JUDGMENT : K. LAKSHMAN, J. 1. Heard Mr. D. Bhasker Reddy, learned counsel for appellant No.2 - accused No.2 and Mr. Syed Yasar Mamoon, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent. 2. This appeal is filed challenging the judgment dated 04.01.2017 in Spl. S.C. No.45 of 2014 passed by learned Special Sessions Judge - cum - VII Additional District and Sessions Judge at Mahabubnagar. 3. Vide the aforesaid judgment, the trial Court convicted the appellants - accused Nos.1 and 2 for the offence under Section - 302 read with 34 of IPC and accordingly sentenced them to undergo life imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs.10,000 (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one (01) year. 4. During pendency of the present appeal, appellant No.1 - accused No.1 died on 10.04.2021. Learned counsel for the appellants filed a Memo vide USR No.134476 of 2025, dated 24.11.2025 to that effect along with copy of Death Certificate dated 29.07.2021 issued by the Registrar of Births and deaths, Circle-18 of GHMC, Hyderabad. Confirming the same, the Inspector of Police, Jadcherla Police Station also addressed a letter to learned Additional Public Prosecutor, vide C.No.56/B1/JDL/2025, dated 18.11.2025 along with copy of death certificate of appellant No.1 - Accused No.1. The same are placed on record. 5. The case of the prosecution is that deceased - Smt. Goda Chennamma wife of Chandraiah, resident of Gangapur Village, while accused Nos.1 and 2 also hail from the very same Village. The deceased was eking for her livelihood by doing coolie work. She has barren land to an extent of Acs.2.00 guntas in the limits of Gangapur Village and cultivated by herself: i) On 14.05.2013, accused No.1 asked the deceased to give her land for cultivation on lease basis, but she refused. Keeping the same in mind, on the very same day in the evening, while accused No.1 was transporting granite stones of the deceased available in front of her house, she had objected to the same. Meanwhile, accused No.2 joined and supported accused No.1. When the deceased protested and abused them, both the accused threatened her with dire consequences by saying that they would kill her with granite stones. Accordingly, they decided to eliminate the deceased as she denied giving her land on lease basis. Meanwhile, accused No.2 joined and supported accused No.1. When the deceased protested and abused them, both the accused threatened her with dire consequences by saying that they would kill her with granite stones. Accordingly, they decided to eliminate the deceased as she denied giving her land on lease basis. ii) As per their plan, on 15.05.2013 at 02:00 hours, accused Nos.1 and 2 went to the house of the deceased carrying kerosene. They forcibly entered into the house and accused No.1 poured kerosene on the deceased, who was sleeping along with her grandson, aged 6 years and her granddaughter, aged 4 years, while accused No.1 set fire by lighting a match stick, then fled away by bolting doors from outside. On hearing screams of the deceased, PW.4 rushed and extinguished the flames and the matter was informed to PW.3 and LWs.3 and 4. The deceased was shifted to District Hospital, Mahabubnagar for treatment through 108 Ambulance. On 21.05.2013 at 7.00 hours, the deceased was succumbed with burnt injuries while undergoing treatment. Therefore, accused Nos.1 and 2 committed the offence punishable under Section - 302 read with 34 of IPC. iii) On receipt of medical intimation, PW.12 - Sub-Inspector of Police, Jadcherla Police Station initially registered a case in Crime No.263 of 2013 under Section -307 read with 34 of IPC on 21.05.2013 and later altered the Section of law into 302 read with 34 of IPC and took up the same for investigation. iv) On completion of investigation, PW.11 filed a charge sheet against the appellants herein. The same was committed to the Sessions Court which has taken on file as S.C. No.45 of 2014 and thereafter made over to the trial Court. 6. The trial Court framed charge for the offence under Section - 302 read with 34 of IPC against the accused and then proceeded with trial. 7. During trial, PWs.1 to 12 were examined, Exs.P1 to P13 were marked and MOs.1 to 4 were exhibited. No oral evidence was let in by the accused, however, Exs.D1 to D3 were marked on their behalf. 8. After completion of evidence on behalf of the prosecution, the accused were examined under Section - 313 of Cr.P.C. Thereafter, upon hearing both sides, the trial Court recorded conviction against the appellants herein for the aforesaid offences and accordingly imposed sentences of imprisonment in the manner stated above. 8. After completion of evidence on behalf of the prosecution, the accused were examined under Section - 313 of Cr.P.C. Thereafter, upon hearing both sides, the trial Court recorded conviction against the appellants herein for the aforesaid offences and accordingly imposed sentences of imprisonment in the manner stated above. Challenging the said conviction and sentences of imprisonment, the appellants preferred the present appeal: 9. Learned counsel for appellant No.2 - accused No.2 contended as follows: i. There is no direct evidence and the entire case rests on circumstantial evidence. ii. The testimonies of PWs.1, 2 and 3 cannot be looked into as they are interested witnesses being family members of the deceased. iii. PWs.4 to 8 did not support the prosecution case. iv. The dying declaration of the deceased does not inspire confidence to convict the appellant for the reason that there are two dying declarations given by the deceased and the same are contradictory with each other. v. Motive was not proved by the prosecution. With the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel sought to set aside the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant. 10. On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor would submit as under: i. Though PWs.4 to 8 turned hostile, still the evidence of PWs.1 to 3 would prove the case of prosecution. ii. The dying declarations made to the Sub-Inspector of Police and the Magistrate proves the case of the prosecution. The contradictions and inconsistencies, if any, in the said declarations, are minor in nature and they would not tile the case of prosecution. iii. Though there is no direct evidence, the circumstantial evidence forms a complete chain to convict the appellant. iv. There was motive on the part of the appellant and the same was proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. v. Having considered all the aforesaid aspects only, the trial Court convicted the appellant and, therefore, there is no error in it. With the aforesaid submissions, learned Additional Public Prosecutor sought to dismiss the appeal. 