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2025 DIGILAW 1843 (TS)

Vanga Sudheer Reddy v. State of Telangana

2025-12-16

JUVVADI SRIDEVI

body2025
ORDER : 1. This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (previously Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) by the petitioners-accused Nos.1 to 3 seeking to quash the proceedings against them in Crime No.231 of 2024 of EOW Team VI, CCS, DD, Hyderabad, registered for the offences under Sections 403, 406, 420 and 506 read with 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred as ‘IPC’). 2. Heard Mr. T.Pradyumna Kumar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing Mr. S.Ganesh, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. G.Ashok Reddy, learned counsel representing Mr. K.V.Rusheek Reddy, learned counsel for respondent No.2 and Mr. M.Ramachandra Reddy, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1-State. Perused the record. 3. Factual Matrix: 3.1. The de facto complainant, a designated partner in UBRS Housing and Infra Developers LLP and Bathala Housing and Infra Developers LLP, and also engaged in hotel and real estate businesses, sought to invest in land, in and around Hyderabad in 2019. 3.2. Through his relative namely RTV Prasad, the de facto complainant came into contact with petitioner-accused No.1, who is the Managing Partner of M/s. Vision Ventures, which is an Unregistered Partnership Firm i.e., petitioner-accused No.2. The petitioner-accused No.1 represented that he was desirous to be a Facilitator in arranging lands in and around Hyderabad, especially in Maheshwaram for either purchase or development purposes. He further represented that he was holding Agreements of Sale in his favour in respect of certain agricultural lands situated in Maheshwaram, Ranga Reddy District; that he had earlier sold those lands to third parties and also shown Agreements of Sale to the de facto complainant. 3.3. Believing the representations of petitioner-accused No.1, the de facto complainant agreed to purchase the lands from him. Stating that the sale deeds would take time to get registered, the petitioner- accused No.1 induced the de facto complainant to enter into Memoranda of Understanding, dated 24.06.2019 and 19.09.2019 for Ac.36.00 guntas in Sy.Nos.280 and 281 and Ac.120.00 guntas in various survey numbers, respectively. Pursuant to these MOUs, the de facto complainant transferred Rs.3.42 crores into the bank account of petitioner-accused No.1. 3.4. Pursuant to these MOUs, the de facto complainant transferred Rs.3.42 crores into the bank account of petitioner-accused No.1. 3.4. After few days, the petitioner-accused No.1 informed the de facto complainant that he is developing another venture in respect of lands belonging to his son i.e., petitioner-accused No.3 along with a related firm namely M/s. Sri Sai Balaji Developers i.e., accused No.4 to an extent of 42,422 square yards. Trusting him, the de facto complainant entered into an Agreement of Sale of Properties, dated 04.10.2019, with petitioner-accused No.3 and accused No.4 and made a payment of Rs.1,00,00,000/- to them. However, upon receiving the said Agreement of Sale, the de facto complainant noticed that only Rs.90,00,000/- was recorded as payment, instead of Rs.1,00,00,000/-. On being questioned, the petitioner-accused No.1 assured that the accounts would be adjusted later, since the entire amount had been transferred through bank transactions. 3.5. Despite the payments and repeated assurances, petitioner- accused No.1 failed to transfer or register any land in favour of the de facto complainant. In the last week of November, 2019, the petitioner-accused No.1 informed the de facto complainant that he could not perform his obligations under the Memoranda of Understanding, dated 24.06.2019 and 19.09.2019, and agreed to repay Rs.3.42 crores within six months with 36% annual interest. In partial fulfillment, he had transferred Rs.40,00,000/- on 28.11.2019, 29.11.2019 and 05.12.2019 to UBRS. 3.6. Again in June, 2021, the petitioner-accused No.1 induced the de facto complainant to invest in lands owned by the Islamic Social Services Society (hereinafter referred to as ‘Society’), stating that it owns Ac.428.00 gts. in Maheshwaram Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, and promising returns up to three times the investment within one year. He further represented that he and his firm had an agreement for sale with the Society for a larger extent and offered to sell approximately Ac.46.00 guntas from the overall extent. Trusting his representations, the de facto complainant executed a Memorandum of Understanding for Sale of Properties, dated 10.11.2021 and paid Rs.2 crores, pursuant to the said MOU. 3.7. Petitioner-accused No.1 claimed to be in possession of Ac.163.00 guntas out of a total extent of Ac.428.00 guntas belonging to the Society, which was given for development to a third party developer, in which, he and his firm were entitled to 58% of the developed area. 3.7. Petitioner-accused No.1 claimed to be in possession of Ac.163.00 guntas out of a total extent of Ac.428.00 guntas belonging to the Society, which was given for development to a third party developer, in which, he and his firm were entitled to 58% of the developed area. For the said land, the petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2 proposed that upon sub-developing or paying developmental fee, the developed area can be at 55:45 ratio between him and UBRS. In pursuance of the same, the de facto complainant entered into a Sub- MOU for Development, dated 10.11.2021, and paid Rs.5 crores as a refundable security deposit. Further, an amount of Rs.2,25,00,000/- was also paid by the de facto complainant in 2021 to the petitioner- accused No.1, through multiple banking transactions towards acquisition of the said lands. 