JUDGMENT : K. LAKSHMAN, J. 1. Heard Mr. Ashok Talla, learned counsel for appellant-accused and Dr. S. Prashanth, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent. 2. This appeal is filed challenging the judgment dated 13.03.2018 in S.C. No.150 of 2015 passed by learned I Additional Sessions Judge at Nalgonda. 3. Vide the aforesaid judgment, learned trial Court convicted the appellant-accused for the offence under Section-302 of IPC, and accordingly sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs.5,000 (Rupees Five Thousand Only) and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one (01) year. 4. It is a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. According to the prosecution, PW.1 is the son of deceased (Ramulu), while PW.3 is the wife of the deceased. The deceased and PW.2 are having an agricultural land at the outskirts of T. Gouraram Gate of Dindi Mandal, Nalgonda District of Telangana State. The accused herein is the agnate to the deceased. PW.6 and the accused jointly cultivated groundnut crop in the leased land of the deceased. For the purpose of watering to the said crop, they brought water pipes on rent basis. On 24.03.2013, PW.6 informed the deceased to return the said water pipes to the owner if he comes. Accordingly, the deceased returned the same. On the same day in the evening hours, the accused came to know that the deceased handed over the rented water pipes to its owner and kept the same in his mind. On the same day evening at about 6.00 P.M. at Ghat Road of Chinna Gouraram Village at the outskirts of T. Gouraram Gate Village, the accused keeping the same in mind quarreled with the deceased and entered into tussle. In the meanwhile, the wife of the deceased, who was proceeding towards her agricultural fields in search of deceased, saw the said tussle and made hue and cries. On noticing the wife of deceased (PW.3), the accused sprinkled the soil into the eyes of the deceased and beat him with a stone on back of head and below the right eye region by making him to fell on the ground. Then, the wife of the deceased made hues and cries, and on hearing the same, PW.2, who was proceeding through the road on bicycle, rushed to the spot and both of them shifted the deceased to their house. Then, the wife of the deceased made hues and cries, and on hearing the same, PW.2, who was proceeding through the road on bicycle, rushed to the spot and both of them shifted the deceased to their house. Thereafter, on 26.03.2013 PW.2 took the injured/deceased to Area Hospital, Devarkonda, with the help of PWs.4 and 5 for treatment, where the doctor examined the injured and referred him to Gandhi Hospital, Secunderabad, for better treatment. On that, the injured was shifted to Gandhi Hospital and got admitted. 5. On 30.03.2013 at 2.00 P.M., the son of the deceased (PW.2) gave Ex.P1 - Telugu written report with the Police of Dindi Police Station, who in turn registered a case in Crime No.24 of 2013 under Section - 324 of IPC and took up investigation by PW.11 - Sub-Inspector of Police. 6. While undergoing treatment, the deceased succumbed to injuries on 31.03.2013 at about 10.15 P.M. Having come to know the same on 01.04.2013 at 6.00 A.M. through PW.1, the police altered the section of law to 304 of IPC. Since the offence is grave in nature, PW.12 took up the case from PW.11 for investigation. 7. PW.15 after examining the witnesses and recording their statements and conducting investigation by following due procedure, laid charge sheet against the accused for the offence under Section - 302 of IPC. The same was committed to the trial Court and the same was taken on file as S.C. No.150 of 2015 for the offence under Section - 302 of IPC. 8. The trial Court framed charge for the aforesaid offence against the accused and then proceeded with trial. 9. During trial, prosecution examined PWs.1 to 12 and marked Exs.P1 to P10 to prove its case. On behalf of the accused, he examined DW.1 and got marked Exs.D1 to D3 to disprove the case of prosecution. 10. After completion of evidence on behalf of the prosecution, the accused was examined under Section - 313 of Cr.P.C. Thereafter, upon hearing both sides, the trial Court recorded conviction against the appellant herein for the aforesaid offence and accordingly imposed life imprisonment. Challenging the said conviction and sentence of life imprisonment, the appellant preferred the present appeal: 11. Learned counsel for the appellant - accused contended as follows: i. PWs.1 to 4 and 6 are interested witnesses and, therefore, no weight can be given to their evidence. ii. Challenging the said conviction and sentence of life imprisonment, the appellant preferred the present appeal: 11. Learned counsel for the appellant - accused contended as follows: i. PWs.1 to 4 and 6 are interested witnesses and, therefore, no weight can be given to their evidence. ii. The evidence of DW.1 and Exs.D1 to D3 disprove the case of prosecution. iii. The prosecution did not prove motive against the accused. iv. There was delay in giving report to the police. v. There are no bleeding injuries on the person of the deceased even according to prosecution witnesses. vi. There are no eye-witnesses in this case. PW.2 said to be an eye-witness is a minor at the time of incident. Therefore, his evidence cannot be basis for conviction. vii. The medical evidence does not speak with regard to the injuries except speaking about cause of death. viii. There are contradictions and omissions in the depositions of prosecution witnesses which disprove the case of prosecution. ix. The prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. x. Without considering all the aforesaid aspects, the trial Court recorded conviction. With the aforesaid submissions, he sought to set aside the impugned judgment recording conviction and imposition of sentence against the appellant herein. 