11. In view above rival submissions, the point that falls for consideration by this Court is: Whether the conviction and sentence of imprisonment recorded by the trial Court for the offence under Section - 302 read with 34 of IPC against appellant No.2 herein - accused No.2 are sustainable, both on facts and in law? 12. 11. In view above rival submissions, the point that falls for consideration by this Court is: Whether the conviction and sentence of imprisonment recorded by the trial Court for the offence under Section - 302 read with 34 of IPC against appellant No.2 herein - accused No.2 are sustainable, both on facts and in law? 12. In view of the aforesaid rival submissions and perusal of record, the prosecution alleges that the accused, harbouring a grudge against the deceased for refusing to lease her land, intentionally killed her by pouring kerosene on her while she was asleep and setting her on fire, causing fatal burn injuries. The act is stated to have been committed with common intention, making the accused liable for the offence of murder under Section 302 read with 34 IPC. 13. PW.3 - the complainant and daughter-in-law of the deceased deposed that the houses of accused are behind the house of the deceased. She is staying with her children in the house of her mother which is away from the house of deceased. On the night of occurrence during mid-night, PW.4 informed about the incident. She and her children rushed there. Meanwhile, Ambulance came and the deceased was shifted to the Hospital. On enquiry made by the villagers as to cause of burns, the deceased started abusing the accused and stated that accused No.1 poured kerosene and accused No.2 set fire to her repeatedly. The deceased survived with burns for one week and died in the Hospital. According to her, there were no disputes between the deceased and the accused. On her enquiry, she was told that since four days prior to the incident, accused No.1 and four others forced the deceased to give her land of Acs.4.00 on lease and that she did not oblige them. 14. PW.1, son of the deceased, deposed that he belongs to Yadava Community, while the accused belong to Kurva Community. By the time of incident, he was in Hyderabad as he migrated to Hyderabad for his livelihood. On his enquiry, his mother told him that accused No.2 poured kerosene and accused No.1 lit fire to her. 15. PW.2 - the daughter of the deceased deposed that accused No.2 is sister-in-law of accused No.1. By the time of incident, she was in Hyderabad as she migrated to Hyderabad about 15 years ago. On his enquiry, his mother told him that accused No.2 poured kerosene and accused No.1 lit fire to her. 15. PW.2 - the daughter of the deceased deposed that accused No.2 is sister-in-law of accused No.1. By the time of incident, she was in Hyderabad as she migrated to Hyderabad about 15 years ago. On receipt of telephonic message, she rushed to the Government Hospital, Mahabubnagar and on enquiry, the deceased informed her that accused Nos.1 and 2 insisted her to give her Acs.2.00 guntas of land on lease, for which she refused. On the date of incident, accused No.1 requested accused No.2 to get kerosene, then both of them came into the house of deceased and among them, accused No.2 poured kerosene on the deceased while accused No.1 lit fire on her to kill. 16. PW.4 to 8 did not support the case of prosecution as they turned hostile. 17. PW.9, the Magistrate, deposed with regard to his recording dying declaration of the deceased. 18. PW.10, the doctor deposed that LW.12 - Dr. Sruthi issued Post-mortem examination report (Ex.P8). 19. PW.11 - the Investigating Officer deposed with regard to conducting scene of panchanama, seizure of MOs.1 to 3 and taking steps for inquest over the dead body of the deceased. 20. PW.12 - Sub-Inspector of Police deposed with regard to receipt of information from the Hospital, registration of crime, issuance of FIR and also recording the statement of the deceased as in Ex.P10. 21. As discussed above, PWs.4 to 8 turned hostile. PW.12 - Sub-Inspector of Police, recorded the statement of the deceased on 15.05.2013 under Ex.P10. Even on the request made by PW.12, PW.9 - Magistrate recorded the dying declaration of the deceased vide Ex.P7, dated 15.05.2013. 22. As per deposition of PW.12, the Sub-Inspector of Police, on 15.02.2013 at 14:30 hours, he received intimation from the District Head Quarters Hospital, Mahabubnagar about admission of the deceased with burns. Immediately he rushed to the Hospital and recorded the statement of the deceased in burns Ward in the presence of Duty Doctor. Basing on the statement of the deceased, he registered Ex.P9 - FIR at 16: hours on 15.05.2013 for the offence under Section - 307 read with 34 of IPC against the accused. Immediately he rushed to the Hospital and recorded the statement of the deceased in burns Ward in the presence of Duty Doctor. Basing on the statement of the deceased, he registered Ex.P9 - FIR at 16: hours on 15.05.2013 for the offence under Section - 307 read with 34 of IPC against the accused. The deceased stated that the accused forcibly entered into her house during mid-night at about 2.00 A.M. Accused No.2 poured kerosene and accused No.1 lit fire and left the house by bolting from outside. He has recorded the statement of the deceased vide Ex.P10. After recording the said statement, he obtained her right thumb impression on its reading over the contents and on admission by her to be true and correct. 