ORDER : REKHA BORANA, J. 1. The facts are that the petitioner Company purchased plot No.4 situated in Light Industrial Area, Jodhpur vide a registered sale-deed. Initially the residential (free hold) patta of the land was issued by then Development Department, Government of Marwar on 16.07.1949 to one Abhay Kumar. Subsequently Abhay Kumar surrendered the land in favour of Government of Rajasthan and in lieu thereof a lease deed was issued by State of Rajasthan in favour of M/s. Life Time Product Corporation of which Abhay Kumar was one of the partners. The said lease deed was executed on 23.02.1970 by State of Rajasthan through its competent authority. 2. M/s. Life Time Product Corporation took a loan from Rajasthan Financial Corporation (for short ‘RFC’) and on failure to repay the loan, RFC took possession of the entire mortgaged assets of the company and put it to auction. M/s. Bright Metals Jodhpur being the highest bidder was sold the complete plant and machinery of the company. 3. The present petitioner-Company is purchaser of the land in question from the partners of M/s. Bright Metals Jodhpur. 4. Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Limited (RIICO) was established in year 1979 and the land in question was transferred by State of Rajasthan alongwith other light industrial area to RIICO for maintenance of the said area. 5. However, prior to sale of the land to the petitioner company, M/s Bright Metals Jodhpur applied for conversion of land use from industrial to residential. The same was done as certain complaints were made by the residence of the vicinity qua the noise and chemical pollution arising out of the manufacturing of the steel re- rolling sheets in the premise. Certain directions to the said effect were also issued in one PIL namely Mahendra Lodha vs. State of Rajasthan ; D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.6073/1993 and in the overall scenario, the production unit of M/s Bright Metals was closed down. The area in question too became thickly populated and hence, permission for conversion of the land use of the plot in question from industrial to residential was sought by M/s Bright Metals from RIICO. However, the said application stood rejected on the count that there was no policy/rule in the Disposal Rules of RIICO to allow change of land use of the allotted industrial plot for residential purposes 6. However, the said application stood rejected on the count that there was no policy/rule in the Disposal Rules of RIICO to allow change of land use of the allotted industrial plot for residential purposes 6. In the said event, application dated 30.12.2011 was moved by M/s Bright Metal before the Jodhpur Development Authority (JDA). 7. In pursuance to the said application, after complete process been adopted, the Empowered Committee of JDA, in its meeting dated 13.08.2013, resolved to permit the conversion of land from industrial to residential. In pursuance to the said resolution, complete charges/requisite fee was deposited by the company and even the Gazette Notification of the same was made on 18.09.2013. 8. M/s Bright Metals then requested the competent authority of RIICO to release the original lease deed, sale-deed and the original documents pertaining to the plot in question to it as the same were handed over to RIICO by Indus Ind Bank Ltd. from whom M/s. Bright Metals had taken a loan. The loan was repaid by the firm but the documents remained in possession of RIICO. However, RIICO declined to hand over the said original documents to M/s. Bright Metals and the said inaction is the bone of contention in the present petition. 9. The reason assigned by RIICO for not handing over the original documents was that it is only RIICO who has the power to permit land use change and JDA is not the competent authority to do so. 10. The petitioner company purchased the plot in question vide two registered sale-deeds; first of 28.05.2014 and second of 07.03.2018 i.e. after the order of conversion been passed by JDA. 11. The petitioner company has made the following prayers: “(i) By an appropriate writ, order and direction the respondents may be directed to hand over the original documents; (1) Original lease Deed dated 21.08.1970 issued by State Govt. through collector Jodhpur in favour of M/s. Lifetime Products Corporation partners Sh. Umedmal, Sh. Abhaj Kumar and Sh. Nirmal Kumar (14 page); (2) Original Sale deed dated 28.03.2001 (Annexure-5) executed by RFC & M/s Lifetime Products Corporation in favour of M/s Bright Metals. (7 page); (3) Original Special power of Attorney dated 28.03.2001 (Annexure-5) of M/s. Bright Metals. (3 page); (4) Copy of order dt. Umedmal, Sh. Abhaj Kumar and Sh. Nirmal Kumar (14 page); (2) Original Sale deed dated 28.03.2001 (Annexure-5) executed by RFC & M/s Lifetime Products Corporation in favour of M/s Bright Metals. (7 page); (3) Original Special power of Attorney dated 28.03.2001 (Annexure-5) of M/s. Bright Metals. (3 page); (4) Copy of order dt. 30.09.2003 for permission for change in constitution of partnership (1 page) to the petitioner within 30 days of passing of order by the Hon’ble High Court. (ii) Or any appropriate writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble High Court deems just and proper may kindly be passed looking to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.” 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the present issue rests covered by the Hon’ble Apex Court judgment in Bishambhar Prasad vs. M/s. Arfat Petrochemicals Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.; Civil Appeal No. 2963 of 2023 and other connected matters (decided on 20.04.2023) whereby the Hon’ble Apex Court specifically held that in cases where the lease was executed by the State Government, no authority vested in RIICO to grant permission for change of land use or allow the sub-division of any plot without the prior approval of the State Government. 13. Learned counsel submitted that once it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that RIICO is not the competent authority to permit land conversion, it is only the State Government or the designated authority who would be entitled to do so. Herein, the order of conversion been passed by JDA after approval of State Government, is totally in consonance with law and hence, RIICO has no power to withhold the documents of the petitioner company. 