12. On the other hand, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would submit as under: i. There is direct evidence of PW.2 and 3 to the occurrence, who categorically deposed with regard to commission of offence by the accused. ii. PW.2 was a child at the time of incident. Evidence of child witness can be relied upon if it satisfies certain legal standards. However, at the time of giving evidence, PW.2 was aged 16 years. iii. Further, the evidence of PW.2 is in tune with the evidence of PW.3, who is the wife of the deceased and witnessed the incident. Therefore, much credit can be given to the evidence of PW.2 and 3. iv. The medical evidence significantly proves the cause of death was due to the injuries caused in the commission of offence. v. There is no rebuttal evidence from the side of accused. The evidence of DW.1 and Exs.D1 to D3 do not support the case of the accused. vi. All the circumstances form a complete chain to connect the accused in commission of offence. vii. The trial Court relying on the evidence, both oral and documentary, recorded conviction against the appellant herein. The evidence of DW.1 and Exs.D1 to D3 do not support the case of the accused. vi. All the circumstances form a complete chain to connect the accused in commission of offence. vii. The trial Court relying on the evidence, both oral and documentary, recorded conviction against the appellant herein. There is no error in it warranting interference by this Court. With the aforesaid submissions, he sought to dismiss the present appeal. 13. In view above rival submissions, the point that falls for consideration by this Court is: Whether the conviction and sentence of imprisonment recorded by the trial Court for the offence under Section - 302 of IPC against the appellant herein - accused are sustainable, both on facts and in law? 14. In view of the aforesaid rival submissions, before delving into the factual matrix, it is necessary to briefly advert to the purport of the offence alleged. Section - 302 of IPC contemplates the gravest form of culpable homicide amounting to murder, requiring proof of an act done with the intention or knowledge that it would cause death. 15. As already stated above, to prove the case of prosecution, it examined PWs.1 to 22 and got Exs.P1 to P10. No material objects were exhibited in this case. 16. PW.1 is not only the complainant, but also son of the deceased. The accused is his agnate. He is not the eye-witness to the incident. What all PW.1 deposed is that on 24.03.2013, his mother (PW.3) informed him over phone that their agnates, PW.6 and the accused sowed groundnut crop in their fields and in order to wet their crop, they brought the water pipes from Chandampet on hire basis. They were using it in their fields to wet the land. On 24.03.2013, PW.6 approached the deceased and informed him that he would not be in the Village and owner of the pipes would come to the spot to collect the pipes and asked the deceased to give the pipes: i) PW.1 further deposed that as per the directions of PW.6, the deceased handed over the said water pipes to its owner. The accused thought that the deceased without the direction of PW.6 handed over the pipes to its owner and, therefore, approached the deceased and picked up quarrel. The accused thought that the deceased without the direction of PW.6 handed over the pipes to its owner and, therefore, approached the deceased and picked up quarrel. While returning from the fields at about 6.00 P.M. the accused followed the deceased and sprinkled soil on his face and beat him with a stone. His father got injured to the back side of his head and below the right eye. Meanwhile, PW.3 was coming to the fields to see the deceased and saw the accused beating the deceased lying on the ground and raised hues and cries. On hearing her voice and on seeing her, the accused left the deceased and fled away from the spot. ii) PW.2, who was riding the bicycle, also followed PW.3 and witnessed the incident and thereafter both of them shifted the deceased to her house. As the injuries were internal and not visible, his mother did not take him to the hospital immediately. But, later she took him to the Hospital at Devarakonda Government Hospital on 26.03.2013 as the deceased fell unconscious by blood vomiting. As per the advice of the doctor, the deceased was shifted to Gandhi Hospital, Hyderabad. The doctors also conducted operation on 27.03.2013. Thereafter, PW.1 went to the police station and gave Ex.P1 - report to the police of Dindi Police Station on 30.03.2013. The deceased died on 31.03.2013 at about 9.00 P.M. and the same was informed to the police also. iii) During cross-examination, PW.1 admitted that there were no disputes between them and the accused. The land in which the pipes were laid is a joint property and belongs to his father and so also the accused and PW.6, but the same was leased to the accused and PW.6. 