3.8. When repeated requests were made for repayment of outstanding amount of Rs.3,02,00,000/- along with interest @ 36% per annum and as the total liability exceeded Rs.6 crores, the petitioner- accused No.1 issued three cheques bearing Nos.000778, 000779 and 000780, dated 31.03.2022 of Rs.2 crores each, but requested the de facto complainant not to present them for encashment, citing a shortage of funds and assured repayment with interest. Relying on his assurances, the de facto complainant withheld the cheques. 3.9. The petitioner-accused No.1 has also issued a cheque bearing No.589239, dated 06.01.2023 for Rs.1,25,00,000/- in the name of Bathala Housing Infra Developer LLP, wherein, the de facto complainant is a partner. However, upon presentation, the cheque was dishonoured with the endorsement ‘Title of the Account Required’. When the de facto complainant confronted petitioner-accused No.1, he admitted the error and promised to transfer the amount online, but the same was not repaid till date. 3.10. Upon persistent demands regarding the payments, the petitioner-accused No.1 issued another cheque bearing No.000795, dated 23.05.2023 for Rs.1,00,00,000/- in favour of the de facto complainant, requesting that it not be presented immediately due to insufficient funds, and to present the same in the first week of August, 2023. However, even in August, he sought further time, stating that he would make the payment through online transfers. 3.11. However, even in August, he sought further time, stating that he would make the payment through online transfers. 3.11. In the last week of August 2024, when the de facto complainant’s relative namely Mallempati Sridhar met petitioner- accused No.1 to discuss repayment and non-performance, petitioner-accused No.1 denied being bound by the agreements, threatened to kill the de facto complainant and his family members, using filthy language and warned them not to initiate any civil or criminal proceedings against him or seek monies again. 3.12. Subsequent inquiries made by the de facto complainant in October, 2024, revealed that neither petitioner-accused No.1 nor petitioner-accused No.2-Company had any ownership, title or legal rights over the lands in Sy.Nos.252, 258, 261, 264, 265, 450, 451, 457, 458, 459, 463, 486, 487 and 518 of Maheshwaram Village and Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, and that the documents and representations made were false and fraudulent, thereby establishing criminal intent and cheating. His further enquiries also revealed that the Society also does not own any land in the aforementioned survey numbers and are owned by some third parties. Similarly, the petitioner-accused No.3 and accused No.4 have also fraudulently cheated and alienated the land promised to the de facto complainant in favour of third parties, despite receiving substantial sale consideration as an advance. Out of Rs.17,31,25,000/-, Rs.4,16,75,000/- crores was repaid by the petitioner-accused No.1 and he did not fulfill the remaining obligations. 3.13. Basing on the complaint lodged by the de facto complainant, a case in Crime No.231 of 2024 of EOW Team VI, CCS, DD, Hyderabad, was registered for the aforesaid offences and investigation was taken up. 4. Submissions of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners: 4.1. The petitioners-accused Nos.1 to 3 are innocent and have nothing to do with the offences alleged against them. The dispute is purely civil in nature. However, to exert pressure on the petitioners, the de facto complainant has given a colour of criminality to a civil dispute by lodging the present complaint. All the allegations pertain to the transactions made in the year 2019 and 2021, but the present complaint was lodged on 17.11.2024 i.e., after a delay of almost three years. The reason for such delay remained unexplained. 4.2. The sub-MOU, dated 10.11.2021, contains an Arbitration clause, and the de facto complainant had issued an Arbitration notice to the petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2 on 04.11.2024. The reason for such delay remained unexplained. 4.2. The sub-MOU, dated 10.11.2021, contains an Arbitration clause, and the de facto complainant had issued an Arbitration notice to the petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2 on 04.11.2024. Yet, before expiry of the statutory period of 30 days and without affording an opportunity to the petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2, the present criminal proceedings were initiated. The de facto complainant has filed Arbitration Application No.159 of 2025 against the petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2 before this Court for adjudicating claims between them by appointing an Arbitrator under the sub-MOU, dated 10.11.2021 and the same is pending. 