JUDGMENT : LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY, J. 1. A.S.No.187 of 2024 is filed aggrieved by the Common Judgment and Decree dated 11.09.2023 passed by the I Additional District and Sessions Judge at Vikarabad, whereby and whereunder O.S.No.83 of 2022 (Old O.S.No.180 of 2005), filed by Plaintiff (Shanta Bai) against Defendant (B. Janardhan Reddy), seeking to declare the agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 and registered sale deed vide document bearing Doc.No.3804 of 2003 dated 28.03.2003, as null and void, was dismissed. 2. A.S.No.183 of 2024 is filed aggrieved by the Common Judgment and Decree dated 11.09.2023 passed by the I Additional District and Sessions Judge at Vikarabad, whereby and whereunder O.S.No.84 of 2022 (Old O.S.No.80 of 2004 and renumbered as O.S.No.566 of 2006) filed by Plaintiff (B.Janardhan Reddy) against Defendant (Shanta Bai), seeking specific performance of agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995, was decreed. 3. Since the issues involved in both the appeals are interconnected and their outcome is interdependent and the parties in both the appeals are one and the same, both the appeals are heard together and are disposed of by way of this common Judgment. 4. Heard Sri V.Hari Haran, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri Srikanth Hariharan, learned Counsel-on-record for the Appellants in AS.No.187 of 2024, and Sri E.Ajay Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri V.S.R.Avadhani, learned counsel-on-record for respondent in AS.No.187 of 2024. A.S.No.187 of 2024 5. This Appeal is filed against the common Judgment and Decree passed by the trial Court in O.S.No.83 of 2022, filed by the Plaintiff (Shanta Bai) against Defendant (B.Janardhan Reddy), seeking to declare the agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 in respect of ‘A’ schedule property (Acs.77-36 Gts.) and the registered sale deed dated 28.03.2003 vide Doc.No.3804 of 2003 in respect of ‘B’ schedule property (Acs.30-32 Gts.), as null and void. 6. The brief facts as averred in the plaint in O.S.No.83 of 2022 are that the Plaintiff along with her two sisters, viz., Yamuna Bai and Jamuna Bai, jointly purchased the land admeasuring Acs.248-00 Gts. 6. The brief facts as averred in the plaint in O.S.No.83 of 2022 are that the Plaintiff along with her two sisters, viz., Yamuna Bai and Jamuna Bai, jointly purchased the land admeasuring Acs.248-00 Gts. situated at Shivareddypet Village, Vikarabad Taluq, Ranga Reddy District, forming part of Sy.Nos.66, 70 to 72, 75 to 78, 84 to 88, 104 and 105 for a valuable sale consideration under registered sale deed vide Doc.No.1421 of 1970 dated 03.05.1970; that there was no division of the aforesaid lands by metes and bounds; that in the aforesaid sale deed out of total extent of land admeasuring Acs.248-00 Gts., an extent of Acs.77.96 Gts., comprising land admeasuring Ac.14-37 Gts. forming part of Survey No.86, land admeasuring Ac.16-12 Gts. forming part of Survey No.37, land admeasuring Ac.15-35 Gts. forming part of Survey No.88, land admeasuring Ac.12-35 Gts. forming part of Survey No.104 and land admeasuring Ac.17-37 Gts. forming part of Survey No.105, has been shown as the land sold to the Plaintiff; that after purchase of the total extent of land of Acs.248-00 Gts. by the Plaintiff and her two sisters, the same was not partitioned by metes and bounds and the same was held jointly by the Plaintiff and her two sisters. 6.1. It was further averred that husband of Plaintiff i.e., Sri Mahesh Chand had a brother by name Ramesh Chand who expired in a car accident in the year 1986 and thereafter, his widow-Suruchi Chand filed several suits claiming share of her husband i.e., Ramesh Chand, from his two elder brothers i.e., Mahesh Chand and Naresh Chand, due to which the properties were divided and some properties were allotted to Suruchi Chand which includes an extent of Acs.6-00 Gts. of land, i.e., 1/3rd of total extent of Acs.18-00 Gts. situated at Shiv Bagh, Gudimalkapur, Hyderabad. of land, i.e., 1/3rd of total extent of Acs.18-00 Gts. situated at Shiv Bagh, Gudimalkapur, Hyderabad. While so, the Defendant and his associates together have purchased the share of late Ramesh Chand in the Shiv Bagh property from Suruchi Chand under an agreement of sale and subsequently approached the husband of Plaintiff herein for purchase of her husband’s property in Shiv Bagh; that in the year 2002-2003, the Defendant came into contact with one of the sons of the Plaintiff namely Prem Chand, and taking advantage of ignorance and innocence of the Plaintiff and her sons, the Defendant stated that by using his clout and influence, he would get the Plaintiff and her family members their legitimate share in the joint family properties by initiating required legal proceedings, i.e., comprehensive partition suits have to be filed and that it would cost large amount of money and he also assured the Plaintiff that he would be able to get Rs.100 crores worth property towards the share of Plaintiff and her children out of the joint family properties. Accordingly, the Plaintiff filed two partition suits vide O.S.No.31 of 2003 on the file of II Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and O.S.No.32 of 2003 on the file of Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, for partition of joint family properties along with an interlocutory application for interim injunction and was also able to secure interim orders. Thus, the defendant gained confidence of the Plaintiff and her children. That the Defendant further represented to plaintiff that he spent a lot of money in pursuing the legal proceedings and insisted the Plaintiff and her children to pay 10% of approximately Rs.100 crores worth properties towards Defendant’s share as his commission and remuneration. 6.2. It is further averred that Defendant collected about Rs.80 lakhs and also obtained blank signed cheques and withdrawal forms etc., as security towards his 10% commission amount from the Plaintiff and her children, and insisted them to transfer the properties belonging to them in his name, as a security for full payment of the said 10% commission amount. Accordingly, defendant executed registered sale deeds in favour of plaintiff in respect of below mentioned properties as security in addition to GPA dated 21.02.2003, which the Plaintiff has subsequently cancelled through a registered Deed of Revocation/Cancellation of GPA vide document No.406 of 2004 dated 07.12.2004. Accordingly, defendant executed registered sale deeds in favour of plaintiff in respect of below mentioned properties as security in addition to GPA dated 21.02.2003, which the Plaintiff has subsequently cancelled through a registered Deed of Revocation/Cancellation of GPA vide document No.406 of 2004 dated 07.12.2004. The details of the conveyance deeds are as under:- a) Registered Sale Deed dated 28.03.2003 bearing document No.3804/2003 in respect of lands admeasuring Ac.14.37 Gts. in Survey No.86, land admeasuring Ac.15.35 Gts. in Sy.No.88, in all Ac.30.32 Gts. situated at Shivareddypet Village, Vikarabad Mandal, R.R.District. b) Registered Sale Deed dated 09.04.2003 bearing document No.4378 of 2003 in respect of 3500 sq.feet carpet area of the building complex, known as B-Block, in Sy.No.48 part, together with undivided share of land admeasuring 50 Sq.Yards, situated at Fatehnagar, Balanagar Mandal, Kukatpally Municipality, R.R.District. c) Registered Sale Deed dated 21.05.2003, bearing document No.6292/2003 in respect of 1500 sq. feet carpet area of the building complex known as B-Block in Sy.No.48 part, together with undivided share of land admeasuring 50 Sq.yards situated at Fatehnagar, Balanagar Mandal, Kukatpally Municipality, R.R.District. 6.3. It is further averred that on request, the Defendant executed a declaration dated 20.05.2004 in favour of Plaintiff admitting that the aforementioned document of transfers were got executed in his favour only as a security towards his 10% commission. That the said documents were not meant to be acted upon and that he would retransfer the said lands in favour of Plaintiff as soon as the Plaintiff and her Children got their legitimate share in the joint family properties and thus the Plaintiff never intended to sell the properties belonging to her and that despite execution of sale deed dated 28.03.2003, the Plaintiff continued to enjoy the land covered under the said sale deed. That contrary to the Plaintiff’s belief, the Defendant became greedy and got issued several legal notices to the Plaintiff, falsely alleging that he is the owner of the said properties. The Defendant also sent legal notice dated 30.09.2004, claiming lands covered under sale deed dated 28.03.2003, to which the Plaintiff got issued reply notice dated 27.10.2004 denying the allegations of Defendant. 6.4. It is further averred that Defendant filed suit vide O.S.No.80 of 2004 for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 contrary to his declaration dated 20.05.2004 in respect of lands forming part of Shivareddypet. 6.4. It is further averred that Defendant filed suit vide O.S.No.80 of 2004 for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 contrary to his declaration dated 20.05.2004 in respect of lands forming part of Shivareddypet. That, in fact, as on the date of the alleged agreement of sale, there was no relation or connection whatsoever between the Plaintiff and Defendant. That as per the amendment to the Stamp Act in A.P. on 31.03.1995, all agreements of sale must be executed on a stamp paper of denomination equivalent to 5% of the consideration shown in the agreement and the . That obviously, Defendant created the alleged agreement of sale on a day earlier to the said date to meet the dead line in order to get a valid agreement in his favour. 6.5. It is further averred that all the registered deeds including the alleged agreement of sale are sham and nominal and never meant to be acted upon and they were obtained by defendant only as security towards his commission. That as per clause 11 of the agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995, the Plaintiff can take steps for survey of land and fix or demarcate the schedule property by metes and bounds and intimate the same to the Defendant in writing and on such intimation, within a period of six months, the Defendant shall pay the balance consideration amount to the Plaintiff and after receiving the same, the Plaintiff shall convey and transfer the said property absolutely in favour of the Defendant or his nominees by duly discharging her part of obligations of the agreement. That no such demarcation has been done and balance consideration has not been paid and therefore, there could not have been valid sale deed in favour of the Defendant as claimed by him. 6.6. It is further averred that though the agreement of sale deed dated 30.03.1995, is fictitious and fabricated and not binding on the Plaintiff, she was advised to get the same cancelled and therefore, she was constrained to file a suit for cancellation of agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 as well as registered sale deed dated 28.03.2003. 7. 6.6. It is further averred that though the agreement of sale deed dated 30.03.1995, is fictitious and fabricated and not binding on the Plaintiff, she was advised to get the same cancelled and therefore, she was constrained to file a suit for cancellation of agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 as well as registered sale deed dated 28.03.2003. 7. The Defendant filed written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint and specifically averred that the agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 as well as registered sale deed dated 28.03.2003 executed by the Plaintiff in favour of Defendant are legal, valid and binding on the Plaintiff and therefore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to any reliefs claimed in the plaint. That the suit is barred by limitation in terms of Article 54 of the Limitation Act and therefore, the same is not maintainable and is liable to be rejected. It was further averred that the Defendant filed a suit in O.S.No.84 of 2022 for specific performance of agreement of sale, dated 30.03.1995; that the allegation that there is no division of lands by metes and bounds is incorrect as the lands purchased by Plaintiff were specifically set out in the schedule of the registered sale deed dated 03.05.1970 wherein specific details of each survey number and extent of land transferred to each of the vendees is mentioned and thus, the plea of joint possession or co-ownership is untenable. 7.1. It was further averred that the transactions of various properties belonging to the Plaintiff’s family through her husband started in the year 1975 onwards and the transactions in respect of properties at Shivbagh and Mehdipatnam areas started in the year 1995. That the Plaintiff entered into sale transactions with regard to the lands in Vikarabad in the year 1995 and with regard to Hyderguda properties in the year 1999 itself. Therefore, the averment that the Defendant got acquaintance with Plaintiff in the year 2003 is false. It is further averred that only after issuance of notice dated 30.09.2004 by the Defendant calling upon the Plaintiff to execute the registered sale deeds for the balance extent of land, the Plaintiff cancelled GPA dated 21.02.2003 with an ulterior motive and in fact, no transaction has been made by the Defendant as GPA holder and the same has no bearing. The allegation against the Defendant that with his influence and manipulation, he will secure the properties of the Plaintiff by initiating legal proceedings, etc., is vague and baseless. It is also denied that the Defendant collected Rs.80 lakhs, blank signed cheques and withdrawal forms as security for the alleged 10% commission amount. 7.2. The Defendant specifically denied execution of declaration dated 20.05.2004 and contended that the accountant of the Plaintiff by name T.Ramesh Kumar actively involved in the transactions. That in the month of December, 2003 the Defendant had lodged a complaint against the Accountant in Narayanaguda Police Station on 11.12.2003 since three blank signed papers belonging to Defendant from his case file were missing/stolen. That since the Plaintiff was proclaiming declaration, dated 20.05.2004, the Defendant filed another complaint at Sanathnagar Police Station on 26.02.2005 against the plaintiff and her Accountant. That the allegation of Plaintiff that she has been in possession and enjoyment of the lands covered by the registered sale deed dated 28.03.2003 is incorrect and in fact, the Plaintiff delivered vacant possession of the said lands to the Defendant and he has been in possession and enjoyment of the same and his name was also mutated in the revenue records. 