JUDGMENT : K. Lakshman, J. 1. Heard Mr. P. Prabhakar Reddy, learned counsel for appellant - accused and Dr. S. Prashanth, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent. 2. This appeal is filed challenging the judgment dated 26.09.2018 in S.C. No.182 of 2018 passed by learned Judge, Family Court - cum - VI Additional Sessions Judge at Khammam. 3. Vide the aforesaid judgment, learned trial Court convicted the appellant - accused for the offences under Sections - 302 and 498A of IPC, and accordingly sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs.1,000 (Rupees One Thousand Only) and in default to undergo imprisonment for a period of three (03) months for the offence under Section - 302 of IPC. He was further sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for Two (02) Years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- (Rupees One Thousand Only) for the offence under Section - 498A of IPC and in default, to undergo imprisonment for a period of three (03) months. 4. It is a homicidal death of a house-wife by her husband. The case of the prosecution is that PW.1 is the brother of the deceased, while the appellant herein - accused is her husband. Twelve Years (12) ago from the date of incident, marriage of the deceased was performed with the appellant herein. They led the marital life happily for some period. Out of their wedlock, they were blessed with female and male child i.e., Priyanka and Prem respectively. The appellant herein addicted to alcohol and used to quarrel and harass the deceased, both mentally and physically without any reasons. The same was narrated to her maternal uncles, PWs.3 and 4, who in turn approached the village elders, LW.12 and PW.16, who conducted a panchayat and admonished the appellant to change his attitude towards the deceased and lead a normal life with her and children. The appellant did not change his attitude and continued his harassment towards the deceased. On 06.04.2018 at about 22:00 hours, while the deceased and the appellant herein were having meals, the appellant picked up quarrel with the deceased and beat her with a pestle on her forehead and caused injury. On hearing the cries of the deceased, PW.2 went and found her in a pool of blood with head injury. By that time, the appellant herein fled away with pestle from there. On hearing the cries of the deceased, PW.2 went and found her in a pool of blood with head injury. By that time, the appellant herein fled away with pestle from there. The same was informed to PW.1. PWs.3 and 4 came there and shifted the deceased to Government Hospital, Khammam for treatment at 10.30 PM by an Auto-rickshaw of PW.10. The duty doctor on examination of the deceased declared her brought dead. 5. On receipt of Ex.P1 - report given by PW.1, brother of the deceased on 07.04.2018 at 02000 hours, PW.20, Sub-Inspector of Police, Raghunadhapalem Police Station, registered a case in Crime No.67 of 2018 under Section - 302 of IPC and issued express FIR and handed over the same to PW.22, Inspector of Police, Singareni/In Charge of Khammam Rural Circle, for investigation. PW.22 accordingly took up investigation. 6. On completion of investigation, PW.22 filed a charge sheet against the appellant herein. The same was committed to the trial Court, which was taken on file as S.C. No.182 of 2018 for the offences under Sections - 302 and 498A of IPC. 7. The trial Court framed charges for the aforesaid offences against the accused and then proceeded with trial. 8. During trial, PWs.1 to 22 were examined, Exs.P1 to P17 were marked and MOs.1 to 6 were exhibited. No evidence either oral or documentary was let in on behalf of the accused. 9. After completion of evidence on behalf of the prosecution, the accused was examined under Section - 313 of Cr.P.C. Thereafter, upon hearing both sides, the trial Court recorded conviction against the appellant herein for the aforesaid offences and accordingly imposed sentences of imprisonment in the manner stated above. Challenging the said conviction and sentences of imprisonment, the appellant preferred the present appeal. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant - accused contended as follows: i. The prosecution failed to prove the commission of offence under Section - 302 of IPC beyond reasonable doubt. ii. The prosecution also failed to prove harassment said to have meted out by the accused. iii. There are contradictions and omissions in prosecution witnesses which disproves the case of prosecution. iv. There is no direct evidence and the entire case rests on circumstantial evidence. v. The prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. ii. The prosecution also failed to prove harassment said to have meted out by the accused. iii. There are contradictions and omissions in prosecution witnesses which disproves the case of prosecution. iv. There is no direct evidence and the entire case rests on circumstantial evidence. v. The prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. With the aforesaid submissions, he sought to set aside the impugned judgment recording conviction and imposition of sentences against the appellant herein. 