ORDER : 1. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the decision of the Committee dated 03.10.2023 (Annex. R/2), whereby the petitioner’s appointment as a Sub-Inspector of Police was withheld for a period of three years on account of the pendency of a criminal case relating to matrimonial offences and other IPC offences. 2. The grievance of the petitioner is that the petitioner applied for the post of Sub-Inspector, and at the time of making the application, no FIR had been lodged against him. During the pendency of the selection process, the wife of the petitioner lodged a police complaint against him, and an FIR was registered by the Mahila Police Thana, Jodhpur, bearing FIR No. 71/2022 dated 20.03.2022 (Annex. 12), for offences under Sections 498 -A, 406, and 323 IPC . After conducting investigation, the police filed a charge-sheet dated 06.06.2022. The trial is pending before the competent Court. 3. The limited grievance of the petitioner is that the petitioner’s appointment cannot be delayed on account of an FIR arising out of a matrimonial dispute between the petitioner and his wife and such an FIR cannot be considered a finding or decision of guilty; it is only an allegation. It is also the case of the petitioner that the said FIR has nothing to do with the discharge of duties of the petitioner, and such offences cannot even amount to moral turpitude so as to deny his appointment. It is further the case of the petitioner that in a similar set of circumstances, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Mukesh Kumar vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. 2016 (3) WLC 345 , held that on account of pendency of a criminal case, the zetitioner cannot be denied appointment. The relevant paragraphs of the Mukesh Kumar’s case (supra) read as follows: “15. Viewed in light of the above factual scenario, it is evident that the Rules not post any hurdle against the petitioner’s right to be appointed in the police services. At best, a rider can be imposed in the petitioner’s appointment order that in the event of conviction in the above criminal case, he may be liable to be terminated from service without holding any enquiry and an undertaking in this regard can be procured from him in this regard. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The respondents are directed to offer appointment to the petitioner on the post of Sub Inspector of Police in the questioned selection process ignoring the pendency of the above criminal case against the petitioner. However, the appointment order shall bear a condition that the petitioner’s services may be terminated in the event of his conviction and he shall also submit an undertaking to this effect before joining to the post. Since the petitioner was gainfully employed as a Teacher during the intervening period, he is not entitled to any consequential benefits. However, the respondents shall grant him all notional services benefits from the date of the order Annex.6 dated 22.12.2009.” 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner further relied upon the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Neeraj Kanwar vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9517/2024 . The relevant paragraphs of the Neeraj Kanwar’s case (supra) read as follows: “20. Perusal of circular dated 04.12.2019 (Annexure R-1) shows that the same is in the nature of the Government’s administrative guidelines to its functionaries and the ultimate decision-whether or not to appoint a candidate is to be taken by the appointing authority taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case, the nature of work and status of the post on merits and that in each case, while deciding on the suitability or unsuitability of a candidate, the appointing authority should assess his (candidate’s) character by taking into consideration the circumstances of the offence. …… 20.4. The Circular ibid, relied upon by the respondents, no doubt stipulates that candidates against whom cases under Chapters XVI and XVII of the IPC are pending investigation or trial, or who have been convicted, should be deemed ineligible for appointment. However, this blanket disqualification must be read in harmony with the nuanced principles laid down by the three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Avtar Singh v. Union of India, which emphasize that the appointing authority must assess the suitability of a candidate based on the nature of the offence, its relevance to the post, and whether it involves moral turpitude, rather than mechanically denying appointment due to the mere pendency of a case. The judgments cited by the respondents, such as Union of India v. Methu Meda and Bhinya Ram Jajra v. State of Rajasthan, no doubt, underscore the employer’s discretion to evaluate antecedents, but they do not override the Avtar Singh’s framework, which permits flexibility in cases of trivial offences or those not involving moral turpitude. In the petitioner’s case, the offences under Sections 452, 341, 323, and 143 , arising from a matrimonial dispute, do not prima facie reflect a character flaw that would render her unfit for the RAS post, warranting such a contextual evaluation as to attract a rigid application of the Circular. 