14. Responding to the above argument, learned counsel appearing for RIICO submitted that the land having been transferred to RIICO by the State Government way back in the year 1979, it vested in RIICO and hence, it is only RIICO who could have exercised the power to convert the land, if permissible in terms of the RIICO Disposal of Land Rules, 1979. The land in question could not have been converted in terms of the said rules and hence, the order of conversion by JDA itself being dehors the law, RIICO is not under an obligation to hand over the original documents to the petitioner. 15. The land in question could not have been converted in terms of the said rules and hence, the order of conversion by JDA itself being dehors the law, RIICO is not under an obligation to hand over the original documents to the petitioner. 15. Regarding the judgment in Bishambhar Prasad (supra), learned counsel submitted that after the said judgment been passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, an amendment has been brought in RAJASTHAN LAND REVENUE ACT , 1956 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1956’) vide Rajasthan Land Revenue (Amendment and Validation) Act, 2025. Vide the said amendment, Section 100-A has now been inserted whereby the complete power pertaining to development of industrial area, preparation and amendment of lay out plans, sub-division and merger of plots, disposal of land, specifications and change of land use granting of permissions, approvals, and other actions necessary for carrying out its functions in such industrial areas have been granted to RIICO. Therefore, it is only RIICO which has the authority to permit for land use change, if any, and the act of JDA, that too, without obtaining any NOC from RIICO cannot be held to be valid. 16. Heard learned counsels. Perused the record. 17. On basis of the arguments as raised, the issue which arises is – Whether it is only RIICO who is competent to permit change of land use in an industrial area and hence, the order of land conversion passed by JDA is without jurisdiction? 18. Before proceeding on to adjudicate the above issue, one most relevant aspect needs to be taken into consideration that the original lease qua the land in question was issued in favour of the original lessee by the State Government and not by RIICO. It is only after the lease deed having been executed way back on 23.02.1970 that the land in question was transferred to RIICO in the Year 1979. 19. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in Bishambhar Prasad (supra) while dealing with a total akin situation whereby the land was transferred vide Government order dated 18.09.1979 to RIICO, held as under: “48. Thus, we have no hesitation to hold that a relationship of lessor - lessee between State Government and JKSL/RIICO continued to subsist and has not been affected in any manner by virtue of Government order dated 18.09.1979.” 20. The Court therein further observed and held as under: “58. Thus, we have no hesitation to hold that a relationship of lessor - lessee between State Government and JKSL/RIICO continued to subsist and has not been affected in any manner by virtue of Government order dated 18.09.1979.” 20. The Court therein further observed and held as under: “58. Having held so, there is no alternative but to conclude that the relationship of lessor and lessee between State and Respondent No. 1 has been validly subsisting at all times and RIICO was never authorised either by Government order dated 18.09.1979 or under Rules 11A and 12 of the 1959 Rules, to bypass the State Government and assume the self- styled role of the lessor in respect of LIA, Kota. Since, the 1967 and 2007 lease deeds in favour of JKSL and Respondent No. 1, respectively, were executed by the State Government in terms of Rule 2 of the 1959 Rules, RIICO had no authority whatsoever to permit Respondent No. 1 to change the land use or allow for the sub-division of plot without the prior approval of the State Government, which is the sole competent authority to accord such permission in exercise of its power under Rule 8 of the 1959 Rules. The contrary view taken by the High Court is plainly erroneous in law and is based on a misconstruction of the provisions of 1959 Rules read with the binding bilateral contracts between the parties.” 21. Meaning thereby, the Hon’ble Apex Court specifically held that in cases where the relationship of lessor and lessee survived between the State and the lessee, RIICO had no authority, whatsoever, to permit the lessee to change the land use or allow sub-division of plot without prior approval of State Government, which is the sole competent authority to do so. 22. In the specific opinion of this Court, the present matter definitely stands governed by the above ratio as herein, the original lease deed was executed by the State Government and the land was subsequently transferred to RIICO. Therefore, as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court, RIICO could not have permitted for the change of land use. 23. So far as the permission granted by the JDA is concerned, it is evident that vide communication dated 14.03.2012 (Annexure- 14), it sought further instructions from the State Government. Therefore, as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court, RIICO could not have permitted for the change of land use. 23. So far as the permission granted by the JDA is concerned, it is evident that vide communication dated 14.03.2012 (Annexure- 14), it sought further instructions from the State Government. Vide letter dated 05.04.2012 (Annexure-15) and subsequent letter dated 31.05.2013 (Annexure-16), it was instructed that JDA shall be authorised to permit land conversion from industrial to residential in Light Industrial Area if the land has not been developed by RIICO and has not been allotted by it. In pursuance to the said clarification/permission of the State Government, JDA called for the factual report of the plot in question, in pursuance to which a Committee of Executive Engineer, Deputy Town Planner, Director (Law) and Deputy Commissioner inspected the site and submitted a detailed report. As per the said report, the area in question had been developed by JDA and not by RIICO and further that the original patta of the plot in question was issued by the former Marwar State and not by RIICO. 