11. On the other hand, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would submit as under: i. Though there is no direct evidence and eye-witness to the occurrence, there is circumstantial evidence which proves the guilt of the accused. ii. All the circumstances form a complete chain to connect the accused in commission of offence. iii. The trial Court relying on the evidence, both oral and documentary, recorded conviction against the appellant herein. There is no error in it warranting interference by this Court. With the aforesaid submissions, he sought to dismiss the present appeal. 12. In view above rival submissions, the point that falls for consideration by this Court is: Whether the conviction and sentences of imprisonment recorded by the trial Court for the offences under Sections - 302 and 498A of IPC against the appellant herein - accused are sustainable, both on facts and in law? 13. In view of the aforesaid rival submissions, before delving into the factual matrix, it is necessary to briefly advert to the purport of the offences alleged. Section - 302 of IPC contemplates the gravest form of culpable homicide amounting to murder, requiring proof of an act done with the intention or knowledge that it would cause death. Section - 498A of IPC, on the other hand, is a social-welfare provision aimed at safeguarding married women from cruelty at the hands of the husband or his relatives, including wilful conduct causing grave injury or harassment connected with unlawful demands for dowry. These provisions, though distinct in scope, often arise together in cases where a pattern of cruelty culminates in the death of a married woman. 14. As already stated above, to prove the case of prosecution, it examined PWs.1 to 22 and got marked Exs.P1 to P17 and MOs.1 to 6. PW.1 is not only the complainant, but also brother of the deceased. 14. As already stated above, to prove the case of prosecution, it examined PWs.1 to 22 and got marked Exs.P1 to P17 and MOs.1 to 6. PW.1 is not only the complainant, but also brother of the deceased. He deposed with regard to the disputes between the accused, addiction of accused to alcohol and the deceased and harassment meted out by the accused towards deceased. He further deposed that he received a phone call from PW.2, co-sister of the deceased that the accused beat the deceased with pestle and ran away from the scene of offence. Thereafter, he and his uncle went to the house of the deceased and shifted her to Government Hospital, Khammam, where the doctors declared her died. He gave Ex.P1 - report to the police. During cross- examination, he admitted that the house of deceased is about 200 yards from his house. Except that, nothing useful was elicited by learned counsel for the accused. 15. PW.2, co-sister of the deceased, deposed that the accused is the younger brother of her husband. Since she did not support the prosecution case, she was declared hostile. During cross-examination by learned Public Prosecutor, she admitted that panchayats were held relating to the disputes in between accused and the deceased. 16. PW.3, maternal uncle of the deceased, deposed with regard to the disputes between the accused and the deceased and also harassment meted out by the accused towards deceased. He also deposed on the lines of PW.1. During cross-examination, he admitted that he received the information from PW.2, then he went to the house of accused. By that time, he found the father of the accused, PW.2, PW.8, PW.9 and some other persons. 17. PW.4, maternal uncle of the deceased, deposed that after the marriage, the deceased and the accused lived happily for few days and thereafter disputes arose between them. The accused addicted to alcohol and used to torture and harass the deceased. Villagers also held panchayats not to harass the deceased. Despite the same, the accused did not stop harassing the deceased. About four (04) months back from the date of incident, the accused beat the deceased with a pestle at his house due to which the deceased died. During cross- examination, he admitted that his house is situated at a distance of 400-500 yards from the house of the accused. 18. About four (04) months back from the date of incident, the accused beat the deceased with a pestle at his house due to which the deceased died. During cross- examination, he admitted that his house is situated at a distance of 400-500 yards from the house of the accused. 18. PW.5, a circumstantial witness, deposed that he married the sister of the deceased. There were disputes between the accused and the deceased and panchayats were held. The accused transferred his property in the name of his children and thereafter she joined the accused. On 06.04.2018 at about 10.30 P.M., he received a phone call from PW.3 that the deceased was beaten by the accused. He was examined by the police. During cross-examination, nothing was elicited by the accused. 19. PW.6 is a photographer. He deposed with regard to taking photographs at the scene of offence as in Ex.P3. 20. PW.7 is also a photographer. He deposed with regard to taking photographs over the dead body of the deceased at Mortuary, Government Hospital, Hyderabad, as in Ex.P4. 