JUDGMENT & ORDER : S.K. Medhi, J. The extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court has been sought to be invoked by filing this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by putting to challenge the opinion rendered vide impugned order dated 29.09.2023 passed by the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal, 1st, Lakhimpur in F.T. (1st) Case No.1341/2011 (District No. 307/2009). By the impugned order, the petitioner, who was the proceedee before the learned Tribunal, has been declared to be a foreigner post 24.03.1971. 2. The facts of the case may be put in a nutshell as follows: (i) The reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (B), Lakhimpur District, against the petitioner giving rise to the aforesaid F.T. Case No. 1341/2011 (District No. 307/2009). (ii) As per requirement u/s 9 of the Foreigner’s Act, 1946 to prove that the proceedee is not a foreigner, the petitioner had filed the written statement along with certain documents and had claimed to be an Indian Citizen by birth. (iii) The learned Tribunal, after considering the facts and circumstances and taking into account of the provisions of Section 9 of the Foreigners’ Act, 1946 had come to a finding that the petitioner, as opposite party had failed to discharge the burden cast upon him and accordingly, the opinion was rendered declaring the petitioner to be a foreign national post 24.03.1971. 3. We have heard Shri A Sattar, learned counsel for the petitioner. We have also heard Shri G Sarma, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department, Assam & NRC; Shri P. Sarma, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, Assam; Ms. S Katakey, learned Standing Counsel, Election Commission of India and Shri SS Roy, learned CGC. We have also carefully examined the records which were requisitioned vide an order dated 25.09.2025. 4. Shri Sattar, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner could prove his case with cogent evidence which the learned Tribunal should have accepted the said proof and accordingly hold the petitioner to be a citizen of India. The petitioner had adduced evidence by himself and has relied to the following documentary evidence: (i) Residential Certificate of the projected mother by U.P. Government, dated 20.09.2013 (Ext. -1); (ii) Death Certificate dated 08.02.2012 of projected father (Ext. – 2); (iii) Order dated 24.01.2014 of the learned Tribunal pertaining to the projected brother (Ext. – 3) and (iv) Electoral Roll of 2008 (Ext. – 4). -1); (ii) Death Certificate dated 08.02.2012 of projected father (Ext. – 2); (iii) Order dated 24.01.2014 of the learned Tribunal pertaining to the projected brother (Ext. – 3) and (iv) Electoral Roll of 2008 (Ext. – 4). 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that such evidence ought to have been accepted by the learned Tribunal which would have been sufficient to hold the petitioner as a citizen of India. He has contended that the petitioner is an illiterate person and was not aware as to how the proceeding should have been contested and the evidence adduced along with the exhibits would establish that he is a citizen of India. He has further submitted that under Order 3(1) of the Foreigners’ (Tribunal) Order, 1964, grounds are to be given followed by a reasonable opportunity which was not done in the instant case. 6. Per contra, Shri G Sarma, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department has categorically refuted the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner. He submits that a proceeding under the FOREIGNERS ACT , 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 relates to determination as to whether the proceedee is a foreigner or not. Therefore, the relevant facts are especially within the knowledge of the proceedee and accordingly, the burden of proving citizenship rests absolutely upon the proceedee, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act, 1872 and this is mandated under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act, 1946. However, in the instant case, the petitioner utterly failed to discharge the burden and the written statement is totally vague and the documents enclosed are not at all relevant for the purpose of adjudication of the issue at hand. He further submits that the evidence of a proceedee has to be cogent, relevant, which inspire confidence and acceptable and only thereafter, the question of adducing rebuttal evidence may come in. 7. The learned Standing Counsel, Home Department further submits that so far as the documents relied upon by the petitioner are concerned, Ext. 1 is a document of the year 2013 pertaining to the residential status of one Mehrun Nessa who has been projected to be the mother of the petitioner and there is no link document. In any case, he submits that a linkage has to be established with the father who has been a resident of the country before 1966. 1 is a document of the year 2013 pertaining to the residential status of one Mehrun Nessa who has been projected to be the mother of the petitioner and there is no link document. In any case, he submits that a linkage has to be established with the father who has been a resident of the country before 1966. The death certificate of the projected father dated 23.02.2012 is also inconsistent with the name projected and the same, in any case, does not have a linkage with the petitioner. As regards the order dated 24.01.2014 said to have been passed in favour of his projected brother, the learned counsel has submitted that the same will not have any precedential value as each of such case are to be decided on its own merits. The Electoral Roll of year 2008 is an irrelevant document which will not have any bearing in the adjudication process. 8. Endorsing the submissions advanced on behalf of the Home Department, Ms. S Katakey, learned Standing Counsel, ECI; Shri SS Roy, learned CGC and Shri P Sarmah, learned State Counsel, Assam have added that this Court, in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction does not act as an Appellate Court and it is only the decision making process which can be the subject matter of scrutiny. They have further submitted that there is no procedural impropriety or illegality in the decision making process and therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed. 9. The rival contentions have been duly considered. The TCRs of the learned Tribunal placed before this Court have been carefully perused. 10. Before embarking to adjudicate the issue involved vis-a-vis the submissions and the materials on record, we are reminded that a writ court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would confine its powers to examine the decision making process only. Further, the present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction. 11. Law is well settled in this field. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after discussing the previous case laws on the jurisdiction of a Writ Court qua the writ of certiorari, in the recent decision of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and Anr. 11. Law is well settled in this field. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after discussing the previous case laws on the jurisdiction of a Writ Court qua the writ of certiorari, in the recent decision of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and Anr. Vs. Bikartan Das & Ors . , [Civil Appeal No. 3339 of 2023] has laid down as follows: “49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something important in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari. 50. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. 51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not.” 12. It also transpires that the petitioner had earlier approached this Court vide WP(C)/1735/2017 challenging an order dated 12.11.2013 passed by the learned Tribunal declaring him as a foreigner. The primary challenge in that case was that the impugned order was passed ex parte. This Court, however, vide order dated 14.03.2023 has made an observation that no infirmity was found in the impugned order but in the interest of justice, the matter was remanded back for an adjudication on merits subject to payment of cost. For ready reference, the operative part of the order dated 14.03.2023 is extracted hereinbelow: “4. We do not notice any infirmity in the order dated 12.11.2013 inasmuch as the petitioner on his own volition had failed to appear before the Tribunal for further proceeding. But however, for the interest of the just, we remand the matter back to the Tribunal for adjudication on its merit. 5. Because of the conduct of the petitioner, the petitioner to pay a cost of Rs.5000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) to be deposited in the District Legal Services Authority, Lakhimpur and thereafter appear before the Tribunal. The petitioner to appear before the Tribunal on 18.04.2023.” 13. We have also noticed that the aforesaid challenge was made in this Court after about 4 years from the date of the order of the Tribunal. 14. The principal ground of the present challenge is that the documents have not been properly appreciated and therefore, the evidence adduced by the petitioner should have been accepted. 15. We have considered the evidence adduced. As regards Ext. 14. The principal ground of the present challenge is that the documents have not been properly appreciated and therefore, the evidence adduced by the petitioner should have been accepted. 15. We have considered the evidence adduced. As regards Ext. 1, the same is a document of the year 2013 issued by the U.P. Government pertaining to the residential status of one Mehrun Nessa who has been projected to be the mother of the petitioner. The same, apart from being of the year 2013 does not establish any link with the petitioner. We find force in the submission advanced by the learned State Counsel that a linkage has to be established with the father who has to be a resident of the country before 1966. With regards Ext. 2-the Death Certificate of the projected father, the same is dated 23.02.2012 and is also inconsistent with the name projected. In any case, the same does not have a linkage with the petitioner. As regards the order dated 24.01.2014 of the learned Tribunal in the case of the projected brother (Ext.3), a bare perusal of the same would show that the evidence was different and in any event, the same will not have any precedential value as each of such case are to be decided on its own merits. We also endorse the opinion of the learned Tribunal that the Electoral Roll of the year 2008 will not have any bearing in the adjudication of the present case. 16. The settled law in this field is that the burden of proof that a proceedee is an Indian citizen is always on the said proceedee and the said burden never shifts. The said procedure is clearly laid down in Section 9 of the Act of 1946 and there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable. For ready reference, Section 9 is extracted hereinbelow- “9. The said procedure is clearly laid down in Section 9 of the Act of 1946 and there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable. For ready reference, Section 9 is extracted hereinbelow- “9. Burden of proof.—If in any case not falling under Section 8 any question arises with reference to this Act or any order made or direction given thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner or is or is not a foreigner of a particular class or description the onus of proving that such person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), lie upon such person.” 17. In this connection, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. Delhi Administration , [ AIR 1963 SC 1035 ] which followed the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ghaus Mohammad Vs. Union of India , [AIR 1961 SC 1526] in the context of FOREIGNERS ACT , 1946 would be relevant which is extracted hereinbelow: “22. This Act confers wide ranging powers to deal with all foreigners or with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or description of foreigner for prohibiting, regulating or restricting their or his entry into India or their presence or continued presence including their arrest, detention and confinement. The most important provision is Section 9 which casts the burden of proving that a person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall lie upon such person. Therefore, where an order made under the FOREIGNERS ACT is challenged and a question arises whether the person against whom the order has been made is a foreigner or not, the burden of proving that he is not a foreigner is upon such a person. In Union of India v. Ghaus Mohd. the Chief Commissioner of Delhi served an order on Ghaus Mohammad to leave India within three days as he was a Pakistani national. In Union of India v. Ghaus Mohd. the Chief Commissioner of Delhi served an order on Ghaus Mohammad to leave India within three days as he was a Pakistani national. He challenged the order before the High Court which set aside the order by observing that there must be prima facie material on the basis of which the authority can proceed to pass an order under Section 3(2)(c) of the FOREIGNERS ACT , 1946. In appeal the Constitution Bench reversed the judgment of the High Court holding that onus of showing that he is not a foreigner was upon the respondent.” 18. We have noted that the learned Tribunal has duly considered each of the documents and rejected the same by assigning reasons. It has been held that apart from Ext.1 not being proved by the concerned authority, the same cannot determine the citizenship of the petitioner. Ext.2 has been held to be a simple proof that the projected father of the petitioner resided in Assam which is a post 1971 document. Ext.3 has been held to have no precedential value and Ext.4 is also a post 1971 document wherein the petitioner’s age is shown to be 37 years. No Voters List of prior period has been enclosed. We do not find any reason to differ with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Tribunal and rather, we endorse such conclusion. 19. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated 29.09.2023 passed by the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal, 1st, Lakhimpur in F.T. (1st) Case No.1341/2011 (District No. 307/2009) does not call for any interference. Accordingly, this writ petition being devoid of merits is accordingly dismissed. 20. The actions consequent upon the opinion rendered by the learned Tribunal would follow, in accordance with law. 21. The records of the aforesaid F.T. (1st) Case No.1341/2011 (District No. 307/2009) be returned to the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal, 1 , Lakhimpur forthwith along with a copy of this order.