JUDGMENT : ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY, J. This Second Appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 29.09.2018 (decree signed on 05.10.2018) passed by learned District Judge – I, Dumka in Civil Appeal No.17 of 2012 whereby the appeal has been allowed and the judgment and decree dated 20.07.2012 (decree signed on 02.08.2012) passed by learned Senior Civil Judge – I, Dumka in Title Suit No.03 of 2008 has been reversed. The learned trial court was pleased to dismiss the plaintiffs' suit. The defendant no.1 is the appellant before this Court. 2. This appeal was admitted for hearing vide order dated 13.06.2023 on the following substantial questions of law: "1. Whether the learned First Appellate Court committed gross illegality by ignoring the fact that the suit was hopelessly barred by limitation? 2. Whether the learned First Appellate Court failed to consider the fact the plaintiff no. 2, could not have been arrayed as such, when the plaintiff no. 1 was making the prayer for cancellation of adoption of defendant no. 1 and the plaintiff no. 2, has no other right except that he is one of the adopted son of plaintiff no. 1? 3. Whether the learned First Appellate Court committed gross illegality by raising doubts over the execution of Exhibit B/1, even though, the execution of the same, is not disputed by the executant thereof?" Arguments of the Appellant/Defendant 3. The learned counsel for the appellant has referred to paragraph 2 of the trial court’s judgment to submit that the entire case of the plaintiff has been narrated therein. He has submitted that the specific case of the plaintiff was that the defendant no.2 is a Mahajan of the locality, a property grabber. The plaintiff no.1 and the defendants had come to Dumka Registry office on 25.06.1975 for execution of bhugabandha (mortgage) deed. However, with a view to grab the land of the plaintiff no.1 (Shanti Kumrain) the defendant no.2 fraudulently manufactured a deed of adoption in favour of his son Pawan Rout (defendant no.1). After some time, the defendant no.2 told the plaintiff no.1 about the adoption deed and on inquiry the plaintiff no.1 learnt about the matter on 18.08.1975. Then the plaintiff no.1 executed a deed of cancellation of adoption deed no.478/1975 dated 23.06.1975 before the Registry Office, Dumka. After some time, the defendant no.2 told the plaintiff no.1 about the adoption deed and on inquiry the plaintiff no.1 learnt about the matter on 18.08.1975. Then the plaintiff no.1 executed a deed of cancellation of adoption deed no.478/1975 dated 23.06.1975 before the Registry Office, Dumka. The cause of action for the suit arose on 12.09.2007 the date on which the defendants claimed adoption before the police officer of Ramgarh based on the alleged adoption deed no.478/1975. It was claimed by the plaintiffs that the defendant’s adoption deed was forged. 4. The learned counsel has submitted that it was the case of the plaintiffs themselves that they came to know about the adoption deed no.478/1975 at least on 18.08.1975 and that they had also executed a deed of cancellation of the adoption deed no.478/1975 but apart from such statement about cancellation of adoption deed no.478/1975, no such deed of cancellation has been exhibited before the court. The suit was barred by limitation as it was filed much after 18.08.1975. The learned counsel has relied upon a judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1996) 7 SCC 767 (Md. Noorul Hoda Vs. Bibi Raifunnisa and Ors.) to submit that in case of fraud also, the suit for declaration or cancellation of the deed has to be filed within a period of three years from the date of knowledge. Arguments of the Plaintiffs 5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents – plaintiffs has submitted that the plaintiffs claimed that the plaintiff no.1 had taken plaintiff no.2 Kundan Kumar by way of adoption on 24.06.2002 after completing the ceremonies. He has also submitted that the plaintiff no.1 is an illiterate lady and has no knowledge of law and procedure, and therefore, merely because the adoption deed no.478/1975 was not challenged, the same is not fatal to her case particularly in view of the fact that it was her specific case that adoption deed no.478/1975 was executed by fraud committed by the defendants. 6. The learned counsel has referred to the judgment passed by Hon’ble Karnataka High Court reported in 1997 SCC OnLine Karnataka 215 (Ravi Namdev Kavale Vs. Kittaswami) to submit that illiteracy is also a disability and consequential ignorance of law of limitation as such can be said to be a disability. 6. The learned counsel has referred to the judgment passed by Hon’ble Karnataka High Court reported in 1997 SCC OnLine Karnataka 215 (Ravi Namdev Kavale Vs. Kittaswami) to submit that illiteracy is also a disability and consequential ignorance of law of limitation as such can be said to be a disability. In the matter relating to right of a person to approach a court to obtain legal relief, unless malafide shown or established, simply on ground of ignorance of law or lack of knowledge of law of limitation or like, no person should be punished for delay in filing the case. The learned counsel has submitted that the remedy was not barred by law even if it is said to be barred by limitation in view of the status of the plaintiff No.1, who was completely illiterate and ignorant. 