4.3. The Agreement of Sale of Properties, dated 04.10.2019 entered into by the de facto complainant and petitioner-accused No.3 and accused No.4 specifically states in clause 19 that the de facto complainant is entitled to file a suit for specific performance and recover the damages or losses, if the vendors fail or refuse to execute the sale deed and get it registered. Accordingly, a civil suit is filed and the same is pending. However, the limitation for filing a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, has expired. 4.4. The amount involved in the sub-MOU, dated 10.11.2021 is Rs.5 crores, which was already paid by the accused towards settlement after registration of the present crime. Even prior to registration of the present crime, the accused agreed to repay the entire amount, and in fact, repaid Rs.4.17 crores, in respect of Memoranda of Understanding, dated 24.06.2019 and 19.09.2019. This clearly establishes that all the MOUs were executed in good faith. Since the petitioner-accused No.1 was unable to comply with the terms, he had duly informed the same to the de facto complainant. Therefore, there is no dishonest inducement on the part of the petitioners from the inception, and at best, the matter constitutes a breach of contract, which does not attract criminal liability. 4.5. The initial MOU was entered into by the parties in 2019. Subsequently, the de facto complainant entered into four agreements with the petitioners. If at all the petitioners had any intention to cheat or did not own the land as alleged, the de facto complainant would not have entered into the subsequent Agreements/MOUs. The relative of de facto complainant namely M.Sridhar has also entered into a sale deed, dated 11.05.2022 with petitioner-accused No.2-Company in respect of agricultural land admeasuring Ac.8.16 gts. If at all the petitioners had any intention to cheat or did not own the land as alleged, the de facto complainant would not have entered into the subsequent Agreements/MOUs. The relative of de facto complainant namely M.Sridhar has also entered into a sale deed, dated 11.05.2022 with petitioner-accused No.2-Company in respect of agricultural land admeasuring Ac.8.16 gts. in Sy.No.259/2 situated at Maheshwaram Village, Ranga Reddy District, conveying it to M/s. Vidyasthali Education and Infra Developers. 4.6. Further, the Tahsildar addressed a letter to the RDO requesting deletion of the land admeasuring Ac.387.01 gts. in Sy.Nos.231, 242, 256, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 280, 281, 450, 451, 457, 458, 459, 463, 469, 486, 487 and 518 situated at Maheshwaram Village, from the prohibitory list, which includes the lands claimed by the petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2. It is also evident from the said proceedings that the petitioner-accused No.1 and petitioner-accused No.2-Company have purchased land admeasuring Ac.183.08 gts. in Sy.Nos.231, 242, 256, 259, 260, 262, 263, 267, 268/A, 269, 280/A, 281 and 469 situated at Maheshwaram Village, Ranga Reddy District, from the Society, through registered Sale Deeds and Agreement of Sale-cum-GPA. 4.7. The de facto complainant had entered into an Agreement of Sale with one M.Chandrashekar Reddy, offering to sell the land admeasuring 12,000 square yards in Sy.Nos.283, 284 and 285 of Maheshwaram Village and Mandal, and had collected Rs.11,04,00,000/- from him. When the de facto complainant intentionally breached the contract and cheated him, the said Chandrashekar Reddy lodged a complaint against him for the offences under Sections 406, 420 and 506 of IPC. The said complaint was registered as Crime No.318 of 2023, which after investigation, was taken cognizance of and numbered as C.C.No.149 of 2024, and the same is pending. 4.8. The petitioners were issued with notices under Section 41-A of Cr.P.C. In response to the same, they have submitted their reply. The said complaint was registered as Crime No.318 of 2023, which after investigation, was taken cognizance of and numbered as C.C.No.149 of 2024, and the same is pending. 4.8. The petitioners were issued with notices under Section 41-A of Cr.P.C. In response to the same, they have submitted their reply. Basing on the complaint lodged by the de facto complainant, the Investigating Officer addressed a letter, dated 27.01.2025 to the Sub-Registrar, SRO Maheshwaram, Ranga Reddy District, requesting him to stop all the transactions i.e., alienation, transfer, mortgage, sale, etc., pertaining to the properties registered/involved vide Doc.No.1247 of 2006, Agreement of Sale, dated 20.12.2005, Doc.No.23342 of 2006, Agreement of Sale-cum-GPA dated 12.12.2006, Development Agreement-cum-General Power of Attorney, Doc.No.2639 of 2019, dated 24.01.2019, Sale Deed Doc.No.934 of 2023, Doc.No.1159 of 2023, Development Agreement-cum-General Power of Attorney registered in the name of M/s. Vision Ventures, M/s. VV Infra Developers, Vanga Sudheer Reddy, Vanga Siddharth Reddy and M/s. Sri Sai Balaji Developers, until further communication, for the purpose of investigation. Questioning the said proceedings, the petitioners-accused Nos.1 to 3 approached this Court by filing W.P.No.2760 of 2025 before this Court and this Court, vide order, dated 31.01.2025, suspended the said proceedings. 