ORDER : (SUBBA REDDY SATTI, J.) The above writ petition is filed impugning the proceedings issued by the 2 nd respondent vide Ref.No.APCO/CO/Ad.I/BUS.AMO/MO/SPO/RJY/TRF/KOLK/24 dated 11.11.2024 (Ex.P1), transferring the petitioner. 2. Petitioner, Assistant Marketing Officer/MO (FAC)/SPO, Rajahmundry, working in Andhra Pradesh State Handloom Weavers’Cooperative Society Limited, has been transferred and posted as AMO/Manager, Cuttack Showroom, Srikakulam Division. 3. Heard Smt.S.V.Bharatha Lakshmi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Prabhakar, learned standing counsel for respondents2 to 5. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that before issuing the proceedings impugned, the petitioner was suspended vide Ref.No.APCO/CO/Admin.II/Deficits/BUS,DMO(FAC)/Suspension/23, dated 11.04.2023 (Ex.P3). Later, the petitioner was reinstated vide Ref.No.APCO/CO/Admin.II/Deficits/BUS,DMO(FAC)/Suspension/Rein stated/23, dated 28.06.2023 (Ex.P5) and posted as Marketing Officer (FAC), Livery Division, Mangalagiri. A charge memo vide Ref.No.APCO/CO/Admin.I/BUS,DMO(FAC),RJY/Charges/23, dated 12.10.2023 (Ex.P6) was issued, for which the petitioner submitted his explanation dated 20.10.2023 (Ex.P7). Pending enquiry, by the proceedings, impugned, the petitioner was transferred, which is punitive. 5. Learned standing counsel for respondents 2 to 5 would submit that the transfer of the petitioner is on administrative grounds and not punitive. He would also submit that though the petitioner pleaded punitive, no such instances are mentioned in the affidavit and he eventually, prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 6. Now, the point for consideration is: Whether the transfer order, impugned in the writ petition, suffers from any illegality warranting interference by this Court to exercise judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? 7. Before delving into the facts of the case, let the Court examine the scope of this court’s jurisdiction qua the transfer of employees. It is a settled law that an employee holding a transferable post cannot claim any vested right to work at a particular place. The transfer of an employee neither affects the service conditions nor legal rights. The transfer issue is a prerogative of the employer and normally Courts will not interfere with transfers. A transfer is not only an incidence of service but also an essential condition of the service. Normally courts are chary to interfere with an order of transfer made for administrative reasons. However, if an order of transfer is found to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power; if the transfer is made in connection with departmental proceedings; for extraneous considerations or collateral purposes, the Court can interfere with such transfers. 8. In Gujarat Electricity Board Vs. However, if an order of transfer is found to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power; if the transfer is made in connection with departmental proceedings; for extraneous considerations or collateral purposes, the Court can interfere with such transfers. 8. In Gujarat Electricity Board Vs. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani , [1989 SCR (2) 357] , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed thus: "Transfer of a Government servant appointed to a particular cadre of transferable posts from one place to the another is an incident of service. No Government servant or employee of public undertaking has legal right for being posted at any particular place. Transfer from one place to other is generally a condition of service and the employee has no choice in the matter. Transfer from one place to other is necessary in public interest and efficiency in the public administration." 9. In Union of India Vs. H.N. Kirtania , [1989 SCR (3) 397] the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as follows: “Transfer of a public servant made on administrative grounds or in the public interest should not be interfered with unless there are strong and pressing grounds rendering the transfer order illegal on the grounds of violation of statutory rules or grounds of malafide.” 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Shilpi Bose Vs. State of Bihar , [ AIR 1991 SC 532 ] observed thus: “4. In our opinion, the Courts should not interfere with a transfer Order which are made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer Orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory Rule or on the ground of malafide. A Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer Orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer Order is passed in violation of executive instructions or Orders, the Courts ordinarily should not interfere with the Order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the Department. If the Courts continue to interfere with day-to-day transfer Orders issued by the Government and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the Administration which would not be conducive to public interest." (emphasis is mine) 11. In State of Punjab Vs. If the Courts continue to interfere with day-to-day transfer Orders issued by the Government and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the Administration which would not be conducive to public interest." (emphasis is mine) 11. In State of Punjab Vs. Joginder Singh D hatt , [ AIR 1993 SC 2486 ] , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as follows: “3. … It is entirely for the employer to decide when, where, and at what point of time a public servant is transferred from his present posting …” 12. In Union of India and Others Vs. S.L. Abbas , [ (1993) 4 SCC 357 ] , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the scope of judicial review is available when there is a clear violation of statutory provision or the transfer is swayed by mala-fide etc., It was observed as follows: “7. Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala-fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the court cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the Government on the subject...” 13. In N.K. Singh Vs. Union of India and Others , [ (1994) 6 SCC 98 ] , the Hon’ble Apex Court considered the aspect of the transfer of an employee, the prerogative of an employer regarding transfer observed as follows: “23. … Assessment of worth must be left to the bonafide decision of the superiors in service and their honest assessment accepted as a part of service discipline. Transfer of a government servant in a transferable service is a necessary incident of the service career. Assessment of the quality of men is to be made by the superiors taking into account several factors including suitability of the person for a particular post and exigencies of administration. Several imponderables requiring the formation of a subjective opinion in that sphere may be involved, at times. The only realistic approach is to leave it to the wisdom of the hierarchical superiors to make that decision. Several imponderables requiring the formation of a subjective opinion in that sphere may be involved, at times. The only realistic approach is to leave it to the wisdom of the hierarchical superiors to make that decision. Unless the decision is vitiated by mala fides or infraction of any professed norm or principle governing the transfer, which alone can be scrutinized judicially, there are no judicially manageable standards for scrutinizing all transfers and the courts lack the necessary expertise for personnel management of all government departments. This must be left, in the public interest, to the departmental heads subject to the limited judicial scrutiny indicated.” The Apex Court further observed that: “24. … Challenge in courts of a transfer when the career prospects remain unaffected and there is no detriment to the government servant must be eschewed and interference by courts should be rare, only when a judicially manageable and permissible ground is made out. This litigation was ill-advised.” 14. In the State of M.P. and another Vs S.S.Kourav and others , [ (1995) 3 SCC 270 ] the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows: “The courts or tribunals are not appellate forums to decide on transfers of officers on administrative grounds. It is for the administration to take appropriate decisions and such decisions shall stand unless they are vitiated either by mala fides or by extraneous consideration without any factual background foundation. In this case transfer order having been issued on administrative grounds, expediency of those orders cannot be examined by the Court.” 15. In National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. Vs Shri Bhagwan , [ (2001) 8 SCC 574 ] , it was observed as follows: “No government servant or employee of a public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place since the transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable post from one place to other is not only an incident but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise of power or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the Courts or the tribunals cannot interfere with such orders as a matter routine, as though they are the appellate authorities substituting their own decisions for that of the management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned.” 16. In Somesh Tiwari Vs. Union of India and others , [ (2009) 2 SCC 592 ] , the Hon’ble Apex Court held thus: “19. Indisputably an order of transfer is an administrative order. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that transfer, which is ordinarily an incident of service should not be interfered with, save in cases where inter alia mala fide on the part of the authority is proved. Mala fide is of two kinds - one malice in fact and the second malice in law. 20. The order in question would attract the principle of malice in law as it was not based on any factor germane for passing an order of transfer and based on an irrelevant ground i.e. on the allegations made against the appellant in the anonymous complaint. It is one thing to say that the employer is entitled to pass an order of transfer in administrative exigencies but it is another thing to say that the order of transfer is passed by way of or in lieu of punishment. When an order of transfer is passed in lieu of punishment, the same is liable to be set aside being wholly illegal.” 17. Of late, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sri Pubi Lombi Vs. The State of Arunachal Pradesh and Others , [2024 0 Supreme (SC) 225] , reversed the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and upheld the order of the learned single Judge, wherein the learned single Judge declined to interfere in a transfer. The Apex Court observed thus: “10. In view of the foregoing enunciation of law by judicial decisions of this Court, it is clear that in absence of (i) pleadings regarding mala-fide, (ii) non-joining the person against whom allegation are made, (iii) violation of any statutory provision (iv) the allegation of the transfer being detrimental to the employee who is holding a transferable post, judicial interference is not warranted. In the sequel of the said settled norms, the scope of judicial review is not permissible by the Courts in exercising of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” 18. Thus, a conspectus of the expressions of the Hon’ble Apex Court makes the thing more than discernible that the interference of the Courts in transfer matters is limited unless the decision suffers from malice or violation of statutory provisions. 19. In the case at hand, as seen from the proceedings impugned, the transfer was on administrative grounds. The disciplinary proceedings, pending against the petitioner, have nothing to do with his transfer. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the transfer is punitive, however, as rightly pointed out learned standing counsel for respondents 2 to 5 that no substantial material was placed before this Court in that regard. 20. During arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that, by transferring the petitioner, he was posted to a lower cadre. However, as seen from Ex.P1 transfer order, the petitioner, AMO/MO (FAC), SPO, Rajahmundry was transferred and posted as AMO/Manager Cuttack Showroom, Srikakulam Division. Learned standing counsel for respondents 2 to 5 would submit that the duties to be performed by the petitioner are the same. Thus, this court doesn’t find any merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 21. Given the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court does not find any merit in the above writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. 22. Accordingly, all the Writ Petition is Dismissed. No order as to costs. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.