20.5. The judgment in Avtar Singh’s case explicitly cautions against arbitrary denials of appointment, and requires a proportionate response after considering the factual matrix, including the absence of any suppression by the petitioner and if offences are not multiple or heinous. This approach is also reflected in and the intent of the Circular ibid. As already observed, the appointing authority should weigh merits and demerits specific to each case, rather than applying a blanket bar. Consequently, the High Court and Supreme Court judgments cited by the respondents, while affirming employer discretion, must yield to the broader, reformative perspective of Avtar Singh, ensuring that the petitioner’s appointment is not unjustly withheld based solely on the pendency of a criminal case like the one in hand arising out of matrimonial discord and not involving any heinous offence or moral turpitude.” 5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner also relied upon the order dated 11.11.2025 passed by this Court in Pankaj Vishnoi vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 21673/2025 . The relevant paragraphs of the order dated 11.11.2025 (supra) read as follows: “From a close reading of the above judgment relied upon by the petitioner, it is clear that it is the appointing authority who has to assess the suitability of a candidate based on the nature of offence, its relevancy to the post and whether it involves moral turpitude. This means that the employer has to apply his mind to the facts of each case and take a decision thereon and there cannot be any blanket denial of appointment merely on the ground that an FIR has been lodged. Each case must be assessed in the context of its own facts. 5. This means that the employer has to apply his mind to the facts of each case and take a decision thereon and there cannot be any blanket denial of appointment merely on the ground that an FIR has been lodged. Each case must be assessed in the context of its own facts. 5. In the present case, there is no such occasion for the appointing authority to assess the nature of offence, relevancy of such allegation to the post to be appointed and whether such allegation amounts to any moral turpitude. Issuing any directions to appoint the petitioner would amount to supplementing the decision to be taken by the appointing authority. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to pass any directions. However, this Court is inclined to direct respondent No. 2 - Directorate, Medical, Health And Family Welfare Services (SIHEW), Govt. Of Rajasthan, Jaipur to assess the suitability of the petitioner basing on the parameters referred hereinabove. Such decision shall be taken within a period of one month from the date of receipt of this order. If any adverse orders are passed by the respondent authorities in this regard, liberty is given to the petitioner to challenge the same. 6. With the above directions, the writ petition is disposed of .” 6. From a combined reading of the above decisions of the Co- ordinate Benches and the view of this Court, it is clear that the appointing authority has to examine the suitability of the candidate based on the nature of the offences, their relevancy to the post, whether they involve moral turpitude and then take a decision whether to grant appointment, considering the facts and circumstances of each case. 7. Looking at the decision of the Committee which is assailed in the present writ petition, it is evident that the Committee has not applied its mind to the nature of the offences, their relevancy to the post, or whether such offences are heinous or involve moral turpitude. The offences for which the petitioner is facing trial arise out of a matrimonial dispute between the petitioner and his wife, and they cannot be said to be grave offences. Such offences cannot have any impact on the discharge of duties of the post for which the petitioner was selected, nor can they be regarded as heinous offence or involving moral turpitude. Such offences cannot have any impact on the discharge of duties of the post for which the petitioner was selected, nor can they be regarded as heinous offence or involving moral turpitude. These aspects were not considered by the Committee while postponing the petitioner’s appointment for a period of three years. Therefore, the impugned order dated 03.10.2023 (Annex. R/2) passed by the Committee is liable to be set aside. 8. In the result, the present writ petition is allowed , and the impugned order dated 03.10.2023 (Annex. R/2) i.e. the Committee report is set aside. The respondents are directed to offer appointment to the petitioner, subject to the condition that the petitioner shall give an undertaking to the appointing authority, prior to the appointment order, to forgo the appointment in the event he is convicted for the offences. The appointment order shall also indicate such condition and the appointing authority shall be entitled to cancel the petitioner’s appointment without any further inquiry if the petitioner is convicted for the offences. 9. The said exercise shall be completed within a period of one month from the date of receipt of this order. 10. All pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.