23. Ex.P6 - is the requisition addressed by PW.12 - Sub-Inspector of Police, Jadcherla to PW.9, the Magistrate, and on receipt of Ex.P6, PW.9 - Magistrate recorded Ex.P7 - dying declaration. In Ex.P7 - dying declaration, the declarant stated that accused No.1 brought kerosene, accused No.2 poured the same on her and lit the fire. Thereafter, her daughters came to her rescue. 24. Thus, there are two statements made by the deceased i.e., Ex.P10 statement was given to PW.12, while Ex.P7 dying declaration was given to PW.9. Ex.P10 is the subsequent statement of the deceased recorded by PW.12 - Sub-Inspector of police, wherein she has stated that during night at about 2.00 A.M., both the accused came together to her house and accused No.2 poured kerosene on her, while accused No.1 lit her and went away by bolting the doors of her house from outside, whereas in Ex.P7 - dying declaration recorded by PW.9 - Magistrate, the deceased stated that accused No.1 brought the kerosene while accused No.2 poured the same on her and lit the fire. Thus, there is contradiction with regard to bringing the kerosene, pouring the same on the deceased and lighting the fire between the two statements. 25. There is no dispute with regard to the legal position that basing on the dying declaration, trial Court can convict the accused provided if the dying declaration inspires confidence. If there are multiple dying declarations, then there should not be any contradictions, more particularly serious contradictions and if the same inspires confidence, trial Court can convict the accused. 25. There is no dispute with regard to the legal position that basing on the dying declaration, trial Court can convict the accused provided if the dying declaration inspires confidence. If there are multiple dying declarations, then there should not be any contradictions, more particularly serious contradictions and if the same inspires confidence, trial Court can convict the accused. If there are two dying declarations, there is inconsistency between them, trial Court has to consider other circumstances and evidence including medical evidence etc. The said principle was also laid down by a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra , (2002) 6 SCC 710 . 26. As discussed above, in the present case, there are two statements made by the deceased i.e., before PW.12 - Sub-Inspector of Police and PW.9 - Magistrate. There is inconsistency in the said statements made by her. Without considering the said aspects, basing on Exs.P7 and P10 - dying declarations, the trial Court convicted the accused and imposed life imprisonment. 27. In Amol Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh , (2008) 5 SCC 468 , the Apex Court had an occasion to deal with the evidentiary value of dying declaration. If there are multiple dying declarations and if there are inconsistencies and discrepancies in the last dying declaration making it doubtful, it would not be safe to convict the accused basing on the said dying declarations wherein there are inconsistencies. The Court has to consider nature of inconsistencies in relation to surrounding facts and circumstances have to be considered. It was further held that if dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any corroboration. The statement should be consistent throughout. If the deceased had several opportunities of making such dying declaration, that is to say if there are more than one dying declaration, they should be consistent. The Apex Court also relied upon the principle laid down by it in Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam v. State of A.P. , (1993) 2 SCC 684 . The Apex Court further held that if some inconsistencies are noticed between one dying declaration and the other, the Court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies, namely whether there are material or not. The Apex Court further held that if some inconsistencies are noticed between one dying declaration and the other, the Court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies, namely whether there are material or not. While scrutinizing the contents of various dying declarations, in such a situation, the Court has to examine the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances. 28. In Nallapati Sivaiah v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Guntur, Andhra Pradesh , (2007) 15 SCC 465 , the Apex Court also considered the evidentiary value of the dying declaration. 29. Paragraph Nos.22 to 26 of the said judgment are relevant and the same are extracted as under: “22. It is equally well settled and needs no restatement at our hands that dying declaration can form the sole basis for conviction. But at the same time due care and caution must be exercised in considering weight to be given to dying declaration inasmuch as there could be any number of circumstances which may affect the truth. This Court in more than one decision has cautioned that the courts have always to be on guard to see that the dying declaration was not the result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. It is the duty of the courts to find that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the dying declaration. In order to satisfy itself that the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration, the courts have to look for the medical opinion. 23. It is not difficult to appreciate why dying declarations are admitted in evidence at a trial for murder, as a striking exception to the general rule against hearsay. For example, any sanction of the oath in the case of a living witness is thought to be balanced at least by the final conscience of the dying man. Nobody, it has been said, would wish to die with a lie on his lips. A dying declaration has got sanctity and a person giving the dying declaration will be the last to give untruth as he stands before his creator. 