17. As per the testimony of PW.1, it is clear that there were no disputes between the deceased and the accused. Further, PW.1 is not an eye witness. What all PW.1 deposed is only a telephonic conservation between him and his mother. He is not an eye-witness to the incident. From the evidence of PW.1, it can be presumed that there was no motive on the part of the accused to commit the offence in a premeditated manner. 18. PW.2 - said to be an eye-witness to the incident deposed with regard to the incident occurred on 24.03.2013. He is not an eye-witness to the incident. From the evidence of PW.1, it can be presumed that there was no motive on the part of the accused to commit the offence in a premeditated manner. 18. PW.2 - said to be an eye-witness to the incident deposed with regard to the incident occurred on 24.03.2013. As on the date of incident, the age of this witness is 13 years and 16 years at the time of his giving evidence. According to him, on 24.03.2013 in the evening at about 6.00 P.M. he was going on his bicycle for pleasure. At that time, he saw the accused beating the deceased with a stone on the head. Both of them are related to him as grandfathers. He heard the hues and cries of PW.3 and she was coming to the spot. On seeing her, the accused fled away from the spot. He along with PW.3 shifted the deceased to her house. They observed injures below the right eye and back side of the head. Later he came to know that the deceased died: i) During cross-examination, he admitted that he was alone on the bicycle. There was no other person at the scene of offence. He could view both the deceased and accused from a visible distance. It was not yet dark. The accused beat the deceased with a stone carrying in his right hand. He went to the spot within no time. 19. In view of the aforesaid testimony of PW.2, it is not in dispute that the accused beat the deceased with stone and that the deceased received injuries. PW.2 who was 13 years at the time of the incident and 16 when giving evidence is a competent witness, and his testimony can be accepted if it is reliable. In view of the above discussion, there is no reason to disbelieve his evidence as he is a relative to both the deceased and the accused. 20. PW.3 - wife of the deceased and eye witness to the incident. She deposed on the lines as that of deposed by PW.1 and PW.2 in regard to the taking place of incident. i) During cross-examination, she admitted that the incident was occurred on the Holy festival. They are not having any disputes with the family of the accused. 21. PW.3 - wife of the deceased and eye witness to the incident. She deposed on the lines as that of deposed by PW.1 and PW.2 in regard to the taking place of incident. i) During cross-examination, she admitted that the incident was occurred on the Holy festival. They are not having any disputes with the family of the accused. 21. As already discussed above, there were no disputes between the family of the deceased and the family of the accused. It is also not in dispute that the accused beat the deceased and the deceased received injuries. Due to the said injuries, the deceased died subsequently while undergoing treatment in Gandhi Medical Hospital, Secunderabad. 22. PW.4 - elder sister of the deceased is a circumstantial witness and she deposed with regard the accused beat the deceased with a stone. i) During cross-examination, PW.4 admitted that she saw injuries on the deceased and also saw the blood bleeding from the injuries. There were also blood stains on the clothes of the deceased. Except the same, nothing useful was elicited from this witness. 23. As per the testimony of PW.4 also, it is clear that the deceased received injuries at the hands of the accused. Therefore, it can be presumed that the deceased died due to the injuries received in an altercation took place between the deceased and the accused. 24. PW.5 - own brother of the accused did not support the prosecution case as he turned hostile. 25. PW.6 - circumstantial witness deposed with regard to bringing the water pipes on rent for cultivation and entrustment of return of those pipes to its owner was given to the deceased etc. He further deposed that the reason for the death of the deceased is beating on his head with a stone by the accused. The deceased died after five days of receiving injuries. He was examined by the police. i) During cross-examination, PW.6 admitted that there was dispute and a panchayat was held between him and the accused for an amount of Rs.30,000/- for investment purpose. He filed a criminal case against the accused. He volunteered that the accused has kicked on the stomach of his wife and, therefore, he gave complaint against the accused. 