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2025 DIGILAW 1838 (KER)

Salim Paul, S/O Paul v. State of Kerala

2025-07-04

K.V.JAYAKUMAR, RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V.

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JUDGMENT : Raja Vijayaraghavan, J. The petitioner is the father of Shyju @ Chenkeri, the detenu, who is undergoing detention pursuant to Ext.P1 order passed by the 2nd respondent under Section 3 (1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (for brevity, "KAA(P) Act"). 2. Short facts necessary for the disposal of this Writ Petition can be encapsulated as under: a) On account of the involvement of the detenu in seven crimes, viz., Crime Nos. 2505 of 2019, 506 of 2020, 2498 of 2020, 532 of 2021, 429 of 2022, 492 of 2022 and 191 of 2023, he was classified as a ‘known rowdy’ and a detention order was issued against him on 25.05.2022. The order was executed, and he underwent detention for a period of six months. After his release, he got involved in Crime No. 164 of 2023, and a fresh order of detention was issued on 17.04.2023. He underwent detention for a period of one year. After his release, he again got involved in Crime No.1150 of 2024 registered under Sections 452, 323, 324, 354, 308, 427 r/w. Section 34 of the IPC. On account of his involvement and taking note of the fact that he continued to be a person falling within the definition of ‘known rowdy’ that a report of sponsorship was submitted on 10.07.2024 by the District Police Chief, Kollam followed up with additional reports dated 08.08.2024 and 21.08.2024, that the impugned detention order was passed on 31.08.2024. b) The detention order would reveal that the date of occurrence of Crime No. 1150 of 2024 is 29.05.2024, and the same was registered on 30.05.2024. The detenu was arrested in connection with the said crime on 02.06.2024, and the final report was filed on 22.08.2024. The detention order dated 31.08.2024 was executed on 07.09.2024, while the detenu was lodged in the Central Prison, Poojappura. The order of detention was approved by the Government on 19.09.2024. The matter was referred to the Advisory Board on 24.09.2024, and based on the opinion, the order was confirmed by the Government by order dated 01.11.2024. 3. Sri. M.H. Hanis, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, raised the following grounds to assail the detention order. a) For classifying the son of the petitioner as a "known rowdy", the detaining authority had relied on seven earlier crimes, which had already been considered while passing the previous detention orders. 3. Sri. M.H. Hanis, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, raised the following grounds to assail the detention order. a) For classifying the son of the petitioner as a "known rowdy", the detaining authority had relied on seven earlier crimes, which had already been considered while passing the previous detention orders. The present detention is stated to be based solely on Crime No. 1150 of 2024. Though involvement in one crime was necessary for passing an order of detention in view of Section 13(2)(i) of the KAA(P) Act, the reckoning of the earlier crimes was with a view to prejudice the minds of the reviewing authorities. b) Though the date of occurrence of Crime No.1150 of 2024 was on 29.05.2024, the sponsorship report was submitted only on 10.07.2024, after a long and unexplained delay of 42 days. It is contended that the delay is fatal and is clearly indicative of lack of urgency or seriousness in initiating preventive detention. No worthwhile explanation has been offered for the delay. c) While the detention order refers to the final report in Crime No. 1150 of 2024, a copy of the same was not served on the detenu, despite it being a relied-upon document. The only conclusion is that the investigation was pending, and the final report had not been laid. It is in the said circumstances that the detaining authority has referred to the affidavit filed by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Kottarakkara Police Station, to verify the stage of investigation. However, in the said affidavit, a copy of which has been served to the detenu, there is no reference to the detenu. The only person mentioned in the affidavit is one Manu, S/o. Michael. The affidavit merely states that an “identifiable person” was involved, without specifying the role of the detenu. No wound certificate, identification materials, or records confirming that witnesses properly identified the detenu have been placed on record. According to the learned counsel, this would not amount to satisfaction of the conditions laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Stenny Aleyamma Saju v. State of Kerala and Ors. No wound certificate, identification materials, or records confirming that witnesses properly identified the detenu have been placed on record. According to the learned counsel, this would not amount to satisfaction of the conditions laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Stenny Aleyamma Saju v. State of Kerala and Ors. , [ 2017 (3) KHC 517 ] , wherein it was held that though the filing of a final report under Section 173 (2) of the Cr.P.C is not a prerequisite to invoke the power under Section 3 of the KAA(P) Act, it has been clarified that mere registration of the FIR is not enough and something more is necessary to meet the requirements under the statute, so as to record the objective as well as subjective satisfaction. 