24. There is a legal maxim “nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire” meaning, that a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth. A dying declaration has got sanctity and a person giving the dying declaration will be the last to give untruth as he stands before his creator. 24. There is a legal maxim “nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire” meaning, that a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth. Woodroffe and Amir Ali, in their Treatise on Evidence Act state: “when a man is dying, the grave position in which he is placed is held by law to be a sufficient ground for his veracity and therefore the tests of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with”. 25. The court has to consider each case in the circumstances of the case. What value should be given to a dying declaration is left to court, which on assessment of the circumstances and the evidence and materials on record, will come to a conclusion about the truth or otherwise of the version, be it written, oral, verbal or by sign or by gestures. 26. It is also a settled principle of law that dying declaration is a substantive evidence and an order of conviction can be safely recorded on the basis of dying declaration provided the court is fully satisfied that the dying declaration made by the deceased was voluntary and reliable and the author recorded the dying declaration as stated by the deceased. This Court laid down the principle that for relying upon the dying declaration the court must be conscious that the dying declaration was voluntary and further it was recorded correctly and above all the maker was in a fit condition— mentally and physically—to make such statement.” 30. In Paniben v. State of Gujarat , (1992) 2 SCC 474 , the Apex Court while holding that a dying declaration is entitled to great weight however cautioned to note that the accused has no power to cross-examination. Paragraph No.18 of the said judgment is relevant and the same is extracted as under: “18. … Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under: (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. [Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. (1976) 3 SCC 104 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 376 : (1976) 2 SCR 764 ] (ii) If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. [State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, (1985) 1 SCC 552 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 127 : AIR 1985 SC 416 ; Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar, (1983) 1 SCC 211 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 169 : AIR 1983 SC 164] (iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. [K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, (1976) 3 SCC 618 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 473 : AIR 1976 SC 1994 ] (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. [Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. (1974) 4 SCC 264 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 426] (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. [Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. (1974) 4 SCC 264 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 426] (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. [Kake Singh v. State of M.P. 1981 Supp SCC 25 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 645 : AIR 1982 SC 1021] (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. [Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. (1981) 2 SCC 654 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 581] (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. [State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu, 1980 Supp SCC 455 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 364 : AIR 1981 SC 617 ] (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. [Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar, 1980 Supp SCC 769 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 519 : AIR 1979 SC 1505 ] (ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. [Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. 1988 Supp SCC 152 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 342 : AIR 1988 SC 912 ] (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. [State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan, (1989) 3 SCC 390 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 585 : AIR 1989 SC 1519 ].” 31. In Nallapati Sivaiah (supra) the Apex Court placing reliance on the principle laid down by its Constitution Bench in Laxman (supra) held in paragraph No.52 that the dying declaration must inspire confidence so as to make it safe to act upon. Whether it is safe to act upon a dying declaration depends upon not only the testimony of the person recording the dying declaration—be it even a Magistrate but also all the material available on record and the circumstances including the medical evidence. The evidence and the material available on record must be properly weighed in each case to arrive at a proper conclusion. The evidence and the material available on record must be properly weighed in each case to arrive at a proper conclusion. The court must satisfy itself that the person making the dying declaration was conscious and fit to make statement for which purposes not only the evidence of persons recording the dying declaration but also cumulative effect of the other evidence including the medical evidence and the circumstances must be taken into consideration. 32. In Uttam v. State of Maharashtra , (2022) 8 SCC 576 , the Apex Court also considered the evidentiary value of dying declaration. In paragraph no.15 of the said judgment, the Apex Court held as under: “15. In cases involving multiple dying declarations made by the deceased, the question that arises for consideration is as to which of the said dying declarations ought to be believed by the court and what would be the guiding factors for arriving at a just and lawful conclusion. The problem becomes all the more knotty when the dying declarations made by the deceased are found to be contradictory. Faced with such a situation, the court would be expected to carefully scrutinise the evidence to find out as to which of the dying declarations can be corroborated by other material evidence produced by the prosecution. Of equal significance is the condition of the deceased at the relevant point in time, the medical evidence brought on record that would indicate the physical and mental fitness of the deceased, the scope of the close relatives/family members having influenced/tutored the deceased and all the other attendant circumstances that would help the court in exercise of its discretion.” 