ORDER : P. Sam Koshy, J. Heard Mr. A.V.A. Siva Kartikeya, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Ms. Nafisa, learned counsel for the petitioner; and Ms. Pravalika, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. Dominic Fernandes, learned Senior Standing Counsel for CBIC, for the respondent. 2. The instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner assailing the proceedings initiated by the respondent / Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise, in show-cause notice O.R.No.69/2006-Hyd-I, Adjn., dated 04.10.2006, to the extent of proposing to determine the assessable value with reference to sale prices of trader Rallies India Limited (for short ‘RIL’) as illegal, void and inoperative and interdict the petitioner from proceeding further in pursuance of the said show-cause notice. 3. The facts of the case are that the petitioner is a manufacturing company based in Hyderabad. The petitioner entered into an agreement date 15.09.2001 with RIL for manufacturing of agro chemical formulation bearing brand name “Contaf 5E” (chemically know as Hexaconazole 5% EC). Under this agreement, RIL supplied all raw materials and packing material to the petitioner, who then manufactures the formulation according to RIL’s standards, specification and quality control procedures. Once manufactured and packed as per RIL’s instruction, the petitioner delivers the finished products at its factory gate to RIL, who then arranges for dispatch to its various depots after quality certification. According to the petitioner, the agreement clearly establishes that the petitioner operates purely as a job worker, who manufactured branded product for RIL. The relationship between the petitioner and the RIL is that of bailor and bailee. The petitioner has no involvement whatsoever in the subsequent sale of these formulations by RIL from its depots to the customers. 4. Now as per the provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944, (for short the ‘Act’) the petitioner is obligated to pay excise duty on products cleared from its factory calculated on its assessable value after claiming CENVAT credit on inputs and raw materials paid by RIL and then claims reimbursement from RIL. It is important to note that the petitioner claims that he has no knowledge of the prospective customers, the prices charged by RIL or any contractual relationship with the ultimate buyers. Moreover, the petitioner has consistently filed clearance returns and paid excise duty accordingly. On 22.09.2006, the Central Excise authorities summoned and recorded the statement of Mr. It is important to note that the petitioner claims that he has no knowledge of the prospective customers, the prices charged by RIL or any contractual relationship with the ultimate buyers. Moreover, the petitioner has consistently filed clearance returns and paid excise duty accordingly. On 22.09.2006, the Central Excise authorities summoned and recorded the statement of Mr. K.Saibaba, the Manager (Planning & Co-ordination) at the petitioner's factory. In his statement, he confirmed that the petitioner undertakes job work for agreed upon conversion charges and pays duty based on the cost construction method, which includes the cost of raw materials and packing materials (as certified by a Chartered Accountant) plus the conversion or job work charges. He also confirmed that the finished products are cleared from the petitioner's factory by RIL to their depots across India, and categorically stated that the petitioner has no knowledge of the rates at which RIL sells these products to its customers. 5. However, the respondent issued the impugned show-cause notice proposing to determine the assessable value of the goods manufactured by the petitioner by reference to the sale price at which RIL, as an independent trader, sold the goods to its ultimate customers from its depot. This proposed assessment would result in a substantial tax demand of approximately Rs.5.33 crores for the Assessment Year 2001-2002 alone. The respondent sought to invoke Rule 7 of the Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000, which applies when goods are transferred to the manufacturer's own depot and sold therefrom. The petitioner challenged the impugned show-cause notice as being illegal, arbitrary, without jurisdiction and is in contrary to the clarification issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs in Circular No.619/10/2002-CX, dated 19.2.2002, which confirmed that the legal position in M/ s. Ujagar Prints and Others (II ) vs. Union of India and Others , (1989) 2 Supreme Court Cases 488 , M/ s.Ujagar Prints and Others (III ) vs. Union of India and Others , (1989) 3 Supreme Court Cases 531 and Pawan Biscuits Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. Collector of Central Excise, Patna , (2000) 6 Supreme Court Cases 489 would continue to apply even after the amendment to Section 4 of the Act. Pvt. Ltd. vs. Collector of Central Excise, Patna , (2000) 6 Supreme Court Cases 489 would continue to apply even after the amendment to Section 4 of the Act. The petitioner further submitted that the impugned show-cause notice was issued despite a detailed representation dated 03.10.2006 bringing the settled legal position to the respondent's attention, thereby demonstrating lack of application of mind and violation of principles of natural justice. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the entire foundation of the impugned show-cause notice rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of both the law and the actual transaction between the parties. When the goods are cleared from the factory gate, that moment is marked as the completion of the sale transaction as far as the petitioner is concerned. This is not merely the petitioner's interpretation; but it is the law as declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the M/ s.Ujagar Prints and Others (II) (supra), M/s.Ujagar Prints and Others (III) (supra) and subsequently affirmed in numerous judgments. The petitioner arranged its entire business affairs, pricing structure and tax compliance in good faith, relying on this settled legal position. The respondent's proposal to tax the petitioner based on RIL's subsequent sale prices to its end customers represents a fundamental legal error and a mischaracterization of the transaction. The moment petitioner handed over the goods at its factory gate that was the end of its involvement in the transaction and its responsibility ended right there. What RIL as an independent trader subsequently does with those goods, including the prices at which it chooses to sell them to third parties falls entirely outside the scope of the petitioner's transaction and cannot form the basis for determining the petitioner's tax liability. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the impugned show-cause notice is time barred under Section 11A of the Act. The disputed period runs from September, 2001 to December, 2002 and throughout this time the petitioner filed all its periodical returns punctually within the statutory deadlines. Further, under Section 11A, the Revenue has only two years from the relevant date to issue a show-cause notice and the relevant date being either the last date for filing the return or the actual date of filing. Further, under Section 11A, the Revenue has only two years from the relevant date to issue a show-cause notice and the relevant date being either the last date for filing the return or the actual date of filing. Since the petitioner met all its filing obligations and the show cause notice was issued well beyond this 2 year window, it should be declared time barred. The respondent cannot take shelter under the extended 5 year limitation period provided in Section 11A(4) because that provision applies only when there is fraud, collusion, willful misstatement, suppression of facts or deliberate contravention with intent to evade duty. Moreover, the show cause notice makes no such allegation at all. He submits that petitioner acted transparently and in good faith, followed Supreme Court judgments, adhered to departmental circulars and maintained complete openness in all its dealings and filings. Therefore, under these circumstances, the respondent's demand fails not just on legal merits but also on the ground of limitation. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the respondent’s position particularly troubling is the misapplication of Rule 7 of the Central Excise Valuation Rules. Rule 7 is meant to apply when manufacturer transfers goods to his own depot and not someone else's depot. Now in the present case the depot belongs to RIL which is an independent company with which the petitioner has no relationship beyond that of a job worker. The petitioner does not own the depot, does not control what happens at the depot, does not know who RIL's ultimate customers are and has no say whatsoever in the pricing decisions RIL makes when selling to those customers. Moreover, the respondent is trying to force this transaction into Rule 7, but it simply doesn’t fit as none of the conditions that Rule 7 requires are actually met here. There is a deemed sale at the factory gate, the goods are not transferred to the petitioner's depot, and the petitioner has no privity of contract with RIL's customers. The department has not only failed to prove that Rule 7 applies, but they also have ignored evidence that does not exist. 9. Subsequently, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that they have submitted a detailed representation dated 03.10.2006, which was duly acknowledged by the respondent’s office on the same day. The department has not only failed to prove that Rule 7 applies, but they also have ignored evidence that does not exist. 