JUDGMENT : SRI ANANDA SEN, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. Petitioner, in this writ petition, has prayed for the following reliefs:- “(i) For issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction, including writ of certiorari, for quashing the order contained in memo no.1121 dated 20.07.2020, communicated to the petitioner vide Memo No.1393 dated 10.08.2020 (Annexure-7), passed by the respondent no.2, whereby the petitioner has been held guilty of the charges and it was ordered that an amount of Rs.4,76,743.50 will be recovered from the petitioner and the petitioner was warned to be careful in future; and (ii) For issuance of further appropriate, writ order or direction, including writ of certiorari, for quashing the order as contained in memo no.1229 dated 07.12.2020 (Annexure-9) passed by respondent no.1, whereby and whereunder, the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed and the order of punishment has been affirmed; and (iia) For issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction, including writ in the nature of certiorari, for quashing that part of the letter contained in memo no. 643, JBVNL, Ranchi dated 29.06.2021 issued under the signature of Deputy General Manager (Finance and Accounts), Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited whereby and whereunder an amount of Rs. 4,76,743.50 (under the head of revenue loss as per JUVNL Ranchi's Resolution No. 1121 dated 20.07.2020) has been deducted from the Death-cum-Retirement Gratuity of the petitioner; and (iib) Upon quashing of the aforesaid memo no. 643, JBVNL Ranchi dated 29.06.2021 an appropriate writ(s), order(s) or direction(s) may be issued upon the respondents to forthwith release the amount of Rs.4,76,743.50 with statutory interest on account of Death-cum-Retirement Gratuity.” 3 . Briefly stated, the facts of the present case are that the petitioner (now retired) was then posted at Deoghar Office as Assistant Electrical Engineer, Electric Supply Sub-Division, Deoghar. On the intervening night of 27.11.2012 and 28.11.2012 a theft occurred in the office, causing a loss of Rs.9,53,487/- to the revenue of Nigam. First information report being Deoghar P.S. Case No. 438 of 2012 dated 28.11.2012 was lodged against unknown persons and the final form being Report No. 336 of 2013 was submitted that the theft was committed by unknown person. On 21.09.017, the petitioner was issued a show cause notice vide memo No.1745 dated 21.09.2017 along with copy of memo of charge. The petitioner submitted reply on 07.09.2018. On 21.09.017, the petitioner was issued a show cause notice vide memo No.1745 dated 21.09.2017 along with copy of memo of charge. The petitioner submitted reply on 07.09.2018. After conclusion of the enquiry a second show cause notice vide memo No. 327 dated 05.02.2019 was issued to the petitioner along with copy of the enquiry report stating therein that the petitioner had not handed over the key of the Iron Chest to his successor before proceeding on leave and the keys of the Iron Chest remained with the cashier which had caused the incident of theft and petitioner was liable to pay half of the amount of Rs.9,53,487/-, that is, Rs. 4,76,743.50/-. In his reply petitioner denied all the charges levelled against him. His reply was found unsatisfactory, punishment order vide memo No. 1121 dated 20.07.2020 was passed. The petitioner preferred an appeal on 21.09.2020 but the same was dismissed vide order contained in memo No.1229 dated 07.12.2020 affirming the order of punishment. Further, during the pendency of this instant writ petition, a letter contained in memo No.643 dated 29.06.2021 was issued by the respondents to the petitioner, mentioning that an admissible Death-cum- Retirement Gratuity of amount of Rs.20,00,000/- would be paid to the petitioner after deducting an amount of Rs. 4,76,743.50 (under the head of revenue loss as per JUVNL Ranchi’s Resolution No. 1121 dated 20.07.2020). 4 . Learned counsel for the petitioner puts forth his arguments stating that the petitioner was on sanctioned leave when the incident took place and had handed over the keys of iron chest to the cashier because the then Assistant Electrical Engineer (In-charge) refused to accept the same. Further, learned counsel submits that in the preliminary enquiry report the then Cashier and the Assistant Engineer were held responsible for their negligence and there was no mention of the petitioner. The counsel further submits that the petitioner has had an unblemished career throughout his entire service period with no misconduct on his part. 5 . Learned counsel representing the respondents submits that the petitioner was negligent in not handing over the Iron Chest key to his successor before proceeding on leave and hence, his act was in violation of Rule 37 of the Financial and Accounts Code (Chapter IV to VII). 5 . Learned counsel representing the respondents submits that the petitioner was negligent in not handing over the Iron Chest key to his successor before proceeding on leave and hence, his act was in violation of Rule 37 of the Financial and Accounts Code (Chapter IV to VII). The counsel further submits that the other half of the theft amount was recovered from the Cashier, who preferred writ application being W.P.(S) No.3053 of 2017 as well as LPA being LPA No.553 of 2018, but both had been dismissed by this Hon’ble Court. The case of the petitioner is on the same grounds as that of the cashier. 6 . After hearing the counsel for the parties and perusal of the records, I find that the action of the petitioner in proceeding on leave without handing over the iron chest key to the then Assistant Electrical Engineer (In-charge) is in violation of the Rule 37 of the Financial and Accounts Code. The petitioner has been given full opportunity to defend his case, hence, violation of principle of natural justice on part of the respondents is ruled out. The ground urged by the petitioner that his act was only a mere negligence cannot be accepted and it also needs to be considered that such negligence of the petitioner resulted in loss worth of Rs.9,53,487/- to the government revenue. 7 . It is settled proposition of law that High Court with limited scope under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot act as an appellate authority and re- evaluate the findings of fact or the adequacy of evidence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Bhupendra Singh reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1908 has held as under: “23. The scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’) in a case of the present nature, is no longer res integra. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , a 3-Judge Bench stated: ‘7. The scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’) in a case of the present nature, is no longer res integra. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , a 3-Judge Bench stated: ‘7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.’” 8 . In the light of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court, when I go through the facts of this case, I find that the departmental proceeding was conducted in accordance with law following the principle of natural justice. In the light of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court, when I go through the facts of this case, I find that the departmental proceeding was conducted in accordance with law following the principle of natural justice. The petitioner has been given full opportunity to place his defence. The order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority are well- reasoned orders which require no interference by this Court. Further, I find that there is clear case of dereliction of duty on the part of the petitioner. 9 . Thus, considering the facts of the case in the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, I find no merit in this writ petition. This writ petition, is accordingly, dismissed 10 . Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of.