21. PW.8 is the neighbour of the accused. He also deposed with regard to the disputes between the accused and the deceased. At about 9.30 p.m. and 10.00 p.m., while he was in his house, he heard some shouting from the house of the deceased. PW.2 made shouting while the accused ran away from his house. On that, he went to the house of the accused and found that she was lying on the floor in the house of the accused. Later they shifted the deceased to the Hospital, where the doctors declared her dead. He was also examined by the police. During cross-examination, he admitted that his house is abutting the house of the accused. 22. PW.9, another neighbor of the accused, deposed that his house and the house of the accused are separate by a road. Since he did not support the case of the prosecution, he was declared hostile. 23. PW.10, villager, deposed on the same lines as deposed by PW.1. During cross-examination, he admitted that he does not know about the disputes between the accused and the deceased. 24. PW.11, son of the accused and the deceased, aged nine (09) years, was examined by the trial Court and having found him to be a competent to give evidence, recorded his evidence. During cross-examination, he admitted that he does not know about the disputes between the accused and the deceased. 24. PW.11, son of the accused and the deceased, aged nine (09) years, was examined by the trial Court and having found him to be a competent to give evidence, recorded his evidence. This witness deposed that at the time of incident, he was staying in the Hostel. His brother (son of PW.2) informed him that the deceased by consuming alcohol, went to the upstairs of the building and fell down. 25. PW.12 is only a panch witness for Ex.P6 - inquest panchanama. PW.13 is also a panch witness for crime details form as in Ex.P7. PW.14 is another panch witness for inquest conducted over the dead body of the deceased. In his presence, the police seized MO.1 - blood stained nighty, MO.2 - petty coat and MO.3 - blouse. 26. PW.15, a panchayat elder, deposed about the pancayat held with regard to the disputes between the accused and the deceased. During the said panchayat, the accused executed an Undertaking (Ex.P8), dated 12.02.2007 and he is one of the signatory to Ex.P8. During cross-examination, he admitted that after panchayat, the accused and the deceased lived happily without any disputes. 27. PW.16 is also another panchayat elder deposed on the very same lines as deposed by PW.15. However, during cross- examination, this witness admitted that he does not know what was happened after the panchayat was held as he is not the resident of the Jinkala Thanda. 28. PW.17 said to be a panch witness for confession and seizure as in Ex.P9 did not support the case of prosecution and, therefore, he was declared hostile, and so also PW.18, another panch witness. 29. PW.19, the doctor, deposed with regard to autopsy conducted over the dead body of the deceased on 07.04.2018 at about 10.15 A.M. He found the following external injuries: 1. Lacerated injury of frontal bone 5”x6” cms. 2. Depressed fracture of 3”x 4” cms. of frontal bone. He found the following internal injuries: 1. Fracture of frontal bone 2. Intra-cerebral bleed. 30. He also issued Ex.P13 - post-mortem examination report. According to him, the injuries referred to by him might have caused with the Pestle shown to him. 31. During cross-examination, he admitted that injury No.1 might have caused when the person forcibly fallen down on the hard surface. Fracture of frontal bone 2. Intra-cerebral bleed. 30. He also issued Ex.P13 - post-mortem examination report. According to him, the injuries referred to by him might have caused with the Pestle shown to him. 31. During cross-examination, he admitted that injury No.1 might have caused when the person forcibly fallen down on the hard surface. He denied the suggestion that injury No.2 might have caused when a person fallen down in a hard rock. However, this witness says that there is no such possibility to cause such an injury when a person fallen down. 32. PW.20, the then Sub-Inspector of Police, Raghunathapalem Police Station, deposed with regard to his receiving Telugu written report from PW.1 and thereafter his registering a case in Crime No.67 of 2018 under Section - 302 of IPC vide Ex.P14 - FIR. 33. PW.21, then In-Charge Circle Inspector, deposed that on receipt of FIR in Cr.No.67 of 2018, he recorded the statement of PW.2 and thereafter he visited the scene of offence in the presence of panch witnesses. He prepared Ex.P7 crime details form and collected MO.4 - piece of floor, MO.5 - blood stained earth. He took steps for conducting autopsy over the dead body of the deceased. He also examined other witnesses and recorded their statements. Thereafter, he handed over the CD file to the regular Circle Inspector for further investigation. 34. PW.22, the then Circle Inspector of Police, deposed with regard to recording of voluntary confessional statement of accused as in Ex.P15 and seizure of MO.6 - pestle under the cover of seizure panchayat, Ex.P16. He arrested the accused and produced before the Magistrate. After receipt of post-mortem examination report and Ex.P17 - RFSL report, he laid charge sheet against the accused. 35. On the analysis of the entire evidence of prosecution witnesses, it is clear that there are no eye-witnesses to the incident. Though it is contended by the prosecution that PW.2 was present at  the time of incident, she (PW.2) did not support the case of prosecution. Moreover, the prosecution witnesses deposed with regard to general domestic disputes and habitual quarrels between the parties. 