ORDER : 1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and also considered the statement of the complainant recorded during the contempt proceedings initiated under Order 39 Rule 2A Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’). 2. The case set up on the application moved under Order 39 Rule 2A CPC was that the appellant had made further construction after an interim order was passed by the learned Commercial Court No.1, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as ‘Commercial Court’) on 02.07.2019 and, therefore, has violated the order passed by the Commercial Court. The learned Commercial Court proceeded to examine the application moved under Order 39 Rule 2A CPC and evidence was led on behalf of the respondent/applicant. After the cross-examination was conducted, the Commercial Court proceeded to pass the impugned order on 24.08.2021, which was subsequently corrected vide order dated 13.09.2021 and it was directed to attach the property of the appellant and also send the appellant to civil jail for a period of 15 days for committing contempt of the order dated 02.07.2019. 3. The present appeal was filed by the appellant wherein he stated that on 02.07.2019, an order was passed by the Commercial Court to maintain the status quo with regard to new constructions only and alienation. It is his submission that so far as the property is concerned, no new construction was done after passing of the order dated 02.07.2019. However, with a view to coerce the appellant, an application was moved immediately on 05.07.2019 under Order 39 Rule 2A CPC. 4. It is submitted that the dispute between the appellant and the respondent is relating to a development agreement entered into between the parties where the appellant was the developer and respondent was the land owner. The respondent had invoked the arbitration agreement and the Arbitral Tribunal consisting of a Sole Arbitrator had rejected the application filed by the respondent under Section 17 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1996’), seeking an interim prayer for disallowing any further construction. 5. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the interim prayer under Section 17 of the Act of 1996 was thereafter allowed to the extent as noticed above by the Commercial Court and the appellant was restrained from making any alienation or making any new construction only. 5. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the interim prayer under Section 17 of the Act of 1996 was thereafter allowed to the extent as noticed above by the Commercial Court and the appellant was restrained from making any alienation or making any new construction only. Thus, the existing construction was not required to be disturbed, however, in the garb of the said order, the contempt proceedings were wrongfully initiated against the appellant. 6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that the application filed was a genuine case of violation of the interim order passed by the Court on 02.07.2019 in the presence of their own counsels. The appellant proceeded to make further construction, to which, an F.I.R. was registered by the respondent with the local Police Station and thereafter the contempt application under Order 39 Rule 2A CPC for committing contempt was moved before the concerned Commercial Court. He asserts that there has been further construction after 02.07.2019 and the punishment awarded by the Commercial Court in the order passed on 24.08.2021/13.09.2021, do not warrant any interference. 7. He has also objected to the maintainability of the present appeal and relies on the judgment passed in the case of Amazon.Com NV Investment Holdings LLC vs. Future Retail Limited and Others 2022 1 SCC 209 8. We have considered the submissions and carefully gone through the record as well as the evidence recorded before the Commercial Court in relation to the application and proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2A CPC. 9. The affidavit has been filed by the respondent-RP Chaudhary asserting that the appellant had made constructions after 02.07.2019. In support thereto, he placed on record a complaint registered with the local Police Station dated 03.07.2019 as Exhibit-2 and the registry receipts of the complaint as Exhibit-3 & 4. The photographs annexed with the contempt application (Exhibits 5 to 22) were also exhibited by him along with the affidavit. The photographs (Exhibits 29 to 52) of the site, digital photographs and memory card were also placed. 10. Upon cross-examination, he has stated that he has not placed on record any position of the building which was existing as on 02.07.2019 or earlier to it. He has also stated that in the penthouse, there are bricks and other building materials lying. He also states that he had taken the photographs from another building. 10. Upon cross-examination, he has stated that he has not placed on record any position of the building which was existing as on 02.07.2019 or earlier to it. He has also stated that in the penthouse, there are bricks and other building materials lying. He also states that he had taken the photographs from another building. He further states that his last visit to penthouse was on 29.06.2019. 11. Having considered the aforesaid statement of the complainant, we notice that neither the complainant has ever visited the site after passing of the order on 02.07.2019, nor he states in the photographs that the same reflect any new construction. None of the photographs have been exhibited mentioning the area where new construction has been done after 02.07.2019. Merely placing the photographs on record along with affidavit or during the evidence, would not mean that the new construction had been done after 02.07.2019. The construction could be also prior to 02.07.2019 and it cannot be said beyond doubt that the order passed by the Commercial Court dated 02.07.2019 has been violated. 12. The contempt proceedings are of penal nature and, therefore, absolute proof is required to be looked into before passing any order. With regards to the nature of such proceedings, reference can be made to a decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta in Dimension Steel and Alloys Limited and Anr. vs Damodar Valley Corporation and Ors. 2022 SCC OnLine Cal 995 which held as under: “ 36. ………It is well-known that the contempt jurisdiction is penal in nature and is distinct and different from execution or implementation of an order…...’’ 13. The principles of evidence therefore have to be strictly construed by the Court before passing orders of punishment. If there is an element of doubt with regard to factual aspects, the benefit would go to the persons against whom allegation is levelled and benefit of doubt therefore has to be given in the present case to the concerned appellant. Regarding the standard of proof required, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muthu Karuppan, Commissioner of Police, Chennai vs Parithi Ilamvazhuthi and Anr. (2011) 5 SCC 496 held that: ‘‘ 17. The contempt proceedings being quasi-criminal in nature, burden and standard of proof is the same as required in criminal cases. Regarding the standard of proof required, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muthu Karuppan, Commissioner of Police, Chennai vs Parithi Ilamvazhuthi and Anr. (2011) 5 SCC 496 held that: ‘‘ 17. The contempt proceedings being quasi-criminal in nature, burden and standard of proof is the same as required in criminal cases. The charges have to be framed as per the statutory rules framed for the purpose and proved beyond reasonable doubt keeping in mind that the alleged contemnor is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Law does not permit imposing any punishment in contempt proceedings on mere probabilities, equally, the court cannot punish the alleged contemnor without any foundation merely on conjectures and surmises. As observed above, the contempt proceeding being quasi-criminal in nature require strict adherence to the procedure prescribed under the rules applicable in such proceedings.’’ 14. So far as the question regarding maintainability of the present appeal is concerned, we notice that appeal has not only been filed under Section 17 of the Commercial Courts Act but also an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(r) CPC. 15. That apart we have to notice that the punishment awarded is in the nature of contempt and under the Contempt of Courts Act also, an appeal would lie to this Court. 16. The contention raised by learned counsel regarding maintainability of this appeal is wholly misconceived. 17. A look at the aspects addressed to us by the learned counsel for the respondent would reflect that it is with regard to an order relating to non grant of interim measures under Section 17 (1) (i) & (ii) of the Act of 1996 and further order passed under (2) of the Act of 1996. It would be apposite to quote Para Nos.73 & 74 of the judgment passed in the case of Amazon.Com NV Investment Holdings LLC (supra): “73. At this juncture, it is important to notice that Section 37 did not remain untouched by the 2015 Amendment Act. As a matter of fact, a new category of appeals was infused into the said provision by adding a new Sub- section (1)(a), which reads as follows: 37. At this juncture, it is important to notice that Section 37 did not remain untouched by the 2015 Amendment Act. As a matter of fact, a new category of appeals was infused into the said provision by adding a new Sub- section (1)(a), which reads as follows: 37. Appealable orders.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely: (a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration Under Section 8; 74. Despite Section 17 being amended by the same Amendment Act, by making (1) the mirror image of Section 9(1) as to the interim measures that can be made, and by adding (2) as a consequence thereof, significantly, no change was made in Section 37(2)(b) to bring it in line with Order XLIII, Rule 1(r). The said Section continued to provide appeals only from an order granting or refusing to grant any interim measure Under . There can be no doubt that granting or refusing to grant any interim measure Under would only refer to the grant or non-grant of interim measures Under (1)(i) and 17(1)(ii). In fact, the opening words of (2), namely, "subject to any orders passed in appeal under Section 37..." also demonstrates the legislature's understanding that orders that are passed in an appeal under Section 37 are relatable only to (1). For example, an appeal against an order refusing an injunction may be allowed, in which case sub-section (2) of then kicks in to enforce the order passed in appeal. Also, the legislature made no amendment to the granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9 to bring it in line with Order XLIII, Rule 1(r), under Section 37(1)(b). What is clear from this is that enforcement proceedings are not covered by the appeal provision.” 18. Apparently, the aforesaid view has no application to the present facts of the case nor can the same be applied for ousting the present appeal on the ground of maintainability. 19. Having considered the aforesaid, we do not find any reason to entertain the objections raised by the respondent. The present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is accordingly allowed. Apparently, the aforesaid view has no application to the present facts of the case nor can the same be applied for ousting the present appeal on the ground of maintainability. 19. Having considered the aforesaid, we do not find any reason to entertain the objections raised by the respondent. The present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is accordingly allowed. The order passed by the learned Commercial Court dated 24.08.2021 read with correction order dated 13.09.2021 are set aside. 20. No order as to costs.