33. In Amol Singh (supra) , the Apex Court considered the fact that when faced with two dying declarations containing inconsistencies, the approach to be adopted by the Court was summarised as under: 13. Law relating to appreciation of evidence in the “form of more than one dying declaration is well settled. Accordingly, it is not the plurality of the dying declarations but the reliability thereof that adds weight to the prosecution case. If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any corroboration. The statement should be consistent throughout. Accordingly, it is not the plurality of the dying declarations but the reliability thereof that adds weight to the prosecution case. If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any corroboration. The statement should be consistent throughout. If the deceased had several opportunities of making such dying declarations, that is to say, if there are more than one dying declaration they should be consistent. [Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam v. State of A.P., (1993) 2 SCC 684 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 655] However, if some inconsistencies are noticed between one dying declaration and the other, the court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies, namely, whether they are material or not. While scrutinising the contents of various dying declarations, in such a situation, the court has to examine the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances.” 34. In Sher Singh v. State of Punjab , (2008) 4 SCC 265 , the Apex Court held that acceptability of a dying declaration is greater because the declaration is made in extremity. When the party is at the verge of death, one rarely finds any motive to tell falsehood and it is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with in case of a dying declaration. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the court would insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court should ensure that the statement was not as a result of tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. It is for the court to ascertain from the evidence placed on record that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had ample opportunity to observe and identify the culprit. Normally, the court places reliance on the medical evidence for reaching the conclusion whether the person making a dying declaration was in a fit state of mind, but where the person recording the statement states that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. What is essential is that the person recording the dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement without there being the doctor's opinion to that effect, it can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certificate by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and, therefore, the voluntary and truthful nature of a statement can be established otherwise. 35. In the light of the aforesaid principle, coming to the facts of the present case, as discussed above, PW.12 recorded the statement of the deceased as in Ex.P10. He has not stated that the declarant is fit and coherent to give her statement. Ex.P7 is the dying declaration recorded by PW.9 - Magistrate. Perusal of the same would reveal that it contains a doctor’s certificate to the effect that the patient was conscious, coherent and in sound state of mind to give valid information of her dying declaration and no sedatives was given to the deceased. But, the prosecution did not examine the said doctor, who gave the said certificate. Thus, there are inconsistencies in both the statements made by the deceased vide Ex.P7 and Ex.P10. There is also inconsistency in the depositions of PWs.1 to 4. Without considering the said aspects, the trial Court convicted the accused for the offence under Section - 302 of IPC. 36. It is also apt to note that as per PW.12 deposition, he received information on 15.05.2013 at 2.30 P.M. with regard to the deceased receiving burn injuries and he has recorded Ex.P10 - statement of the deceased in the presence of duty doctor. Even then, prosecution did not examine the said duty doctor. Basing on the said statement of the deceased, PW.12 - registered Ex.P9 - FIR in Crime No.263 of 2013 under Section - 307 read with 34 of IPC against the accused. 37. Perusal of Ex.P6 - requisition letter addressed by PW.12 to PW.9 - Magistrate would reveal that PW.9 - Magistrate received the same on 15.05.2013 at 12.45 P.M. Even in Ex.P7 - dying declaration, PW.9 mentioned that she received requisition under Ex.P6 on 15.05.2013 at 12.45 P.M. Thereafter she went to the Hospital for the purpose of recording statement of the deceased. 38. 