Mahesh Mittal S/o Shri Musaddilal v. Directorate of Enforcement, Through Special Public Prosecutor
2025-02-04
PRAVEER BHATNAGAR
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
Order : 1. The instant bail application has been filed under Section 483 of B.N.S.S., 2023 on behalf of accused-petitioner in connection with ECIR No.JPZO/29/2023 dated 21.08.2023 recorded at Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India, Jaipur Zonal Office, Jaipur for the offences under Sections 3/4 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the PMLA’). 2. Learned Senior counsel Mr V.R. Bajava presents an argument, asserting that there is no substantial case against the petitioner under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA). He firmly states that the petitioner has not generated funds through illicit activities. Even if the petitioner secured the tender without full eligibility and there are inaccuracies in the certification, it's essential to recognise that the petitioner actively executed various works under the contract of the Jal Jeevan Mission, investing significant resources to meet the obligations outlined in government-issued work orders. Moreover, the relevant department has deposited the amount in the petitioner's account accordingly. 3. While the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) has yet to arrest the petitioner regarding the predicate offence, charge sheets have been filed against other co-accused individuals in the predicate offence. The petitioner has not been arrested nor charge sheeted in the predicate offence. Padam Chand Jain, the other co-accused, also received a contract based on an allegedly fraudulent IRCON certificate and has been granted bail due to prolonged detention and the unlikelihood of a trial. The petitioner’s circumstances, including the nature of the allegations, the duration of detention, and the likelihood of a timely trial, are similar to those of co- accused Padam Chand. Therefore, it is imperative to consider the provisions of Article 21 alongside Section 45 of the PMLA rather than viewing one as subservient to the other. 4. The petitioner is not merely seeking equality based on their role in the alleged offence; the focus remains on the excessive period of incarceration and the questionable prospects of a prompt trial. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. V.R. Bajava emphasises the reliance on the Apex court’s prior orders regarding granting bail to the other co-accused, Padam Chand, Piyush Jain and Sanjay Badaya. The learned senior counsel fortifies his arguments on the strength of the judgments passed in the matters of Manish Sisodia Vs. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 INSC 595 and Kalvakuntla Kavitha Vs. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 INSC 632 5.
The learned senior counsel fortifies his arguments on the strength of the judgments passed in the matters of Manish Sisodia Vs. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 INSC 595 and Kalvakuntla Kavitha Vs. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 INSC 632 5. Contrarily, the learned Additional Solicitor General (ASG) argues that the petitioner’s circumstances differ significantly from those of Padam Chand, asserting that this distinction undermines the application of the principle of parity in bail consideration. The Learned ASG Mr. R.D. Rastogi cites a Supreme Court judgment passed in the matter of Gajanand Agrawal Vs. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 537 to bolster this perspective. 6. Furthermore, the ASG argues that substantial evidence indicates that the petitioner actively persuaded officials to forge vital documentation necessary to secure the tender under the Jal Jeevan Mission. Allegations include a conspiracy between the petitioner and Shri Manoj Pathak, who allegedly created a fraudulent email identity at the petitioner’s behest and was involved in the forgery of the IRCON certificate. It is asserted that the petitioner provided a bribe of 16.5 lakh rupees to Manoj Pathak, supported by transaction records between the parties involved. 7. The petitioner’s financial dealings concerning Sanjay Badaya are also under scrutiny, specifically a reported transfer of 1 crore rupees from the account of Padam Chand’s father to that of Sanjay Badaya account and the petitioner's account to the account of Padam Chand's father. This has been substantiated through extensive investigations of the petitioner’s and associated individuals' bank accounts. Statements of section 50 of the PMLA from the petitioner and co-accused individuals, specifically Manoj Pathak, Padam Chand Jain, and Sanjay Badaya, underscore the petitioner’s significant involvement in the alleged crime. It is alleged that the petitioner secured a contract using the forged certificate, leading to proceeds of crime amounting to 367.56 crore rupees. 8. It is clear that the stipulations of Section 45 of the PMLA are mandatory, and the court must deny bail until it determines that there is insufficient evidence against the petitioner regarding the alleged crime. The ASG has referred to judgment of Tarun Kumar Vs. Assistant Directorate Enforcement, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486 (SLP Criminal Appeal No.9431/2023) , wherein it was held that conditions specified under Section 45 of the PMLA are mandatory and Court is required to focus upon the role attached to the accused. The parity is also misconceived.
The ASG has referred to judgment of Tarun Kumar Vs. Assistant Directorate Enforcement, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486 (SLP Criminal Appeal No.9431/2023) , wherein it was held that conditions specified under Section 45 of the PMLA are mandatory and Court is required to focus upon the role attached to the accused. The parity is also misconceived. The apprehension of trial is likely to take any time and the accused would be incarcerated for indefinite period, is also not well founded, as the economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. 9. Heard perused the material along with the Judgment cited by the parties. Factual Matrix 10. The investigation conducted to date strongly indicates that the petitioner firm secured the contract under the Jal Jeevan Mission Scheme by deceitfully claiming the possession of an eligibility certificate purportedly issued by IRCON. This certificate has been definitively identified as forged and fabricated. Further scrutiny revealed that the petitioner illicitly obtained this forged certificate by bribing Manoj Pathak, who created a fraudulent email ID of IRCON and falsely validated its authenticity. It has been established that the petitioner’s firm transferred 16.50 lakhs into Pathak's account. This connection is further supported by recorded telephonic communications and their transcriptions. Notably, the contract was acquired through manipulation, with substantial payments made to the intermediary, Sanjay Badaya. The investigation and bank transaction records confirm that one crore was transferred to Sanjay Badaya, underscoring the extent of the corruption involved. Thus, it is evident that the petitioner secured the contract through document forgery and bribery of officials and intermediaries. Consequently, the Court is convinced there are reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner is significantly involved in the alleged crime. The petitioner has not demonstrated to the Court that he is innocent of the charges. Legal Position: 11. In the case of Maneesh Sisodia Vs. Directorate of Enforcement (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court determined that any delays in starting the trial, combined with the prolonged incarceration of the accused, must be considered within Section 45 of the PMLA. The Court also affirmed that while trial courts and High Courts have the authority to conduct a merit-based review of the allegations against the applicant, they must always remain mindful of the significance of Article 21 of the Constitution.
The Court also affirmed that while trial courts and High Courts have the authority to conduct a merit-based review of the allegations against the applicant, they must always remain mindful of the significance of Article 21 of the Constitution. The following observations made in paragraphs 49 to 57 of the Judgment are particularly pertinent: “49. We find that, on account of a long period of incarceration running for around 17 months and the trial even not having been commented, the appellant has been deprived of his right to speedy trial. 50. As observed by this Court, the right to speedy trial and the right to liberty are sacrosanct rights. On denial of these rights, the trial court as well as the High Court ought to have given due weightage to this factor. 51. Recently, this Court had an occasion to consider an application for bail in the case of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra and Another 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693 wherein the accused was proseucted under the provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. This Court surveyed the entire law right from the judgment of this Court in cases of Gudikanti Narasimhulu and Others v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1977 INSC 232, Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 INSC 68, Hussainara Khatoon and Others (I) v. Home Secretary, Stateof Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1979 INSC 34, Union of India V. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713 : 2021 INSC 50 and Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another (2022) 10 SCC 51 : 2022 INSC 690 . The Court observed thus: “19. If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime.” 52. The Court also reproduced the observations made in Gudikanti Narasimhulu (supra), which read thus: “10.
Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime.” 52. The Court also reproduced the observations made in Gudikanti Narasimhulu (supra), which read thus: “10. In the aforesaid context, we may remind the trial courts and the High Courts of what came to be observed by this Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court reported in (1978) 1 SCC 240 . We quote: “What is often forgotten, and therefore warrants reminder, is the object to keep a person in judicial custody pending trial or disposal of an appeal. Lord Russel, C.J; said [ R V. Rose, (1898) 18 Cox]: “I observe that in this case bail was refused for the prisoner. It cannot be too strongly impressed on the, magistracy of the country that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment, but that the requirements as to bail are merely to secure the attendance of the prisoner at trial.” 53. The Court further observed that, over a period of time, the trial courts and the High Courts have forgotten a very well-settled principle of law that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. From our experience, we can say that it appears that the trial courts and the High Courts attempt to play safe in matters of grant of bail. The principle that bail is a rule and refusal is an exception is, at times, followed in breach. On account of non-grant of bail even in straight forward open and shut cases, this Court is flooded with huge number of bail petitions thereby adding to the huge pendency. It is high time that the trial courts and the High Courts should recognize the principle that “bail is rule and jail is exception”. 54. In the present case, in the ED matter, as well as the CBI matter, 493 witnesses have been named. The case involves thousands of documents and over a lakh pages of digitized documents. It is thus clear that there is not even the remotest possibility of the trial being concluded in the near future. In our view, keeping the appellant behind the bars for an unlimited period of time in the hope of speedy completion of trial would deprive his fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.