7. The learned counsel has also submitted that mere execution of adoption deed no.478/1975 is not sufficient, the same was also required to be acted upon in such a manner that the adopted child severe all his relationship with the natural parents. 8. He has submitted that at the appellate stage, three documents were exhibited i.e. Ext. 3, 3/1 and 3/2 which were relating to the records of the electoral office relating to the year 1995 till the year 2004, to submit that the defendant no.1 has been showing himself as son of his natural parents. He has submitted that a finding has been recorded by the appellate court on the basis of the additional evidence adduced before the appellate court that the defendant no.1 was living with his natural parents. The learned counsel submits that the said documents were enough to show that the defendant no.1 had not severed all relationship with his natural parents and therefore the adoption deed no.478/1975, even though it was said to have been executed way back in the year 1975, is of no consequence as the adoption was not complete. He has relied upon the provision of Section 6 (iv), 5(i), 11 (vi) and 12 of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, to submit that the so-called adoption was no adoption in the eyes of law and it was void-ab-initio. He has relied upon the provision of Section 6 (iv), 5(i), 11 (vi) and 12 of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, to submit that the so-called adoption was no adoption in the eyes of law and it was void-ab-initio. He has also relied upon the judgment reported in ( 1969) 2 SCC 544 ( Smt. Sitabai and another v. Ramchandra ) paragraph 5 to submit that the provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act have been duly considered and it has been held that the true effect and interpretation of Sections 11 and 12 of the Act of 1956 is that when either of the spouse adopts a child, all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth becomes completely severed and these are all replaced by those created by the adoption in the adopted family. 9. The learned counsel has further referred to the judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2006) 5 SCC 353 ( Prem Singh v. Birbal ) paragraphs 11 and 16 to submit that when a document is valid, no question arises for its cancellation, but when a document is void ab initio, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary as the same is non est in the eyes of law, and it would be a nullity. The learned counsel submits that the adoption claimed way back in the year 1975 is ex facie a nullity in the eyes of law and therefore, the suit cannot be said to be barred by limitation. However, during the course of arguments, it transpired that in paragraph 17 of the said judgment, it has been held that once a suit is filed by a plaintiff for cancellation of a transaction, it would be governed by Article 59 of the limitation Act and even if Article 59 is not attracted, the residuary Article would be. 10. The learned counsel thereafter relied upon the judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 1958 SCC OnLine SC 54 ( Kishori Lal v. Mst. Chaltibai) paragraph 7 to submit that as the adoption results in change in the course of succession, the adoption to strangers or more remote relation is required to be examined as to whether it was free for any suspicion. 11. Chaltibai) paragraph 7 to submit that as the adoption results in change in the course of succession, the adoption to strangers or more remote relation is required to be examined as to whether it was free for any suspicion. 11. The learned counsel thereafter has relied upon the judgment passed by Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case reported in 1967 SCC Online Kar 144 (Govinda Vs. Chimabai) paragraph 37 to submit that in the said case, the endorsement was made before the Sub- registrar which showed that the document of adoption was executed but it has been held that mere registration is not sufficient and cannot be taken as evidence of proof of adoption as the adoption deed never proves an adoption. It has been held that an adoption deed which contains a recital to the adoption having been made would not give the plaintiff a status of adopted son if that option itself is disproved or if it is shown that the adoption deed was not executed voluntarily but was obtained by misrepresentation or fraud. The learned counsel submits that in the present case, it was the specific case of the plaintiff that the adoption deed was obtained by fraud and it was never voluntarily executed by the plaintiff no.1. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that so far as substantial questions of law framed no.1 and 3 are concerned, they are related and he has advanced his aforesaid arguments on those questions. 