38. Even PW.12 during cross-examination categorically admitted that he received message from Hospital through Police. He did not put G.D. Entry as he was not SHO then. The Inspector was the SHO by that time. Medical intimation was received by the Station but not by him specifically. He was told about medical intimation by the Inspector of Police (PW.11) within five minutes of receiving the intimation. Immediately he left Jadcherla Police Station on the instructions of Inspector to Mahabubnagar. Within 15 to 20 minutes he reached Mahabubnagar hospital. With the help of duty doctor, he identified the patient and then recorded her statement. He does not remember the name of duty doctor. After enquiry with the duty doctor, he satisfied with the mental condition of patient and her fit state of mind to give statement. He did not verify the case sheet to find out the percentage of burns. He does not remember whether any of relatives of patient were present then. He does not remember the number of patients in the burns ward then as he did not find them. According to his memory, there were some more patients in that ward. He commenced recording the statement of patient at 15:00 hours and concluded by 15:35 hours. He further admitted that he carries stamp pad also with him whenever he goes to hospital on hospital intimations. The deceased did not state that any other persons were present in the house apart from her by the time of offence. Impression of the patient was on middle of Ex.P10 paper and his signature was to its right. As per recitals of Ex.P10, thumb impression was taken before reading over the contents of statement to the patient. He left the hospital at about 15:40 hours. By the time he returned to police station, head constable was SHO. On returning to the station, he assumed charge of SHO and registered Ex.P9 - FIR. As per Ex.P9, intimation was received to the Station at 16:00 hours for the first time. In Ex.P9, a printed FIR, they have to write only the contents of complaint/statement and they are not supposed to mention any other things. In Ex.P9 - FIR, it is mentioned that they received hospital intimation at 14: 30 hours though the same is not mentioned I Ex.P10. He dispatched the FIR through the Court Constable. In Ex.P9, a printed FIR, they have to write only the contents of complaint/statement and they are not supposed to mention any other things. In Ex.P9 - FIR, it is mentioned that they received hospital intimation at 14: 30 hours though the same is not mentioned I Ex.P10. He dispatched the FIR through the Court Constable. He does not remember the time of the dispatch. The time of dispatch of Ex.P9 is mentioned as 16:30 hours on 15.05.2013 in column No.15 but mode of dispatch is not mentioned. He has also admitted that the distance in between Jadcherla Police Station and the Court at Jadcherla is about one kilometer. As per the endorsement made by the then Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Jadcherla, Ex.P9 was received on 16.05.2013 at 5.30 P.M. Within no time after registering Ex.P9, he handed over C.D. to his Inspector. He also gave requisition to the then Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Jadcherla to record dying declaration on 15.05.2013. As per the endorsement of Magistrate on Ex.P6, it was received at 12:45 P.M. on 15.05.2013. C.D. file does not reveal that he gave Ex.P6 - requisition. 39. PW.11 - Investigating Officer deposed that he took up investigation of the present case on 21.05.2013 on receipt of death intimation from Government Hospital, Mahabubnagar. He also seized one Back piper Whiskey Empty Bottle used as Kerosene Lamp, burnt cloth pieces and burnt hairs. MOs.1 to 3 are the same (empty whisky bottle is found broken), but the same were not sent to FSL. During cross-examination, he admitted the said facts. Accused No.1 poured kerosene and accused No.2 lit fire repeatedly. He did not examine grand children of the deceased nor ascertained their particulars with whom the deceased used to stay. 40. However, learned Additional Public Prosecutor would contend that the grand children are minors and, therefore, their statements were not record. As discussed above, PWs.4 to 8 turned hostile and did not support the prosecution. 41. It is also apt to note that PW.12 received information and rushed to the Hospital, recorded Ex.P10 statement of the deceased. Even then, his evidence incriminating material was not put to the accused during examination under Section - 313 of Cr.P.C. The same is fatal to the case of prosecution. 41. It is also apt to note that PW.12 received information and rushed to the Hospital, recorded Ex.P10 statement of the deceased. Even then, his evidence incriminating material was not put to the accused during examination under Section - 313 of Cr.P.C. The same is fatal to the case of prosecution. The said principle was also held by the Apex Court in Ramji Prasad Jaiswal alias Ramjee Prasad Jaiswal v. State of Bihar , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1182 . The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are as under: “29. Section 313 CrPC deals with the power of the court to examine the accused. Section 313 CrPC is as follows: 313. Power to examine the accused .— (1) In every inquiry or trial, for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, the court— (a) may at any stage, without previously warning the accused put such questions to him as the court considers necessary; (b) shall, after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence, question him generally on the case: Provided that in a summons-case, where the court has dispensed with the personal attendance of the accused, it may also dispense with his examination under clause (b). (2) No oath shall be administered to the accused when he is examined under sub-section (1). (3) The accused shall not render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such questions, or by giving false answers to them. (4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed. (5) The court may take help of prosecutor and defence counsel in preparing relevant questions which are to be put to the accused and the court may permit filing of written statement by the accused as sufficient compliance of this section. 30. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, this Court was examining Section 342 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which is pari materia to Section 313 Cr. 30. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, this Court was examining Section 342 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which is pari materia to Section 313 Cr. P.C. and explained the rationale behind such provision in the following words: 16……………… It is trite law, nevertheless fundamental, that the prisoner's attention should be drawn to every inculpatory material so as to enable him to explain it. This is the basic fairness of a criminal trial and failures in this area may gravely imperil the validity of the trial itself, if consequential miscarriage of justice has flowed. However, where such an omission has occurred it does not ipso facto vitiate the proceedings and prejudice occasioned by such defect must be established by the accused. In the event of evidentiary material not being put to the accused, the court must ordinarily eschew such material from consideration. It is also open to the appellate court to call upon the counsel for the accused to show what explanation the accused has as regards the circumstances established against him but not put to him and if the accused is unable to offer the appellate court any plausible or reasonable explanation of such circumstances, the Court may assume that no acceptable answer exists and that even if the accused had been questioned at the proper time in the trial court he would not have been able to furnish any good ground to get out of the circumstances on which the trial court had relied for its conviction. In such a case, the court proceeds on the footing that though a grave irregularity has occurred as regards compliance with Section 342, CrPC, the omission has not been shown to have caused prejudice to the accused… 31. Section 313 CrPC came up for consideration in Dharnidhar v. State of Uttar Pradesh where this Court outlined the proper methodology to be adopted by the court while recording statement of an accused under Section 313 CrPC. This Court held thus: 29. The proper methodology to be adopted by the court while recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC is to invite the attention of the accused to the circumstances and substantial evidence in relation to the offence, for which he has been charged and invite his explanation. This Court held thus: 29. The proper methodology to be adopted by the court while recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC is to invite the attention of the accused to the circumstances and substantial evidence in relation to the offence, for which he has been charged and invite his explanation. In other words, it provides an opportunity to an accused to state before the court as to what is the truth and what is his defence, in accordance with law. It was for the accused to avail that opportunity and if he fails to do so then it is for the court to examine the case of the prosecution on its evidence with reference to the statement made by the accused under section 313 CrPC. 32. This Court discussed the purpose of recording the statement of an accused under Section 313 CrPC in Raj Kumar Singh alias Raju alias Batya v. State of Rajasthan and held as under: 30. In a criminal trial, the purpose of examining the accused person under Section 313 CrPC is to meet the requirement of the principles of natural justice i.e. audi alteram partem. This means that the accused may be asked to furnish some explanation as regards the incriminating circumstances associated with him, and the court must take note of such explanation. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the same is essential to decide whether or not the chain of circumstances is complete. No matter how weak the evidence of the prosecution may be, it is the duty of the court to examine the accused, and to seek his explanation as regards the incriminating material that has surfaced against him. The circumstances which are not put to the accused in his examination under Section 313 CrPC, cannot be used against him and have to be excluded from consideration. 33. Again, in Raj Kumar alias Suman v. State (NCT of Delhi, this Court summarized the law as regards Section 313 CrPC in the following manner: 22. The law consistently laid down by this Court can be summarised as under: 22.1. It is the duty of the trial court to put each material circumstance appearing in the evidence against the accused specifically, distinctively and separately. The material circumstance means the circumstance or the material on the basis of which the prosecution is seeking his conviction. 22.2. The law consistently laid down by this Court can be summarised as under: 22.1. It is the duty of the trial court to put each material circumstance appearing in the evidence against the accused specifically, distinctively and separately. The material circumstance means the circumstance or the material on the basis of which the prosecution is seeking his conviction. 22.2. The object of examination of the accused under Section 313 is to enable the accused to explain any circumstance appearing against him in the evidence. 22.3. The Court must ordinarily eschew material circumstances not put to the accused from consideration while dealing with the case of the particular accused. 22.4. The failure to put material circumstances to the accused amounts to a serious irregularity. It will vitiate the trial if it is shown to have prejudiced the accused. 22.5. If any irregularity in putting the material circumstance to the accused does not result in failure of justice, it becomes a curable defect. However, while deciding whether the defect can be cured, one of the considerations will be the passage of time from the date of the incident. 22.6. In case such irregularity is curable, even the appellate court can question the accused on the material circumstance which is not put to him. 22.7. In a given case, the case can be remanded to the trial court from the stage of recording the supplementary statement of the accused concerned under Section 313 CrPC. 22.8. While deciding the question whether prejudice has been caused to the accused because of the omission, the delay in raising the contention is only one of the several factors to be considered. 34. In a recent decision, this Court in Ashok v. State of Uttar Pradesh held as under: 23. In the present case, there is no doubt that material circumstances appearing in evidence against the appellant have not been put to him. The version of the main prosecution witnesses PWs 1 and 2 was not put to him. The stage of the accused leading defence evidence arises only after his statement is recorded under Section 313 CrPC. Unless all material circumstances appearing against him in evidence are put to the accused, he cannot decide whether he wants to lead any defence evidence. 