4. The learned Public Prosecutor, opposing the contentions, submitted that though the crime was registered on 29.5.2024, he was identified as an accused only much later and a report incorporating his name as an accused was submitted before the jurisdictional court on 18.06.2024, and the final report in the case was filed on 22.08.2024. It is further contended that a copy of the final report has, in fact, been served on the detenu, and the records bear acknowledgement of the same. He asserts that the judgment in Stenny Aleyamma (supra) is inapplicable to the facts of the present case, as the complainant and the wife of the victim had clearly identified the detenu, and the relevant records were served upon him. The learned Public Prosecutor submitted that there was no delay in passing the detention order. The initial sponsorship report was submitted on 10.07.2024. Subsequent queries were raised, leading to the filing of an additional report on 08.08.2024 and a second supplementary report on 21.08.2024, along with witness statements. The detention order was passed thereafter on 31.08.2024. 5. We have considered the rival submissions and have perused the materials on record. 6. The first ground urged is the alleged non-supply of the documents identifying the detenu. We find from the original file that was handed over for perusal that all the documents relied on were furnished to the detenu, and his acknowledgement was obtained. It is also seen from the file that the final report, which was laid before the jurisdictional Court on 22.08.2024, forms part of the served materials and it contains the signature of the detenu. It is also seen from the file that the final report, which was laid before the jurisdictional Court on 22.08.2024, forms part of the served materials and it contains the signature of the detenu. Thus, the argument that the order is vitiated on account of the non-supply of documents is without merit. 7. The second contention pertains to the delay of 42 days in submitting the sponsorship report. Ext.P1 is the third detention order passed against the detenu. It was after his release pursuant to the 2nd detention order that he got involved in Crime No. 1150 of 2024 as accused No.2. The contention advanced by the learned counsel is that while the crime was registered on 30.05.2024, the report of sponsorship was submitted only on 10.07.2024. This delay is highlighted by the learned counsel as fatal. It is his contention that the officer who submitted the proposal did not entertain a genuine apprehension with regard to the predilection of the detenu to commit prejudicial activities. While considering the contention, it needs to be borne in mind that though the crime was registered on 30.05.2024, the address report identifying the detenu as an accused was submitted before the court only on 18.06.2024, as is borne out from the records. It is stated in the report submitted before the jurisdictional Magistrate that accused No. 2 in the aforesaid crime is Shyju @ Chenkeri. Thereafter, the report of sponsorship was submitted on 10.07.2024. Only after the detenu was arrayed as an accused that the sponsoring authority gathered the documents with regard to the previous detentions undergone by the detenu and had placed the matter before the detaining authority. If that be the case, it cannot be said that there has been a delay of more than 40 days in submitting the report of sponsorship. If the involvement of the accused is revealed only later, it would not be proper to reckon the date from the registration of the crime. The sponsorship report was submitted within 22 days of the identification of the detenu as an accused in the aforesaid crime. 8. If the involvement of the accused is revealed only later, it would not be proper to reckon the date from the registration of the crime. The sponsorship report was submitted within 22 days of the identification of the detenu as an accused in the aforesaid crime. 8. In T.A. Abdul Rahiman v. State of Kerala , [1990 SCC (Cri) 76] , the Apex Court held that the question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances, and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down on that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting the number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is an undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of the detention order, the court has to scrutinize whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned when called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case. 9. We are of the considered view that the respondents have adequately explained the delay in submitting the report of sponsorship, and in that view of the matter, we are unable to accept the contentions forcefully advanced by the learned counsel. 10. The last and final contention advanced by the learned counsel is that the representation submitted by the detenu has not been promptly considered by the Government. From the order of confirmation, it can be seen that the order of detention was approved by the Government on 19.9.2024, and the opinion of the Advisory Board was sought by letter dated 24.09.2024. The opinion dated 25.10.2024 was received by the Government, and the order was confirmed on 02.11.2024. It appears that the detenu submitted a representation dated 23.10.2024 before the Advisory Board, which was also taken into consideration by the Board while forming its opinion. The opinion dated 25.10.2024 was received by the Government, and the order was confirmed on 02.11.2024. It appears that the detenu submitted a representation dated 23.10.2024 before the Advisory Board, which was also taken into consideration by the Board while forming its opinion. The representation was also forwarded to the Government. It has been stated in the counter that the representation was considered, and the same was rejected by order dated 04.11.2024, and its fate was communicated to the detenu. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that there is any unreasonable delay in considering the representation. In view of the discussion above, we are of the view that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference. This Writ Petition is dismissed.