7.3. It is further averred that since the Plaintiff did not execute the registered Sale Deed for the remaining extent of schedule land covered by the said agreement of sale, the Defendant, after issuance of legal notice and in view of the false averments made in the reply given by the Plaintiff, filed O.S.No.84/2022 for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995. It is further averred that the allegation of Plaintiff that she came to know about Agreement of Sale dated 30.03.1995 only after receiving summons in O.S.No.84 of 2022 is absolutely false and untenable and in fact there is specific reference to Agreement of Sale in GPA dated 21.02.2003 as well as registered Sale Deed dated 28.03.2006, and the same is also subject matter of notice dated 30.09.2004, therefore, the allegations made by the Plaintiff are false and baseless. That since the Plaintiff received further consideration of Rs.5 lakhs by way of account payee cheque and the same was 13ealized, she executed registered Sale deed dated 28.03.2003. That since the Plaintiff received further consideration of Rs.5 lakhs by way of account payee cheque and the same was 13ealized, she executed registered Sale deed dated 28.03.2003. The allegation that the agreement of sale and the registered Sale deed are sham and nominal and never intended to be acted upon, but they were all obtained as security for the alleged agreement, were denied. 7.4. It is further averred that as per clause 11 of Agreement of Sale, the Plaintiff was under obligation to take steps for survey of land and demarcate the same by metes and bounds and only after complying the same, the Defendant shall pay the balance sale consideration. That since the Plaintiff failed to comply with the said condition, the Defendant was constrained to issue notice dated 30.09.2004. That the relief sought for by the Plaintiff for rectification of revenue records is unsustainable since the mutation of Defendant’s name in revenue records is valid, basing on the registered Sale Deed dated 28.03.2003 and in conformity with the provisions of the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 and that the Agreement of Sale, the Registered Sale Deed and the Mutation proceedings, referred supra, are legal, valid and binding on the Plaintiff and prayed to dismiss the suit. 8. During pendency of the suit O.S.No.83 of 2022, the Plaintiff - Shantha Bai expired and her legal heirs were brought on record as Plaintiff Nos.2 to 7 vide orders in I.A.No.625 and 626 of 2016, dated 01.03.2016. A.S.No.182 OF 2024 9. This appeal is filed aggrieved by the Common Judgment and Decree dated 11.09.2023 passed in O.S.No.84 of 2022 by the I Additional District and Sessions Judge at Vikarabad, filed by B.Janardhan Reddy seeking specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 executed by Shantha Bai. 10. The brief facts as averred in the plaint in O.S.No.84 of 2022 are that in the registered sale deed bearing document No.1421 of 1970 dated 03.05.1970, it is specifically mentioned that out of total extent of Acs.248-00 guntas of land, an extent of Acs.77-36 Gts. covered by Sy.Nos.86 to 88, 104 and 105 of Shivareddypet Village was allotted to the share of Defendant No.1. and that, Defendant No.1 entered into an agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 with the Plaintiff in respect of the said lands admeasuring Ac.77-36 Gts. for a total sale consideration of Rs.15,58,000/-. covered by Sy.Nos.86 to 88, 104 and 105 of Shivareddypet Village was allotted to the share of Defendant No.1. and that, Defendant No.1 entered into an agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 with the Plaintiff in respect of the said lands admeasuring Ac.77-36 Gts. for a total sale consideration of Rs.15,58,000/-. That on the date of agreement, the Plaintiff paid a sum of Rs.5 lakhs to Defendant No.1, which was clearly mentioned in the Agreement of Sale. That as per the Agreement, the balance sale consideration of Rs.10,58,000/- shall be payable by Plaintiff to Defendant No.1 within a period of six months from the date of intimation in writing by the Defendant No.1 demarcating the lands by metes and bounds, and that after receiving the balance sale consideration, the Defendant No.1 shall execute a registered sale deed in favour of the Plaintiff or his nominees. That as per Clause 7 of the agreement of sale, if the Defendant No.1 fails to perform her obligation of taking steps to get the land surveyed and demarcated, the Plaintiff shall be entitled to enforce the said agreement of sale. 11. It is further averred that the Defendant No.1 had executed a registered General Power of Attorney vide Doc.No.68 of 2003 dated 21.02.2003, appointing the Plaintiff and defendant No.1’s son- Prem Chand (Defendant No.6) as her attorneys. In the said General Power of Attorney, it is specifically mentioned that the Defendant No.1 purchased an extent of Acs.77-36 Gts. of land under registered sale deed vide document No.1421 of 1970, dated 03.05.1970 and she entered into agreement of sale with the Plaintiff on 30.03.1995 in respect of the said land. 12. It is further averred that defendant No.1 executed registered sale deed vide document No.3804 of 2003, dated 28.03.2003 in favour of Plaintiff in respect of land admeasuring Acs.30-32 Gts. covered by Survey No.86 (Acs.14-37 Gts.) and Sy.No.88 (Acs.15-35 Gts.) for a total sale consideration of Rs.6.16 lakhs and in the said Sale deed, it is mentioned that a sum of Rs.1 lakh was adjusted out of advance amount of Rs.5,00,000/-, and the balance amount of Rs.5.16 lakhs was paid by way of cheque and cash, totaling to Rs.6.16 lakhs, being total sale consideration. That after purchase of the said land, the Plaintiff submitted an application for mutation of his name in the revenue records and accordingly, mutation proceedings were issued by the M.R.O., Vikarabad Mandal, vide proceedings dated 28.10.2003 and the Plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the said extent of land admeasuring Ac.30-32 Gts. That though Defendant No.1 entered into agreement of sale in respect of Acs.77-36 Gts., she executed sale deed in respect of Ac.30-32 Gts. and despite repeated demands, the Defendant did not get the land surveyed and demarcated and failed to execute sale deed in respect of balance extent in favour of the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff was always ready and willing to pay balance sale consideration. That Defendant No.1 postponed the issue on one pretext or the other and vexed with the attitude of Defendant No.1, Plaintiff got issued Legal Notice dated 30.09.2004, calling upon the Defendant No.1 to demarcate the balance extent and produce pattadar pass books in respect of lands in Survey Nos.87, 104 and 105, for which, the Defendant No.1 got issued reply notice dated 27.10.2004 denying the claim. Therefore, the Plaintiff is constrained to file the suit for specific performance and Plaintiff is ready and willing to pay balance sale consideration of Rs.9,42,000/- for execution of sale deed in respect of balance land to an extent of Acs.47-04 Gts. in Sy.Nos.87, 104 and 105. 13. The Defendant No.1 filed written statement denying the allegations/averments made in the plaint and contended that the agreement of sale sought to be enforced against her is hit by the provisions of the Stamp and Registration Act and the Specific Relief Act; that the agreement of sale was brought into existence fraudulently and hence, the same is unsustainable in law and that the suit is barred by limitation. 14. It is further averred that the agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 is legally inadmissible in evidence and unenforceable against the Defendant No.1 and that the stamp on which the alleged agreement of sale was executed is a suspicious one and the said fact is apparently evident and as such it is a fit case to forward the same to appropriate authority under law for its authentication and verification with regard to its genuinity, validity and issuance of the said stamp by the stamp vendor on the alleged date. It is further averred that the Defendant No.1 never intended to sell the suit property to the Plaintiff, which is evident from the Declaration dated 20.05.2004 made by plaintiff himself, and as such, the question of payment of any amount much less alleged amount of Rs.5,42,000/- by the Plaintiff to the Defendant No.1 and the Plaintiff’s readiness to pay the balance amount does not arise. It is further averred that there is no legal or contractual obligation on the part of Defendant No.1 to receive the alleged consideration from the Plaintiff and to execute the Sale Deed in respect of the suit schedule property in favour of Plaintiff. That no cause of action had arisen to file the suit against the Defendant No.1 and hence, the suit is liable to be dismissed. 15. Apart from the above contentions, the Defendant No.1 reiterated the averments made in the plaint in OS.No.83 of 2022, therefore, the same are not repeated for brevity. 16. During pendency of the suit in O.S.No.84 of 2022, the Defendant (Shanta Bai) died and her legal heirs were brought on record as Defendant Nos.2 to 7, vide orders dated 12.02.2016 in I.A.No.3573 of 2015. ISSUES FRAMED IN O.S.No.83 of 2022: 17. Basing on the pleadings of both the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues: a. Whether the Plaintiff (Shanta Bai) is entitled for a declaration that the registered sale deed dated 30.03.1995 and 28.03.2003 as illegal, null and void as prayed for? b. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree in his favour and against the Defendant (B. Janardhan Reddy) by directing the concerned revenue authorities to alter and rectify the revenue records relating to the plaint ‘B’ schedule property by incorporating the name of Plaintiff and deleting the name of the Defendant therefrom? c. To what relief? ADDITIONAL ISSUES FRAMED IN O.S.No.83 of 2022: d. Whether the declaration dated 20.05.2004 is true, valid and binding on the Defendant (B. Janardhan Reddy)? e. Whether the Plaintiff (Shanta Bai) is entitled to the declaration that the agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 is illegal, null and void as prayed for? ISSUES FRAMED IN O.S.No.84 of 2022: 18. Basing on the pleadings of both the parties, the Trial Court framed the following issues: a. Whether the Defendant (Shanta Bai) executed an Agreement of Sale dated 30.03.1995 in favour of the Plaintiff (B. Janardhan Reddy) regarding Acs.77.36 Gts. ISSUES FRAMED IN O.S.No.84 of 2022: 18. Basing on the pleadings of both the parties, the Trial Court framed the following issues: a. Whether the Defendant (Shanta Bai) executed an Agreement of Sale dated 30.03.1995 in favour of the Plaintiff (B. Janardhan Reddy) regarding Acs.77.36 Gts. of land including the schedule properties as alleged? b. Whether the Agreement of Sale dated 30.03.1995 is fraudulent, void and without consideration as alleged by Defendant? c. Whether the suit claim is barred by limitation? d. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 or not? e. To what relief? 19. During the course of trial in OS.No.84 of 2022, the Plaintiff (B.Janardhan Reddy) was examined as PW.1, and Exs.A1 to A50 were marked on his behalf. On behalf of the Defendants, Defendant No.1 was examined as DW.1, however, on account of her death, her evidence was subsequently eschewed. Defendant Nos.2 and No.4 were examined as DWs.3 and 2, respectively, and Exs.B1 to B32 were got marked. 20. Since the subject matter of both the suits are interconnected and the parties are same and further as the evidence in both the suit is also the same, on a memo filed by the parties, the trial Court clubbed both the suits and rendered a common judgment. 21. The Trial Court on due consideration of the pleadings of both the parties as well as the oral and documentary evidence, passed the common judgment dated 11.09.2023 dismissing O.S.No.83 of 2022 with costs, and decreed O.S.No.84 of 2022 with costs directing the Plaintiff therein (B. Janardhan Reddy) to deposit the balance sale consideration within one month of passing the decree and on such deposit, the Defendant Nos.2 to 7, being the legal heirs of Defendant No.1 (Shanta Bai), were directed to execute a sale deed in respect of the suit schedule property in favour of the Plaintiff (B. Janardhan Reddy), in pursuance of the agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995, within a period of two months thereafter. In the event of the defendants’ failure to execute the registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, the Plaintiff (B. Janardhan Reddy) is entitled to get the sale deed executed through the process of the Court. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT: 22. In the event of the defendants’ failure to execute the registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, the Plaintiff (B. Janardhan Reddy) is entitled to get the sale deed executed through the process of the Court. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT: 22. The Trial Court made the following observations: a. With regard to additional issue No.1 in O.S.No.83 of 2022 as to whether the declaration dated 20.05.2004 is true, valid and binding on the Defendant (B. Janardhan Reddy), the Trial Court held that the Plaintiff (Shanta Bai), failed to discharge the burden of proving Ex.A10 declaration dated 20.05.2004. The Trial Court further observed that the Plaintiff (Shanta Bai) has also failed to prove averments of plaint and the circumstances in which the Defendant (B. Janardhan Reddy) obtained the alleged instruments of transfer, conveyance and agreements from Plaintiff No.1 (Shanta Bai). b. The Trial Court dealt with issue No.1 and additional issue No.2 in O.S.No.83 of 2022 and issue Nos.1 and 2 in O.S.No.84 of 2022 together, and held that agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 (Ex.B1 in O.S.No.83 of 2022) and registered sale deed dated 28.03.2003 (Ex.B-2 in OS.No.83 of 2022) are true, valid and supported by consideration and therefore, they cannot be declared as illegal, null and void. Accordingly, answered these issues in favour of Defendant (B. Janardhan Reddy) and against Plaintiff (Shanta Bai) and others. c. The Trial Court has specifically observed that the Plaintiff (B.Janardhan Reddy) in O.S.No.84 of 2022 proved that he has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property and his name was also mutated in the revenue records basing on the registered sale deed dated 28.03.2003, whereas the Plaintiff (Shanta Bai) and others in O.S.No.83 of 2022 failed to prove that they are in possession of the suit schedule property as no evidence has been adduced on their behalf. d. The Trial Court further observed that if Shanta Bai and her two sisters were in joint possession of the suit schedule property, they would have certainly objected to Shanta Bai from executing the agreement of sale as well as registered sale deed in favour of B.Janardhan Reddy. e. With regard to payment of sale consideration by B.Janardhan Reddy, the Trial Court observed that under agreement of sale, an amount of Rs.5 lakhs has been paid by him as part of the total sale consideration of Rs.15,58,000/-. e. With regard to payment of sale consideration by B.Janardhan Reddy, the Trial Court observed that under agreement of sale, an amount of Rs.5 lakhs has been paid by him as part of the total sale consideration of Rs.15,58,000/-. Further, a cheque for Rs.5 lakhs was issued by B.Janardhan Reddy to Shanta Bai, vide Ex.B28 and the same was encashed, vide Ex.B27 (Account statement of Shanta Bai dated 08.04.2003). Further, a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was adjusted out of advance amount of Rs.5 lakhs and a sum of Rs.16,000/- was paid in cash, totaling to Rs.6,16,000/- which is evident from sale deed dated 28.03.2003. f. The Trial Court further observed that burden is on Shantha Bai, who is Plaintiff in O.S.No.83 of 2022, to prove that all the transactions in favour of B.Janardhan Reddy are nominal, but, she failed to prove the same. g. With regard to issue No.4 in O.S.No.84 of 2022 as to whether Plaintiff (B. Janardhan Reddy) is entitled to the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995, the Trial Court observed that he was ready and willing to perform his obligation and was also ready to pay the balance sale consideration and that the evidence of B. Janardhan Reddy is trust worthy and reliable, and accordingly, answered the issue in favour of B.Janardhan Reddy. h. With regard to issue No.3 in O.S.No.84 of 2022 as to whether the suit claim is barred by limitation, the Trial Court held that the suit is within the period of limitation and answered the issue in favour of Plaintiff (B. Janardhan Reddy). i. The Trial Court observed that as per clause 11 of the agreement of sale, the balance sale consideration was agreed to be paid by B.Janardhan Reddy within a period of six months from the date of written intimation from Shanta Bai about getting the lands surveyed and demarcated by metes and bounds, however, she failed to comply with the same in spite of Ex.A3 (Legal Notice dated 30.09.2004) in O.S.No.83 of 2022. Therefore, the limitation of three years as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act would commence only after six months of written communication from the vendor-Shantha Bai and as such, held that the suit is within the period of limitation. Therefore, the limitation of three years as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act would commence only after six months of written communication from the vendor-Shantha Bai and as such, held that the suit is within the period of limitation. j. With regard to issue No.2 in O.S.No.83 of 2022 as to whether the Plaintiff (Shanta Bai) is entitled for rectification of revenue records relating to schedule B property, the Trial Court answered the issue against Plaintiff (Shanta Bai) and in favour of Defendant (B. Janardhan Reddy). k. Accordingly, the Trial Court answered issue Nos.1 and 2 and additional issues Nos.1 and 2 in O.S.No.83 of 2022 against the Plaintiff (Shanta Bai) and dismissed O.S.No.83 of 2022 with costs. 23. Aggrieved by decreeing of O.S.No.84 of 2022 and dismissal of O.S.No.83 of 2022, the Appellants (Shanta Bai and her legal heirs), filed the present appeals vide A.S.Nos.182 and 187 of 2024, respectively. 24. The Appellants, challenged the Common Judgment and Decree passed by the Trial Court principally on the following grounds:- A. The Trial Court committed error in coming to conclusion that the agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 was proved and valid, despite specific allegation that the agreement of sale was manipulated. B. The Trial Court failed to observed that the sale consideration of Rs.6,16,000/- mentioned in the sale deed, dated 28.03.2003, was not proved. C. Execution of Agreement of Sale dated 30.03.1995 in respect of Acs.77-36 Gts. of land by Appellant No.1 in favour of Respondent does not arise and that the same is sham. C.1. Agreement of sale is invalid for want of stamp duty and registration in terms of Section 17 of the Registration Act. D. The suit-OS.No.84 of 2022 is barred by limitation in view of Article 54 of the Limitation Act, which specifies the limitation for filing a suit for enforcement of Agreement of Sale as three years. E. Agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 and sale deed dated 28.03.2003 were executed nominally to secure payment of 10% commission to the respondent. 25. Learned Senior Counsel for Appellants submitted that in the year 1995 or any day subsequent thereto, Appellant No.1 had never agreed to sell any portion of her share at the alleged rate or for any consideration to respondent No.1 and therefore, the agreement of sale is false and fabricated. 25.1. 25. Learned Senior Counsel for Appellants submitted that in the year 1995 or any day subsequent thereto, Appellant No.1 had never agreed to sell any portion of her share at the alleged rate or for any consideration to respondent No.1 and therefore, the agreement of sale is false and fabricated. 25.1. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the Trial Court failed to observe that no independent evidence was lead by the Respondent to prove payment of sale consideration for execution of sale deed dated 28.03.2003; that payment of Rs.5 lakhs by respondent No.1 herein to Appellant No.1 was not in respect of present transaction and in fact, the same was for some other purpose and that in the absence of proper material and independent evidence, the Trial Court has come to erroneous conclusion that the payment of sale consideration of Rs.6,16,000/- mentioned in Sale Deed dated 28.03.2003, was proved. 25.2. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the Appellant No.1 along with her two sisters purchased an extent of Acs.248-00 Gts. under sale deed bearing Doc.No.1421 of 1970 dated 03.05.1970 and all the three sisters were joint owners of the said extent and there was no demarcation of land among sisters. He further submitted that as there was no division of the said land by metes and bounds, for all purposes, the purchasers are to be treated as joint owners. Therefore, execution of agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 in respect of Acs.77-36 Gts, which is part of the total extent of Acs.248.00 guntas, by Appellant No.1 in favour of Respondent No.1 does not arise. 25.3. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that even sale deed dated 28.03.2003 in respect of Acs.30-32 Gts. in favour of Respondent is also equally invalid and sham. This fact is evident from the notice dated 30.09.2004 wherein the Respondent himself has requested the Appellant No.1 for survey and demarcation of lands and for execution of sale deed in respect of balance land. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that if really the land admeasuring Acs.77-36 Gts. covered under agreement of sale, is separated and demarcated, there is no necessity for Respondent No.1 to issue notice dated 30.09.2004 demanding the Appellant No.1 to survey and demarcate the land. This aspect was not properly considered by the Trial Court and thus, has come to an erroneous conclusion. 25.4. covered under agreement of sale, is separated and demarcated, there is no necessity for Respondent No.1 to issue notice dated 30.09.2004 demanding the Appellant No.1 to survey and demarcate the land. This aspect was not properly considered by the Trial Court and thus, has come to an erroneous conclusion. 25.4. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that Respondent No.1 admitted that he has signed the Ex.A10 (Declaration) and as such, it can safely be concluded that there was no agreement of sale and as such, execution of registered sale deed by appellant No.1 in favour of respondent No.1 does not arise; that the burden to disprove Ex.A-10 (Declaration) is upon Respondent No.1, however, he failed to discharge the same. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that agreement of sale and registered sale deed are not proved in the light of totality of the circumstances and evidence available on record, which demonstrate that the Respondent played fraud and misrepresented, and more particularly taking advantage of the family disputes. 25.5. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the agreement of sale was executed on 30.03.1995 whereas the suit was filed on 10.11.2004, i.e., after lapse of about 9 years, therefore, the suit is clearly barred by limitation in view of Article 54 of the Limitation Act which specifies the limitation for filing suit for enforcement of agreement of sale as three years. The observations of the Trial Court that no specific time is mentioned in the agreement of sale and that, as per clause 11 of the agreement of sale, the land was not demarcated and therefore, the suit filed within the period of three years from the date of notice, dated 30.09.2004, is well within the period of limitation are perverse. He further submitted that mere issuance of notice after a period of 9 years from the date of agreement of sale does not save limitation and therefore, the Trial Court ought to have dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation. 25.6. He further submitted that mere issuance of notice after a period of 9 years from the date of agreement of sale does not save limitation and therefore, the Trial Court ought to have dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation. 25.6. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that Agreement of Sale dated 30.03.1995 and Sale Deed dated 28.03.2003 were executed nominally to secure payment of 10% commission to the respondent, which is evident from the declaration dated 20.05.2004, wherein Respondent No.1 categorically stated that the sale deed dated 30.03.1995, and other documents and also several cash and cheque payments shown in the said documents were only nominal and no such amounts have been paid by him and further the blank signed cheques were taken as security from the Appellants and her children and the same were not intended to be acted upon and that he would cancel the same after resolving the disputes. 25.7. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the Respondent No.1 had offered services to the Appellants to resolve the disputes among family members by using his clout and political influence and for that, the Appellants have to pay 10% commission towards his services and as a security for payment of his commission, respondent No.1 has obtained documents nominally and the same were supposed to be cancelled after resolving the disputes. However, the Respondent No.1 failed to fulfill his promise and has fraudulently claimed the documents as valid and proper and that, no consideration was paid by him to appellant No.1. 25.8. Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants further submitted that the agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 was in fact prepared in the year 2003 along with general power of attorney dated 21.02.2003. He further submitted that the Trial Court failed to observe that the New Indian Express, City Edition newspaper dated 24.08.2023, provided information that the Software ‘Windows-95’ was launched on 24.08.1995, as the first consumer oriented operating system by Microsoft and thus the question of font with the software of ‘windows 95’ on the alleged agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995, is highly suspicious and doubtful and thus the agreement of sale was not obviously prepared on 30.03.1995, but, on subsequent date. He further submitted that this information was indicated in C.R.P.No.3050 of 2022, however, the same was got closed in view of pronouncement of judgment in the suit. 25.9. He further submitted that this information was indicated in C.R.P.No.3050 of 2022, however, the same was got closed in view of pronouncement of judgment in the suit. 25.9. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the font used in both the documents, i.e. agreement of sale and general power of attorney, is one and the same, however, this aspect was not properly considered by the Trial Court and thus, it has come to erroneous conclusion that agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 is proved. The Trial Court did not properly appreciate the contention of Appellant No.1 that she came to know about the sale deed dated 28.03.2003, only after receiving summons in O.S.No.84 of 2022 (Old O.S.No.80 of 2004) and thereby committed error in rejecting the said contention. 25.10. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that in the criminal case filed by the Respondent himself, there is clear observation by the Criminal Court that the declaration dated 20.05.2004 is genuine and valid. In fact, the respondent did not dispute his signature on the declaration, however, the trial Court, failed to consider the observations of the Criminal Court on the ground that the observations of the criminal Court are not binding on the civil Court and discarded the same and thus, came to improper and perverse findings. 25.11. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the agreement of sale is invalid for want of stamp duty and registration in terms of Section 17 of the Registration Act. He further submitted that the Stamp Act was amended on 31.03.1995, as per which, the stamp duty has to be paid @ 5% of the sale consideration mentioned in the document. To overcome this, the agreement of sale was manipulated and shown as if the same was executed on 30.03.1995. Further, the agreement of sale has to be registered in terms of Section 17 of the Registration Act and admittedly, the subject agreement of sale is not registered, therefore, the said document is invalid. But, the Trial Court ignored non-compliance of the statutory requirements and thus, came to erroneous conclusion that agreement of sale is valid and hence, the same requires interference by this Court. 26. In support of his aforesaid contentions, learned senior counsel relied upon the following judgments: 1. Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja , (2021) 1 SCC 414 2. Ramdas v. Sitabai & Ors. (2009) 7 SCC 444 3. 26. In support of his aforesaid contentions, learned senior counsel relied upon the following judgments: 1. Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja , (2021) 1 SCC 414 2. Ramdas v. Sitabai & Ors. (2009) 7 SCC 444 3. S. Muralidaran v. K. Bhaskaran , 2022 SCC OnLine Mad 9288 4. Ayithi Appalanaidu v. Petla Papamma , 2011 SCC OnLine AP 130 5. Shenbagam v. K.K. Rathinavel, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 71 27. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondents submitted that the trial Court, on proper appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence placed on record, has rightly passed common Judgment dated 11.09.2023 and the Appellants have failed to make out any ground to interfere with the well-reasoned Judgment of the trial Court. 27.1. Learned Senior Counsel for respondents made the following submissions in response to the submissions and grounds raised on behalf of the Appellants:- 27.2. With regard to limitation, learned senior counsel for Respondents submitted that the Appellant No.1 entered into agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 with Respondent No.1 in respect of Schedule-A property and as per clause 6 thereof, time is not essence of agreement. He further submitted that as per clause 11 of agreement of sale, the Respondent is liable to pay balance sale consideration within a period of six months from the date of communication in writing by the appellant about demarcation of property, therefore, limitation for filing a suit for specific performance commences from the date of communication by Appellant No.1 to Respondent No.1. However, in the present case, the Appellant No.1 did not address any letter to the Respondent No.1 as per clause 11 of Agreement of Sale, in fact, it is Respondent No.1 who got issued Legal Notice dated 30.09.2004 seeking specific performance of agreement of sale and in response, the Appellant No.1 got issued reply refusing performance of agreement of sale and therefore, the period for limitation for filing a suit for specific performance commences only from 27.01.2004 and thus, the suit in O.S.No.80 of 2004 filed on 10.11.2004, is well within the period of limitation and subsequently, the said suit was renumbered as O.S.No.566 of 2006 and further renumbered as O.S.No.84 of 2022. 27.3. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that Article 54 of Limitation Act prescribes limitation of 3 years for filing a suit for specific performance of contract and it has two limbs. 27.3. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that Article 54 of Limitation Act prescribes limitation of 3 years for filing a suit for specific performance of contract and it has two limbs. First limb deals with contracts in which date is fixed for performance, and the second limb deals with circumstances in which no date is fixed and in those cases, the limitation period of three years commences from the date of refusal by the seller. 27.4. In the present case, since the Appellants refused performance of agreement of sale vide notice dated 27.10.2004, the suit is well within the limitation as per Article 54 of the Limitation Act. He further submitted that the Trial Court has rightly appreciated the facts and law and has come to correct conclusion that the suit is within the period of limitation. Therefore, contention raised by the Appellants that the suit is barred by limitation is untenable and liable to be rejected. 27.5. With regard to contention of the Appellants that the agreement of sale is not valid in view of non compliance of provisions of Stamps and Registration Act, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that an agreement of sale need not be mandatorily registered for the purpose of making claim for specific performance in terms of Section 17 and proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1899. 27.6. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 was duly impounded by the competent authority and an endorsement to that effect was also made on the back side of the first page of agreement of sale, therefore the same is not hit by non-payment of stamp duty. He further submitted that the proviso to Section 33 as well as Section 42 of the Indian Stamps Act, 1908 and also in the light of impounding of agreement of sale and payment of stamp duty, the said document is valid. 27.7. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the signatures of Appellant No.1 on agreement of sale were admitted and no plea has been taken that the same are forged or fabricated and therefore, the validity of agreement of sale cannot be questioned. He further submitted that there is clear reference of agreement of sale in the Sale Deed No.3804 of 2003 dated 28.03.2003 executed by the Appellant No.1 in favour of Respondent and also in GPA No.68 of 2003 dated 21.02.2003. He further submitted that there is clear reference of agreement of sale in the Sale Deed No.3804 of 2003 dated 28.03.2003 executed by the Appellant No.1 in favour of Respondent and also in GPA No.68 of 2003 dated 21.02.2003. He further submitted that the sale deed dated 28.03.2003 as well as GPA dated 21.02.2003 are registered documents and the signatures on both the documents were admitted. Therefore, the contention with regard to execution and genuinity of agreement of sale is baseless and contrary to the material on record and thus, untenable. 27.8. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the contention of Appellants that the Appellants came to know about the execution of agreement of sale only on receipt of summons in the suit-OS.No.84 of 2022 is false and invented only for the purpose of denial in view of reference of agreement of sale in registered documents i.e. GPA dated 21.02.2003 as well as sale deed dated 28.03.2003. 27.9. With regard to contention of Appellants that registered Sale Deed dated 28.03.2003 is a nominal sale deed, learned senior counsel for the Respondent submitted that registered sale deed vide Doc.No.3804 of 2003 dated 28.03.2003 was executed pursuant to agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995. In fact, in the registered sale deed it is clearly mentioned that the Appellant (Shanta Bai) has entered into agreement of sale with the Respondent. He further submitted that the Appellants have never disputed the execution and validity of the sale deed dated 28.03.2003 and that the plea that sale deed was nominal, was taken for the first time in the written statement filed on 21.02.2005. He further submitted that if the sale deed was nominal, the Appellants ought to have raised such plea immediately after execution of sale deed, however, no such plea was taken. Therefore, the contention of the Appellants that the Sale Deed was nominal is untenable and has been invented only after filing of suit for specific performance of agreement of sale by respondent No.1. 28. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the Appellants are relying upon the declaration dated 20.05.2004, which has not been proved, and in fact there is no reference to such declaration in the reply notice dated 27.10.2004 got issued by Appellant in response to the legal notice dated 30.09.2004 of the respondent. 28. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the Appellants are relying upon the declaration dated 20.05.2004, which has not been proved, and in fact there is no reference to such declaration in the reply notice dated 27.10.2004 got issued by Appellant in response to the legal notice dated 30.09.2004 of the respondent. He further submitted that even in revocation of GPA dated 07.12.2004, the Appellants have narrated in detail the events and disputes between the Appellants and Respondent No.1, however, there is no mention as to the declaration dated 20.05.2004. He further submitted that if declaration dated 20.05.2004 is genuine, the same would have been executed simultaneously on the date of execution of sale deed dated 28.03.2003 or at least immediately thereafter, however the declaration was purported to have been executed on 20.05.2004 which is more than a year after execution of sale deed. Therefore, the contention of Appellants is untenable and not supported by any material. 28.1. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that no witness of the said declaration was examined and the same was also not registered as per Section 17 (1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908, as per which, any document which creates or extinguishes right in the immoveable property is mandatorily registerable. He also submitted that the declaration dated 20.05.2004 is a forged and fabricated document, created and signed on stolen papers and respondent No.1 has also given a police complaint and there is a clear finding by the Trial Court that the declaration is a fabricated document He further submitted that appellant No.1 filed the suit- OS.No.83 of 2022 for declaring the agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995 and registered sale deed dated 28.03.2003 as null and void, about 13 months subsequent to filing of the suit-O.S.No.84 of 2022 by the Respondent No.1 for specific performance of agreement of sale, therefore, the suit in OS.No.83 of 2022 is nothing, but an afterthought and a counter blast to the suit filed by respondent No.1. 28.2. Insofar as the allegation of Appellants that the Respondents have played fraud, learned Senior Counsel for Respondents submitted that the plea of fraud is a serious allegation which has severe civil and criminal consequences and therefore, the same has to be proved with sufficient proof and evidence. 28.2. Insofar as the allegation of Appellants that the Respondents have played fraud, learned Senior Counsel for Respondents submitted that the plea of fraud is a serious allegation which has severe civil and criminal consequences and therefore, the same has to be proved with sufficient proof and evidence. In the present case except making bald allegations, the Appellants failed to prove the alleged fraud and no evidence is placed on record in proof of the said allegations. 29. Learned Senior Counsel finally contended that the Trial Court, on due consideration and evaluation of the oral and documentary evidence placed on record, has rightly decreed the suit filed by the Respondent and dismissed the suit filed by the Appellants herein and the Appellants failed to point out any illegality or irregularity in the impugned common Judgment passed by the trial Court. He further submitted that no grounds are made out by the appellants warranting interference of this Court with the well-reasoned common judgment passed by the trial Court and finally, prayed to dismiss the appeals as the same are devoid of any merit. 30. In support of his contentions, learned Senior Counsel relied upon the following Judgments: 1 . A.C. Ananthaswamy & Ors. v. Boraiah (Dead) by LRs. (2004) 8 SCC 588 2 . Bishundeo Narain and Another v. Seogeni Rai & Jagernath , 1951 SCC 447 3 . Muruganandam v. Muniyandi (Died) through LRs. 2025 SCC Online SC 1067 4 . A. Valliammai v. K.P. Murali and Ors. 2023 SCC Online SC 1150 5 . Aniglase Yohannan v. Ramlatha and Ors . (2005) 7 SCC 534 6 . J.P. Builders & Anr. v. A. Ramadas Rao & Anr. (2011) 1 SCC 429 7 . K. Nalini Devi & Anr. v. K. Haritha Reddy & Ors. (2020) 3 ALD 156 31. In the light of the grounds raised and the submissions made by learned senior counsel on behalf of Appellants as well as respondents, the following issues arise for consideration. 1. Whether the suit schedule property in OS.No.84/2022 is joint property or distinct? 2. Whether the declaration dated 20.05.2004 said to be given by respondent No.1 is genuine or fabricated? 3. Whether the Agreement of Sale dated 30.03.1995 and Sale Deed dated 28.03.2003 are null and void (or) binding on parties? 4. Whether the sale consideration as mentioned in Sale Deed dated 28.03.2003 is paid or not? 5. 2. Whether the declaration dated 20.05.2004 said to be given by respondent No.1 is genuine or fabricated? 3. Whether the Agreement of Sale dated 30.03.1995 and Sale Deed dated 28.03.2003 are null and void (or) binding on parties? 4. Whether the sale consideration as mentioned in Sale Deed dated 28.03.2003 is paid or not? 5. Whether the suit-OS.No.84 of 2022 filed by respondent No.1 is barred by limitation? 6. Whether the Plaintiff in OS.No.84/2022 is entitled to specific performance of agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995? 7. Whether the impugned common judgment dated is sustainable or it requires interference by this Court? 8. To what relief? 32. For convenience, hereinafter, the documents marked and the witnesses examined on behalf of both the parties are referred to as arrayed in OS.No.83 of 2022. ISSUE No.1: 33. It is an undisputed fact that Appellant No.1, along with her two sisters, viz., Yamuna Bai and Jamuna Bai, jointly purchased the property admeasuring Acs.248.00 guntas situated at Shivareddypet Village, Vikarabad Taluk, Ranga Reddy District, forming part of Survey Nos.66, 70 to 72, 75 to 78, 84 to 88, 104 and 105, for valuable consideration under a registered sale deed bearing Document No.1421/1970 dated 03-05-1970 (vide Ex.A-1). Although the property was purchased jointly, the registered sale deed clearly specifies the respective extents of land sold to Appellant No.1 and her two sisters. 