9. Subsequently, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that they have submitted a detailed representation dated 03.10.2006, which was duly acknowledged by the respondent’s office on the same day. This representation carefully explained the legal position, supported with the relevant Supreme Court judgments and also clarifying why Rule 7 had no application to the petitioner's case. Yet, barely a day later the impugned show cause notice was issued proposing the very same interpretation that had just been demonstrated to be legally incorrect. This sequence of events suggests either a complete failure to apply judicial mind to the petitioner’s submissions or the decision which has already been made before the representation was even looked at. Whatever, the reason it doesn’t reflect the kind of careful approach that should characterize proceedings of this nature. The CBEC's own Circular No.619/10/2002-CX explicitly stated that the legal position in M/ s.Ujagar Prints and Others (II) (supra), M/ s.Ujagar Prints and Others (III) (supra) would continue to apply, yet the respondent has chosen to disregard this binding clarification. 10. Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is not a large corporate entity with deep pockets but it is a manufacturing unit whose entire worth does not exceed Rs.3 crores. The demand now being proposed is Rs.5.33 crores for just one assessment year, a figure that would not only burden the petitioner but also effectively destroy it. He further submitted that the demand comes five years after the relevant period at a time when the petitioner had every reason to believe it was in full compliance with the law. Moreover, the petitioner structured its pricing, its contracts and its financial planning based on settled legal principles. To now overturn that understanding retrospectively would inflict a manifest injustice that goes beyond mere financial hardship and also render it impossible for businesses to plan their affairs with any confidence in the stability of legal interpretations. Therefore, the respondent's actions appear to be driven more by revenue targets than by a fair application of the law and the petitioner respectfully submits that this Hon'ble Court should not allow such an approach to prevail over established legal principles and basic fairness. 11. Therefore, the respondent's actions appear to be driven more by revenue targets than by a fair application of the law and the petitioner respectfully submits that this Hon'ble Court should not allow such an approach to prevail over established legal principles and basic fairness. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent-Department contended that the petitioner has undervalued the goods manufactured on a job work basis for RIL, thereby resulting in payment of central excise duty amounting to Rs.5,33,22,744/-. Further, she submitted that the assessee determined the value based on the cost construction method which included only the landed cost of raw material, packing materials and job work charges with profit margin. However, this valuation method did not reflect the actual transaction value at which the finished goods were ultimately sold by RIL from their depots to end customers. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent-Department further contended that as per Rule 7 of the Central Excise Valuation Rules, 2000, where excisable goods are not sold at the time and place of removal but are transferred to depots or premises of consignment agents from where they are subsequently sold, the assessable value should be the normal transaction value at which such goods are sold from such depot or premises. In this case, since finished product “Contaf 5E” was cleared from the factory of the petitioner and transferred to various depots of RIL where actual sales to customers took place at significantly higher price, the duty should have been paid on the depot sale price rather than on the artificially constructed cost based value. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent-Department contended that there exists vast difference between the value on which duty was paid by the job worker and the actual sale price at the depot of RIL. The invocation of the extended period under the proviso (1) of Section 11A of the Act is justified as neither the petitioner nor RIL disclosed to the department the actual sale prices at which the final product was sold to customers from the depots. This non-disclosure and adoption of an incorrect valuation methods constitutes suppression of material facts with intent to evade payment of duty. Therefore, it was submitted that the petitioner has contravened the provisions of Section 4 of the Act, 1944 read with Rule 7 of the Valuation Rules, 2000 and Rule 6 and 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002. This non-disclosure and adoption of an incorrect valuation methods constitutes suppression of material facts with intent to evade payment of duty. Therefore, it was submitted that the petitioner has contravened the provisions of Section 4 of the Act, 1944 read with Rule 7 of the Valuation Rules, 2000 and Rule 6 and 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002. Consequently the petitioner / assessee is liable to pay the differential duty of Rs.5,33,22,744/- along with interest under Section 11AB and penalty under Section 11AC of the Act. 14. After careful consideration of the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent-Department and after thoroughly examining the materials placed on record including the impugned show cause notice, the petitioner’s primary contention that the assessable value should be determined solely on the basis of the cost construction method comprising raw material costs, conversion charges and the job worker's profit, relying upon the Supreme Court decisions in M/ s.Ujagar Prints and Others (II) (supra), M/s. Ujagar Prints and Others (III) (supra) and Pawan Biscuits Co. Pvt. Ltd. (supra) fails to appreciate the true nature and scope of Rule 7 of the Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000. While it is true that the Supreme Court in Ujagar Prints held that post manufacturing profits of the trader cannot be included in the assessable value, that decision must be understood in its proper context and cannot be applied mechanically to defeat the clear language and legislative intent of Rule 7. 15. The essence of Rule 7 is to capture the actual transaction value where goods are not sold at the place of removal but are transferred to depots from where they are subsequently sold to customers. In the present case, the finished goods manufactured by the petitioner were cleared from its factory and transferred to RIL's depots and from there they were sold to end customers at significantly higher prices reflecting the true market value. The mere fact that the depot belongs to RIL rather than the petitioner does not take the transaction outside the ambit of Rule 7 particularly when the petitioner and RIL operated in a coordinated manner and the actual realization of value occurred only upon sale from the depot. The mere fact that the depot belongs to RIL rather than the petitioner does not take the transaction outside the ambit of Rule 7 particularly when the petitioner and RIL operated in a coordinated manner and the actual realization of value occurred only upon sale from the depot. The purpose of central excise duty is to tax goods at their true value in the market and the arrangement between the petitioner and RIL, though structured as a job work agreement cannot be used as a device to artificially suppress the assessable value and evade legitimate tax liability. The respondent has rightly invoked Rule 7 to ensure that duty is paid on the normal transaction value at which goods were sold from the depot rather than on an artificially constructed cost-based value that bears no relationship to market reality. 16. On the question of limitation, this Bench finds that the invocation of the extended period of five years under the proviso (1) of Section 11A of the Act is fully justified and warranted in the facts and circumstances of this case. The petitioner’s contention that there was no suppression of facts or willful misstatement and that it acted in good faith by following Supreme Court judgments and departmental circulars is not borne out by the record. The critical fact remains that neither the petitioner nor RIL disclosed to the respondent the actual sale prices at which the finished product "Contaf 5E" were sold from RIL's depots to end customers, despite the vast difference between the declared value and the depot sale price. This non-disclosure constitutes suppression of material facts which, if disclosed, would have immediately attracted the application of Rule 7 and resulted in a higher duty liability. The petitioner cannot take shelter under the plea of bona fide belief when it deliberately adopted a valuation method that ignored the depot sale prices which were within the knowledge of RIL. 17. The relationship between the petitioner and RIL was such that the petitioner could have and should have obtained information about depot sale prices and disclosed the same to the Department. The fact that the petitioner filed periodical returns does not absolve it of the duty to make full and true disclosure of all material facts. 17. The relationship between the petitioner and RIL was such that the petitioner could have and should have obtained information about depot sale prices and disclosed the same to the Department. The fact that the petitioner filed periodical returns does not absolve it of the duty to make full and true disclosure of all material facts. When the returns themselves were based on an incorrect and incomplete disclosure of the transaction value, filing of such returns cannot be said to constitute proper disclosure for the purposes of limitation. The petitioner's representation dated 03.10.2006 was submitted only after the departmental enquiries had commenced and could not be treated as voluntary disclosure. The filing of periodical returns based on incorrect valuation does not constitute proper disclosure for limitation purposes. Therefore, the extended period was properly invokable in this case. 18. While the Bench also acknowledges the petitioner's concerns about financial hardship, this alone cannot justify preventing the revenue authorities from exercising their lawful powers. When duty has been underpaid due to an incorrect valuation method, the legal consequences must be applied. 