4.9. In support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Jain v. State of Gujarat and another , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 998 and drawn attention of this Court to paragraph Nos. 9.2, 9.3 and 12, wherein, it is held as follows: 9.2. Further, in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC 168 , this court observed as follows: “ 15. In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement which may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise cannot be presumed.” (Emphasis supplied) 9.3. The ingredients to constitute an offence under sections 415 read with 420 of IPC have been considered and laid down by this court in Prof. R.K. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam, (2019) 16 SCC 739 , as under: “ 16. The ingredients to constitute an offence of cheating are as follows: 16.1. There should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him: 16.1.1. The person so induced should be intentionally induced to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or 16.1.2. The person so induced should be intentionally induced to do or to omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and 16.2. In cases covered by 16.1.2. above, the act or omission should be one which caused or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation or property. 17. A fraudulent or dishonest inducement is an essential ingredient of the offence. A person who dishonestly induces another person to deliver any property is liable for the offence of cheating. 18. xxx xxx xxx 19. The ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 420 are as follows: 19.1 A person must commit the offence of cheating under Section 415; and 19.2 The person cheated must be dishonestly induced to: (a) deliver property to any person; or (b) make, alter or destroy valuable security or anything signed or sealed and capable of being converted into valuable security.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. From the above, respondent no. 2 has not availed the services of M/s. Oswal Overseas as a transport carrier. It is unclear whether the invoice has been raised in the name of the appellant or the exporter. From the above, respondent no. 2 has not availed the services of M/s. Oswal Overseas as a transport carrier. It is unclear whether the invoice has been raised in the name of the appellant or the exporter. The “bill of lading” would have disclosed the transfer of title in goods in favour of the appellant. On the contrary, the FIR is filed showing that the appellant, as accused, had an intention to cheat and commit breach of trust. The documents belie the allegations in the FIR. Looking at the controversy from any perspective, a mere civil dispute has been given the colour of an offence of cheating and criminal breach of trust. We have perused the FIR and are convinced that the inducement is an explanation to contradict the documents through which exports have been completed. In the circumstances of this case, by referring to inducement, the continuation of investigation/prosecution into the offence of cheating and breach of trust would amount to an abuse of the process of law. Further, what begs the question is whether such non-payment of the sale price can be an offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating at the hands of the second respondent. The answer is clearly no. 4.10. Learned Senior Counsel further relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mala Choudhary and another v. State of Telangana and another , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1474 and drawn attention of this Court to paragraph Nos.12 to 15, wherein, it is held as follows: “ 12. Thus, clearly the complainant has manipulated and distorted the facts and has used its influence for getting the FIR registered against the appellants. On a bare reading of the FIR, it is clear that a plain and simple dispute involving non-execution of a registered sale deed in terms of so-called oral agreement to sell has been given the cloak of a criminal case by misusing the criminal machinery. Not only this, appellant No.1 being a 70 years' old lady and wife of a retired Army officer was arrested in connection with this false and frivolous FIR and had to remain in the custody for almost eight days. 13. Not only this, appellant No.1 being a 70 years' old lady and wife of a retired Army officer was arrested in connection with this false and frivolous FIR and had to remain in the custody for almost eight days. 13. We are of the firm opinion that even from the admitted allegations set out in the complaint, there was no justification for registering the FIR and rather the complainant should have been instructed to avail the appropriate remedy by approaching the civil Court. 14. In gross disregard to all tenets of law, the impugned FIR came to be registered for allegations which had no elements of any offence whatsoever what to talk of a cognizable offence. The fact that appellant No.1 was arrested in this frivolous FIR clearly shows the clout of the company of which the complainant is an agent, on the police agency as not only did the complainant manage to get the FIR registered, but thereafter, also saw to it that appellant No.1 is arrested and humiliated by keeping her in custody for eight days. During the course of the hearing of the appeal, the appellants fairly offered to return the amount of Rs.4,05,00,000/- transferred to them by the complainant through valid banking transactions but the counsel for the complainant on instructions stated that the complainant is not interested in accepting the same and demanded interest on the amount for settling the dispute. 15. We feel that rather than awarding interest to the complainant, it is a fit case wherein the complainant should be penalized with exemplary cost for misusing the process of criminal law in a case which was of purely civil nature.” 4.11. Learned Senior Counsel further relied on the judgment of this Court in Lamba Anand and others v. M.Ramesh Kumar Yadav and another , 2024 (1) ALD (Crl.) 704 (TS) and drawn attention of this Court to paragraph Nos.12 and 13, which are as follows: “ 12. The transactions are not disputed by the petitioners. It cannot be said from the admitted documents which are the MOU and the correspondence between the parties that there was any intention of the petitioners, from the inception to deceive the complainant. The petitioners herein were only made as accused, though others were also parties to the MOU. The transactions are not disputed by the petitioners. It cannot be said from the admitted documents which are the MOU and the correspondence between the parties that there was any intention of the petitioners, from the inception to deceive the complainant. The petitioners herein were only made as accused, though others were also parties to the MOU. The dispute in question is a civil dispute which can be agitated by the parties having recourse to the Civil Court. 13. The 2 nd respondent is only interested in the criminal prosecution and for reasons best known, he has not taken any steps to safeguard the rights over the property. Though arbitration clause was invoked, the 2 nd respondent has not shown interest. Admittedly notice was issued to pay the balance amount and get the property registered. It is not the case that though money was offered after the notice, registration of property was refused. Breach of agreement if any in the present circumstances will not amount to a criminal offence, unless the ingredients of Section 420 are made out.” 4.12. Learned Senior Counsel further relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.C. Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another , 2025 INSC 493 and drawn attention of this Court to paragraph Nos.23 and 24, which are as follows: “ 23. Similarly in the matter of Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2024) SCC OnLine SC 2248, this Court has held that a person cannot be vicariously prosecuted, especially for offences under the IPC, merely on account of the fact that he holds a managerial position in a company without there being specific allegations regarding his involvement in the offence. …. 24. This Court in Iqbal @ Bala v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2023) 8 SCC 734 has underlined the court's duty to look into the FIR closely and with care when the challenge is thrown on the ground that the prosecution is manifestly frivolous or vexatious. … ..” 4.13. Learned Senior Counsel also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anukul Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another , 2025 LawSuit (SC) 1294 and drawn attention of this Court to paragraph No.19, which is as follows: 19. … ..” 4.13. Learned Senior Counsel also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anukul Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another , 2025 LawSuit (SC) 1294 and drawn attention of this Court to paragraph No.19, which is as follows: 19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @ Shailesh R. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others [ 2025 INSC 869 ], this Court disapproved the practice of using criminal proceedings as a substitute for civil remedies, observing that money recovery cannot be enforced through criminal prosecution where the dispute is essentially civil. The Court cautioned High Courts not to direct settlements in such matters but to apply the settled principles in Bhajan Lal. The following paragraphs are relevant in this context: “9. What we have been able to understand is that there is an oral agreement between the parties. The Respondent No.4 might have parted with some money in accordance with the oral agreement and it may be that the appellant herein owes a particular amount to be paid to the Respondent No.4. However, the question is whether prima facie any offence of cheating could be said to have been committed by the appellant. 10. How many times the High Courts are to be reminded that to constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be something more than prima facie on record to indicate that the intention of the accused was to cheat the complainant right from the inception. The plain reading of the FIR does not disclose any element of criminality. 11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of “Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh”, (2024) 10 SCC 690 . In the said decision, the entire law as to what constitutes cheating and criminal breach of trust respectively has been exhaustively explained. It appears that this very decision was relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner before the High Court. However, instead of looking into the matter on its own merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to go for mediation and that too by making payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4 th respondent as a condition precedent. We fail to understand why the High Court should undertake such exercise. However, instead of looking into the matter on its own merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to go for mediation and that too by making payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4 th respondent as a condition precedent. We fail to understand why the High Court should undertake such exercise. The High Court may either allow the petition saying that no offence is disclosed or may reject the petition saying that no case for quashing is made out. Why should the High Court make an attempt to help the complainant to recover the amount due and payable by the accused. It is for the Civil Court or Commercial Court as the case may be to look into in a suit that may be filed for recovery of money or in any other proceedings, be it under the Arbitration Act, 1996 or under the provisions of the IB Code, 2016. …….” 4.14. Hence, he prayed to quash the proceedings against the petitioners. 5. Submissions of learned counsel for respondent No.2-de facto complainant: 5.1. The petitioners, in criminal conspiracy with each other, have induced the de facto complainant to purchase lands over which they had no valid title, thereby cheating him and extracting huge amounts of money. 5.2. The petitioner-accused No.1 has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, dated 24.06.2019, with the de facto complainant in respect of land admeasuring Ac.36.00 gts. in Sy.Nos.280 and 281 situated at Maheshwaram Village. In the said MOU, it was clearly recorded that the petitioner-accused No.1 was only a Facilitator, holding certain agreements with the owners and occupants of the schedule land for its proposed purchase, and that he had offered the said land to the de facto complainant for development, assuring that he would sell the same to him. These recitals make it evident that the petitioner-accused No.1 had neither title nor ownership over the said property, yet he collected Rs.50,00,000/- from the de facto complainant towards advance. The petitioner-accused No.1 has wantonly not made petitioner-accused No.2-Company as a party to the agreement to avoid performance of contract, as only petitioner-accused No.2-Company holds General Power of Attorney in the schedule land as evinced by the Encumbrance Certificate. 5.3. Stating that they are the owners and possessors of the land admeasuring Ac.120.00 gts. The petitioner-accused No.1 has wantonly not made petitioner-accused No.2-Company as a party to the agreement to avoid performance of contract, as only petitioner-accused No.2-Company holds General Power of Attorney in the schedule land as evinced by the Encumbrance Certificate. 5.3. Stating that they are the owners and possessors of the land admeasuring Ac.120.00 gts. in Sy.Nos.486, 487, 463, 469, 231, 242, 252, 256, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 267, 268, 269, 280, 281, 450, 451, 457, 458, 459 and 518 situated at Maheshwaram Village, the petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2 entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, dated 19.09.2019 with the de facto complainant for development. However, the words ‘absolute owner and possessor of agricultural lands admeasuring about’ have been struck out in the said Memorandum of Understanding, dated 19.09.2019 filed through a Memo, dated 24.03.2025 by the petitioners, contrary to the original. Hence, it is clear that the petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2 are neither the owners nor possessors of any land in Sy.Nos.486, 487, 252, 258, 261, 264, 265, 450, 451, 457, 459, 463 and 518. In respect of the remaining survey numbers, despite holding portions of land and having received consideration of Rs.50,00,000/-, the petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2 failed to perform the obligations under the MOU. 5.4. Claiming to be the owners and possessors of land admeasuring 42,422 square yards in Plot Nos.1 to 160 in Sy.No.291/part of Maheshwaram Village, Sy.Nos.321/part, 322/part, 323/part, 325/part and 326/part of Pendyal Village, Maheshwaram Mandal, the petitioners-accused No.3 and 4 have entered into an Agreement of Sale of Properties, dated 04.10.2019, offered to sell the said extent of land and received Rs.1 crore from the de facto complainant as an advance. However, the petitioner-accused No.3 alienated the land in Plot Nos.57 and 58 in Sy.No.291/part of Pendyal Village, in favour of one V.Kavitha Sagar in the year 2020 i.e., subsequent to entering into the Agreement itself. Further, in respect of Sy.Nos.321/part, 322/part and 323/part, neither petitioner-accused No.3 nor accused No.4 had ownership or possession of any plots. In the said Agreement of Sale, the de facto complainant noticed that only Rs.90,00,000/- was recorded as payment, instead of Rs.1,00,00,000/-. 5.5. The petitioner-accused No.1 and the Society have induced the de facto complainant to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding for Sale of Properties, dated 10.11.2021 in respect of the land admeasuring Ac.46.00 gts. In the said Agreement of Sale, the de facto complainant noticed that only Rs.90,00,000/- was recorded as payment, instead of Rs.1,00,00,000/-. 5.5. The petitioner-accused No.1 and the Society have induced the de facto complainant to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding for Sale of Properties, dated 10.11.2021 in respect of the land admeasuring Ac.46.00 gts. in Sy.Nos.486, 487, 463, 469, 231, 242, 252, 256, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 267, 268, 269, 280, 281, 450, 451, 457, 458, 459 and 518 situated at Maheshwaram Village. The petitioner-accused No.1 undertook to facilitate the sale of the said land in favour of the de facto complainant. Despite having the rights to facilitate the said lands and having received Rs.2 crores from the de facto complainant, petitioner-accused No.1 failed to perform his obligations under the said MOU. 5.6. The petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2 have also entered into a sub-MOU for development, dated 10.11.2021 with the de facto complainant claiming to be the owners and possessors of the land admeasuring Ac.179.00 gts. situated in Sy.Nos.231, 242, 256, 259, 260, 263, 267, 268, 269, 280, 281, 458 and 469 of Maheshwaram Village. The de facto complainant had paid Rs.5 crores as a refundable security deposit. Though the petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2 claim title over Ac.179.00 gts., the actual title pertains only to Ac.160.36 gts. In the MOU, there is a reference to an Arbitration clause and in relation to the same, the de facto complainant has already filed Arbitration Application No.159 of 2025 before this Court against the petitioners- accused Nos.1 and 2, and the same is presently pending. While entering into the sub-MOU, the petitioner-accused No.1 represented that he was entitled to 58% of the developed area, and further proposed that upon sub-development or payment of the developmental fee, the developed area would be divided in the ratio of 55:45 between himself and the de facto complainant. However, the said land was sold to Sri A.Venkateshwar Reddy and others on 24.08.2021, which clearly demonstrates the dishonest intention on the part of the petitioner-accused No.1. 5.7. On the similar set of facts, the petitioner-accused No.1 is also involved in another case in Crime No.729 of 2021 with same modus operandii of delivering agricultural lands to M/s. Bella Design Concepts in Sy.Nos.231, 242, 256, 256, 259, 260, 261, 262, 269, 281, 469, 458, etc. situated at Maheshwaram Village. 5.7. On the similar set of facts, the petitioner-accused No.1 is also involved in another case in Crime No.729 of 2021 with same modus operandii of delivering agricultural lands to M/s. Bella Design Concepts in Sy.Nos.231, 242, 256, 256, 259, 260, 261, 262, 269, 281, 469, 458, etc. situated at Maheshwaram Village. After completion of investigation, charge sheet is filed before the Court concerned, the same was numbered as C.C.No.124 of 2023 for the offences under Sections 406, 420, 464, 465, 468, 471, 506 and 120-B r/w. 34 of IPC and the same is pending for trial. 5.8. The dispute between the parties does not merely involve civil remedies but clearly necessiates recourse under criminal law, hence, the present criminal proceedings are initiated against the accused. Merely because civil or Arbitration proceedings are pending does not debar the de facto complainant from initiating criminal proceedings. The action of the petitioners in constantly promising and entering into various agreements and MOUs over a long period of time, though they do not own any land in many survey numbers, clearly establishes the long strategic criminal intent from the inception and further action in continuing such fraudulent actions. The contents of the complaint clearly constitutes the serious allegations of criminal conspiracy, cheating and dishonest intention against the petitioners since the inception, which is a subject matter of full-fledged investigation and trial. The judgments relied on by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 5.9. In support of his contention, he relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Jagadish v. Udaya Kumar G.S. and another , (2020) 14 SCC 552 , wherein, it was held that the very same set of facts may give rise to remedies in civil as well as criminal proceedings and even if a civil remedy is availed by a party, he is not precluded from setting in motion, proceedings in criminal law, or continuing with the criminal proceedings if already initiated. 5.10. 5.10. He further relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dilbag Rai v. State of Haryana and others , (2019) 16 SCC 736 , wherein, it was held that although the accused did not have title to the property, she had dealt with it and induced the complainant to part with valuable consideration, and whether these allegations are true or otherwise is a matter of trial. 5.11. He further relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Somjeet Mallick v. State of Jharkhand and others , (2024) 10 SCC 527 , wherein, it was held that the threshold for deciding whether to quash the proceedings is whether the allegations in the FIR/police report/complaint, taken at their face value, disclose a prima facie case warranting investigation or continuation of proceedings against the accused. The correctness or otherwise of the allegations is not to be examined at this stage. 5.12. He further relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra , (2021) 19 SCC 401 , wherein, it was held that criminal proceedings should not be scuttled at the initial stage, and once the allegations disclose a cognizable offence, the Court need not assess the merits of the case at that stage to allow the investigation to proceed. 5.13. He further relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kamal Shivaji Pokarnekar v. State of Maharashtra and others , (2019) 14 SCC 350 wherein, it was held that the criminal complaints cannot be quashed only on the ground that allegations made therein appear to be of civil nature and if the ingredients of offence alleged against the accused are prima facie made out in the complaint, criminal proceeding not to be interdicted. 5.14. He also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal and others , (1999) 8 SCC 686 wherein, it was held that the arbitration clause is not a sufficient ground for quashing the complaint filed by the appellant alleging cheating. 5.15. Hence, he prayed to dismiss the petition. 6. Submissions of learned Additional Public Prosecutor: 6.1. 5.15. Hence, he prayed to dismiss the petition. 6. Submissions of learned Additional Public Prosecutor: 6.1. As per the bank statements of petitioners, it is well established that the petitioners have received huge amounts, which were diverted to the accounts of his family members and to M/s. Vision Ventures, a Proprietorship Firm, instead of M/s. Ventures Partnership Firm. During the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer addressed a letter to the concerned officials to freeze the bank accounts to which the petitioners have diverted the funds. Aggrieved by the same, the wife of petitioner-accused No.1 namely Mrs. Vanga Aruna Reddy filed W.P.No.8158 of 2025 before this Court seeking directions to the concerned officials to defreeze the said bank accounts and the same is pending. The petitioners have approached this Court by filing Crl.P.No.418 of 2025 seeking pre-arrest bail, and this Court directed the Investigation Officer to issue notice under Section 35(3) of BNSS to the petitioners and proceed with the investigation by following the guidelines of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and another, (2014) 8 SCC 273 . In response to the said notices, the petitioners have submitted their explanation. 6.2. As per the investigation, it is revealed that out of Sy.Nos.231, 242, 252, 256, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 267, 268, 269, 280, 281, 450, 451, 457, 458, 459, 463, 469, 486, 487 and 518, the petitioners or their related firms does not hold any title in Sy.Nos.252, 258, 265, 280, 450, 451, 457, 458, 459, 463, 486, 487 and 518 of Maheshwaram Village and Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. Though the petitioners have title over the remaining survey numbers, they deliberately sold the same to third parties, which clearly shows their dishonest intention to cheat, misrepresent and commit economic offences since the inception. Despite entering into an agreement of sale in the year 2018 with M/s. Bella Design Concepts, the petitioners have entered into an agreement with the de facto complainant with a dishonest intention to have wrongful gain. Misrepresenting the facts as if it is a civil dispute, the petitioners have obtained interim order. The petitioner-accused No.1 has utilized the amounts received from the de facto complainant for his personal benefits. Serious allegations are levelled against the petitioners and the ingredients of the offences alleged against them are clearly made out. Hence, he prayed to dismiss the petition. 7. The petitioner-accused No.1 has utilized the amounts received from the de facto complainant for his personal benefits. Serious allegations are levelled against the petitioners and the ingredients of the offences alleged against them are clearly made out. Hence, he prayed to dismiss the petition. 7. CONCLUSION: 7.1. Having heard the submissions of both sides and upon careful perusal of the material on record, it is apparent that a prima facie case is made out against the petitioners. The allegations, when taken at their face value, reveals that the petitioners, in criminal conspiracy with each other, have induced the de facto complainant from the very inception with a dishonest intention to cheat him, involving substantial financial transactions. 7.2. Whether these allegations will ultimately be established during trial, or whether the evidence collected will conclusively prove the alleged conspiracy and dishonest intention, are questions that fall exclusively within the ambit of investigation and trial. At this preliminary stage, when the investigation is still at a nascent stage, this Court is neither required nor expected to render any definitive findings on the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations levelled against the petitioners. 7.3. It is well-settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., the High Court does not undertake a detailed scrutiny of the correctness or otherwise of the allegations in the complaint, except in the rarest of rare cases where the allegations are demonstrably frivolous, absurd, or fail to disclose the commission of any offence. No such circumstances are made out in the present case. As such, the present criminal petition is liable to be dismissed. 8. Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is dismissed. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.