JUDGMENT : SRI ANANDA SEN, J. Heard learned counsel representing the petitioner and learned counsel representing the respondents. 2. By filing this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order as contained in Memo No.7485 dated 09.10.2019, passed in Departmental Proceeding No.62 of 2018, whereby punishment of withholding of pay increment for six months has been inflicted upon the petitioner. The said punishment is equivalent to one “black mark”. Further, the salary of the petitioner for the period of 510 days has been withheld on the ground of “No Work No Pay”. 2.1. The petitioner has also challenged Memo No.699 dated 29.03.2020, whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner has been dismissed in a most cryptic manner. 2.2. The petitioner further prays that a direction be given to the respondents to pay the salary to the petitioner for the period of 510 days along with interest, which has been withheld by way of punishment. 3. The facts are undisputed in this case. The petitioner is in Police Force. He was elected as the Vice President of the Jharkhand Police Mens Association, which is a recognized Body. 3.1. He was posted in the District of Jamshedpur (East Singhbhum). The petitioner was transferred to the District of Latehar vide order bearing No.4405/2017 as contained in Memo No.6334 dated 21.12.2017. 3.2. Immediately vide Letter No.1354 dated 29.12.2017, the order of transfer in relation to the office bearers of the Jharkhand Police Mens Association, was kept in abeyance till completion of their tenure as the office bearer. 3.3. As the petitioner did not join Latehar, he was proceeded against on the ground that he has absconded. Since the petitioner did not join Latehar, he was proceeded against departmentally on the ground of dereliction of duty. The departmental proceeding was instituted and proceeded ex-parte and ultimately by the impugned order dated 09.10.2019, the punishment was inflicted. 3.4. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority, which was dismissed vide order dated 29.03.2020. 4. Learned counsel representing the petitioner submits that since the transfer order was kept in abeyance, there was no occasion for the petitioner to join the transferred post i.e. at Latehar. 3.4. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority, which was dismissed vide order dated 29.03.2020. 4. Learned counsel representing the petitioner submits that since the transfer order was kept in abeyance, there was no occasion for the petitioner to join the transferred post i.e. at Latehar. He submits that by virtue of the order passed by the Department, wherein the transfer order was kept in abeyance, no proceeding could have been initiated, and the act of the petitioner for not joining at Latehar cannot be said to be a misconduct. 5. Learned counsel representing the respondent – State submits that since the petitioner did not join at Latehar in spite of the transfer order dated 21.12.2017, he was proceeded against as the same amounts to grave misconduct. He submits that this Court sitting in a writ jurisdiction cannot act as an Appellate Authority to reconsider the entire allegation against the petitioner. 6. It is true that in a departmental proceeding, this Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot act as an Appellate Authority. 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 , has held down the conditions and circumstances, when Court can and cannot interfere in a departmental proceeding. It is necessary to quote para-12 & 13 of the said judgment, which reads hereunder:- “ 12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 8. In this case, I find that admittedly, the petitioner was transferred on 21.12.2017. It is also an admitted fact that the petitioner was elected as the Vice President of Jharkhand Police Mens Association and the information was given on 29.07.2016. On 29.12.2017, the Inspector General of Police (Personnel), Ranchi, had sent a communication to all the Police officials including the Superintendent of Police of Jamshedpur and other Districts intimating that the transfer order in respect of the office bearers of the Jharkhand Police Mens Association, will be kept in abeyance till the period of their tenure as office bearers. Only after conclusion of the tenure they will be immediately relieved. 9. Only after conclusion of the tenure they will be immediately relieved. 9. By virtue of this letter, the transfer order of the petitioner which was passed on 21.12.2017 is deemed to have been kept in abeyance. When the transfer order has been kept in abeyance, there was no occasion for the petitioner to join the transferred post i.e. at Latehar. By virtue of order dated 29.12.2017, the petitioner did not join Latehar. The fact of not giving joining at Latehar by the petitioner cannot be said to be a misconduct in view of the direction dated 29.12.2017. 10. Thus, when there is no misconduct, no departmental proceeding could have been initiated against the petitioner. Initiation of this departmental proceeding is absolutely bad and thus the same is set aside. The impugned order as contained in Memo No.7485 dated 09.10.2019, passed in Departmental Proceeding No.62 of 2018, is quashed. So far as the Appellate Order dated 29.03.2020 is concerned, the same is also set aside, as the aforesaid observation is missing in the Appellate Order. The petitioner is entitled for the consequential benefits and the same may be extended to him. 11. Accordingly, this writ petition stands allowed . No order as to costs. 12. Pending interlocutory application, if any, stands disposed of.