13. So far as substantial question no.2 is concerned, the point essentially relates to the fact that there was no occasion to array plaintiff no.2 as party, as plaintiff no.2 was said to have been adopted by adoption deed of the year 2002. He has submitted that if the adoption deed no.478/1975 is held to be null and void or illegal then under such circumstances, the adoption deed of plaintiff no.2 would survive. He submits that the legality of the adoption of plaintiff no.2 was also involved in this manner and he was being represented through plaintiff no.1. Rejoinder argument of the Appellant 14. He submits that the legality of the adoption of plaintiff no.2 was also involved in this manner and he was being represented through plaintiff no.1. Rejoinder argument of the Appellant 14. The learned counsel for the appellant, in response, has submitted that the respondents have made out a case during the course of argument that the adoption deed no.478/1975 was not required to be cancelled as it was null and void, however, such a point is not available as the suit was filed by the plaintiff seeking cancellation of the deed and therefore, it has to be governed by the provisions of Limitation Act and Article 59 is attracted. He has also referred to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in ( 2011) 9 SCC 126 [ Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India] and has submitted that the said judgment has been delivered in the context of Article 58, but the same principle would apply. The learned counsel has submitted that the cause of action to file a suit arises when the first cause of action is there and there is continuous running of time. He has relied upon paragraphs 23 and 30 of the said judgment. He submits that subsequent cause of action will not give rise to a fresh period of limitation. 15. The learned counsel has also submitted that once the suit is held to be barred by limitation, then there is no question of giving any findings on merit. 16. The learned counsel has also submitted that the appellate court has gone into and made out a third case altogether by observing that the lady was illiterate and her thumb impression was not sent for examination by expert, although the execution of the adoption deed no.478/1975 was not in dispute and the case of the plaintiff was that it was fraudulently got executed. The learned counsel submits that it is not permissible for the court to make out a third case on which the parties did not join issue. He has also submitted that Sections 15 and 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 is required to be taken into consideration with regard to validity of adoption and presumption as to registered document relating adoption. He has also submitted that Sections 15 and 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 is required to be taken into consideration with regard to validity of adoption and presumption as to registered document relating adoption. He has submitted that not only the execution of adoption deed no.478/1975 was duly proved but also the ceremonies in connection with the adoption were also proved by the defendant. 17. The learned counsel has also submitted that Exhibits 3, 3/1 and 3/2 exhibited at the stage of the appellate court has no relevance in view of the fact that once the child is adopted, he cannot go back to his natural parents. The learned counsel has submitted that so far as plaintiff no.2 is concerned, he came into picture in view of the fact that there was a deed of adoption with respect to him in the year 2002. He submits that plaintiff no.2 could not have challenged the adoption which had taken place way back in the year 1975. It is submitted that in the year 2008, plaintiff no.2 was just 10 years of age as shown in the plaint itself and therefore plaintiff no.2 was not even born in the year 1975 when the adoption had taken place. The learned counsel has also submitted that so far as the judgment passed by Hon’ble Karnataka High Court reported in 1997 SCC Online Kar 215 (Ravi Namdev Kavale Vs. Kittaswami) is concerned, the same was relating to filing of appeal where there is a provision for condonation of delay but so far as suit is concerned, once the suit becomes barred by limitation, there is no remedy enforceable through the court of law and delay cannot be condoned. Findings of this Court 18. The Title Suit No.3 of 2008 was filed by two plaintiffs; plaintiff no.1 (Shanti Kumrain) is the wife of late Chandan Kumar and plaintiff no.2 (Kundan Kumar) is the adopted son of plaintiff no.1 and her husband. Plaintiff no.2 was represented through plaintiff no.1 stating that plaintiff no.2 was 10 years of age. The plaintiff no.2 was said to have been taken in adoption by plaintiff no.1 on 24.06.2002. The suit was filed for cancellation of adoption deed no.478 of 1975 and seeking a declaration that the defendant no.1 was not the adopted son of Chandan Kumar. Plaintiff no.2 was represented through plaintiff no.1 stating that plaintiff no.2 was 10 years of age. The plaintiff no.2 was said to have been taken in adoption by plaintiff no.1 on 24.06.2002. The suit was filed for cancellation of adoption deed no.478 of 1975 and seeking a declaration that the defendant no.1 was not the adopted son of Chandan Kumar. The defendant nos.2 and 3 were the natural father and mother of the defendant no.1. The parties are governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. It was the case of the plaintiffs that the cause of action for suit arose on 12.09.2007, that is, the