JUDGMENT : Heard. 2. The Petitioner, Erode District Co-operative Milk Producers Union (hereinafter referred to as "the Management"), has filed this writ petition challenging the order passed by the Labour Court, Salem in C.P. No. 23 of 2016, dated 06.06.2008. By the said order, the Labour Court computed a sum of Rs.3,30,000/- as dues payable to the Respondent, along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of retirement until the date of the order, and further directed that in the event of default, the interest shall stand enhanced to 12% per annum. 3. It is evident from the records that the impugned order of the Labour Court is dated 06.06.2018, whereas the present writ petition has been filed only on 25.01.2021, after a lapse of two years and six months. The certified copy produced by the Petitioner Management indicates that the application for copy was made on 20.11.2018, and the same was made ready on 29.11.2018. Thus, the application for certified copy itself was filed five months after the date of the order. As per Rule 54(2) of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 , the Labour Court is required to communicate, by registered post, a gist of the order passed under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, upon conclusion of the proceedings. Therefore, it is reasonable to presume that the Petitioner Management was aware of the order passed by the Labour Court. 4. However, the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition offers no explanation for the inordinate delay in approaching this Court. Such a casual approach to legal proceedings cannot be countenanced. It appears that this may have been the reason why the writ petition was not admitted at the initial stage and only notice was ordered. The writ petition remains unadmitted. When the matter was again listed on 23.04.2024, this Court directed that it be placed before the National Lok Adalat scheduled for 08.06.2024. There is, however, no material on record to show whether the matter was in fact taken up or considered by the Lok Adalat. Subsequently, the case has been posted for hearing before this Court. 5. When the matter was again listed on 23.04.2024, this Court directed that it be placed before the National Lok Adalat scheduled for 08.06.2024. There is, however, no material on record to show whether the matter was in fact taken up or considered by the Lok Adalat. Subsequently, the case has been posted for hearing before this Court. 5. Learned counsel for the Petitioner sought to contest the impugned order on merits, contending that the Labour Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, lacked the authority to compute any monetary claim in the absence of a prior adjudication or pre-existing right. In support of this submission, reliance was placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s. Bombay Chemical Industries v. Deputy Labour Commissioner & Another reported in (2022) 1 SCR 523 . 6. The records disclose that the Respondent had earlier filed W.P. No. 10848 of 2015 seeking a direction to the Petitioner Society to pass final orders in the departmental proceedings initiated against him. The said writ petition was disposed of by order dated 15.04.2015, with the following direction: — “As the petitioner, against whom departmental proceedings were initiated, was allowed to retire from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.3.2014, this court keeping in mind that the petitioner also has submitted his representations dated 24.12.2014, 13.3.2015 and 21.3.2015 to the report of the enquiry officer, the third respondent is hereby directed to pass final orders on merits and in accordance with law within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order.” 7. Pursuant to the aforesaid direction, the Petitioner Society passed an order dated 26.06.2015, imposing a penalty of stoppage of increment for two years with cumulative effect. In the said order, based on the audit report for the year 2012–2013, particularly paragraphs 12 and 13, the Respondent was directed to remit a sum of Rs. 4,74,700.50 to the Society. It was thereafter that the Respondent approached the Labour Court by filing a petition under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, seeking computation of amounts allegedly due to him towards earned leave wages. 8. 4,74,700.50 to the Society. It was thereafter that the Respondent approached the Labour Court by filing a petition under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, seeking computation of amounts allegedly due to him towards earned leave wages. 8. The Labour Court placed reliance on the decision of this Court in M. Subburayan v. Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies , reported in 2016 (2) LLJ 121 (Mad) , wherein it was held that a co-operative society has no authority to initiate or continue disciplinary proceedings against an employee after he has attained the age of superannuation, and that any such proceedings would be invalid. It was further held that, in such cases, the employee would be entitled to terminal benefits, including gratuity and provident fund. Referring to the said decision in paragraph 8 of the impugned order, the Labour Court recorded the following finding:— 9. The facts of the case reveal a disturbing lapse, as the Respondent, having attained the age of superannuation more than eleven years ago, is yet to receive his earned leave salary, which is now sought to be adjusted against certain dues pointed out in the audit report. In any event, this Court is not inclined to entertain the present writ petition, as the Petitioner Management is guilty of unexplained delay and laches in approaching this Court. In this context, it is apposite to refer to a few decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the issue. In P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu , reported in (1975) 1 SCC 152 , the Supreme Court held that writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are liable to be dismissed where there is undue delay and laches. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:— “It is not that 'here is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:— “It is not that 'here is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters- The petitioner's petition should, therefore have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as well as the appeal.” 10. Further, in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Nandlal Jaiswal & Others, reported in (1986) 4 SCC 566 , the Supreme Court reiterated the principle and held as follows:— “…it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent of the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is excercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is excercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled With the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 11. Furthermore, in Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. through its Chairman & Managing Director & Another v. K.Thangappan , reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:— “Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports ( AIR 1970 SC 769 ). Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.” 12. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is also closed. There shall be no order as to costs.