26. PW.7, panch witness for the inquest conducted over the dead body of the deceased as in Ex.P3 - inquest panchanama. He filed a criminal case against the accused. He volunteered that the accused has kicked on the stomach of his wife and, therefore, he gave complaint against the accused. 26. PW.7, panch witness for the inquest conducted over the dead body of the deceased as in Ex.P3 - inquest panchanama. According to him, the deceased died due to manhandling of the accused. He observed the injury at the back side of the head of the deceased and also below his right eye. i) During cross-examination, PW.7 admitted that the deceased is his co-brother. He heard about the death of deceased. Police did not enquire him. Except that, nothing useful was elicited from PW.7. 27. From the testimony of PW.7, it is clear that he is only a panch witness for the inquest and that the deceased died due to injuries caused on the back side of the head and also below his right eye. 28. PW.8, a panch witness for the scene of offence. According to him, the police conducted scene of offence at the outskirts of T. Gouraram Village on the road leading to Chinagouraram Village on the mud road. The police were present at the spot and PW.2 was also present, who narrated the incident and the offence committed by the accused. Ex.P4 is the scene of offence panchanama. Ex.P5 is the rough sketch. He and LW.8 signed on Exs.P4 and 5. i) During cross-examination, he admitted that he is CPI Party leader. He goes to police station frequently to settle political issues. He acted as panch witness in many cases. 29. The testimony of PW.8 is with regard to acting as one of the panch witness for the scene of offence. 30. PW.9, a panch witness for confessional statement of the accused, deposed that in the year 2013, he along with LW.12 went to the house of the accused, where the police were present and the police stated that the accused confessed that he has committed the offence. The police recorded the confessional statement of the accused. i) During cross-examination, PW.9 admitted that by the time they went, the panchanama was written. They have not spoken to the accused. 31. From the evidence of PW.9, it can be culled out that he acted as panch witness to the confessional statement of the accused. 32. The police recorded the confessional statement of the accused. i) During cross-examination, PW.9 admitted that by the time they went, the panchanama was written. They have not spoken to the accused. 31. From the evidence of PW.9, it can be culled out that he acted as panch witness to the confessional statement of the accused. 32. PW.10, Civil Assistant Surgeon, Area Hospital, Devarakonda, deposed that he conducted post-mortem examination report over the dead body of the deceased. He found surgical wound present on fronto parietal region, which is a post operated injury ante- mortem injury. He found small homophone in right fronto parietal region. According to him, the cause of the death was due to head injury. He issued Ex.P6-posrtmortem examination report. i) During cross-examination, he admitted that the injuries mentioned in Ex.P6 are possible when a person falls on the ground on right side. 33. In view of the testimony of PW.10 and as per Ex.P6, the injuries found on the body of the deceased are possible when a person falls on the ground. In the present case, it is also the case of prosecution that the accused beat the deceased with a stone on the head as deposed by PW.2 and 3, and in the course of the assault, the deceased must have fallen to the ground and thereby sustained the injuries. 34. PW.11, the Sub-Inspector of Police, deposed with regard to receipt of Ex.P1 - report and issuance of Ex.P7 - FIR and examining and recording the statements of PWs.1 and 2 and also securing panch witnesses for conducting scene of offence. Since there was delay in giving report to the police with regard to the incident, he could not found the incriminating material at the scene of offence. On 31.03.2013 at 21:00 hours, the injured died in the hospital and on receipt of information with regard to the same, he altered section of law from Section - 324 of IPC to 304 of IPC on 01.04.2013. i) During cross-examination, he admitted that there is no gravel on the road. Nothing useful was elicited from PW.11. 35. In this regard, the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the Investigating Officer did not collect/seize the material object i.e., stone, the case of the prosecution cannot be believed. i) During cross-examination, he admitted that there is no gravel on the road. Nothing useful was elicited from PW.11. 35. In this regard, the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the Investigating Officer did not collect/seize the material object i.e., stone, the case of the prosecution cannot be believed. In this case, the incident had occurred on 24.03.2013, whereas the report was given to the police on 30.03.2013 by PW.1. Thus, there was a delay of about six days. The accused beat the deceased with the stone. In view of the same, it cannot be expected that the stone would be available on the road for about six days. That was the reason, PW.11 could not find the said stone at the scene of offence when he visited the place of occurrence. 