24. In this case, even the date and place of the crime allegedly committed by the appellant were not put to the appellant. Unless all material circumstances appearing against him in evidence are put to the accused, he cannot decide whether he wants to lead any defence evidence. 24. In this case, even the date and place of the crime allegedly committed by the appellant were not put to the appellant. What was reportedly seen by PW-2 was not put to the appellant in his examination. Therefore, the appellant was prejudiced. Even assuming that failure to put material to the appellant in his examination is an irregularity, the question is whether it can be cured by remanding the case to the trial court. 35. After surveying the law on this print, let us revert back to the facts of the present case. The manner in which the trial court had recorded the statements of the appellants under Section 313 CrPC was not at all in tune with the requirements of the said provision as explained by this Court as discussed supra. 36. Four questions generally were put to the appellants, that too, in a most mechanical manner. These questions did not reflect the specific prosecution evidence which came on record qua the appellants. As all the incriminating evidence were not put to the notice of the appellants, therefore, there was a clear breach of Section 313 CrPC as well as the principle of audi alteram partem. Certainly, this caused serious prejudice to the appellants to put forth their case. Ultimately, such evidence were relied upon by the court to convict the appellants. 37. Therefore, there is no doubt that such omission, which is a serious irregularity, has completely vitiated the trial. Even if we take a more sanguine approach by taking the view that such omission did not result in the failure of justice, it is still a material defect albeit curable. In Raj Kumar (supra), this Court highlighted that while deciding whether such defect can be cured or not, one of the considerations will be the passage of time from the date of the incident.” 42. It is also apt to note that PW.12 and PW.11 did not follow the procedure laid down while registering Ex.P9 - FIR, while issuing Ex.P6 - requisition to PW.9 - Magistrate to record the statement of the deceased. 43. When a particular procedure is prescribed under the Cr.P.C., the Investigating Officer and the Sub-Inspector of Police have to follow the same. 43. When a particular procedure is prescribed under the Cr.P.C., the Investigating Officer and the Sub-Inspector of Police have to follow the same. In the present case, they failed to follow the said procedure. It is also apt to note that even the prosecution failed to prove the motive. Without considering the said aspects, the trial Court convicted both the appellants - accused Nos.1 and 2 for the offence under Section - 302 read with 34 of IPC and sentenced them to undergo life imprisonment. 44. It is settled principle of law that however, “grave the offence may be”, prosecution has to prove such offence beyond reasonable doubt. Unless and until guilt is proved, accused is presumed to be an innocent. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove the role played by appellant No.2 - accused No.2 in the commission of offence beyond reasonable doubt. 45. As discussed above, PW.4 to 8 did not support the case of prosecution. PWs.5 and 6 are the panch witnesses for scene of offence, while PWs.7 and 8 are the panch witnesses for the inquest conducted over the dead body of the deceased. The trial Court convicted the accused basing on Ex.P7 and P10 - dying declarations. Ex.P10 - statement was recorded by PW.12 - Sub-Inspector of Police, while Ex.P7 dying declaration was recorded by PW.9 - Magistrate. In Ex.P10 - statement of the deceased recorded by PW.12 - Sub- Inspector of police, the deceased stated that during night at about 2.00 A.M., both the accused came together to her house and accused No.2 poured kerosene on her, while accused No.1 lit her and went away by bolting the doors of her house from outside, whereas in Ex.P7 - dying declaration recorded by PW.9 - Magistrate, the deceased stated that accused No.1 brought the kerosene while accused No.2 poured the same on her and lit the fire. Thus, there are inconsistencies, discrepancies and contradictions between the two statements. The prosecution did not examine the duty doctor, with the help of whom PW.12 recorded the statement (Ex.P10) of the deceased and the doctor, who certified Ex.P7 - dying declaration. Thus, there are serious lapses on the part of prosecution. 46. As discussed above, accused No.1 died during pendency of present appeal and, therefore, this Court dismissed the proceedings in the present appeal against appellant No.1 - accused No.1 as abated. 47. Thus, there are serious lapses on the part of prosecution. 46. As discussed above, accused No.1 died during pendency of present appeal and, therefore, this Court dismissed the proceedings in the present appeal against appellant No.1 - accused No.1 as abated. 47. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned judgment recording conviction and imposition of sentence of life imprisonment on appellant No.2 - accused No.2 is liable to be set aside. 48. The present Criminal Appeal is accordingly allowed setting aside the conviction recorded against appellant No.2 herein - accused No.2 and the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on her vide the judgment dated 04.01.2017 in Spl. S.C. No.45 of 2014 by learned Special Sessions Judge - cum - VII Additional District and Sessions Judge at Mahabubnagar. Appellant No.2 - Accused No.2 is acquitted of the aforesaid charge framed against her. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by her stand cancelled. Fine amounts, if any, paid by accused No.2 is also ordered to be returned to accused No.2 after expiry of appeal time. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed.