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2025 DIGILAW 1829 (MAD)

C. Palanisamy, Secretary v. Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies

2025-04-02

P.B.BALAJI

body2025
ORDER : The review application has been filed by the writ petitioner seeking to review my order dated 21.07.2023 in W.P.No.30477 of 2018. 2. I have heard Mr.C.Prakasam, learned counsel for the review applicant, Mr.B.Tamilnidhi, learned Additional Government Pleader for the respondents 1 and 2. The third respondent refused to receive notice and the fourth respondent, despite service of notice, has not chosen to appear in person or through a counsel. I have also gone through the records. 3. While disposing of the said writ petition, I had directed the first respondent, Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Erode, to proceed with the Section 87 surcharge proceedings, after giving reasonable opportunity to the writ petitioner. I further directed the exercise to be completed within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. I also found that the writ petitioner was not exonerated and the writ petition itself was premature. 4. It is an admitted fact that the writ petitioner filed a Writ Appeal challenging my order dated 21.07.2023. However, the said W.A.No.1676 of 2024 was withdrawn with liberty to prefer a review application before me. Subsequently, the review was filed along with an application to condone delay and considering the fact that the writ petitioner had lost time in challenging my order before the Hon'ble Division Bench, I also condoned the delay and thereafter, the review application has been heard by me. 5. Mr.C.Prakasam, learned counsel for the review petitioner, would first and foremost submit that the Enquiry Officer has not recommended initiation of Section 87 surcharge proceedings. He would further submit that the petitioner is not an authority to sanction loan to the members of the second respondent Society and it is only the Board of Directors, who pass resolutions, sanctioning loans and as Secretary, the petitioner was bound to implement the said resolutions passed by the Board of Directors. He would therefore submit that even the loan waiver scheme, in pursuance of G.O. (Ms.)No.50, Food and Co-operation Department, dated 23.05.2016 contemplated a committee be formed to ascertain beneficiaries, who would be entitled to waiver of loans and the entire exercise shall be carried out by the committee to which the President of Society, second respondent is also a party and ultimate decision to waive the loan was taken only by the first respondent. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr.C.Prakasam, would submit that no liability can be imputed on the writ petitioner and further laying specific emphasis on the Enquiry Officer's report dated 04.06.2018, he would submit that when the said report did not recommend initiation of surcharge proceedings against the writ petitioner, the same being a pre-condition, the order passed in the writ petition, directing the surcharge proceedings be taken against the petitioner is erroneous on the face of the record and therefore, calls for review. 6. The learned counsel would further submit that the order directing recovery of loss sustained by the Government from the petitioner was without giving any notice to the petitioner. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr.C.Prakasam, no opportunity was given to the petitioner before the impugned order was passed and the order itself recognizes the loss being caused by all employees of the second respondent Society and the Secretary alone has been made a scape goat. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that even in terms of Section 81 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act (herein after referred to as “the Act”), the first respondent was not entitled to order enquiry on the basis of the complaint of just two members, viz., the respondents 3 and 4. In any event, he would submit that the enquiry officer, who conducted an elaborate enquiry, having not recommended sur- charge proceedings against the petitioner, no proceedings under Section 87 of the Act can be taken against the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr.C.Prakasam, would pray for review petition being allowed. 8. Per contra, Mr.Tamilnidhi, learned Additional Government Pleader for the respondents 1 and 2 would submit that my order does not require interference and that rightly it has been held that the writ petition itself was pre-mature and the petitioner cannot escape the surcharge proceedings under Section 87 of the Act. He would further submit that as on date, admittedly, surcharge proceedings are already concluded and therefore, the petitioner can challenge the said proceedings instead of seeking review of the order in the writ petition. 9. He would further submit that as on date, admittedly, surcharge proceedings are already concluded and therefore, the petitioner can challenge the said proceedings instead of seeking review of the order in the writ petition. 9. Mr.Tamilnidhi, learned Additional Government Pleader for the respondents 1 and 2 would further submit that the petitioner, by issuing loans to defaulting borrowers, has caused financial loss to the Government and the petitioner being the person, managing the affairs of the Society cannot shift responsibility. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner without proper verification, has sanctioned loans to persons, who were already overdue, which is against norms and by-laws of the Society. Lastly, he would submit that the petitioner can always challenge the surcharge proceedings and prayed the present review application being dismissed. 10. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel on either side. 11. With regard to Mr.C.Prakasam's contentions that the enquiry under Section 81 of the Act itself, based on a complaint of respondents 3 and 4 alone, was not maintainable, the said contention is taken for the first time only in this review application. It was not the case of the writ petitioner that the launching of enquiry itself under Section 81 was contrary to the provisions of Section 81 of the Act. The only ground that was raised in the writ petition was that the agricultural loans were verified at five stages before sanctioning waiver and that no notice was given to the petitioner before the impugned order came to be passed. It was never the case of the writ petitioner that the Section 81 enquiry itself was without jurisdiction and in violation of the mandate of Section 81. Therefore, I am unable to countenance the said arguments of Mr.C.Prakasam, raised for the first time in this review petition. 12. With regard to the enquiry officer, in his report, not recommending surcharge proceedings, in the enquiry report dated 04.06.2018, the enquiry officer has found that the Secretary was responsible for having issued loans to persons, who were already in default and therefore, an amount to Rs.7,31,922/- would have to be recovered from the petitioner. 13. The surcharge proceedings are already concluded and therefore, it is open to the petitioner to challenge the surcharge order, instead of prosecuting the review petition. 13. The surcharge proceedings are already concluded and therefore, it is open to the petitioner to challenge the surcharge order, instead of prosecuting the review petition. Under Section 87 of the Act, when it comes to light, on enquiry, under Section 81 of the Act that there has been misappropriation or any act or omission that has resulted in deficiency in the assets of the Society, including by breach of trust or negligence, then it shall be open to the Registrar or authorised person in that behalf to frame charges after giving reasonable opportunity to the persons concerned and pass orders to repay or restore money or property with interest as the Registrar or the authorized person may deem fit, in accordance with law and the Act and Rules or By-laws. 14. Admittedly, what was challenged in the writ petition before me was not the findings of the enquiry officer under Section 81 of the Act. I clearly found that the writ petition was challenging only inter-department communication and the petitioner had approached the Court only in anticipation of action being taken against him. Section 87 proceedings have also held to be only a fall out of the enquiry conducted Section 81 of the Act and therefore, liberty was granted to the first respondent to take all further steps, including Section 87 surcharge proceedings against the petitioner, after giving an opportunity to the petitioner, to answer the charges against him and thereafter, pass final order. 15. As seen from the counter affidavit filed by the respondents 1 and 2 in this review petition, Section 87 proceedings were also subsequently initiated and the petitioner was also given an opportunity to answer the charges levelled against him. The petitioner appeared for hearing on 05.08.2024, 28.08.2024 and again on 04.09.20204 only thereafter, the first respondent has proceeded to pass the surcharge order on 25.09.2024. The said order was served on the petitioner on 30.09.2024. Therefore, now the scope of the review petition seems to be entirely side tracked. When the writ petition was dismissed giving liberty to the authorities to proceed with surcharge proceedings in accordance with law and the said proceedings have also been taken and an order has also been passed on 25.09.2024, it is now only open to the petitioner to challenge the surcharge order in the manner known to law. When the writ petition was dismissed giving liberty to the authorities to proceed with surcharge proceedings in accordance with law and the said proceedings have also been taken and an order has also been passed on 25.09.2024, it is now only open to the petitioner to challenge the surcharge order in the manner known to law. There is no scope for reviewing my order in the writ petition, which in fact has already worked itself only, in view of not only initiation of Section 87 proceedings, but subsequently final orders also passed therein. Therefore, I do not find any error apparent on the face of record to entertain the present review petition. 16. In fine, this Review Application is dismissed. However, it is made clear that the review petitioner shall be entitled to challenge the surcharge proceedings dated 25.09.2024, in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.