36. PW.12, the Investigating Officer, deposed with regard to his conducting investigation etc. 37. Even the accused also examined one Mr. P. Srinivasulu as DW.1. He deposed with regard to the deceased was a worker under Employment Guarantee Scheme in T. Gouraram village. Accordingly he produced Ex.D2- copy of payment order dated 01.04.2013 and at serial No.147 pertains to the deceased, which is Ex.D3. 38. On analyzing the entire evidence of prosecution witnesses, it is clear that PWs.2 and 3 are eye-witnesses to the incident. They categorically deposed about the accused beating the deceased with stone and caused injuries. Due to the said injuries, later the deceased died while undergoing treatment. However, PW.1 and 3 categorically deposed that the accused is their agnate and that there were no disputes between them. In view of the same, it is clear there was no motive on the part of the accused in commission of offence. Absence of motive further weakens the prosecution’s case of intentional murder under Section - 302 IPC. Thus, there is no evidence of premeditation or any deliberate plan to kill the deceased. The incident appears to have occurred in the heat of the moment, during a quarrel between the accused and the deceased. Using stone indicates the assault occurred impulsively, without preparation. Although a stone is capable of causing fatal injuries, it is not a weapon ordinarily associated with intentional homicide. The prosecution has not proved the accused inflicted repeated blows with a deliberate intention to ensure death. Using stone indicates the assault occurred impulsively, without preparation. Although a stone is capable of causing fatal injuries, it is not a weapon ordinarily associated with intentional homicide. The prosecution has not proved the accused inflicted repeated blows with a deliberate intention to ensure death. The circumstances suggest that the accused acted in a fit of anger, and the death resulted from the assault rather than any calculated act. 39. Thus, the circumstances proved by the prosecution do not unerringly point to a homicidal intention. While it is established that the accused caused the injuries leading to death, the chain of evidence does not meet the standard necessary for conviction under Section - 302 of IPC. The facts indicate that the accused had knowledge that his act of hitting the deceased with a stone was likely to cause death. However, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intended to cause death or such bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Therefore, the mental state aligns with Section - 299 IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) falling within Part-II because only knowledge and without intention is established. Given the absence of intention, lack of premeditation, the impulsive nature of the act, absence of motive, and the fact that the death occurred due to injuries inflicted in a quarrel, the conviction under Section - 302 of IPC is unsustainable. However, since the accused had knowledge that his act was likely to cause death, conviction under Section - 304 Part-II of IPC is appropriate. 40. “Culpable Homicide” is a genus and “murder” is its species and all “murders” are “culpable homicides, but all “culpable homicides” are not “murders” as held by the Apex Court in Rampal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh , (2012) 8 SCC 289 . The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of actual circumstances, but in the light of what is supposed to be the circumstances. There is nothing on record to suggest that the accused had come and prepared to commit the offence or there was premeditation for commission of offence. 41. Section - 302 of IPC is important in many ways. Persons accused of murder are tried under this section only. There is nothing on record to suggest that the accused had come and prepared to commit the offence or there was premeditation for commission of offence. 41. Section - 302 of IPC is important in many ways. Persons accused of murder are tried under this section only. Further, if in case, an accused of murder is found guilty of an offence, Section - 302 provides for punishment to such offenders. It states that whoever commits murder shall be punished with either life imprisonment or death (depending on the gravity of the murder) along with fine. The primary point of consideration for the Court in matters relating to murder is the intent and purpose of the accused. That is why, it is important that the object and intention of the accused is proved in cases under this section. The required materials for murder include intention (must be intended to cause death), cause of death (the act has to be done with the knowledge that the act may cause the death of another and bodily injury (there must be intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death). 