date on which the defendants claimed adoption on the basis of alleged deed of adoption no.478 of 1975. The plaintiffs claimed that the deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 was fraudulently executed and hence was forged and fabricated. It was the case of the plaintiffs that plaintiff no.1 had never adopted defendant no.1 (Pawan Raut) nor any ceremony was performed in that regard on 25.05.1975 or any other date and defendant no.1 was still living with his natural parents [defendant nos.2 and 3] and the marriage of defendant no.1 was also performed by his natural parents. The defendant no.1 has no connection with the family of the plaintiffs; defendant no.2 was Mahajan of the locality and a property grabber. With regard to the deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 dated 25.06.1975, it was the case of the plaintiffs that plaintiff no.1 and the defendants had come to Dumka Registry office on 25.06.1975 for execution of Bhugatbanda deed (mortgage deed) but with a view to grab the land of the plaintiff no.1, the defendant no.2 fraudulently manufactured the deed of adoption, got it executed by the plaintiff no.1 showing adoption of biological son of the defendant no.2, that is, defendant no.1, by the plaintiff no.1. It was further case of the plaintiffs that the defendant no.2 told plaintiff no.1 about the adoption deed and on inquiry, the plaintiffs no.1 learnt about the matter on 18.08.1975. It was further case of the plaintiffs that the plaintiff no.1 executed a deed of the cancellation of the aforesaid adoption deed before the Registry office, Dumka. However, admittedly, the cancellation deed was never exhibited before the court. It was further case of the plaintiffs that the plaintiff no.1 executed a deed of the cancellation of the aforesaid adoption deed before the Registry office, Dumka. However, admittedly, the cancellation deed was never exhibited before the court. The execution of deed no.478 of 1975 is not in dispute but it was the case of the plaintiffs that the deed no.478/1975 was executed fraudulently as an adoption deed and the plaintiff no.1 had gone to the Registry office only for the purposes of execution of the bhugatbandha deed (mortgage deed) and not for execution of adoption deed no.478/1975. 19. On the other hand, the defendants claimed that the plaintiff no.1 and her husband late Chandan Kumar had no issue and they intended to take a boy, and therefore, they adopted defendant no.1 and plaintiff no.1 on her own accord selected defendant no.1 for taking in adoption and requested his natural parents [defendant nos.2 and 3] to give him in adoption. Thereafter, with their consent, 25.05.1975 was fixed for performance of katha puja including giving and taking ceremony of defendant no.1 and in the ceremony, relatives, friends and villagers as well as the natural parents [defendant nos.2 and 3] were invited who attended the ceremony along with the boy [defendant no.1] and the adoption was completed and the defendant no.1 was renamed as Ram Chandra Kumar. It was the case of the defendants that the plaintiff no.1 was fully aware about the legal, valid and operative adoption of the defendant no.1 and of the adoption deed no.478/1975 executed by her and natural parents[defendant nos.2 and 3] and as such the suit for declaration that the defendant no.1 was not adopted son of plaintiff no.1 and that the deed of adoption no.478/1975 was null and void was barred by limitation being filed after 23 years instead of 3 years from 1975 as provided under the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. With regard to adoption of plaintiff no.2, it was asserted that no adoption had taken place and no such ceremony was performed and the plaintiff no.2 never resided with the plaintiff no.1 and he was living with his natural parents. It was also asserted that the plaintiff no.1 never executed any cancellation deed in relation to the adoption deed no.478 of 1975. 20. Following issues were framed by the learned trial court (i) Is the suit maintainable in it’s present form? It was also asserted that the plaintiff no.1 never executed any cancellation deed in relation to the adoption deed no.478 of 1975. 20. Following issues were framed by the learned trial court (i) Is the suit maintainable in it’s present form? (ii) Have the plaintiffs valid cause of action for the present suit? (iii) Is the suit barred by law of limitation? (iv) Is the suit barred under the principle of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence? (v) Whether Pawan Raut defendant no.1 is not the adopted son of Chandan Kumar. (vi) Whether registered deed of adoption no.478/1975 is legal inoperative, void and fit to be cancelled? (vii) Are the plaintiffs entitled to the claim relief/reliefs? (viii) To what other relief or reliefs, the plaintiffs are entitled to? 21. With regard to Substantial Question No. 2, this Court finds that the Plaintiff No. 1 added Plaintiff No. 2 and also represented Plaintiff No. 2 as he was minor. Admittedly the Plaintiff No. 1 was seeking cancellation of adoption of Defendant No. 1 being registered deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 and the Plaintiff No. 2 had no other right except that he was said to be the adopted son