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2025 DIGILAW 1866 (RAJ)

Kalu Khan S/o Mammu Khan v. State of Rajasthan

2025-11-27

FARJAND ALI

body2025
JUDGMENT : FARJAND ALI, J. 1. The instant Criminal Appeal has been instituted by the appellants under Section 374 Cr.P.C. assailing the judgment dated 29.04.1995 rendered in Criminal Case No.71/1992 (4/1992) by the learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act Cases, Pratapgarh. By the said judgment, the appellants were acquitted of the offence under Section 323 IPC yet concurrently convicted and sentenced as under: Name of the accused Offence for which convicted Substantive sentence Fine and default sentence 1. Kalu Khan Section 447 IPC One month -- 2. Rustam Khan Section 3 (2) (V) of the SC/ST Act Six Months Fine of Rs.100/- and in default in payment of fine to further undergo 15 days SI 3. Whaid Khan 2. The prosecution narrative, as unfurled through the FIR lodged by the complainant Smt. Radhi (PW-1), alleges that the appellants trespassed upon her land and assaulted her, thereby inflicting bodily injuries. Following the usual investigative process, the police opined that prima facie offences under Sections 447 , 323, and 34 IPC and Section 3(v) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 stood established. A charge- sheet was consequently filed, and the matter was committed for trial. The prosecution examined eleven witnesses and exhibited eleven documents in support of its case. The accused, in their statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C., denied the allegations and produce DW1 in their defence evidence. 2.1. Upon completion of trial, the learned Court convicted the accused for the offence above and sentenced them as aforesaid. Aggrieved by the judgment aforesaid, the appellants have preferred the instant appeal. 3. I have meticulously heard learned counsel for both sides and perused the impugned judgment as well as the entire evidentiary corpus. Before embarking upon an appraisal of the merits of the appeal, it is apposite, indeed imperative, to examine whether the conviction under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act meets the statutory contours and evidentiary standards mandated by law. 3.1. The prosecution relies upon the Jama-Bandhi (Exhibit P-7) and the Trace Map (Exhibit P-8) to demonstrate that Khasra No.201 stands in the name of the complainant’s husband. PW-10 Labhchand, the Area Patwari, has duly authenticated these records. The complainant’s possession, therefore, stands incontrovertibly established. 3.2. However, mere ownership of the land does not, in and of itself, trigger the application of the stringent provisions of the SC/ ST Act. PW-10 Labhchand, the Area Patwari, has duly authenticated these records. The complainant’s possession, therefore, stands incontrovertibly established. 3.2. However, mere ownership of the land does not, in and of itself, trigger the application of the stringent provisions of the SC/ ST Act. What is indispensable is a judicial determination regarding the mens rea of the accused namely, whether the alleged trespass was actuated by animus based on the complainant’s caste identity. 3.3. The evidence on record, both oral and documentary, clearly reflects that the parties have adjoining agricultural fields. It has emerged from cross-examination of several prosecution witnesses that the appellants had been using a narrow footpath (pugdandi) passing through the complainant’s land for many years to access their fields. This long-standing practice has been specifically asserted by the appellants in their statements under Section 313 CrPC. 3.4. The presence of a visible footpath and signs of regular usage demonstrate that the dispute between the parties was not sudden but was the continuation of a long-standing conflict over the right of way. PW-10 Labhchand Area Patwari candidly admitted that he had not inspected the site at the time of the incident and therefore could not state whether a traditional passage existed through the said land. This admission weakens the prosecution’s claim of deliberate and forcible trespass. 3.5. The FIR (Exhibit P-1), which constitutes the earliest and most spontaneous version of the incident, itself records that the quarrel arose because the complainant attempted to obstruct the path customarily used by the appellants. Thus, the genesis of the dispute lies in the obstruction of access rather than any caste-based motive. 3.6. In light of the above, this Court finds that the appellants’ entry upon the complainant’s land was driven by a bona fide belief in their continued right of passage. Even though they had no enforceable legal right to traverse the complainant’s field, their conduct does not suggest any intention to dispossess or humiliate the complainant on account of her caste identity. 4. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the conviction of the appellants under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act was legally sustainable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Since the correctness of the conviction hinges entirely upon the applicability of this provision, it becomes necessary to examine the scope, ingredients, and legislative intent underlying Section 3(2)(v) in some detail. Since the correctness of the conviction hinges entirely upon the applicability of this provision, it becomes necessary to examine the scope, ingredients, and legislative intent underlying Section 3(2)(v) in some detail. Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act, which reads as under: “(v) commits any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine.” A plain and grammatical reading of the above provision leaves no room for ambiguity. The Legislature has imposed two mandatory preconditions for invoking the aggravated penal consequences under Section 3(2)(v): first, the offence committed must be one under the Indian Penal Code which is punishable with imprisonment of ten years or more; second, such offence must have been committed because the victim belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, and the offender must have knowledge of such membership. Both these requirements must coexist; the absence of either condition renders the provision wholly inapplicable. 4.1. The legislative intent underlying Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act is unambiguous. The provision aims to impose enhanced punishment for grave and heinous offences which, but for the caste identity of the victim, may not have been committed. Its object is to deter offences where caste prejudice is the motivating force, and where the substantive offence under the IPC is of serious magnitude, carrying a punishment of ten years or more. Thus, the provision is not intended to encompass ordinary property disputes, minor scuffles, or trivial infractions unless they satisfy the dual statutory prerequisites. Every offence committed by any person under provisions carrying a punishment of less than ten years; even if the accused knew the victim belonged to an SC/ST community and the property in question belonged to that victim, would not fall within the ambit of Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act. 4.2. Judicial interpretation of Section 3(2)(v) has consistently reiterated that its application requires a direct nexus between the offence and the caste identity of the victim. Courts have held that merely establishing that the victim belongs to an SC/ST community does not suffice. The prosecution must demonstrate that the offence was committed on the ground of such caste identity. 4.2. Judicial interpretation of Section 3(2)(v) has consistently reiterated that its application requires a direct nexus between the offence and the caste identity of the victim. Courts have held that merely establishing that the victim belongs to an SC/ST community does not suffice. The prosecution must demonstrate that the offence was committed on the ground of such caste identity. Simultaneously, the underlying IPC offence must be one punishable with imprisonment of not less than ten years, indicating the gravity contemplated by the legislature. The provision, therefore, cannot be invoked mechanically, nor can it be applied in a routine or perfunctory manner. 4.3. Evaluating the facts of the present case in light of the statutory mandate, it is clear that the offences alleged and proved against the appellants fall under Sections 447 IPC only. Section 447 prescribes a maximum punishment of three months’ simple imprisonment or a fine of Rs. 500/- or both. In this context, one cannot overlook that the learned trial Court proceeded to frame charges under Section 3(2)(v) without satisfying the foundational requirements of the provision. I would not hesitate to observe that the learned Sessions Judge failed to apply judicial mind before framing charges, as the provision is ex-facie inapplicable. Since the alleged offence does not approach the mandatory minimum punishment of ten years, the very basis for invoking Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act is conspicuously absent and in my humble view, has been invoked by the learned Judge on an erroneous assumption. 4.4. Further, there is no material on record to suggest that the appellants acted with any caste-related motive. The consistent evidence, including the FIR, points to a dispute arising from obstruction of a long-used passage through the complainant's field. The quarrel thus stemmed from an agrarian right-of-way dispute, and not from any intention to target the complainant on account of her caste. The essential ingredient of caste-based animus is therefore not established. The record suggest that the parties were neighbours and must have doing their agricultural work since long back. 4.5. In these circumstances, both statutory elements namely, a qualifying IPC offence punishable with ten years or more, and the commission of such offence on account of the complainant’s caste stand completely unfulfilled. Consequently, the conviction under Section 3(2)(v) cannot be sustained. The learned Special Judge erred in applying the provision to a case where the statutory prerequisites were apparently absent. In these circumstances, both statutory elements namely, a qualifying IPC offence punishable with ten years or more, and the commission of such offence on account of the complainant’s caste stand completely unfulfilled. Consequently, the conviction under Section 3(2)(v) cannot be sustained. The learned Special Judge erred in applying the provision to a case where the statutory prerequisites were apparently absent. Thus, the conviction under Section 3 (2) (v) of the SC/ST Act is unsustainable and liable to be set aside. 4.6. In any event, it stands beyond the pale of contestation that the appellants were bereft of any legal, proprietary, or possessory entitlement to intrude upon the land of the complainant. The factual matrix, as crystallised through unimpeached evidence, unmistakably establishes that on the date in question the appellants transgressed the lawful boundaries of the complainant’s property and thereby rendered themselves culpable of the offence of simple trespass, punishable under Section 447 of the Indian Penal Code. For this transgression, they were visited with a sentence of one month’s simple imprisonment. This Court, therefore, finds no infirmity in the conviction recorded under IPC and accordingly upholds the same, while simultaneously setting aside their conviction under the penal provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, which is found unsustainable in law. 4.7. The more intricate question that now arises pertains to the propriety of enforcing the sentence after an extraordinary lapse of three decades. Compelling the appellants who, it must be noted, reside as neighbours of the complainant, to undergo incarceration at this far-removed juncture would neither subserve the ends of justice nor comport with the principles of proportionality and fairness that animate criminal jurisprudence. Rather, such a direction would risk rekindling dormant hostilities, disturbing whatever tenuous harmony time may have fostered between the parties, and thereby result in avoidable social disquiet. 4.8. Ordinarily, an offence of this relatively minor nature might well have fallen within the compassionate ambit of probationary relief. However, the trial court, for reasons not apparent on the record, refrained from invoking the ameliorative provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. To impose at this late hour a probationary condition, such as requiring the appellants to maintain peace and good behaviour for a prescribed period, would verge on the theatrical and would be bereft of pragmatic relevance. However, the trial court, for reasons not apparent on the record, refrained from invoking the ameliorative provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. To impose at this late hour a probationary condition, such as requiring the appellants to maintain peace and good behaviour for a prescribed period, would verge on the theatrical and would be bereft of pragmatic relevance. Indeed, such a stipulation, after a lapse of thirty years, would be more symbolic than substantive and would border on the nonsensical. 4.9. In view of the totality of circumstances, the overarching considerations of equity, justice, and societal harmony impel this Court to hold that the period of incarceration already undergone by the appellants constitutes adequate punishment. No penological purpose would be served by requiring them to suffer any further deprivation of liberty. Accordingly, the sentence already undergone is deemed sufficient to meet the ends of justice. 4.10. It is also pertinent to note that the appellants had already undergone incarceration in May 1991 in connection with the present incident. The offence under Section 447 IPC relates only to a simple trespass, and in view of the trivial nature of the incident, coupled with the lapse of more than three decades, no useful purpose would be served by maintaining the conviction at this stage. 4.11. The appellants are now advanced in age, and the dispute arose out of a long-standing disagreement regarding right of way. In such circumstances, the ends of justice would be better served by obliterating the conviction rather than perpetuating further penal consequences. 5. In light of the foregoing analysis, the appeal is partly allowed. The judgment dated 29.04.1995 rendered in Criminal Case No. 71/1992 (4/1992) by the learned Special Judge, SC/ST (PA) Act Cases, Pratapgarh, is hereby quashed and set aside to the extent indicated. The conviction of the appellants under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act is annulled, and they are accordingly acquitted of the said charge. 5.1. Their conviction under Section 447 IPC is, however, affirmed. Nonetheless, the sentence imposed for this offence stands modified, and it is directed that the period of incarceration already undergone by the appellants shall be treated as sufficient to satisfy the ends of justice. Consequently, their bail bonds stand discharged.