JUDGMENT : Nitin Jamdar, C.J. By this appeal filed under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, the Appellants/Petitioners have challenged the interim order dated 23 January 2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (C)No.2679 of 2025 whereby the writ petition was admitted however, stay to the selection process for allotment of Akshaya Centre had not been granted by holding that the selection would be subject to the outcome of the writ petition. 2. The Petitioners, who were among the candidates participating in the selection process for the post of 'Akshaya Centre Entrepreneurs,' by W.P.(C)No.2679 of 2025 challenged the policy adopted by the District Authority of the Akshaya Project in Kannur, which grants 2.4 marks as 'form marks' at the time of application and an additional 10% of the total marks—comprising 'form marks,' examination marks, and interview marks—at the time of publication of the rank lists for allocating reservation benefits to SC/ST candidates. The learned Single Judge, by the interim order dated 23 January 2025, admitted the writ petition and refused to stay the selection process for allotment of Akshaya Centre but observed that the selection would be subject to the outcome of the writ petition. 3. Heard Adv. Mr. Rebin Vincent Gralan representing Mr. Manas P. Hameed, learned counsel for the Appellants and Mr. K.P. Harish, learned Senior Government Pleader for the State. 4. According to the learned counsel for the Appellants, there is a strong prima facie case and if no interim order is granted, it will create complications as third party rights will be created. 5. Akshaya project is implemented in the State of Kerala to bridge the digital divide and address the issues of ICT access, basic skills sets and availability of relevant content. Akshaya Centre provides a variety of online services and is able to influence a wide range of development to the extent to which the information and communication is important to individual users. 6. Considering that the Akshaya Centres are designed to deliver public services for citizens to access various government services, the learned Single Judge has exercised his discretion in not staying the process and making it subject to the outcome of the writ petition. 7. Though an appeal is maintainable against such discretionary interim order under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, the appeal against discretionary order is an appeal on principle. 7. Though an appeal is maintainable against such discretionary interim order under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, the appeal against discretionary order is an appeal on principle. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Wander Ltd. and Another v. Antox India P. Ltd., 1990 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 727 had an occasion to consider the approach of the Appellate Bench against discretionary orders. In this case, a suit was filed on the original side of the High Court of Madras, wherein an injunction was sought before the learned Single Judge, which was refused. This order was reversed by the Division Bench of Madras High Court. The defendants filed an appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down certain guidelines and parameters in respect of the exercise of powers by the Appellate Bench and against the discretionary order passed by the learned Single Judge. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows: “13. On a consideration of the matter, we are afraid, the appellate bench fell into error on two important propositions. The first is a misdirection in regard to the very scope and nature of the appeals before it and the limitations on the powers of the appellate court to substitute its own discretion in an appeal preferred against a discretionary order. The second pertains to the infirmities in the ratiocination as to the quality of Antox's alleged user of the trademark on which the passing-off action is founded. We shall deal with these two separately. 14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the Appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the Court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the Court below if the one reached by that Court was reasonably possible on the material. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the Court below if the one reached by that Court was reasonably possible on the material. The Appellate Court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the Trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the Appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the Trial Court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph: (SCR 721) '... These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton '...the law as to the reversal by a Court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case'.' The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle.” (emphasis supplied) Therefore, it is held that the Appellate Court is not expected to reassess the material and reach a conclusion different than the one reached by the Single Judge only on the ground that had it considered the matter at the first instance it would have come to the contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been reasonably exercised, interference is not warranted. 8. This decision is also followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Mehtab Khan and Others v. Khushnuma Ibrahim and Others (2013) 9 SCC 221 where in a suit filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 a mandatory injunction at an interim stage was sought before the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, which was not granted. The Appellate Bench of the High Court, however, issued a mandatory injunction. The Appellate Bench of the High Court, however, issued a mandatory injunction. The Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the order passed by the Appellate Bench, not on merits, but on the ground that the Appellate Bench had taken a different view in setting aside a discretionary order of the Single Judge without finding any perversity or a legal error in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the order observing thus: “15. In a situation where the learned Trial Court on a consideration of the respective cases of the parties and the documents laid before it was of the view that the entitlement of the plaintiffs to an order of interim mandatory injunction was in serious doubt, the Appellate Court could not have interfered with the exercise of discretion by the learned Trial Judge unless such exercise was found to be palpably incorrect or untenable. The reasons that weighed with the learned Trial Judge, as already noticed, according to us, do not indicate that the view taken is not a possible view. The Appellate Court, therefore, should not have substituted its views in the matter merely on the ground that in its opinion the facts of the case call for a different conclusion. Such an exercise is not the correct parameter for exercise of jurisdiction while hearing an appeal against a discretionary order. While we must not be understood to have said that the Appellate Court was wrong in its conclusions what is sought to be emphasized is that as long as the view of the Trial Court was a possible view the Appellate Court should not have interfered with the same following the virtually settled principles of law in this regard as laid down by this Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 (Supp) SCC 727 Para 14 of the aforesaid judgment which is extracted below would amply sum up the situation …….” (emphasis supplied) Thus, the legal position is that the Appellate Court will not ordinarily interfere with a discretionary order unless the discretion was exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or in disregard of settled legal principles. An appeal against discretion is an appeal on principle, not a reassessment of material to reach a different conclusion. An appeal against discretion is an appeal on principle, not a reassessment of material to reach a different conclusion. If the Single Judge's use of discretion is reasonably possible, the Appellate Court will not substitute its view merely because it would have decided differently. Interference is justified only if the exercise of discretion is palpably incorrect or untenable. This is not to say that an appeal against the interim orders which involve the use of discretion is not maintainable, but these parameters are to be kept in mind. 9. In the present case, as stated above, the two options were open. One, to stay the selection process and second, to make it subject to the outcome of the writ petition. Considering the nature of the proceedings and the public interest that could be affected, the learned Single Judge chose to exercise discretion in not granting a stay to the selection process but making it subject to the outcome of the petition. We find no perversity or any breach of legal principle or fundamental error to interfere. 10. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. It is open to the Appellants to make a request to the learned Single Judge for an early hearing of the petition, and it is for the learned Single Judge to decide the request depending on the position of the workload and pendency of the earlier cases.