24. In view of the above specific report, the Empowered Committee of JDA, in its meeting dated 13.08.2013 (Annexure- 17), resolved to grant permission for change of land use. In the specific opinion of this Court, the process undertaken by JDA clearly was after the approval of the State Government. The said action therefore cannot be termed to be bad. 25. So far as applicability of the newly inserted Section 100-A in the Act of 1956 is concerned, admittedly, the said provision received assent of His Excellency the Governor on 03.10.2025. True it is that vide the said amended provision, all the rights as mentioned in the preceding para, have now been granted to RIICO, but then the said provision cannot be deemed to invalidate all the permissions or acts done by the State authorities prior to the said provision having come into effect. 26. Further, ‘the Statement of Objects and Reasons’ as assigned for implementing Section 100-A itself specifies and rather re- affirms the fact that RIICO was not competent to permit any change of land use prior to the said amendment. It is only because of the fact that RIICO had issued various such permissions without it being competent to do so, the Hon’ble Apex Court held in Bishambhar Prasad (supra) that such action was bad. It is only because of the fact that RIICO had issued various such permissions without it being competent to do so, the Hon’ble Apex Court held in Bishambhar Prasad (supra) that such action was bad. Because of the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bishambhar Prasad (supra), the need to insert a provision empowering RIICO was felt by the State Government and it is only for the said reason that Section 100-A has been inserted. 27. It would be apt to reproduce ‘the Statement of Objects and Reasons’ as to why Section 100-A was inserted. It reads as under:- “ STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS The State Government has encountered certain challenges in the management and operation of the industrial areas transferred from the Industries Department to the Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Limited (RIICO) under Order No. F. 4(56) Industry/1/79 dated 18.09.1979. Following this transfer, RIICO officials have granted approvals for transfers, subdivisions, and regularizations within these areas. However, in its judgement dated 20.04.2023 in Civil Appeal No. 2963 of 2023 and other connected matters, the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not recognise rights of RIICO for want of any indenture of law. As a result, questions have been raised regarding the validity of earlier permissions granted by RIICO in these transferred industrial areas. Furthermore, RIICO has ceased issuing permissions for such areas, causing difficulties for both existing lessees and prospective investors in the manufacturing and service sectors. This has negatively impacted the State’s industrial environment. Therefore, the State Government deems it necessary to validate all actions taken by RIICO in these industrial areas from 18.9.1979 till the proposed Amendment and Validation Act comes into effect. Additionally, the government land allotted to RIICO for the development of industrial areas is granted on a leasehold basis under rules formulated by the State Government, as per the powers conferred by section 100 of the RAJASTHAN LAND REVENUE ACT , 1956 (Act No. 15 of 1956). Similarly, the disposal of private land acquired for RIICO by the State Government as well as government land allotted for industrial purposes have been governed by the RIICO Disposal of Land Rules, 1979, which lack statutory force as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its above cited judgement. Similarly, the disposal of private land acquired for RIICO by the State Government as well as government land allotted for industrial purposes have been governed by the RIICO Disposal of Land Rules, 1979, which lack statutory force as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its above cited judgement. To get out of the impasse, the State Government seeks to ensure that government land allocated for establishment of industrial areas vests in RIICO and is disposed of according to rules framed by the State Government. The proposed amendment shall provide statutory backing for disposal of such lands, along with validating transfers and sub- divisions and other actions taken previously by RIICO in industrial areas established by the Government of Rajasthan. Additionally, it is proposed that land already given to RIICO by allotment or by handing it over shall be deemed to have been placed at disposal of RIICO and shall be deemed to have vested in it with authority for disposal and taking all other actions in the manner prescribed by the State Government. It is also proposed to empower RIICO to frame regulations. The Bill seeks to achieve the aforesaid objectives. Hence the Bill.” 28. The above ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ fortifies the fact that RIICO was not authorized or competent to issue permission for change of land use and it is only the State authorities who were competent to do so till the date Section 100- A was inserted. The permission in question having been granted by the State authority therefore, is in accordance with law. 29. In view of above overall analysis, this Court is of the clear opinion that once the State authority has permitted the change of land use in accordance with law, RIICO has no authority to retain the documents of the petitioner company/the original lessee/predecessor in title i.e. M/s. Bright Metals Jodhpur. 30. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed 31. The respondent RIICO is directed to hand over all the original documents as prayed for in the writ petition to the petitioner company within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of copy of the present order. 32. Stay application and all pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.