of Plaintiff No. 1 vide another registered deed of adoption of the year 2002. The legality and validity of the deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 has a direct bearing on the legality and validity of adoption deed of plaintiff no.2 in the year 2002 and therefore the plaintiff no.2 was certainly interested in setting aside the deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 of the defendant no.1. There was no illegality in arraying the plaintiff no. 2 as a party in the suit. It is important to note that no issue was framed by the learned court with regard to misjoinder of parties. The substantial question no.2 is accordingly answered. Substantial question no.3 22. Both the parties led oral and documentary evidences. The plaintiffs inter alia exhibited the registered deed of adoption dated 08.07.2002 as Exhibit 2 and the original deed of adoption no.478 dated 23.06.1975 executed by plaintiff no.1 in favour of defendant no.1 was exhibited by the defendants as Exhibit B/1. Exhibit A was the signature of Ram Nishan Rai on adoption deed dated 23.06.1975 and Exhibit B was the writing and signature of Kapleshwar Jha on the adoption deed dated 23.06.1975. 23. The two main issues, namely, issue no. Exhibit A was the signature of Ram Nishan Rai on adoption deed dated 23.06.1975 and Exhibit B was the writing and signature of Kapleshwar Jha on the adoption deed dated 23.06.1975. 23. The two main issues, namely, issue no. 6 and 7 were taken up by the trial court together and upon scrutiny of the materials on record held that it was an admitted fact that the plaintiff no.1 had come to the Registry officer on 23.06.1975 and execute a deed but she claimed that she had come to execute bhugatbandha deed (mortgage deed) and not adoption deed; it was held that the plaintiffs did not bring any proof of any talk about bhugatbandha deed (mortgage deed) and there was no proof that the defendant no. 2 was a Mahajan and a land grabber or a fraud person; it was held that the plaintiff no.1 had gone to the registry office and duly executed the deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 and had not gone for execution of any other deed as alleged and the deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 was a genuine document; it was also held that the recitals of the deed also mentioned about performance of the ceremonies of adoption by giving and taking and performance of katha puja and the oral evidences of the defendants also supported the factum of performance of ceremonies of adoption. It was held that the defendant no.1 was validly adopted and deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 was genuine and valid and cannot be cancelled. Further, the suit was held to be barred by limitation and on merits the deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 was held to be valid and operative and dismissed the suit. 24. Before the first appellate court, three documents relating to the records of the electoral office concerning voter list of the period 1995 till 2004 which were marked as Exhibits 3, 3/1 and 3/2 were taken as additional evidence from the side of the plaintiffs, who were the appellants. The first appellate court by referring to the additional evidence Exhibits 3, 3/1 and 3/2 held that the name of defendant no.1 in the voter list was showing son of defendant nos. 2 and 3, and the wife of defendant no.1 had no relation with the plaintiffs. The first appellate court by referring to the additional evidence Exhibits 3, 3/1 and 3/2 held that the name of defendant no.1 in the voter list was showing son of defendant nos. 2 and 3, and the wife of defendant no.1 had no relation with the plaintiffs. By referring to Exhibits 3, 3/1 and 3/2, the appellate court recorded that at present the defendant no.1 was having relation with his biological parents and after his marriage, he was living with his biological parents, and accordingly, held that the genuineness of deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 falls like a pack of card. The learned appellate court thereafter referred to the deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 (Exhibit B/1) and interalia, observed that the thump impression made by the plaintiff no.1 on the deed of adoption was not sent for examination by any expert and held that the deed of adoption was got executed fraudulently by the defendants, who were her close relative (gotia). The appellate court rejected the evidence of the defendants witnesses in connection with the factum of adoption primarily on the ground that the thumb impression of the plaintiff no.1 on the deed was not examined by an expert and also on the basis of Exhibits 3, 3/1 and 3/2, which were exhibited as additional evidences at the appellate stage and were relating to voter list of the year 1995 to 2004, and accordingly, the learned appellate court reversed the findings in connection with issue nos.5 and 6 decided by the learned trial court. This Court finds that, it is in this background, the substantial question of law no.3 as framed by this Court is required to be decided. 25. This Court finds that execution of the registered deed no. 478 of 1975 is not in dispute from the side of the plaintiffs and what was disputed was that plaintiff did not execute any deed of adoption of defendant no.1 but had gone to the registry office to execute a bhugatbandha deed (mortgage deed) and it was also the case of the plaintiff no.1 that as soon as she came to know in the year 1975 itself that she was fraudulently made to execute an adoption deed and not bhugatbandha deed (mortgage deed), plaintiff no.1 got the deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 cancelled. However, no evidence regarding cancellation of deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 was produced and the original deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 was produced by the contesting defendants marked as Exhibit B/1. 26. Thus, it was nobody's case that the deed no. 478 of 1975 was never executed by the plaintiff no.1. In view of the aforesaid finding, the learned First Appellate Court has certainly committed gross illegality by raising doubts over the very execution of Exhibit B/1. The substantial question no.3 is accordingly, answered against the respondents and in favour of the appellant (defendant no1). 27. The consequence of deciding the substantial question no.3 in favour of the appellant (defendant no.1) is also required to be considered as the appellate court had substantially based its finding with regard to issue nos.5 and 6 by disbelieving the very execution of deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 (Exhibit B/1) by the defendant no.1. It was in this background; the learned appellate court has rejected the evidence of the defendants with regard to the factum of conduct of ceremonies and giving and taking of the defendant no.1 in the ceremony performed for adoption. The severance of relationship with the biological parents has also been considered in the light of Exhibits 3, 3/1 and 3/2, which were adduced as additional evidences at the appellate stage and were admittedly relating to the period 1995 to 2004 in connection with entry made in voter list. Once the deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 has been found to be executed by the plaintiff no.1, the legal presumption under Section 16 of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act in connection with registered documents relating to adoption, cannot be ignored and the onus was heavy upon the plaintiffs to disprove the factum of adoption. This Court is also of the view that the factum of actual adoption could not have been disbelieved by the appellate court on the basis of the present status of defendant no.1 by holding that he was at present living with his biological parents that too on the basis of the records of the electoral office relating to voter list of the period 1995 till 2004 which were marked as Exhibits 3, 3/1 and 3/2. This observation cannot be sustained in view of Section 15 of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 which provides that no adoption validly made can be cancelled and the child cannot renounce his status as such and return to the family. It is important to note that the defendant no.1, the child given in adoption, is the appellant before this Court and he has challenged the finding of the learned first appellate court which had held that the deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 is null and void. As recorded by the learned trial court, the factum of adoption was duly proved by oral evidence led by the defendants and the learned trial court had discarded the evidences of the plaintiffs on the point by observing that they were interested witnesses. The findings of the learned trial court in connection with the factum of adoption has not been dealt with by the learned appellate court, although the judgement passed by the learned trial court on this point was a well-reasoned judgement. Consequently, the finding of the learned first appellate court reversing the finding of the learned trial court on issue nos.5 and 6 is set aside and the finding of the learned trial court in connection with issue nos.5 and 6 is upheld. Substantial question no.1 28. The issue of limitation being issue no.(iii) was decided vide paragraph 10 of the trial court judgment. It was held that the adoption deed is of the year 1975 and the suit has been filed in the year 2008 after 33 years. It was further observed that in the pleadings in paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of the plaint, it was stated that Soudagar Rout (defendant no2) told the plaintiff no.1 about adoption deed and when plaintiff no.1 enquired in the Registry office on 18.08.1975, she came to know about the matter and plaintiff no.1 also executed cancellation of adoption deed no.478 of 1975. The learned trial court recorded that it was crystal clear that the plaintiff has knowledge of adoption deed as back as in the year 1975 but she filed the suit after 33 years which was barred by limitation. 29. The learned trial court recorded that it was crystal clear that the plaintiff has knowledge of adoption deed as back as in the year 1975 but she filed the suit after 33 years which was barred by limitation. 29. The learned appellate court doubted the very execution of the deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 by the plaintiff no.1 and consequently rejected the oral evidence of the defendants regarding the factum of adoption by performing ceremonies/rituals and physical taking and giving of defendant no.1 and while doing so held that the present status of the defendant no.1 was that he was living with his wife with his biological parents by referring to the documents relating to voter list for the period 1995 to 2004 in view of additional evidences adduced by the plaintiffs at appellate stage. The learned first appellate court held that the deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 was void -ab-initio and a nullity. The appellate court also held that the cause of action arose on 12.09.2007 and the suit was filed within three years thereafter. 30. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Md. Noorul Hoda (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that Article 59 of the Limitation Act is a general provision and, in a suit, to set aside or cancel an instrument, a contract or a decree on the ground of fraud, Article 59 is attracted and the starting point of limitation is the date of knowledge of the alleged fraud. It has also been held that when the Plaintiff seeks to establish his title to property which cannot be established without avoiding the decree or an instrument that stands as insurmountable obstacle in his way which otherwise binds him, though not a party, the Plaintiff necessarily has to seek a declaration and have that decree, instrument or contract cancelled or set aside or rescinded. Paragraph 6 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted as under: “6. The question, therefore, is as to whether Article 59 or Article 113 of the Schedule to the Act is applicable to the facts in this case. Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 had provided inter alia for suits to set aside decree obtained by fraud. There was no specific article to set aside a decree on any other ground. Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 had provided inter alia for suits to set aside decree obtained by fraud. There was no specific article to set aside a decree on any other ground. In such a case, the residuary Article 120 in Schedule III was attracted. The present Article 59 of the Schedule to the Act will govern any suit to set aside a decree either on fraud or any other ground. Therefore, Article 59 would be applicable to any suit to set aside a decree either on fraud or any other ground. It is true that Article 59 would be applicable if a person affected is a party to a decree or an instrument or a contract. There is no dispute that Article 59 would apply to set aside the instrument, decree or contract between the inter se parties. The question is whether in case of person claiming title through the party to the decree or instrument or having knowledge of the instrument or decree or contract and seeking to avoid the decree by a specific declaration, whether Article 59 gets attracted? As stated earlier, Article 59 is a general provision. In a suit to set aside or cancel an instrument, a contract or a decree on the ground of fraud, Article 59 is attracted. The starting point of limitation is the date of knowledge of the alleged fraud. When the plaintiff seeks to establish his title to the property which cannot be established without avoiding the decree or an instrument that stands as an insurmountable obstacle in his way which otherwise binds him, though not a party, the plaintiff necessarily has to seek a declaration and have that decree, instrument or contract cancelled or set aside or rescinded. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 regulates suits for cancellation of an instrument which lays down that any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable and who has a reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding, may cause him serious injury, can sue to have it adjudged void or voidable and the court may in its discretion so adjudge it and order it to be delivered or cancelled. It would thus be clear that the word ‘person’ in Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act is wide enough to encompass a person seeking derivative title from his seller. It would thus be clear that the word ‘person’ in Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act is wide enough to encompass a person seeking derivative title from his seller. It would, therefore, be clear that if he seeks avoidance of the instrument, decree or contract and seeks a declaration to have the decrees set aside or cancelled he is necessarily bound to lay the suit within three years from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the decree set aside, first became known to him.” 31. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in the case of Prem Singh and Ors. v. Birbal and Ors. (2006) 5 SCC 353 , it has been held in paragraph 16 that when a document is valid, no question arises for its cancellation and when a document is void ab initio, the decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary as the same is nonest in the eyes of law, as it would be a nullity. It has been held that once a suit is filed by the Plaintiff for cancellation of a transaction, it would be governed by Article 59 and even if Article 59 is not attracted, the residuary article would be attracted. It has been held in paragraph 18 of the judgement that Article 59 would be attracted when coercion, undue influence, misappropriation or fraud which the Plaintiff asserts is required to be proved. Article 59 would apply to the case of such instruments. It would, therefore, apply where the document is prima facie valid. It would not apply only to instruments which are presumptively invalid. 