34. As per sale deed, dated 03.05.1970, the following are the respective extent of lands sold to Appellant No.1 and her two sisters out of total extent of Acs.248-00 Gts.:- 1. Total land admeasuring Acs.77.36 guntas conveyed to appellant No.1 (Shanta Bai) comprises of: • Ac.14-37 Gts. in Survey No.86 • Ac.16-12 Gts. in Survey No.87 • Ac.15-35 Gts. in Survey No.88 • Ac.12-35 Gts. in Survey No.104 • Ac.17-37 Gts. in Survey No.105 2. Total land admeasuring Acs.84.29 guntas conveyed to Yamuna Bai comprises of • Ac.0-05 Gts. in Survey No.57 • Ac.2-04 Gts. in Survey No.60 • Ac.0-29 Gts. in Survey No.61 • Ac.0-07 Gts. in Survey No.62 • Ac.11-21 Gts. in Survey No.66 • Ac.2-05 Gts. in Survey No.71 • Ac.1-09 Gts. in Survey No.72 • Ac.16-10 Gts. in Survey No.50 • Ac.17-12 Gts. in Survey No.51 • Ac. 0-18 Gts. in Survey No.53 • Ac.0-33 Gts. in Survey No.54 • Ac.2-17 Gts. in Survey No.55 • Ac.10-39 Gts. in Survey No.56 • Ac.1-03 Gts. in Survey No.58 • Ac.2-12 Gts. in Survey No.71 • Ac.1-09 Gts. in Survey No.72 • Ac.16-10 Gts. in Survey No.50 • Ac.17-12 Gts. in Survey No.51 • Ac. 0-18 Gts. in Survey No.53 • Ac.0-33 Gts. in Survey No.54 • Ac.2-17 Gts. in Survey No.55 • Ac.10-39 Gts. in Survey No.56 • Ac.1-03 Gts. in Survey No.58 • Ac.2-12 Gts. in Survey No.59 • Ac.6-22 Gts. in Survey No.63 • Ac.0-34 Gts. in Survey No.64 • Ac.0-24 Gts. in Survey No.65 • Ac.9-05 Gts. in Survey No.70 3. Total land admeasuring Acs.85-15 Gts conveyed to Jamuna Bai comprises of • Ac.16-15 Gts. in Survey No.52 • Ac.11-08 Gts. in Survey No.75 • Ac.13-30 Gts. in Survey No.76 • Ac.9-31 Gts. in Survey No.77 • Ac.8-06 Gts. in Survey No.78 • Ac.14-26 Gts. in Survey No.84 • Ac.11-19 Gts. in Survey No.85 35. It was the contention of learned Senior Counsel for Appellants that the Appellant No.1 along with her two sisters were joint pattadars and possessors of the land to the extent of Acs.248- 00 Gts., and that the said land has not been divided by metes and bounds. 36. Though, the Appellant and her two sisters purchased the land admeasuring Acs.248-00 Gts. under a single sale deed, as detailed above, extent of land allotted to each of the sisters is specifically, distinctly and clearly mentioned therein. It is pertinent to mention that the lands allotted to each sister forms part of different Survey numbers and there is no overlap of Survey numbers. 37. Further, as per schedule of property mentioned in GPA (Ex.B2) dated 21.02.2003, the land of appellant No.1 admeasuring Acs.77-36 Gts. is separate, identifiable and has been developed with mango trees, tamarind trees, four wells, water ways, fencing, and other developments. The long-standing separate possession, development, and enjoyment of the land by appellant No.1 strengthens the conclusion that the suit schedule property in OS.No.84 of 2022 is distinct and is not a joint property. It is also pertinent to note that in Ex.A4-reply notice dated 27.10.2004, it is admitted that in recognition of right, title and possession of Appellant No.1 and her sisters, the revenue authorities have issued title deeds, etc., mentioning the land belonging to each of the owners i.e., Appellant No.1 and her sisters. 38. It is also pertinent to note that in Ex.A4-reply notice dated 27.10.2004, it is admitted that in recognition of right, title and possession of Appellant No.1 and her sisters, the revenue authorities have issued title deeds, etc., mentioning the land belonging to each of the owners i.e., Appellant No.1 and her sisters. 38. In the light of above, the contention of learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants that there was no demarcation of land among sisters is untenable and the judgment referred to by learned senior counsel for Appellants in Ramdas v. Sitabai & Ors. (cited supra) has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The Appellants did not place on record any material to prove that Appellant No.1 along with her two sisters was in joint possession and that they are joint pattadars and possessors. Therefore, it has to be concluded that the lands purchased in the names of Shanthabai, Jamunabai, and Yamunabai are separate, distinct and form part of different survey numbers, and as such, the suit schedule property in OS.No.84 of 2022 is not a joint property. 39. This issue is answered accordingly. ISSUE No.2: 40. To decide this issue-whether declaration dated 20.05.2004 Ex.A-10) is genuine or fabricated, it is appropriate to refer to the contents of the said declaration, which read as hereunder: “2. ……….. I have obtained and got executed and registered the below stated documents of conveyance from Smt. Shanta Bai and her children, in order to solve the said disputes with her husband and others and to retransfer the same in her favour thereafter. (a) Sale deed dated 28.03.2003, Document No.3804 of 2003 in respect of lands Sivareddypet, Vikarabad, RR District (b) Sale deed dated 09.04.2003 and sale deed dated 21.05.2003, bearing Document Nos.4378/03 and 6292/03 in respect of 5000 sq.ft. area of Fatehnagar Property and rectification deeds connected thereto (c) Sale deed dated 13.02.2004 bearing document No.398/04 regarding Hyderguda Property 3. I declare that, several cash and cheque payments as shown in the above documents were only nominal and no such amounts have been in fact paid by me. In addition thereto, I have taken blank signed cheques as security from Shanta Bai and her children and I declare that I will not use the same against them 4. ………….. I undertake to cancel the same after resolving the disputes relating thereto 5. In addition thereto, I have taken blank signed cheques as security from Shanta Bai and her children and I declare that I will not use the same against them 4. ………….. I undertake to cancel the same after resolving the disputes relating thereto 5. I further declare that what all the documents I have obtained from Shanta Bai and children, such as sale deeds, agreement of sale, GPA etc. are only for the said purpose and to be cancelled as aforesaid…………” 41. PW2-Rajini Chandra (Plaintiff No.4), daughter of Appellant No.1, in her cross examination deposed as under: “It is true in Ex.B29-reply notice (OS No.No.84 of 2022) it is not mentioned about the said declaration as in Ex.B30- declaration (OS.No.84 of 2022). No separate written statement is filed by me after I was brought on record as LR of my mother. It is true that I did not mention in any of the affidavits filed by me in this proceedings about the Ex.B30. Witness again adds since it was not required, it was not mentioned.” 42. PW3-Kishan Chand (Plaintiff No.2), son of Appellant No.1, in his cross examination deposed as under: “It is not true to suggest that D2 (Pream Chand) is not a party to the declaration made by D1 (B.Janardhan Reddy). Witness is confronted with the declaration. It is true that the declaration does not contain the signature of D2. Witness adds the declaration covers D2. It is true that the declaration is not a registered document. I do not know the witnesses to the declaration. I did not witness D1 executing declaration in favour of my family members. Witness adds my mother told me about D1 executing the declaration. I did not mention in my chief examination affidavit about my mother informing me about the declaration………………… It is true that the declaration does not contain the details of the property with respect to the extent, survey number and schedule. Witness volunteers the declaration contains the document numbers and said documents have the details of the property which is subject matter of declaration.” 43. The Respondent No.1 in his chief-examination deposed as under: “It is true that I have stated in my cross examination in OS.No.18/2005 that the signature on the declaration, Dt.20.05.2004 is made by me. Witness adds that the declaration is fabricated on a stolen paper. The Respondent No.1 in his chief-examination deposed as under: “It is true that I have stated in my cross examination in OS.No.18/2005 that the signature on the declaration, Dt.20.05.2004 is made by me. Witness adds that the declaration is fabricated on a stolen paper. It is true that certified copies of declaration are filed in OS.No.18/2005, the present case and OS.No.896/2007. I have filed Ex.A46 calling upon the defendant to produce the original declaration…… It is not true to say that in addition to above I insisted the defendant and her children to transfer the same once the suits are succeeded and respective shares are allotted, and that I categorically admitted in my declaration 20.05.2004 (witness adds that all above properties transactions done by defendant after taking full consideration through Bank cheques and cash), that I have not given any declaration to the defendant or any one regarding any properties or any cheques. It is fabricated document…… It is not true to suggest that on the request of Defendant and her children I have executed declaration dt. 20.05.2004 in favour of the defendant admitting and declaring the documents executed as of transfer of properties are only as a security for 10% commission and not intended to be acted upon and agreed to retransfer as soon as they get their share in the joint family property and the entire transfer of property documents never intended to sell and defendant not received any sale consideration of single naya paisa.” 44. It is pertinent to note that Respondent No.1 herein filed a suit in O.S.No.4 of 2005 against daughters of Appellant No.1 (Shanta Bai) for recovery of Rs.11,44,000/- before XIV Additional Chief Judge (Fast Track Court), City Civil Court at Hyderabad, wherein the Court held that the declaration dated 20.05.2004 was fabricated. 45. It is significant to note that the declaration-Ex.A-10, dated 20.05.2004, was not referred to in the reply notices Ex.A4 (27.10.2004), Ex.B20 (26.10.2004), and Ex.B21 (09.11.2004), though these notices specifically dispute execution of both agreement of sale and registered sale deed. If Ex.A10-declaration was executed on 20.05.2004, the same would have been naturally and necessarily mentioned in the aforesaid notices. The statement of PW2 in her cross examination that the said declaration was not mentioned as the same is not required, cannot be appreciated, particularly, when the Appellants are strongly relying upon the declaration. If Ex.A10-declaration was executed on 20.05.2004, the same would have been naturally and necessarily mentioned in the aforesaid notices. The statement of PW2 in her cross examination that the said declaration was not mentioned as the same is not required, cannot be appreciated, particularly, when the Appellants are strongly relying upon the declaration. Further, the Appellants did not file the declaration in the initial stages of trial and the same was filed at the instance of the Trial Court at the stage of cross examination of witnesses, which raises a serious doubt about the very existence of Ex.A10. Moreover, it is an admitted fact that the said declaration is an unregistered document. 46. It is also pertinent to note that the learned Senior Counsel for Appellants submitted that appellants have to pay 10% commission towards the services of Respondent No.1 as a security for payment of commission and hence, he has obtained documents nominally and the same were supposed to be cancelled after resolving the disputes. However, a perusal of Ex.A10-declaration shows that there is no whisper about the payment of 10% commission towards the services provided by Respondent No.1. 47. Learned Senior Counsel for Appellants pointed out that the criminal Court in its judgment observed that the declaration dated 20.05.2004 is genuine and valid. In support thereof, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Satish Chander Ahuja’s case (cited supra), wherein it is observed as hereunder: 164. We need to observe that in event a judgment of a criminal court is relevant as per Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act in civil proceedings, the judgment can very well be taken note of and there is no embargo on the civil court to place reliance upon it as a corroborative material. We may notice a judgment of the Madras High Court in K. Subramani v. Director of Animal Husbandry [K. Subramani v. Director of Animal Husbandry, 2008 SCC OnLine Mad 1384 : (2009) 1 Mad LJ 363] where the Madras High Court has made the following observations in para 7: “7. A decision of the criminal court does not have the effect of binding nature on the proceedings before the civil court including the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal for the reason that the proof in both the civil and criminal cases are having two different categories of standards. A decision of the criminal court does not have the effect of binding nature on the proceedings before the civil court including the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal for the reason that the proof in both the civil and criminal cases are having two different categories of standards. In criminal cases, guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, while in civil cases, the rights of the parties or matter in issue shall be decided on preponderance of probabilities. If a party to the case relies upon a decision of the criminal court and insists the civil court to give credence to the said decision, it is incumbent upon the party to gather further materials in the case, which would support the observations and the decisions of the criminal court. If any material is available in the case, which would corroborate or strengthen the decision of the criminal court, then, there is no embargo for the civil court to place reliance upon it.” 48. In the light of the above ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is incumbent upon the Appellants to place further material supporting the observations and decision of the criminal Court/lead additional evidence to prove the declaration-Ex.A-10. In the instant case, Respondent No.1 admitted his signature on the declaration, but denied the contents therein. He deposed that his blank signed papers were stolen, and he had filed a criminal case regarding such theft. The criminal proceedings (Exs.B17 & A13) show that although Appellant No.1 was initially convicted, she was acquitted in appeal. 49. Admission of signature alone does not amount to proof of execution of the document, nor does it prove the contents. The burden lies on the Appellants to prove that Respondent No.1 executed the declaration. Though, the declaration was signed by three witnesses, the Appellant No.1 failed to examine none of the witness to prove the said declaration. Except oral assertion that the Respondent No.1 executed the declaration, the Appellants did not adduce any documentary or independent evidence to prove the declaration. 50. Further, Respondent No.1 filed a criminal case against the Appellant No.1 for theft of his signed blank papers. 