36. The material on record shows that the accused was addicted to alcohol, and the incident occurred when he was under the influence of alcohol. While intoxication does not excuse the act, it is relevant to determine presence or absence of intention. Moreover, the prosecution witnesses deposed with regard to general domestic disputes and habitual quarrels between the parties. 36. The material on record shows that the accused was addicted to alcohol, and the incident occurred when he was under the influence of alcohol. While intoxication does not excuse the act, it is relevant to determine presence or absence of intention. It supports the inference that the act was committed without the mental state required under Section - 300 of IPC. There is no evidence of premeditation or any deliberate plan of the accused to kill the deceased. The incident appears to have occurred in the heat of the moment, during a sudden quarrel between the accused and the deceased. Using pestle indicates the assault occurred impulsively, without preparation or selection of a deadly weapon beforehand. Although a pestle is capable of causing fatal injuries, it is not a weapon ordinarily associated with intentional homicide. The prosecution has not proved the accused inflicted repeated blows with a deliberate intention to ensure death. The circumstances suggest that the accused acted in a fit of anger, and the death resulted from the assault rather than any calculated act. Even PW.19, the doctor, deposed that the injuries might have caused with the pestle shown to him. 37. However, during cross-examination, the doctor admits that injury No.1 might have caused when the person forcibly fallen down on the hard surface. Thus, the circumstances proved by the prosecution do not unerringly point to a homicidal intention. While it is established that the accused caused the injuries leading to death, the chain of evidence does not meet the standard necessary for conviction under Section - 302 of IPC. The facts indicate that the accused had knowledge that his act of hitting the deceased with a pestle was likely to cause death. However, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intended to cause death or such bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Therefore, the mental state aligns with Section - 299 IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) falling within Part-II because only knowledge and without intention is established. 38. Therefore, the mental state aligns with Section - 299 IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) falling within Part-II because only knowledge and without intention is established. 38. Given the absence of intention, lack of premeditation, the impulsive nature of the act, absence of motive, and the fact that the death occurred due to injuries inflicted in a sudden quarrel, the conviction under Section - 302 of IPC is unsustainable. However, 1 6 since the accused had knowledge that his act was likely to cause death, conviction under Section - 304 Part-II of IPC is appropriate. 39. “Culpable Homicide” is a genus and “murder” is its species and all “murders” are “culpable homicides, but all “culpable homicides” are not “murders” as held by the Apex Court in Rampal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh , (2012) 8 SCC 289 . The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of actual circumstances, but in the light of what is supposed to be the circumstances. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that accused No.1 then accompanied the deceased on the date of death. However, there is nothing on record to suggest that all the accused had come prepared to commit the offence or there was premeditation/prior meeting of minds of the accused for commission of offence. 40. Section 302 of IPC is important in many ways. Persons accused of murder are tried under this section only. Further, if in case, an accused of murder is found guilty of an offence, Section - 302 provides for punishment to such offenders. It states that whoever commits murder shall be punished with either life imprisonment or death (depending on the gravity of the murder) along with fine. The primary point of consideration for the Court in matters relating to murder is the intent and purpose of the accused. That is why, it is important that the object and intention of the accused is proved in cases under this section. The required materials for murder include intention (must be intended to cause death), cause of death (the act has to be done with the knowledge that the act may cause the death of another and bodily injury (there must be intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death). 41. The required materials for murder include intention (must be intended to cause death), cause of death (the act has to be done with the knowledge that the act may cause the death of another and bodily injury (there must be intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death). 