42. In Basdev v. State of Pepsu , AIR 1956 SC 488 the Apex Court held as under: “Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion.” 43. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion.” 43. It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two different terminologies, ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in equal terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held guilty under second part of Section - 304 IPC. It is in this background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely “intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section - 300 are not satisfied and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the said Section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section - 300 IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. 44. The Apex Court in Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh , AIR 2006 SC 3010 , held as under: “Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. 44. The Apex Court in Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh , AIR 2006 SC 3010 , held as under: “Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters - plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302, are not converted into offences punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under Section 302. The intention to cause death can be 16 gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention. Be that as it may.” 45. The Apex Court in Anbazhagan v. The State Represented by the Inspector of Police , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 857 , held as under: “60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus: (1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in 21 ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused. This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused. (2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC. (3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is 22 punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’. (4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder. (5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death. To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of 23 the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. (6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably happen’. (6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death. (7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC. (8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant 24 must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack. (9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack. (9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries. (10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case. (11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies. (12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.” 46. The Apex Court in a recent judgment in N. Ramkumar v. The State Rep. by Inspector , Crl. Appeal No. 2006 of 2023 decided on 06.09.2023 also reiterated the aforesaid principle. 47. The Apex Court in a recent judgment in N. Ramkumar v. The State Rep. by Inspector , Crl. Appeal No. 2006 of 2023 decided on 06.09.2023 also reiterated the aforesaid principle. 47. In State of M.P. v. Udham , 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1378 , the Apex Court held as under: “12. Sentencing for crimes has to be analyzed on the touch stone of three tests viz., crime test, criminal test and comparative proportionality test. Crime test involves factors like extent of planning, choice of weapon, modus of crime, disposal modus (if any), role of the accused, anti-social or abhorrent character of the crime, state of victim. Criminal test involves assessment of factors such as age of the criminal, gender of the criminal, economic conditions or social background of the criminal, motivation for crime, availability of defense, state of mind, instigation by the deceased or any one from the deceased group, adequately represented in the trial, disagreement by a judge in the appeal process, repentance, possibility of reformation, prior criminal record (not to take pending cases) and any other relevant factor (not an exhaustive list).” 48. In the light of the aforesaid discussion and the principle laid down in the above decisions, coming to the case on hand, the entire commission of offence had resulted without any premeditation. In such circumstances, we are of the opinion that it was a case where an act was committed by the accused with knowledge but without intention. The trial Court did not consider all the aforesaid aspects while imposing life imprisonment on the appellant-accused. Accordingly, this Court while upholding the finding of guilt against the accused, converted the conviction from Section-302 IPC to Section-304 Part-II of IPC and he is sentenced to the imprisonment for the period already undergone. The appellant was in jail from 13.03.2018 and he is on bail vide order dated 11.01.2024 in I.A. No.2 of 2023. Therefore, his bail bonds stand discharged. 49. The present Criminal Appeal is accordingly allowed in part in the above terms. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed.