JUDGMENT : Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, J The present intra court appeal under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act , 1958, assails the judgment dated 22.11.2013 passed in W.P(C)No.6492 of 2009, whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition and directed the appellants herein to re-compute the pension and other retirement benefits reckoning the period of leave along with consequential benefits. The appellants were the respondents in the writ petition and the respondent was the petitioner. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent joined the services of Kerala State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC) as conductor in the year 1977. He availed Leave Without Allowance (LWA) for the period from 21.08.1981 to 20.08.1986 and rejoined duty on 21.08.1986. Thereafter he was promoted as Station Master and then as Inspector. He retired from service while officiating as Inspector on 31.12.2008. 3. The issue involved in the writ petition was whether the period of LWA can be reckoned as qualifying service for the purpose of computing pension and other retirement benefits. Vide the impugned order, the appellant authorities had reduced the above mentioned period while reckoning the qualifying service. Being aggrieved, the respondent had filed the writ petition seeking a declaration that he is entitled to count his past services including the period of leave for computing the pension and other benefits. He also prayed for consequential benefits with regard to disbursement of pension. 4. The learned Single Judge relying on the unamended provisions of Rule 26 of Part III of Kerala Service Rules came to the conclusion that leave of all kinds with or without allowance will count for qualifying service, unless or otherwise specified. The amendment in this regard was adopted by the appellant Corporation with effect from 10.06.2010, with the rider that the amended provision would apply with respect to all employees who retired after 10.06.2010. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that since LWA was availed by the respondent in the year 1981, neither the amended provision of Rule 26 nor Rules contained in Appendix XIIA would have any effect and therefore, the same cannot be deducted from the qualifying service. 5. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that since LWA was availed by the respondent in the year 1981, neither the amended provision of Rule 26 nor Rules contained in Appendix XIIA would have any effect and therefore, the same cannot be deducted from the qualifying service. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the learned Single Judge did not take into account Ext.P1 which is the leave sanction order dated 23.07.1981 whereby Clause 2 specifically mentions “the leave without allowance granted will not be counted for pension, granting leave, increment or any other service benefits”. Clause 6 provides for “the period of Leave Without Allowance granted, the date of availing leave, etc. should be recorded in the Service Book of the employee in red ink with Chief Office reference with specific indication that the period will not count for pension, granting leave, increment or any other service benefits and a duly attested copy of this order should be pasted in the Service Book”. 6. The learned counsel submits that in view of Clauses 2 and 6 above, the respondent cannot challenge the order so belatedly in the year 2009 without there being any explanation for inordinate delay and laches. He further submitted that as per the leave sanction order, certain conditions have been imposed therein and after having taken advantage of the same, the respondent cannot now turn round and challenge the conditions which were imposed to deny the service benefits during the period of his absence. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the doctrine, viz “Approbate and Reprobate/Qui Approbat/Non Reprobat” would apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Others v. N.Murugesan and Others [ (2022) 2 SCC 25 ] where the Apex Court in respect of the aforesaid doctrine has held as under:- “Approbate and reprobate 26.These phrases are borrowed from the Scots law. They would only mean that no party can be allowed to accept and reject the same thing, and thus one cannot blow hot and cold. The principle behind the doctrine of election is inbuilt in the concept of approbate and reprobate. Once again, it is a principle of equity coming under the contours of common law. They would only mean that no party can be allowed to accept and reject the same thing, and thus one cannot blow hot and cold. The principle behind the doctrine of election is inbuilt in the concept of approbate and reprobate. Once again, it is a principle of equity coming under the contours of common law. Therefore, he who knows that if he objects to an instrument, he will not get the benefit he wants cannot be allowed to do so while enjoying the fruits. One cannot take advantage of one part while rejecting the rest. A person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of instrument while questioning the same. Such a party either has to affirm or disaffirm the transaction. This principle has to be applied with more vigour as a common law principle, if such a party actually enjoys the one part fully and on near completion of the said enjoyment, thereafter questions the other part. An element of fair play is inbuilt in this principle. It is also a species of estoppel dealing with the conduct of a party. We have already dealt with the provisions of the Contract Act concerning the conduct of a party, and his presumption of knowledge while confirming an offer through his acceptance unconditionally.” 8. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that in view of the above, the order passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside and the writ appeal ought to have been dismissed. 9. Eventhough notice has been validly served on the respondent, there was no appearance for him. 10. The respondent in the writ petition had contended that Rule 26 Part III of KSR provides for leave of all kinds with or without allowances will count as qualifying service unless otherwise specified in general or special orders are issued from time to time. Therefore, Ext.P1 to the effect that the period of leave will not count for pension is unsustainable. He may lose seniority in case the period is not counted. Some of the similarly situated employees have been permitted to count the period of Leave Without Allowances, while some others like him have been denied the benefit on the sole ground that there is an endorsement in the leave sanction order. Discriminatory attitude has been adopted by the appellants. 11. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and perused the records. 12. Discriminatory attitude has been adopted by the appellants. 11. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and perused the records. 12. The learned Single Judge erred in allowing the writ petition inasmuch as it failed to consider Clause Nos. 2 and 6 in Ext. P1, which specifically provides that the respondent would not be eligible to count the period of absence for the purpose of pensionary benefits. The respondent was sanctioned leave in the year 1981 and rejoined in service in the year 1986. The writ petition was filed in the year 2009 with inordinate delay and laches for which no plausible explanation has been put forth in the writ petition. The learned single Judge failed to consider the delay aspect and went on to decide the writ petition on merits, which could not have been done without addressing the delay. 13. Admittedly there is a huge unexplained delay of about 20 years in filing the writ petition. Even otherwise applying the doctrine of approbate and reprobate, as held by the Apex Court in the case of N.Murugesan (Supra), the respondent after having enjoyed the one part fully and thereafter questioning the other part with an inordinate delay, an element of fair play is inbuilt in this principle. Therefore, the principle of estoppel would apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge erred in allowing the writ petition. Accordingly, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside. As a consequence, the writ petition stands dismissed. The present writ appeal is allowed. No order as to costs.