19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s.Ujagar Prints and Others (II) (supra), held at paragraph Nos.72 to 77, as under: “ 72. In the argument, as presented, that the assessable value would include what is referred to as the “post-manufacturing profits”, there is an obvious fallacy. In Atic Industries Ltd. v. H.H. Dave, Asstt. CCE [ (1975) 1 SCC 499 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 135 : (1975) 3 SCR 563 ] Bhagwati, J. speaking for the court said : (SCC pp. 507-508, para 12) The value of the goods for the purpose of excise must take into account only the manufacturing cost and the manufacturing profit and it must not be loaded with post- manufacturing cost or profit arising from post- manufacturing operation .... It may be noted that wholesale market in a particular type of goods may be in several tiers and the goods may reach the consumer after a series of wholesale transactions. In fact the more common and less expensive the goods, there would be greater possibility of more than one tier of wholesale transactions .... If excise were levied on the basis of second or subsequent wholesale price, it would load the price with a post-manufacturing element, namely, selling cost and selling profit of the wholesale dealer. In fact the more common and less expensive the goods, there would be greater possibility of more than one tier of wholesale transactions .... If excise were levied on the basis of second or subsequent wholesale price, it would load the price with a post-manufacturing element, namely, selling cost and selling profit of the wholesale dealer. That would be plainly contrary to the true nature of excise as explained in the Voltas case [A.K. Roy v. Voltas Ltd., (1973) 3 SCC 503 : 1973 SCC (Tax) 261] . Secondly, this would also violate the concept of the factory gate sale which is the basis of determination of value of the goods for the purpose of excise. There can, therefore, be no doubt that where a manufacturer sells the goods manufactured by him in wholesale to a wholesale dealer at arm's length and in the usual course of business, the wholesale cash price charged by him to the wholesale dealer less trade discount would represent the value of the goods for the purpose of assessment of excise. 73. Explaining what really is the idea of “post-manufacturing profit” referred to in Atic case [ (1975) 1 SCC 499 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 135 : (1975) 3 SCR 563 ] this Court in Union of India v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd. [ (1984) 1 SCC 467 : 1984 SCC (Tax) 17 : (1984) 1 SCR 347 , 375] said : (SCC p. 491, para 24) When it refers to post-manufacturing expenses and post- manufacturing profit arising from post-manufacturing operations, it clearly intends to refer not to the expenses and profits pertaining to the sale transactions effected by the manufacturer but to those pertaining to the subsequent sale transactions effected by the wholesale buyers in favour of other dealers . (emphasis supplied) The principles for the determination of assessable value are laid down under Section 4 of the Act. (emphasis supplied) The principles for the determination of assessable value are laid down under Section 4 of the Act. Section 4 of the “Central Excise Act” envisages that the value of an article for the purposes of duty shall be deemed to be; (a) The wholesale cash price for which an article of the like kind and quality was sold or was capable of being sold at the time of removal of the article from the factory or premises of manufacture for delivery at the place of manufacture or; (b) Where such price was not ascertainable, the price at which an article of the like kind and quality was sold or capable of being sold at the time of removal of the article chargeable with duty. 74. The nature of the excise duty is not to be confused with, or tested with reference to, the measure by which the tax is assessed. The standard adopted as the measure of assessment may throw light on the nature of the levy but is not determinative of it. When a statutory measure for assessment of the tax is contemplated, it “need not contour along the lines which spell out the levy itself”, and “a broader based standard of reference may be adopted for the purposes of determining the measure of the levy”. Any statutory standard which maintains a nexus with the essential character of the levy can be regarded as a valid basis for assessing the measure of the tax. 75. In the case of processing houses, they become liable to pay excise duty not because they are the owners of the goods but because they cause the “manufacture” of the goods. The dimensions of Section 4(1)(a) and (b) are fully explored in a number of decisions of this Court. Reference may be made to the case of Bombay Tyres International [ (1984) 1 SCC 467 : 1984 SCC (Tax) 17 : (1984) 1 SCR 347 , 375]. 