ORDER : 1. The petitioner has filed the present D.B. Civil Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking enforcement of his legal and fundamental rights, alleging non-release of the leave encashment benefits payable on account of the death of his brother, late Shri Sita Ram Bairwa, who was serving as a Helper in the respondent- department. The challenge is also laid to the validity of Rule 39-C (viii) of the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972, on the ground that the same is highly arbitrary, irrational and hence violative of Articles 14 of the Constitution of India. 2. The Petitioner has preferred the present writ petition with the following prayers: “a) by an appropriate writ, order or direction, the Rule 39C Explanation (viii) may be declared unconstitutional and ultra vires to the extent it denies/deprives the elder surviving brother from receiving leave encashment benefits upon attainment of 18 years of age; b) by an appropriate writ, order or direction, respondents may be directed to immediately release the leave encashment amount (Rs. 3,35,350/-) along with interest for delayed payment from the date when the same became due till its actual payment along with cost; c) any other appropriate writ, order or direction to which the Petitioner may be entitled to in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be passed.” 3. Om Prakash Bairwa (hereinafter refererred as to ‘the petitioner’) is the elder brother of the deceased employee, Sita Ram Bairwa, who died in harness while serving in the Department of Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking, Municipal Corporation of Delhi. Upon the death of the employee, the petitioner sought payment of leave encashment benefits amounting to Rs. 3,35,350/-, claiming himself to be a dependent family member of the deceased. The respondents rejected the claim vide communication dated 03.05.2019 on the ground that the petitioner, being above the age of 18 years, was not eligible to receive the leave encashment benefits under Rule 39-C of the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules, 1972”). Aggrieved by the said communication, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging both the order dated 03.05.2019 and the constitutional validity of Rule 39-C (viii) of the Rules, 1972. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the communication dated 03.05.2019 is arbitrary and discriminatory. Aggrieved by the said communication, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging both the order dated 03.05.2019 and the constitutional validity of Rule 39-C (viii) of the Rules, 1972. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the communication dated 03.05.2019 is arbitrary and discriminatory. It is contended that the petitioner, being the brother of the deceased employee, was entitled to receive the monetary benefits and the withholding of the same by the respondent-department is unfair and unjust. It is further contended that the petitioner has been issued a Succession Certificate by the Competent Court, and in view of the same, he cannot be denied the payment of these benefits. The exclusion of a brother above 18 years of age under Rule 39-C from the category of eligible dependents is unreasonable and arbitrary. While laying challenge to the validity of Rule 39-C, it is alleged that the same is discriminatory and lacking any reasonable nexus to the objective sought to be achieved and hence deserves to be declared unconstitutional. 5. In reply, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the communication dated 03.05.2019 was passed strictly in accordance with 39-C of the Rules, 1972. The rule clearly defines the eligible category of persons entitled to receive leave encashment, and the petitioner, being an adult brother of the deceased employee, does not fall within the said definition. 6. Learned counsel further contended that Rule 39-C was framed in the exercise of powers conferred under Article 309 of the Constitution and therefore carries statutory force. It is also submitted that the classification has a clear and rational nexus with the object of providing financial assistance to those directly dependent on the deceased employee. Hence, the impugned provision does not violate Articles 14 of the Constitution and is legally valid. Accordingly, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed. 7. Perused the record and heard counsels for the parties. 8. Hence, the impugned provision does not violate Articles 14 of the Constitution and is legally valid. Accordingly, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed. 7. Perused the record and heard counsels for the parties. 8. Before proceeding further, it will be relevant to reproduce Rule 39C of the Rules of 1972: “ 39-C. Payment of cash equivalent of leave salary in case of death, etc., of Government servant: In the event of the death of a Government servant while in service or after retirement or after final cessation of duties but before actual receipt of its cash equivalent of leave salary payable under Rules 39,39-A and 39-B, such amount shall be payable- i) to the widow, and if there are more widows than one, to the eldest surviving widow if the deceased was a male Government servant, or to the husband, if the deceased was a female Government servant; EXPLANATION .- The expression ?eldest surviving widow shall be construed with reference to the seniority according to the date of the marriage of the surviving widows and not with reference to their ages; (ii) failing a widow or husband, as the case may be, to the eldest surviving son; or an adopted son; (iii) failing (i) and (ii) above, to the eldest surviving unmarried daughter; (iv) failing (i) to (iii) above, to the eldest surviving widowed daughter; (v) failing (i) to (iv) above, to the father; (vi) failing (i) to (v) above, to the mother; (vii) failing (i) to (vi) above, to the eldest surviving married daughter; (viii) failing (i) to (vii) above, to the eldest surviving brother below the age of eighteen years; (ix) failing (i) to (viii) above, to the eldest surviving unmarried sister; (x) failing (i) to (ix) above, to the eldest surviving widowed sister; (xi) failing (i) to (x) above, to the eldest child of the eldest predeceased son.” 9. It is a settled proposition of constitutional law that plenary legislation or the statutory Rules can be invalidated only on three grounds, namely: (i) lack of legislative competence, (ii) violation of fundamental rights or any other constitutional provision and (iii) manifest arbitrariness entrenched in Article 14, as recognised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of A.P. Vs. McDowell & Co. (1996) 3 SCC 709 , Shayara Bano Vs. Union of India , (2017) 9 SCC 1 and Navtej Singh Johar Vs. McDowell & Co. (1996) 3 SCC 709 , Shayara Bano Vs. Union of India , (2017) 9 SCC 1 and Navtej Singh Johar Vs. Union of India , (2018) 10 SCC 1 . 10. The Rules of 1972 have been framed by the President of India in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. The rule-making power under Article 309 is plenary in nature, subject only to the Constitution and any law made by Parliament. The principle laid down in Rutu Mihir Panchal v. Union of India , 2025 INSC 593 and D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab , (1971) 3 SCC 360 makes it clear that so long as the rule relates to a matter within the scope of the enabling provision, its validity cannot be questioned on the ground of lack of competence. The rule 39-C of Rules, 1972, which regulates payment of leave encashment to the family of a deceased Government servant, is squarely referable to the subject of conditions of service of Union employees and, therefore, well within the constitutional competence of the rule-making authority. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate any lack of legislative competence. 11. The petitioner contends that Rule 39-C violates Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground that the classification it creates is neither based on any intelligible differentia nor bears a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved, and is therefore arbitrary and unconstitutional. It is urged that denying the benefit of leave encashment to an adult brother solely on the basis of having attained the age of 18 years, while extending it to the mother, father, daughter, or surviving unmarried or widowed sister, amounts to discrimination. However, the petitioner has not asserted at any stage that he is, in any manner, incapable of maintaining himself due to physical disability or that he lacks the ability to earn his livelihood, nor has he pleaded that he was financially dependent upon the deceased employee. 12. Upon examining the Rule 39-C of the Rules of 1972, it is seen that the Rule provides for payment of leave encashment in case of the death of a government servant. The first right upon the same is of the widow or husband, and then in their absence, the eldest surviving son or adopted son at Sr. No.(ii) is entitled. Upon examining the Rule 39-C of the Rules of 1972, it is seen that the Rule provides for payment of leave encashment in case of the death of a government servant. The first right upon the same is of the widow or husband, and then in their absence, the eldest surviving son or adopted son at Sr. No.(ii) is entitled. Thereafter, the other relations of the deceased-employee are provided, however the latter are entitled only upon the exclusion or failure of the former survivors. Therefore, the benefit of the leave encashment on the death of a government servant is payable only to the persons specified therein, in the order of preference described. The said provision exclusively include the spouse, children and dependent parents, while extending the benefit to a brother only if he is below 18 years of age at the time of the death of the government servant, and thereafter the same is followed by the eldest surviving unmarried sister, surviving widowed sister, and eldest children of the eldest pre-deceased son. 13. The scheme of the Rule and the hierarchy it prescribes is evidently grounded in the social framework in which dependency is assessed. An adult male is ordinarily presumed to be capable of maintaining himself and, therefore, cannot be treated as a dependent of the deceased employee. Whereas, an unmarried sister or a widowed sister is more likely to be financially reliant upon the deceased. A minor brother also stands on a different footing, as dependency is presumed until he attains majority. The exclusion of an adult surviving brother from the specified category of dependents eligible to receive leave encashment is thus a conscious policy determination, and the conferment of such entitlement upon the unmarried or widowed sister rests on a rational nexus with the object of identifying genuine dependents. The classification therefore cannot be termed arbitrary or irrational. 14. Further, the Rules make it clear that each category of dependents becomes entitled to the benefit only if the persons placed before them in the hierarchy are not available. Thus, if an adult son is treated as eligible, it would automatically exclude the elder unmarried sister or the eldest widowed sister, who stand next in the order of priority and who may, in fact, be financially dependent, and the same would be unjustified. Therefore, an adult brother cannot be given priority over an unmarried or widowed sister. 15. Thus, if an adult son is treated as eligible, it would automatically exclude the elder unmarried sister or the eldest widowed sister, who stand next in the order of priority and who may, in fact, be financially dependent, and the same would be unjustified. Therefore, an adult brother cannot be given priority over an unmarried or widowed sister. 15. In such circumstances, the argument of the petitioner that the Rule makes a clear discrimination between the adult surviving brother and adult surviving unmarried sister and widowed sister cannot be sustained. The distinction drawn is consistent with the underlying principle of dependency and is in harmony with the purpose sought to be achieved by the Rule. 16. In view of the above, there is a clear nexus in including the unmarried or widowed sister and excluding the adult brother from the list of eligible dependents. The object of the Rule, viewed in the context of the social fabric of society, is to provide financial support to those family members who are ordinarily dependent on the deceased employee. The exclusion of elder brother from the specified list thus reflects this understanding. The hierarchy prescribed under the Rule is based on an intelligible differentia and is structured to ensure that financial benefits are extended to those most likely to suffer hardship upon the death of the employee. Each category becomes relevant only when the category above it is unavailable. In such circumstances, the exclusion of collateral relations who are ordinarily self-sufficient and capable of sustaining themselves cannot be considered arbitrary or unreasonable, as the Rule remains consistent with the foundational principle of identifying actual dependents. 17. Further, the petitioner’s contention that the Rule creates an irrational discrimination between the adult brother on the one hand and the parents or married daughter on the other, is untenable. The degree of dependency of an adult brother cannot be equated with that of the parents or a married daughter, having regard to the nature and proximity of the relationship. On this basis, the classification cannot be said to be irrational or discriminatory. 18. The degree of dependency of an adult brother cannot be equated with that of the parents or a married daughter, having regard to the nature and proximity of the relationship. On this basis, the classification cannot be said to be irrational or discriminatory. 18. In furtherance of the above discussion, it is important to note that the object of framing Rule 39-C of the Rules, 1972, is not to determine rights of succession to the estate of the deceased Government servant, but to regulate the mode of disbursement of the statutory benefit of leave encashment to those family members who are identified as genuine dependents. The scheme of the Rule operates in a limited and distinct sphere, separate from the principles of inheritance under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The focus is not merely on the existence of kinship but on the likelihood of apt financial dependency and the closeness of the relationship to the deceased employee. By restricting eligibility in a defined order, the Rule ensures that the benefit is released to those members of the family who were most closely connected to the deceased and likely to be affected financially by his demise. Such a classification, being grounded in a rational assessment of dependency and proximity, cannot be regarded as arbitrary or discriminatory. 19. On an overall consideration, this Court finds no merit in the challenge to the constitutional validity of Rule 39-C(viii) of the Rules, 1972 on the ground that it denies an adult brother from receiving leave encashment benefits. The Rule is intra vires the Constitution and constitutes a valid exercise of the rule-making power under Article 309. The differentiation it makes is neither arbitrary nor irrational, but is founded upon a sound and reasonable classification consistent with the object of the scheme. 20. The payment leave encashment is governed by the set of Rules. The claim of the petitioner for release of the leave encashment has been rejected by the respondents vide order dated 03.05.2019 relying upon the condition of the Rule 39- C (viii). Having upheld held that the validity of Rule, we see no illegality in the order passed by the respondents dated 03.05.2019 rejecting the claim of the petitioner. 21. In view of the foregoing discussion and findings recorded herein above, this Court finds no substance in the writ petition. The same, being bereft of merit, stands dismissed.