from the averments made in the petition that the petitioners have stated that Panchappa was cultivating the property. It is also difficult to assume that the contesting respondents having got their names entered in the property records pursuant to Form No.10 in 1980, kept quite and remained away from the property till 2012. 34. It is also noticed from the averments made in the petition that the petitioners have stated that Panchappa was cultivating the property. Thus, it is not open to the petitioners to contend that Panchappa who was cultivating the property was not competent to execute the lease deed, more so when the lease deed was executed gifted in the year 1968. 35. Under these circumstances, the Court is of the view that the petitioners cannot claim to be the owners of the property, as the alleged Gift Deed has not been given effect to, and, subsequent to the purported Gift Deed, a registered lease deed was executed in the names of the respondents. 36. Though learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would urge that the petitioners’ uncle could not have executed a lease Deed in the year 1968, since there is no challenge to the registered lease deed of 1968, the Court has to presume that the lease deed was executed with the knowledge of the petitioners’ father, who appeared to have a share assuming there was no partition in the family. 37. This being the position, the Court is of the view that the petitioners are not the owners of the property. Accordingly, the proceedings were concluded based on the registered lease deed and the lease in favour of the contesting respondents is not disputed by the executants of the lease deed. 38. Though the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would urge that, in appropriate cases, a writ petition challenging an order can be entertained even after two-three decades, the Court is of the view that, in the present case, the petitioners are not the owners as such in the proceedings conducted under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, the petitioners are not necessary parties. 39. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed on merits , and not merely on the ground of delay.