76. Consistent with the provisions of Section 4 and the Central Excise (Valuation) Rules, 1975, framed under Section 37 of the Act, it cannot be said that the assessable value of the processed fabric should comprise only of the processing charges. This extreme contention if accepted, would lead to and create more problems than it is supposed to solve; and produce situations which could only be characterised as anomalous. This extreme contention if accepted, would lead to and create more problems than it is supposed to solve; and produce situations which could only be characterised as anomalous. The incidence of the levy should be uniform, uninfluenced by fortuitous considerations. The method of determination of the assessable value suggested by the processors would lead to the untenable position that while in one class of grey fabric processed by the same processor on bailment, the assessable value would have to be determined differently dependent upon the consideration that the processing house had carried out the processing operations on job work basis, in the other class of cases, as it not unoften happens, the goods would have to be valued differently only for the reason the same processing house has itself purchased the grey fabric and carried out the processing operations on its own. 77. It is to solve the problem arising out of the circumstance that goods owned by one person are “manufactured” by another that at a certain stage under Rule 174-A, a notification was issued by the Central Government exempting from the operation of Rule 174-A ... every manufacturer who gets his goods manufactured on his account from any other person, subject to the conditions that the said manufacturer authorises the person, who actually manufactures or fabricates the said goods to comply with all procedural formalities under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) and the rules made thereunder, in respect of the goods manufactured on behalf of the said manufacturer and, in order to enable the determination of value of the said goods under Section 4 of the said Act, to furnish information relating to the price at which the said manufacturer is selling the said goods and the person so authorised agrees to discharge all liabilities under the said Act and the rules made thereunder.” 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court again in the case of M/ s.Ujagar Prints and Others (III) (supra), held at paragraph Nos.1 and 2, as under: “ 1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court again in the case of M/ s.Ujagar Prints and Others (III) (supra), held at paragraph Nos.1 and 2, as under: “ 1. In respect of the civil miscellaneous petition for clarification of this Court's judgment dated 4-11-1988 [Ujagar Prints v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 488 ] , it is made clear that the assessable value of the processed fabric would be the value of the grey cloth in the hands of the processor plus the value of the job work done plus manufacturing profit and manufacturing expenses whatever these may be, which will either be included in the price at the factory gate or deemed to be the price at the factory gate for the processed fabric. The factory gate here means the “deemed” factory gate as if the processed fabric was sold by the processor. In order to explain the position it is made clear by the following illustration: if the value of the grey cloth in the hands of the processor is Rs 20 and the value of the job work done is Rs 5 and the manufacturing profit and expenses for the processing be Rs 5, then in such a case the value would be Rs 30, being the value of the grey cloth plus the value of the job work done plus manufacturing profit and expenses. That would be the correct assessable value. 2. If the trader, who entrusts cotton or man-made fabric to the processor for processing on job work basis, would give a declaration to the processor as to what would be the price at which he would be selling the processed goods in the market, that would be taken by the excise authorities as the assessable value of the processed fabric and excise duty would be charged to the processor on that basis provided that the declaration as to the price at which he would be selling the processed goods in the market, would include only the price or deemed price at which the processed fabric would leave the processor's factory plus his profit. Rule 174 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 enjoins that when goods owned by one person are manufactured by another the information is required relating to the price at which the said manufacturer is selling the said goods and the person so authorised agrees to discharge all the liabilities under the said Act and the rules made thereunder. The price at which he is selling the goods must be the value of the grey cloth or fabric plus the value of the job work done plus the manufacturing profit and the manufacturing expenses but not any other subsequent profit or expenses. It is necessary to include the processor's expenses, costs and charges plus profit, but it is not necessary to include the trader's profits who gets the fabrics processed, because those would be post-manufacturing profits.” 21. Lastly, in the case of Pawan Biscuits Co. Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph Nos.10 to 16, has held as under: “ 10. Repelling these contentions, this Court noticed that according to Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, the value of an article for the purposes of duty shall be deemed to be the wholesale cash price for which an article of the like kind and quality was sold or was capable of being sold at the time of removal of the article from the factory or premises of manufacture. It was then observed that in the case of processing houses they became liable to pay excise duty not because they were the owners of the goods but because they caused the manufacture of the goods. 11. It was held that it could not be contended, keeping in view the provisions of Section 4 and the Central Excise (Valuation) Rules, 1975 that the assessable value of the processed fabric should comprise only of the processing charges disregarding the value of the grey cloth. 12. Justice Mukharji, in a separate but concurring judgment observed that the assessable value of the goods manufactured would include the value of the grey cloth in the hands of the processor plus the value of the jobwork done plus manufacturing profits and manufacturing expenses. The correct assessable value was to be the value of the fabric at the factory gate at the time when the manufactured goods leave the factory and enter the mainstream. 13. The correct assessable value was to be the value of the fabric at the factory gate at the time when the manufactured goods leave the factory and enter the mainstream. 13. After the aforesaid judgment in Ujagar Prints case [ (1989) 3 SCC 488 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 469] was delivered on 4-11-1988, a civil miscellaneous application for clarification was filed. 14. The Constitution Bench in a two-para order dated 27-1- 1989 reported in Ujagar Prints (III) v. Union of India [ (1989) 3 SCC 531 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 512] clarified that the assessable value of the processed fabric would be the value of the grey cloth in the hands of the processor plus the value of the jobwork done plus manufacturing profit and manufacturing expenses whatever they pay. The factory gate was to mean the “deemed” factory gate as if the processed fabric was sold by the processor. To make the position clear this Court gave the following example: (SCC p. 531, para 1) “[I]f the value of the grey cloth in the hands of the processor is Rs 20 and the value of the jobwork done is Rs 5 and the manufacturing profit and expenses for the processing be Rs 5, then in such a case the value would be Rs 30, being the value of the grey cloth plus the value of the jobwork done plus manufacturing profit and expenses. That would be the correct assessable value.” 15. It was further observed (at SCC p. 532, para 2) that the price at which the processing house sells the goods “must be the value of the grey cloth or fabric plus the value of the jobwork done plus the manufacturing profit and the manufacturing expenses but not any other subsequent profit or expenses. It is necessary to include the processor's expenses, costs and charges plus profit, but it is not necessary to include the trader's profits who gets the fabrics processed, because those would be post-manufacturing profits”. 16. The present case is similar to Ujagar Prints case. In Ujagar Prints case it was the grey cloth which was given to the processor whereas in the present case it was the raw material for the manufacture of biscuits given to the appellant. After the biscuits are made, they are given back to or are delivered under the instructions of Britannia. In Ujagar Prints case it was the grey cloth which was given to the processor whereas in the present case it was the raw material for the manufacture of biscuits given to the appellant. After the biscuits are made, they are given back to or are delivered under the instructions of Britannia. The appellant was entitled to receive processing charges which would include its expenses plus profits for the purpose of determining the excise value. However, the cost of the raw material supplied by Britannia will have to be included in addition to the appellant's manufacturing costs and profit. What cannot be included on the ratio of Ujagar Prints case is any profit of Britannia or expenses which are incurred after the manufacture of the biscuits by the appellant. Despite repeated attempts made by the learned counsel for the respondent, we are unable to distinguish this case from the ratio laid down by this Court in the aforesaid two decisions of Ujagar Prints case.” 22. Therefore, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances narrated in the preceding paragraphs and also the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cited above, this Bench finds no merit in the instant writ petition and the impugned show- cause notice No.O.R.No.69/2006-Hyd-I Adjn., dated 04.10.2006, has been issued by the respondent in accordance with law and does not suffer from any jurisdictional error, legal infirmity, procedural irregularity or violation of principles of natural justice. Neither can the impugned show-cause notice be held to be barred by limitation. The instant writ petition therefore deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. 23. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shall stand closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.