51. However, if the registered sale deed as contemplated in the alleged declaration is to be cancelled, it shall be done by the mutual consent of both the parties or by the order of the Court and not otherwise. 52. 50. Further, Respondent No.1 filed a criminal case against the Appellant No.1 for theft of his signed blank papers. 51. However, if the registered sale deed as contemplated in the alleged declaration is to be cancelled, it shall be done by the mutual consent of both the parties or by the order of the Court and not otherwise. 52. With regard to validity and genuineness of the declaration- Ex.A-10, there are two judgments rendered by the Courts, one by the Civil Court in OS.No.4 of 2005, dated 29.06.2011, wherein it is held that the declaration is fabricated, and another by the criminal Court in CC.No.138 of 2006, whereunder appellant No.1 was convicted for the charge of theft, but, on appeal, she was acquitted by the appellate Court. Thus, there are two judgments rendered by the Courts with regard to validity of the declaration-Ex.A-10. It is relevant to note that the judgment rendered in OS.No.4 of 2005 was not carried in appeal by appellant No.1. In such an event, when two conflicting judgments are staring at the parties, the appellants have not taken any steps to prove the said declaration by way of examining the witnesses thereto either in the suit filed by appellant No.1-OS.No.83 of 2022 or in the suit filed by respondent No.1-OS.No.84 of 2022, when the appellants rest their case heavily upon the said declaration, which was denied by respondent No.1. 53. On the above analysis, this Court holds that the appellants failed to prove that declaration-Ex.A-10 is valid and genuine and therefore, this issue is answered against the appellants and in favour of the respondents. ISSUE Nos. 3 and 4: 54. As seen from the record, the agreement of sale was executed on 30.03.1995 by Appellant No.1 in favour of Respondent No.1 agreeing to sell land admeasuring Acs.77-36 Gts. in Sy.Nos.86, 87, 88, 104 & 105 for a total consideration of Rs.15,58,000/- out of which a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- was paid in advance by Respondent No.1 to the Appellant No.1 at the time of execution of agreement of sale. 55. in Sy.Nos.86, 87, 88, 104 & 105 for a total consideration of Rs.15,58,000/- out of which a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- was paid in advance by Respondent No.1 to the Appellant No.1 at the time of execution of agreement of sale. 55. The registered sale deed vide Doc.No.3804 of 2003 dated 28.03.2003, was executed by Appellant No.1 in favour of Respondent No.1 for a total sale consideration for Rs.6,16,000/-, out of which Rs.5,00,000/- was paid by way of cheque No.006486 dated 28.03.2003 drawn on Central Bank of India, Gudimalkapur Branch, Hyderabad and a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was adjusted from advance amount and balance amount of Rs.16,000/- was paid by way of cash. 56. Ex.B28 is the certified copy of cheque dated 28.03.2003 bearing No.006486, for Rs.5 lakhs, issued by the Respondent No.1 in favour of Appellant No.1, towards sale consideration. Ex.B27 is the certified copy of UCO Bank account statement of the Appellant No.1, which clearly shows that the above cheque was cleared on 08.04.2003, this clearly establishes receipt of sale consideration by Appellant No.1. Further, payment of Rs.5 lakhs towards sale consideration was also mentioned in clause 1(b) of the said registered sale deed, which reads as under: “(b) Rs.5,00,000/- today received by way of cheque No. 006486 dated 28.03.2003 of Central Bank of India of Gudimalkapur, Hyderabad.” 57. Learned Senior Counsel for Appellants submitted that Rs.5 lakhs paid by the Respondent No.1 to the Appellant No.1 was not in respect of the present transaction, but for some other purpose and that, neither the agreement of sale nor the registered sale deed were executed by Appellant No.1 and that both the said documents are forged, fabricated and are obtained by fraudulent means. 58. PW2 in her deposition admitted that she along with her brother and sister have put their signatures on both agreement of sale and registered sale deed as witnesses and that Appellant No.1 and Respondent No.1 also put their signatures. The said part of deposition of PW2 is extracted as follows: “We include myself, my mother and my family members in Ex.A1 dated 30.03.1995 my signature and the signatures of my sister and brother are found as witnesses, wherein my mother signed as executor/vendor and the signature of Janardhan Reddy Plaintiff is also found…. In Ex.A6 vendor is shown as my mother and vendee is showing B. Janardhan Reddy and that document contain my signature as first witness. In Ex.A6 vendor is shown as my mother and vendee is showing B. Janardhan Reddy and that document contain my signature as first witness. The other signatures are that of my brother and sister, it is dated 28.03.2003.” 59. From the above statements of P.W-2, it is clear that the Appellant No.1 signed the agreement of sale and registered sale deed in the presence of the witnesses. 60. Thus, when P.W-2-one of the children of appellant No.1, who is one of the witnesses to Ex.A-1, admitted about affixing of signatures by herself, her siblings and her mother-appellant No.1 on Ex.A-1-registered sale deed, it necessarily means that the contents therein are to be taken as true and correct. Further, except saying that the amount was paid for some other purposes, the Appellants failed to prove the same by adducing any evidence and even failed to disclose the other purpose. In such an event, the contention of learned senior counsel for appellants that the consideration mentioned in Ex.A-1 is not towards sale consideration, but for some other purpose, does not hold water and is shattered to ground. 61. It is also the contention of Appellants that agreement of sale and sale deed denied by the Appellants as the said documents were executed in view of the declaration dated 20.05.2004 entered into by the Appellant and Respondent. However, in the light of conclusion on issue No.2, the declaration has no effect on the execution of agreement of sale and sale deed. 62. The signatures on agreement of sale and sale deed were admitted by Appellants in their evidence. The Appellants have taken contradictory stands with regard to execution of agreement of sale and registered sale deed i.e. (i) it was contended that the agreement of sale and sale deed were executed nominally to secure payment of 10% commission to the Respondent and (ii) on the other hand, it was contented that the Appellants come to known about agreement of sale only on receipt of summons in O.S.No.84 of 2022 filed by Respondent. It is pertinent to mention that there is clear reference of Agreement of sale in the registered sale deed and as such the contention that the Appellants coming to known about agreement of sale only on receipt of summons in O.S.No.84 of 2022 filed by Respondent No.1 is untenable and the question of non-execution of agreement of sale does not arise. 63. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants that agreement of sale and sale deed has been obtained by fraud and misrepresentation cannot be considered unless and until sufficient evidence is adduced on record by the Appellants, since the burden lies on the Appellants to prove fraud and misrepresentation. 64. In Ranganayakamma v. K.S. Prakash, (2008) 15 SCC 673, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “ 39. Another aspect of the matter cannot also be lost sight of Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under: 4. Particulars to be given where necessary.—In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading.” 40. When a fraud is alleged, the particulars thereof are required to be pleaded. No particular of the alleged fraud or misrepresentation has been disclosed.” 65. In A.C. Ananthaswamy v. Boraiah , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under: “ 5 .….Fraud is to be pleaded and proved. To prove fraud, it must be proved that representation made was false to the knowledge of the party making such representation or that the party could have no reasonable belief that it was true. The level of proof required in such cases is extremely higher. An ambiguous statement cannot per se make the representor guilty of fraud. To prove a case of fraud, it must be proved that the representation made was false to the knowledge of the party making such representation.” 66. In Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under: “ 22. We turn next to the questions of undue influence and coercion. Now it is to be observed that these have not been separately pleaded. It is true they may overlap in part in some cases but they are separate and separable categories in law and must be separately pleaded. It is also to be observed that no proper particulars have been furnished. Now it is to be observed that these have not been separately pleaded. It is true they may overlap in part in some cases but they are separate and separable categories in law and must be separately pleaded. It is also to be observed that no proper particulars have been furnished. Now if there is one rule which is better established than any other, it is that in cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any court ought to take notice however strong the language in which they are couched may be, and the same applies to undue influence and coercion. See Order 6 Rule 4, Civil Procedure Code.” 67. Applying the above position of law, it is held that mere allegation/assertion of the Appellants that the agreement of sale and sale deed are obtained by way of fraud and misrepresentation does not nullify the said documents, as the said averment of fraud is not supported by any sufficient evidence. 68. Accordingly, in the light of the foregoing reasons, the registered sale deed is held to be genuine and binding on the appellants, which explicitly implies that the contents therein i.e., with regard to payment of Rs.6,16,000/- towards total sale consideration for an extent of Acs.30-32 Gts. of land, are valid and binding on the parties. 69. With regard to the aspect whether agreement of sale is null and void for want of registration, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramesh Chand (D) through LRs. v. Suresh Chand & Anr . , 2025 INSC 1059 , wherein it is observed as under: “ 15. There is a difference between a sale deed and an agreement for sale, or a contract for sale. A contract for sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. While a sale is a transfer of ownership; a contract for sale is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document, namely a registered sale deed to complete the transaction of sale of an immovable property. While a sale is a transfer of ownership; a contract for sale is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document, namely a registered sale deed to complete the transaction of sale of an immovable property. Section 54 in its definition of sale does not include an agreement of sale and neither confers any proprietary rights in favour of the transferee nor by itself create any interest or charge in the property. If after entering into a contract for sale of property, the seller without any reasonable excuse avoids executing a sale deed, the buyer can proceed to file a suit for specific performance of the contract. 16. The scope of an agreement for sale has been highlighted by this court in the case of Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited (2) through Director v. State of Haryana3, wherein this Court observed that: “ 16. Section 54 of the TP Act makes it clear that a contract of sale, that is, an agreement of sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. This Court in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam, [ (1977) 3 SCC 247 ] observed: “ 32. A contract of sale does not of itself create any interest in, or charge on, the property. This is expressly declared in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. (See Ram Baran Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazra, [AIR 1967 SC 744]). The fiduciary character of the personal obligation created by a contract for sale is recognised in Section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and in Section 91 of the Trusts Act. The personal obligation created by a contract of sale is described in Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act as an obligation arising out of contract and annexed to the ownership of property, but not amounting to an interest or easement therein. 33. In India, the word ‘transfer’ is defined with reference to the word ‘convey’. … The word ‘conveys’ in Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act is used in the wider sense of conveying ownership. *** 37. … that only on execution of conveyance, ownership passes from one party to another….” 17. In Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra, [ (2004) 8 SCC 614 ] this Court held: “10. … The word ‘conveys’ in Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act is used in the wider sense of conveying ownership. *** 37. … that only on execution of conveyance, ownership passes from one party to another….” 17. In Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra, [ (2004) 8 SCC 614 ] this Court held: “10. Protection provided under Section 53-A of the Act to the proposed transferee is a shield only against the transferor. It disentitles the transferor from disturbing the possession of the proposed transferee who is put in possession in pursuance to such an agreement. It has nothing to do with the ownership of the proposed transferor who remains full owner of the property till it is legally conveyed by executing a registered sale deed in favour of the transferee. Such a right to protect possession against the proposed vendor cannot be pressed into service against a third party.” 18. It is thus clear that a transfer of immovable property by way of sale can only be by a deed of conveyance (sale deed). In the absence of a deed of conveyance (duly stamped and registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an immovable property can be transferred. 19. Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which is not a registered deed of conveyance (deed of sale) would fall short of the requirements of Sections 54 and 55 of the TP Act and will not confer any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable property (except to the limited right granted under Section 53- A of the TP Act). According to the TP Act, an agreement of sale, whether with possession or without possession, is not a conveyance. Section 54 of the TP Act enacts that sale of immovable property can be made only by a registered instrument and an agreement of sale does not create any interest or charge on its subject-matter.” 17. In the instant matter, undisputedly plaintiff claims that there is only an agreement to sell, and there is no sale deed executed in his favour by the father. As per the settled position of law, this document does not confer a valid title on the plaintiff as it is not a deed of conveyance as per Section 54 of the TP Act. As per the settled position of law, this document does not confer a valid title on the plaintiff as it is not a deed of conveyance as per Section 54 of the TP Act. At best, it only enables the plaintiff to seek for specific performance for the execution of a sale deed and does not create an interest or charge on the suit property.” 70. Therefore, applying the above legal position to the present case, the agreement of sale executed between the Appellant No.1 in favour of Respondent No.1 cannot be equated as conveyance of property, as the same does not confer a valid title on the Respondent No.1 as per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. 71. In the present case, pursuant to the agreement of sale, a registered sale deed has been executed by Appellant No.1 in favour of the Respondent No.1, but only in respect of part extent of land covered by agreement of sale. The agreement of sale is entered for land admeasuring Acs.77-36 Gts., whereas the registered sale deed was executed only in respect of Acs.30-32 Gts. and the Respondent No.1 is seeking specific performance for the remaining extent of land covered in the agreement of sale. 72. It is the contention of learned counsel for the Appellants that the agreement of sale is hit by the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act and the Registration Act. Section 49 of the Registration Act reads as under: “49. Effect of non-registration of documents required to be registered.— No document required by section 171 [or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882)], to be registered shall— (a) affect any immovable property comprised therein, or (b) confer any power to adopt, or (c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered: [Provided that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (3 of 1877) 2 , 3 *** or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument.]” 73. Thus, as seen from the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, it is construed that an unregistered document affecting immovable property may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance. 74. The learned counsel for the Respondents placed reliance on the Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Muruganandam’s case (cited supra), wherein it is observed as under: “9. Having considered the matter in detail, we are of the opinion that the prayer of the appellant in the interlocutory application falls under proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act which provides that an unregistered document affecting immovable property may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance. The proviso also enables the said document to be received in evidence of a collateral transaction. … .. 10. In Kaladevi (supra), this Court has held that an unregistered document may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit seeking specific performance. The relevant portion from the decision is as follows: “12. The main provision in Section 49 provides that any document which is required to be registered, if not registered, shall not affect any immovable property comprised therein nor such document shall be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property. The proviso, however, would show that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by the 1908 Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered may be received as an evidence to the contract in a suit for specific performance or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. By virtue of the proviso, therefore, an unregistered sale deed of an immovable property of the value of Rs. 100 and more could be admitted in evidence as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance of the contract. Such an unregistered sale deed can also be admitted in evidence as an evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered document. When an unregistered sale deed is tendered in evidence, not as evidence of a completed sale, but as proof of an oral agreement of sale, the deed can be received in evidence making an endorsement that it is received only as evidence of an oral agreement of sale under the proviso to Section 49 of 1908 Act.” 75. When an unregistered sale deed is tendered in evidence, not as evidence of a completed sale, but as proof of an oral agreement of sale, the deed can be received in evidence making an endorsement that it is received only as evidence of an oral agreement of sale under the proviso to Section 49 of 1908 Act.” 75. In the present case, Respondent No.1 sought specific performance of Agreement of Sale against Appellant No.1 for the remaining extent of land i.e. Acs.47.04 Gts. 76. Applying the ratio laid down in Muruganandam’s case (cited supra) and also in view of language employed in proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, this Court is of the considered opinion that Ex.B-1-Agreement of sale affecting the immovable property can be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance though the same is unregistered. 77. For the foregoing reasons vis-à-vis the above facts and circumstances of the case, there is no legal or factual basis to declare the agreement of sale and sale deed as null and void. Accordingly, this Court comes to conclusion that the Agreement of Sale dated 30.03.1995 and the Sale Deed dated 28.03.2003 are valid, enforceable and binding on the parties. 78. Thus, issue Nos.3 and 4 are answered against the appellants. ISSUE No.5: 79. With regard to the issue of limitation, on perusal of the record, it can be seen that the agreement of sale was executed on 30.03.1995, whereas the Respondent No.1 filed the suit for specific performance in O.S.No.80 of 2004 (renumbered as O.S.No.84 of 2022) on 10.11.2004 i.e., after a lapse of 9 years. 80. The limitation for filing a suit for specific performance is governed by Article 54 of the Limitation Act. Article 54 of the Schedule to the Act reads as follows: 81. As per the above provision, the limitation starts from the date fixed for performance and if no date has been fixed, the limitation runs from the date of notice of refusal by the vendor. In the present case, in the agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995, it is mentioned that the balance sale consideration has to be paid within six months from the date of written intimation by Appellant No.1 (vendor) after demarcation of the property by metes and bounds. 82. Clause 6 of agreement of sale stipulates as under: “ 6. In the present case, in the agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995, it is mentioned that the balance sale consideration has to be paid within six months from the date of written intimation by Appellant No.1 (vendor) after demarcation of the property by metes and bounds. 82. Clause 6 of agreement of sale stipulates as under: “ 6. That the First party shall perform her part of obligations mentioned in this agreement and all of the clauses mentioned herein above, are essence of the agreement and both parties shall lawfully endeavour for completion of the transaction. Time is not essence of this agreement". 83. Thus, from the aforesaid Clause-6, it is evident that time is not the essence of the agreement. Clause 11 of agreement of sale stipulates as under: “ 11. That the vendor shall take steps for survey of land and fixing demarcating the schedule property by metes and bounds, the same shall be intimated in writing to the Vendee and on such intimation, within a period of six months, the Vendee shall pay the balance consideration amount to the Vendor and the Vendor duly receiving the same shall convey and transfer the said property absolutely in favour of the Vendee or his nominee/s, duly discharging her part of obligations of this Agreement.” 84. In pursuance of the agreement of sale, Appellant No.1 conveyed land to an extent of Acs.30-32 Gts. vide sale deed dated 28.03.2003 to respondent No.1. 85. As per the agreement of sale, the total extent of land was Acs.77-36 Gts., but, in pursuance thereof, only an extent of Acs.30-32 Gts. was conveyed to Respondent No.1, vide registered sale deed dated 28.03.2003. Hence, Respondent No.1 issued a legal notice dated 30.09.2004 calling upon Appellant No.1 to perform her part of contract as per the agreement of sale, i.e., to demarcate the land by metes and bounds and convey the remaining extent of land. In reply, Appellant No.1 issued a reply notice dated 27.10.2004 unequivocally denying her obligation to execute the sale deed and denied the very existence of agreement of sale. Aggrieved by the action of Appellant, the Respondent No.1 filed the suit seeking specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995. 86. In reply, Appellant No.1 issued a reply notice dated 27.10.2004 unequivocally denying her obligation to execute the sale deed and denied the very existence of agreement of sale. Aggrieved by the action of Appellant, the Respondent No.1 filed the suit seeking specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995. 86. As per clause 11 of the agreement of sale, an obligation lies upon Appellant No.1 to demarcate the land by metes and bounds and intimate the same to the Respondent No.1 in writing and thereafter within a period of six months, the Respondent shall pay the balance sale consideration to the Appellant. The Appellant upon receiving the sale consideration shall transfer the property to the Respondent. 87. It was the contention of learned counsel for Appellant that suit is barred by limitation as it is not filed within a statutory period of 3 years and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in S.Muralidharan’s case (cited supra) and contended that the issue of delay and laches is different from limitation. 88. However, learned counsel for Respondents relied upon second limb of Article 54 of Limitation Act to state that since no time is fixed, the limitation commences from the date of refusal and in support of the said submission, he relied upon the judgment rendered in A.Valliammai’s case (cited supra). 89. It is pertinent to note that Appellant No.1 herself executed the registered Sale Deed dated 28.03.2003 for part of the land, i.e., Acs.30.32 gutnas, covered under the agreement of sale, after receiving sale consideration in respect of that portion. However, she failed to execute the sale deed for the remaining land, which is the suit schedule property in OS.No.84 of 2022. 90. In the present case, as seen from the agreement of sale, since there is no stipulated time for execution of sale deed (except for the demarcation of property), the cause of action commences from the date of reply notice sent by the Respondent denying the very existence of the agreement of sale. The reply notice dated 27.10.2004 amounts to the refusal of performance of conditions stipulated in agreement of sale by the vendor-appellant No.1, therefore, as per Article 54 of Schedule of the Limitation Act, the limitation period of three years commences from 27.10.2004. 91. The reply notice dated 27.10.2004 amounts to the refusal of performance of conditions stipulated in agreement of sale by the vendor-appellant No.1, therefore, as per Article 54 of Schedule of the Limitation Act, the limitation period of three years commences from 27.10.2004. 91. If the Appellants are contending that issue of delay and laches is different from limitation, they should have placed reliance on relevant evidence to prove how Respondent No.1 committed delay in filing the suit. Instead, it is a proven fact that the Appellant No.1 executed sale deed in the year 2003 by referring to the agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995. This is contrary to the reply notice of the Appellant which denies the very existence of the agreement sale. Agreement of sale is clearly referred in the sale deed and as well as in the GPA executed by Appellant No.1. 92. Thus, appellant No.1 having executed registered sale deed, dated 28.03.2003, in favour of respondent No.1, purportedly in pursuance of the agreement of sale dated 28.03.2003, cannot give a go-bye to the contents therein or take an altogether different stand that the suit filed for specific performance of agreement of sale is barred by limitation. 93. In A.Valliammai’s case (cited supra) , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under: “22. Article 54 of Part II of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 stipulates the limitation period for filing a suit for specific performance as three years from the date fixed for performance, and in alternative when no date is fixed, three years from the date when the plaintiff has notice that performance has been refused. Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963 stipulates that once the limitation period has commenced, it continues to run, irrespective of any subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application. 23. It is an accepted position that Rs. 1,00,000/- was paid at the time of execution of the agreement to sell (Exhibit A-1), and the balance consideration of Rs. 31,45,000 was required to be paid by 26.05.1989. Time for payment of Rs. 31,45,000/- and execution of the sale deed was extended till 26.11.1989 vide the endorsement (Exhibit A-3). If we take the date 26.11.1989 as the date for performance, the suit for specific performance filed on 27.09.1995, is barred by limitation. 31,45,000 was required to be paid by 26.05.1989. Time for payment of Rs. 31,45,000/- and execution of the sale deed was extended till 26.11.1989 vide the endorsement (Exhibit A-3). If we take the date 26.11.1989 as the date for performance, the suit for specific performance filed on 27.09.1995, is barred by limitation. However, we agree with the submission raised on behalf of K.P. Murali and S.P. Duraisamy, that the aforesaid time, as fixed vide the agreement to sell and the endorsement (Exhibit A-1 and A- 3), was not the essence of the contract and therefore, the first part of Article 54 will not be applicable. Instead, the second part of Article 54 will apply. On the interpretation of Article 54, this Court in Pachanan Dhara v. Monmatha Nath Maity, has held that for determining applicability of the first or the second part, the court will have to see whether any time was fixed for performance of the agreement to sell and if so fixed, whether the suit was filed beyond the prescribed period, unless a case for extension of time or performance was pleaded or established. However, when no time is fixed for performance, the court will have to determine the date on which the plaintiff had notice of refusal on part of the defendant to perform the contract. Therefore, we have to examine whether K. Sriram or his assignees, K.P. Murali or S.P. Duraisamy, had notice that performance had been refused by A. Valliammai and, if so, from which date.” 94. In view of the above legal position and applying the second limb of Article 54 i.e., “if no such date is fixed, when the Plaintiff has notice that performance is refused”, and further, in view of the continuous cause of action, the limitation starts from the date of issuance of reply notice dated 27.10.2004 by appellant No.1(vendor). As such, the suit filed by respondent No.1 on 10.11.2004 is well within the period of limitation. ISSUE No.6: 95. To adjudicate the issue as to whether Respondent No.1 is entitled to the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale dated 30.03.1995, it is necessary to determine whether the Respondent No.1 was ready and willing to perform his obligation. 96. As per clause 11 of the agreement of sale, the obligations specified therein can be referred to as reciprocal promises. 96. As per clause 11 of the agreement of sale, the obligations specified therein can be referred to as reciprocal promises. It is for the Appellant No.1 to first get the land surveyed and demarcated, and then, intimate the same in writing to Respondent No.1. Respondent No.1, to perform his reciprocal promise, must wait until the Appellant No.1 performed her part of promise i.e., to get the land surveyed and demarcated by metes and bounds, and thereafter, within a period of six months, respondent No.1 is under obligation to pay the balance sale consideration and thereupon, appellant No.1 is under obligation to transfer the property to respondent No.1. 97. In the present case, admittedly Appellant No.1 failed to perform her obligation as specified in the agreement of sale. However, from the pleadings and the evidence on record, it is evident that Respondent No.1 is ready and willing to perform his part of reciprocal promise/obligation to pay the balance sale consideration under the agreement of sale. 98. In this context, it is relevant to discuss Sections 52 and 55 of Indian Contract Act: “ 52. Order of performance of reciprocal promises. Where the order in which reciprocal promises are to be performed is expressly fixed by the contract, they shall be performed in that order; and where the order is not expressly fixed by the contract, they shall be performed in that order which the nature of the transaction requires. ****** 55. Effect of failure to perform at fixed time, in contract in which time is essential. —When a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing at or before a specified time, or certain things at or before specified times, and fails to do any such thing at or before the specified time, the contract, or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee, if the intention of the parties was that time should be of the essence of the contract. Effect of such failure when time is not essential. — If it was not the intention of the parties that time should be of the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing at or before the specified time; but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. — If it was not the intention of the parties that time should be of the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing at or before the specified time; but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. Effect of acceptance of performance at time other than that agreed upon. —If, in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor’s failure to perform his promise at the time agreed, the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance, he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so.” 99. Since the Appellant failed to perform her part of reciprocal promise/obligation as per the agreement of sale, the Respondent issued a legal notice dated 30.09.2004, the contents of which are as under: “…..Though my client repeatedly approached you to demarcate the balance extent of land and intimated his readiness and willingness to pay the balance sale consideration in terms of above referred agreement of sale, you resorted to postpone the issue on one pretext or other. My client is ready to pay the balance sale consideration and to obtain the registered sale deed/s for balance extent of said land. Hence, my client hereby called upon you to demarcate the balance extent of land and produce pattadar passbooks of the above referred property covered by Sy.No.87, 104 and 105 and intimate the same and my client is ready to bear the balance sale consideration in terms of above referred agreement of sale and further called upon you to execute the registered sale deed for the said balance extent of land in favour of my client within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of this legal notice…….” 100. In response to the said legal notice, Appellant No.1 sent a reply notice denying the existence of agreement of sale. Aggrieved by the reply notice, the Respondent No.1 filed suit in O.S.No.80 of 2004 (renumbered as O.S.No.84 of 2022), pleading in the plaint as follows: “ 8 ….. In response to the said legal notice, Appellant No.1 sent a reply notice denying the existence of agreement of sale. Aggrieved by the reply notice, the Respondent No.1 filed suit in O.S.No.80 of 2004 (renumbered as O.S.No.84 of 2022), pleading in the plaint as follows: “ 8 ….. the plaintiff is ready to pay the balance sale consideration and get the sale deed for balance land and the defendant was further cautioned that with the defendant fails to comply with the demand within 15 days of the receipt of the notice…… Thus it is clear, that the defendant is not willing to perform her part of obligation and execute the Regd. Sale Deed in favour of plaintiff after receiving the balance sale consideration. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff is forced to file the present suit for Specific Performance. The plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his obligation and also ready to pay the balance sale consideration. 10 .……. The plaintiff is liable to pay a sum of Rs.5,42,000/- to the defendant being the balance sale consideration, on execution of sale deed in favour of the plaintiff as demanded in the legal notice dated 30.09.2004. The plaintiff is ready and willing to pay the balance sale consideration as and when directed by the Hon’ble Court” 101. During cross-examination of respondent No.1, nothing was elicited to challenge his readiness and willingness to pay the balance sale consideration. No suggestion was made that the Appellants were not bound by agreement of sale, instead, it is suggested that “Ex.B1 is a created document.” 101.1. The conduct of appellant No.1 in failing to demarcate the land as per the terms of the agreement of sale, executing the sale deed only to certain extent and refusing to perform the balance part of her obligation, clearly demonstrates that appellant No.1 failed to comply with her reciprocal promises under Section 52 of the Contract Act. In contrast, respondent No.1 consistently demonstrated his readiness and willingness to pay the balance sale consideration in respect of the remaining extent of land, as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Gaddipati Divija and Anr. Vs. Pathuri Samrajyam & Ors . 2023 SCC Online Special Court 442 , observed as under:- “23. In contrast, respondent No.1 consistently demonstrated his readiness and willingness to pay the balance sale consideration in respect of the remaining extent of land, as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Gaddipati Divija and Anr. Vs. Pathuri Samrajyam & Ors . 2023 SCC Online Special Court 442 , observed as under:- “23. At the outset, we would like to mention that Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (along with its explanation) is the relevant provision of law which is attracted in the present case, and as has also been held by the High Court. The 2018 Amendment to the Specific Relief Act made certain amendments to Section 16 as well. However, it has been clarified in the recent 3-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Katta Sujatha Reddy v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd., that the 2018 Amendment was not a mere procedural enactment, but it had substantive principles built into its working, and, as such, the said Amendment is prospective in nature and cannot apply to those transactions that took place prior to its enforcement. Therefore, in the present case, Section 16, as it stood prior to the 2018 Amendment, would be applicable, since the matter dates back to 2002. Section 16 (as it then stood) is being reproduced hereunder:— “ 16. Personal bars to relief.— Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person— (a) who would not be entitled to recover compensation for its breach; or (b) who has become incapable of performing, or violates any essential term of, the contract that on his part remains to be performed, or acts in fraud of the contract, or wilfully acts at variance with, or in subversion of, the relation intended to be established by the contract; or (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms of the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation.— For the purposes of clause (c),— (i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the court; (ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction.” 87. On a bare perusal of the aforementioned section, it becomes clear that prior to the 2018 Amendment, clause (c) of Section 16 laid down that the plaintiff is entitled for a specific performance of contract if he avers and proves that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform his obligation under the contract. The explanation attached to clause (c) further clarified that in a contract involving the payment of money, the plaintiff need not actually deposit the money to the defendant, and that he must aver that he has performed, or is ready and willing to perform the contract according to its true construction.” 102. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court by referring to the judgments rendered in Syed Dastagir v. T.R. Gopalakrishna Setty and Aniglase Yohannan v. Ramlatha, observed as hereunder:- “Therefore, it can be deduced that unless the vendor got the subject land measured and demarcated within three months, it would be impossible for the purchaser (Respondent No. 1 herein/Plaintiff) to get a sale deed executed, and as such, the question of paying the balance sale consideration does not arise. This was also observed by the High Court while placing reliance on the recitals in the sale agreement coupled with the evidence of PW1 and PW2. Moreover, as has been held above, it is clear that the vendor (deceased G. Venugopala Rao) failed to perform his part of the obligations by getting the subject land measured and demarcated, while the purchaser (Respondent No. 1 herein/Plaintiff) was ever ready and willing to pay the balance consideration. As such, when specific performance of the terms of the contract has not been done, the question of time being the essence does not arise.” 103. The facts of the present case and the facts in Gaddipati Divija’s case (cited supra) are almost similar and hence, the judgment rendered in the said case squarely applies to the present case. 104. As such, when specific performance of the terms of the contract has not been done, the question of time being the essence does not arise.” 103. The facts of the present case and the facts in Gaddipati Divija’s case (cited supra) are almost similar and hence, the judgment rendered in the said case squarely applies to the present case. 104. Therefore, applying the above legal position to the present case, it can be held that the Respondent No.1 clearly pleaded in his legal notice as well as in the plaint that he is ready and willing to perform his obligation as per the agreement of sale and is also ready to pay the balance sale consideration upon the direction of the Court. It is the Appellant No.1 who was not ready to perform her part of obligation as agreed in the agreement of sale. 105. In the light of the above, Respondent No.1 is entitled to the relief specific performance and Respondent No.1 is hereby directed to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs.5,42,000/- (Rupees Five lakhs forty two thousand only) to Appellants towards remaining extent of land within a period of two months from today and upon such payment, the Appellants are directed to execute a registered sale deed in respect of the remaining extent of land in favour of Respondent No.1 within a period of two months thereafter. In the event of the appellants failing to execute a registered sale deed in favour of respondent No.1, respondent No.1 is entitled to get the registered sale deed executed through the process of the Court. ISSUE Nos. 7 & 8: 106. In view of the findings of this Court on the abovementioned issued and the reasons assigned therefor, this Court is of the considered opinion that the trial Court has appreciated the oral and documentary evidence placed on record from a proper perspective and has come to a right conclusion and hence, the impugned common judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court does not require any interference by this Court and both the Appeals are liable to be dismissed. 107. In the result, the Appeals are dismissed. 108. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.