It is thus clear that there is not even the remotest possibility of the trial being concluded in the near future. In our view, keeping the appellant behind the bars for an unlimited period of time in the hope of speedy completion of trial would deprive his fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. As observed time and again, the prolonged incarceration before being pronounced guilty of an offence should not be permitted to become punishment without trial. 55. As observed by this Court in the case of Gudikanti Narasimhulu (supra), the objective to keep a person in judicial custody pending trial or disposal of an appeal is to secure the attendance of the prisoner at trial. 56. In the present case, the appellant is having deep roots in the society. There is no possibility of him fleeing away from 36 the country and not being available for facing the trial. In any case, conditions can be imposed to address the concern of the State. 57. Insofar as the apprehension given by the learned ASG regarding the possibility of tampering the evidence is concerned, it is to be noted that the case largely depends on documentary evidence which is already seized by the prosecution. As such, there is no possibility of tampering with the evidence. Insofar as the concern with regard to influencing the witnesses is concerned, the said concern can be addressed by imposing stringent conditions upon the appellant.” 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court's subsequent judgment in Kalvakuntla Kavitha Vs. Directorate of Enforcement (supra) reiterated the observations made in Manish Sisodia (supra) regarding the requirement to ensure compliance with Article 21 of the Constitution. 13. In granting bail to the other co-accused, Padam Chand Jain about the same ECR, the Honble Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.17476/2024 (Padam Chand Jain Vs. Enforcement Directorate), has observed as under:- “5. We have perused the material on record in the present case. The son of the petitioner herein, namely, Shri Peeyush Jain has been granted bail by a coordinate Bench of this Court in Criminal Appeal No.3754 of 2024 so also another accused, namely, Sanjay Badaya has been granted bail by this Court on 17.12.2024 in SLP (Crl) No.15953 of 2024. 6.
The son of the petitioner herein, namely, Shri Peeyush Jain has been granted bail by a coordinate Bench of this Court in Criminal Appeal No.3754 of 2024 so also another accused, namely, Sanjay Badaya has been granted bail by this Court on 17.12.2024 in SLP (Crl) No.15953 of 2024. 6. Learned Single Judge of the High Court, while considering the law laid down by this Court in Manish Sisodia V. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine 1920, has observed that this Court has granted bail in the said matter in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. 7. We may clarify that in the case of Manish Sisodia (supra) the Court has not exercised the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The Court has held that the twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA cannot override the constitutional safeguards, as provided under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This Court has held that a prolonged incarceration cannot be permitted to be converted pre-trial detention into a sentence without trial. Like in the case of Manish Sisodia (supra) in the present case also thousands of documents are required to be considered at the stage of trial, so also around 50 witnesses are required to be examined. The main evidence in the present case is documentary in nature, which is already seized by the prosecution agency. As such, there is no possibility of the same being tampered with. 8. It is further to be noted that the Minister, for whose benefit the alleged transactions have taken place, has also not been implecated as an accused in the present case. The petitioner has already been released on bail in the predicate offences. 9. In that view of the matter, we are inclined to grant bail to the petitioner herein.” 14. This Court is fully conscious of the law regarding the issue of parity in granting bail. In making decisions on bail applications, it is crucial to consider the specific facts of each case, the accused's role in the alleged crime, the nature and severity of the offence, and its broader implications for society. Additionally, the commission method, the court's legitimate concerns about potential tampering, the likelihood of the accused re-offending, and the accused's prior record must all be considered. 15.
Additionally, the commission method, the court's legitimate concerns about potential tampering, the likelihood of the accused re-offending, and the accused's prior record must all be considered. 15. The role of the present petitioner is somewhat akin to that of the other co-accused, barring the additional facts that he persuaded the co-accused to create the forged and fake certificate and also bribed the co-accused Manoj Pathak. 16. The two accused secured the contract under pretenses, presenting a fake certificate. They engaged in bribery of government officials and systematically transferred large sums from their accounts to others' accounts in a blatant attempt to obtain the contract by any means necessary. In a similar vein, Padam Chand's incarceration terms were identical. 17. Therefore, even though the petitioner failed to satisfy the twin conditions enshrined under section 45 of the PML Act, this court, considering the legal position enunciated in the Judgment of Manish Sisodia and reiterated in the Kalvakuntla Kavitha Vs. Directorate of Enforcement’s case and the apex court's grant of bail to the other co-accused Padam Chand Jain, deems it proper to enlarge the petitioner on bail. 18. Accordingly, the bail application under Section 483 B.N.S.S. is allowed and it is ordered that the accused-petitioner-Mahesh Mittal S/o Shri Musaddilal in connection with ECIR No.JPZO/29/2023 dated 21.08.2023 recorded at Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India, Jaipur Zonal Office, Jaipur shall be enlarged on bail provided he furnishes a personal bond in the sum of Rs.10,00,000/- (rupees ten lakhs) with two sureties of Rs.5,00,000/- (rupees five lakhs) each to the satisfaction of the learned trial Judge for his appearance before the Court concerned on all the dates of hearing and as and when called upon to do so. The petitioner shall not make any attempt to tamper with the evidence or influence the witnesses. The petitioner shall deposit his passport with the learned Trial Judge & he shall not leave India without seeking permission from the trial court.