32. This Court also finds that the plaintiffs tried to make out a case that the deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 was got fraudulently executed instead of bhugatbandha deed (mortgage deed) and certainly this allegation was required to be proved by the plaintiffs through evidence. It was also the case of the plaintiffs that cancellation of the adoption deed was also executed, which fact was denied by the defendants, but no such deed of cancellation was produced or exhibited by the plaintiffs and the original adoption deed no.478/1975 was produced in the court by the defendant no.1 which was admittedly a registered deed of adoption of the defendant no.1. 33. 33. Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act ,1956 clearly provides that there is presumption as to registered documents relating to adoption. It provides that whenever any registered document is produced before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of the said Act of 1956 unless and until it is disproved. Section 16 is quoted as under: - 16. Presumption as to registered documents relating to adoption.?Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved. 34. This Court is of the considered view that there is presumption of genuineness attached with a registered deed of adoption and therefore, it is a voidable instrument and it is required to be challenged in order to avoid it and therefore the Limitation Act is attracted once a suit is filed seeking cancellation of the registered deed of adoption. The learned trial court has recorded from the plaint itself that the plaintiff no.1 had knowledge of the registered deed of adoption of the defendant no.1 way back in the year 1975 but she did not challenge the same within the period of limitation and hence the suit was barred by limitation. 35. This Court is of the considered view that the learned trial court had rightly referred to Article 57 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which provides that the limitation to obtain a declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid, or never, in fact, took place. The period of limitation is 3 years and it commences when the alleged adoption becomes known to the plaintiffs. In the present case, the alleged adoption becomes known to the plaintiffs way back in the year 1975. Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 57. To obtain a declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid, or never, in fact, took place. Three years When the alleged adoption becomes known to the plaintiff. 36. In the present case, the alleged adoption becomes known to the plaintiffs way back in the year 1975. Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 57. To obtain a declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid, or never, in fact, took place. Three years When the alleged adoption becomes known to the plaintiff. 36. While recording the findings in connection with limitation, the learned first appellate court has neither considered the findings recorded by the learned trial court that the suit challenging deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 was filed after 33 years of knowledge nor considered the fact that as per the case of the plaintiff no.1, she came to know about the execution of deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 way back in the year 1975 itself and she claimed that a deed of cancellation was also executed but no evidence regarding execution of deed of cancellation was produced by the plaintiffs. This Court is of the considered view that the cause of action regarding deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 arose for the plaintiff no.1 to take steps arose for the first time in the year 1975 itself when she came to know about the execution of deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 but she did not take any steps and certainly the suit was barred by limitation. This Court is of the considered view that subsequent incident in the year 2007 relating to the proceedings under Section 144 Cr.P.C. when the defendant no.1 relied upon the deed of adoption no.478 of 1975 does not give a fresh period of limitation to challenge the deed of adoption no.478 of 1975. The learned first appellate court has erred in law while holding that the suit was not barred by limitation. The substantial question no.1 is accordingly answered in favour of the appellant (defendant no. 1) and against the respondents and finding of the learned appellate court on the point of limitation is reversed and the finding of the learned trial court that the suit was barred by limitation is upheld. 37. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed. The appellate court judgment and decree is set aside and the trial court judgment is upheld. 38. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is dismissed as not pressed.