41. In Basdev v. State of Pepsu , AIR 1956 SC 488 the Apex Court held as under: “Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion.” 42. It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two different terminologies, ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in equal terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held guilty under second part of Section - 304 IPC. It is in this background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely “intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. It is in this background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely “intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section - 300 are not satisfied and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the said Section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section - 300 IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. 43. The Apex Court in Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh , AIR 2006 SC 3010 , held as under: “Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters - plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302, are not converted into offences punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under Section 302. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302, are not converted into offences punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under Section 302. The intention to cause death can be 16 gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention. Be that as it may.” 44. The Apex Court in Anbazhagan v. The State represented by the Inspector of Police , 4. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 857 , held as under: “60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus: (1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in 21 ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused. (2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC. (3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is 22 punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’. (4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder. (5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death. To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of 23 the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. (6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death. (7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC. (8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant 24 must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. (8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant 24 must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack. (9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries. (10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case. (11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies. (12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.” 45. The Apex Court in a recent judgment in N. Ramkumar v. The State, rep.by Inspector , Crl.A. No.2006 of 2023, decided on 06.09.2023 also reiterated the aforesaid principle. 46. In State of M.P. v. Udham , 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1378 , the Apex Court held as under: “12. Sentencing for crimes has to be analyzed on the touch stone of three tests viz., crime test, criminal test and comparative proportionality test. Crime test involves factors like extent of planning, choice of weapon, modus of crime, disposal modus (if any), role of the accused, anti-social or abhorrent character of the crime, state of victim. Criminal test involves assessment of factors such as age of the criminal, gender of the criminal, economic conditions or social background of the criminal, motivation for crime, availability of defense, state of mind, instigation by the deceased or any one from the deceased group, adequately represented in the trial, disagreement by a judge in the appeal process, repentance, possibility of reformation, prior criminal record (not to take pending cases) and any other relevant factor (not an exhaustive list).” 47. In the light of the aforesaid discussion and the principle laid down in the above decisions, coming to the case on hand, the entire commission of offence had resulted without any premeditation. In such circumstances, we are of the opinion that it was a case where an act was committed by the accused with knowledge but without intention. The trial Court did not consider all the aforesaid aspects while convicting the appellant - accused for the offence under Section - 302 of IPC and imposing life imprisonment. In such circumstances, we are of the opinion that it was a case where an act was committed by the accused with knowledge but without intention. The trial Court did not consider all the aforesaid aspects while convicting the appellant - accused for the offence under Section - 302 of IPC and imposing life imprisonment. Therefore, this Court while upholding the finding of learned trial Court holding the appellant herein guilty of the offence altered the conviction and sentence of the appellant - accused imposed to that of Section 304 Part II of IPC from Section 302 of IPC, and the appellant - accused is imposed sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone. The appellant - accused was in jail from 26.09.2018 and thereafter he was granted bail vide order dated 02.01.2024 by this Court. His bail bonds stand discharged accordingly. 48. The present Criminal Appeal is accordingly allowed in part in the above terms. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed.