JUDGMENT : (KAKHETO SEMA, J.) Heard Mr.A. Zhimomi, learned counsel for the applicant, Mr. Imti Imsong, learned Addl. Advocate General for the State respondents and Ms.Nuksungtila, learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1/petitioner. 2. The facts of the case as projected by the opposite party No.1/writ petitioner in the writ petition is that the petitioner is the owner of a plot of land situated in Ward No. 16, New Minister’s Hill, Kohima, Nagaland. The petitioner resides in House No. C/109 on the said land. 3. That the petitioner brought the land in the year 2010 from one Kevikhelie Sorhie of Kohima Village. The petitioner thereafter applied for the land patta and the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima, after following the due procedure issued the Patta No. (New) 8161, Plot No. 5414 vide Allotment Order No. REV/PATTA-2/2012 dated 30/06/2014 at New Minister’s Hill Kohima, for the land measuring 11517 sq. ft. 4. That out of the land allotted to the petitioner a portion of the land measuring 3120 sq. ft. was gifted to one Shri. P. Shokum Yimchunger, the petitioner’s maternal uncle, by executing the gifted deed dated 17/10/2016. 5. That on 12/04/2017, the petitioner was issued the Land Patta Book No. 1119 against the Allotment Order No. REV/TRANS-1/2017 dated 12/04/2017 bearing Patta/Permit No. 9791(P)/8161(old), Dag/Plot No. 5414 ‘A’, for the land measuring an area of 6673 Sq. ft. in Block/Ward New Minister’s Hill, Kohima. The petitioner has accordingly paid the land revenue for the said land. 6. That the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima, Nagaland, has however issued the restraining order dated 16/06/2023 to the petitioner, conveying therein that the petitioner is illegally encroaching and undertaking construction activities within the Hon’ble Judges Bungalow No. AH/44 at New Minister’s Hill, Kohima. The petitioner has accordingly been restrained from undertaking any construction works within the said site. The petitioner has also been asked to submit his landed documents within 15(fifteen) days from the date of receipt of the order. 7. Against the restraining order dated 16/06/2023, the petitioner has submitted his reply to the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima on 30/06/2023 asserting his rights on the land and requesting the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima to recall and set aside the restraining order dated 16/06/2023. 8. 7. Against the restraining order dated 16/06/2023, the petitioner has submitted his reply to the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima on 30/06/2023 asserting his rights on the land and requesting the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima to recall and set aside the restraining order dated 16/06/2023. 8. That on 29/11/2023, at about 9:30 A.M, the respondent No.4 i.e. the Revenue-cum-Settlement Officer, Kohima, Nagaland, along with some Dobashis and Police personnel met and directed the petitioner to vacate the premises. The petitioner was also asked to collect the eviction order from the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima. The petitioner accordingly collected the eviction order and on perusal of the same it came to light that the eviction order was issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima on 17/11/2023 under section 6(1) of the Nagaland Eviction of Persons in Unauthorized Occupation of Public Land Act, 1971, conveying therein that as the petitioner has not complied with the notice to vacate the encroached land/bungalow within the stipulated time, the petitioner shall be evicted from the illegal occupation of the Government land by using force as may be necessary. 9. That against the eviction order dated 17/11/2023, the petitioner filed W.P. (C) No. 324/2023. The writ petition was disposed by the judgment & order dated 12/12/2023 inter-alia giving liberty to the petitioner to approach the Commissioner, State of Nagaland, in accordance with section-12 of the Act of 1971 within 15 days from the date of passing of the judgment. By the said order, the parties were also directed to maintain status-quo as regards the possession of the land for a period of 15 days from the date of the order. 10. The petitioner has accordingly filed the appeal before the Commissioner, Nagaland on 20/12/2023 and on the appeal filed by the petitioner, the Commissioner, Nagaland has issued the order dated 12/02/2024 staying the operation of the eviction order dated 17/11/2023 and directing the parties to maintain status-quo till further orders. It is the however the case of the petitioner that when the order dated 12/02/2024 was in operation, the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima has again issued the order dated 16/03/2024 cancelling the Patta No. 9791(P) which was allotted to the petitioner on 12/04/2017, with immediate effect. The order dated 16/03/2024 however reflects that the cancellation order dated 16/03/2024 was issued pursuant to the Approval No. CN/CANCEL/PATTA/2018/KMA/312 dated 01/03/2024 issued by the Commissioner, Nagaland. 11. The order dated 16/03/2024 however reflects that the cancellation order dated 16/03/2024 was issued pursuant to the Approval No. CN/CANCEL/PATTA/2018/KMA/312 dated 01/03/2024 issued by the Commissioner, Nagaland. 11. The petitioner has accordingly filed the present writ petition (W.P.(C) No. 58/2024) seeking for a direction to restrain the respondent No.3 i.e. the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima from evicting the petitioner from the land in question and also for a direction to quash and set aside the impugned Cancellation order dated 16/03/2024, the restraining order dated 16/06/2023 and the eviction order dated 17/11/2023. This Court by the order dated 22/04/2024 has directed the petitioner and the State respondents, in the said writ petition,to maintain status-quo in respect of the disputed land. 12. It is pertinent to note that in the earlier W.P.(C) No. 324/2023 which was disposed by the judgment & order dated 12/12/2023, the present applicant i.e. the Gauhati High Court represented by the Registrar, Gauhati High Court, Kohima Bench, Kohima, Nagaland was not impleaded as one of the party respondent in the said case. The applicant was impleaded in the present case as the respondent No.6 only consequent to the order dated 04/06/2024 passed by this Court in the connected I.A(C) No. 83/2024. It is therefore seen that the order dated 22/04/2024 passed in the present writ petition directing the parties to maintain status-quo on the disputed land was passed by the Court prior to the impleadment of the applicant/respondent No.6 in the present case. 13. That the applicant/respondent No.6 has filed the application on 08/07/2024 praying for modification/cancellation/vacation of the interim order dated 22/04/2024. The application was registered as I.A(C) No. 101/2024 and listed before the Court on 09/07/2024 and by the order dated 09/07/2024 notice was issued to the opposite parties returnable after 2(two) weeks. The opposite party No.1/petitioner was also allowed to file objection to the application on or before the next date fixed. 14. The opposite party No.1/petitioner filed the written objection in the said I.A(C) on 29/07/2024. The I.A(C) was thereafter listed on 05/08/2024 and on which date, the learned counsel for the opposite party No.1/petitioner was allowed time to file an affidavit placing the order dated 31/07/2024 passed by the Commissioner, Nagaland. 14. The opposite party No.1/petitioner filed the written objection in the said I.A(C) on 29/07/2024. The I.A(C) was thereafter listed on 05/08/2024 and on which date, the learned counsel for the opposite party No.1/petitioner was allowed time to file an affidavit placing the order dated 31/07/2024 passed by the Commissioner, Nagaland. In the order dated 05/08/2024, the submission made by the learned Standing counsel for the applicant that as on 05/08/2024 Article 226(3) is in operation and therefore, granting time to the opposite party/petitioner may not serve any effective purpose was also recorded. The I.A(C) was again directed to be listed on 13/08/2024 as a part-heard item. 15. That on 13/08/2024, the application was released from part-heard, but the issue as to whether the interim order dated 22/04/2024 passed by this Court in the main writ petition stands vacated in view of the operation of the Article 226(3)was kept open and the application was directed to be listed again on 22/08/2024. The application was thereafter listed again on 22/08/2024, 27/08/2024, 17/09/2024, 26/09/2024& 17/10/2024. 16. That on 21/10/2024 and 22/10/2024, the application was taken up for hearing on the question as to whether the interim order dated 22/04/2024 passed by this Court in the writ petition stands vacated in view of the operation of Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India . After hearing the parties at length the judgment & order was reserved. 17. The learned counsel for the applicant as well as the learned counsel for the opposite party No.1/petitioner are both in unanimity that the order dated 22/04/2024 passed in writ petition directing the parties to maintain status-quo in respect of the disputed land was passed without hearing the present applicant/respondent No.6 and the application filed by the applicant on 08/07/2024 for modification/cancellation/vacation of the interim order dated 22/04/2024 has not been disposed as mandated under the provision of Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India . The only bone of contention between the learned counsel for the parties is as to whether Sub-Article (3) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directory or mandatory. 18. Mr. The only bone of contention between the learned counsel for the parties is as to whether Sub-Article (3) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directory or mandatory. 18. Mr. A. Zhimomi, the learned Standing counsel, Gauhati High Court, Kohima Bench, for the applicant, submits that the provisions incorporated in Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India is mandatory and therefore, the interim order dated 22/04/2024 passed in the writ petition directing the parties to maintain status-quo on the disputed land automatically stands vacated by operation of law as mandated under Article-226(3) of the Constitution of India . In support of his submission, Mr. A. Zhimomi has relied in the case of the High Court Bar Association, Allahabad -versus- State of Uttar Pradesh & Others , reported in (2024) 6 SCC 267 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that filing of an application for vacation of the stay order is a sine qua non for triggering the automatic vacation of the stay order under Article-226(3) if such an application is not decided within the time prescribed of 2(two) weeks. Mr. A. Zhimomi has further relied in the case of Rukuvotu Ringa & Ors -versus- Miyalemla & Ors ., reported in 2024 (4) GLT(FB) 779 , wherein the Full Bench of this Court has held that Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India is not directory in nature. 19. Ms. Nuksungtila, the learned counsel for the opposite party No.1/petitioner has on the other hand submitted that Article-226(3) of the Constitution of India is directory and not mandatory and in support of her submission has relied on the order dated 31/01/2014 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in W.P No. 1850/2010 & W.P No. 26579/2013, reported in 2014 SCC Online Mad 235. 20. The question as to whether the provisions of Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India is directory or mandatory is no longer res-integra, in view of the Full Bench decision in Rukuvotu Ringa (supra) in which the Hon’ble Full Bench after a detail discussion/deliberations on the subject has held that the mandate under Article-226(3) of the Constitution is not directory in nature. The question as to whether Sub-Article-(3) of Article-226 of the Constitution is directory or mandatory was referred to the Full Bench of this Court for a decision in view of the conflicting decisions of the Division Bench of this Court on the issue. 21. The Hon’ble Full Bench in Rukuvotu Ringa (supra) while giving a finding that the mandate under Article-226(3) of the Constitution of India is not directory in nature has inter-alia held that; "27. The above meaning ascribed to the terms “directory” and “mandatory” shows that when a provision is mandatory or absolute, the provision has to be obeyed or fulfilled exactly. However a directory provision only requires substantial compliance. The question therefore arises as to whether a Constitutional provision which is the basic law of the nation can be said to be directory or requiring substantial compliance only. We are of the opinion that taking into consideration the place a Constitution or Constitutional provision holds which is the supreme law of our nation, a Constitutional provision cannot be said or declared to be directory or requiring substantial compliance only. The framers of our Constitution as well as the evolution of the Constitutional Laws as referred to herein above, nowhere conceived that a Constitutional provision would be directory. No doubt, a statutory provision or contractual provision or a term of a tender document can be held to be mandatory or directory on the basis of the language used coupled with the intention of the Legislature or the parties respectively but the said principles of interpretation, in our opinion cannot be imported to interpret a Constitutional provisions to be mandatory or directory. In our opinion, declaring a Constitutional provision to be directory would not only result in demeaning or diluting the powers of the Parliament under Article 368 of the Constitution which is an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution, but would also go against the various judicial pronouncements which hold that the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution is plenary and wide and the Parliament can amend every aspect of the Constitution, except abrogating the Constitution or changing the essential features forming the basic structure of the Constitution. In addition to the above, we also find it is apposite to observe that except the judgments holding that Article 226(3) of the Constitution to be directory, we have not come across any judgment holding that a Constitutional provision is directory. The reason seems to be obvious inasmuch as the Constitution is the Supreme law of the land. We are further of the view that a Constitutional provision inserted to the Constitution by way of an amendment can be struck down on the ground that the said amendment infringes the basic structure of the Constitution forming the Constitutional core of our Constitution or given an interpretation which would be conducive to the changing times taking into account that our Constitution is a living document but under no circumstances, a Constitutional provision can be said to be directory save and except where the Constitution itself states so. 28. We are also of the opinion that a legislative enactment which is a creature of the Legislature in exercise of a legislative powers cannot be put into the same pedestal with a constitutional amendment in exercise of the constitutional powers of the Parliament. In this regard, we find it apposite to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Mohit Minerals (P) Ltd. reported in (2022) 10 SCC 700 wherein His Lordship Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J. speaking for the Court observed that as a matter of first principle, the provisions of the Constitution which is the grundnorm of the nation, cannot be interpreted based on a provision of a primary legislation. It is only the provision of a primary legislation that can be interpreted with reference to the Constitution. The Legislature amends the Constitution by exercising its constituent power and legislates by exercising its legislative power. The constituent power of the legislature is of higher Constitutional order as compared to its legislative power. 29. We accordingly hold that Article 226(3) of the Constitution is not directory in nature. 31. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh (supra) also dealt with the principle of interpretation of a constitutional provision. It was observed that normally a Constitutional or statutory provision should be construed according to the intent of they that made it. 31. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh (supra) also dealt with the principle of interpretation of a constitutional provision. It was observed that normally a Constitutional or statutory provision should be construed according to the intent of they that made it. Normally such intent is gathered from the language of the provision and if the language of the phraseology employed is precise and plain and thus by itself proclaims the legislative intent in unequivocal terms, the same must be given effect to regardless of the consequences that may follow……………………… 37. In the backdrop of the above, let us consider Article 226(3) of the Constitution and for the sake of convenience, the said provision is quoted herein under. “226(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without— (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated.” 38. A perusal of the above quoted Article 226(3) as it stands today, reveals that the said provision is in respect to passing of interim orders without (a) furnishing to such party copies of the petition and documents in support of the plea for an interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard. A perusal of the above quoted Article 226(3) as it stands today, reveals that the said provision is in respect to passing of interim orders without (a) furnishing to such party copies of the petition and documents in support of the plea for an interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard. In other words, Article 226(3) of the Constitution relates to an ex-parte interim order. In the recent Constitution Bench judgment in the case of High Court Bar Association Allahabad (supra), the majority opinion rendered by His Lordship Abhay S. Oka J. categorically observed at paragraph No. 16 that when the High Court grants the stay of the proceedings while issuing notice without giving an opportunity of being heard to the contesting parties, it is not an interim order but it is ad-interim order. It was further observed that ad-interim order becomes an interim order only after an opportunity of being heard is granted on the prayer for interim relief to all the parties to the proceedings. We are also of the opinion that any interim order passed whether by way of an injunction or stay or in any other manner in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, without giving an opportunity to the party against whom such orders are passed, is also an ad-interim order and the said ad-interim order would only become an interim order after an opportunity of being heard is granted on the prayer for interim relief to all the parties to the proceedings. This aspect of the matter is very relevant taking into account that an application so conceived of in Article 226(3) of the Constitution has to be construed to be an application for vacation of an ad-interim order. It was observed that ad-interim orders has to be for limited duration or in other words, fixing a date till when the ad-interim order would be in force. We find it relevant to reproduce the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph No.16 of the judgment in the case of High Court Bar Association Allahabad (supra). “16. When a High Court grants a stay of the proceedings while issuing notice without giving an opportunity of being heard to the contesting parties, it is not an interim order, but it is an ad interim order of stay. “16. When a High Court grants a stay of the proceedings while issuing notice without giving an opportunity of being heard to the contesting parties, it is not an interim order, but it is an ad interim order of stay. It can be converted into an interim order of stay only after an opportunity of being heard is granted on the prayer for interim relief to all the parties to the proceedings. Ad interim orders, by their very nature, should be of a limited duration. Therefore, such orders do not pose any problem.” 39. A further perusal of the provisions of Article 226(3) of the Constitution would show that the party against whom an ad-interim order has been passed has to make an application to the High Court for vacation of such adinterim order and in doing so has to furnish a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made, or the counsel of such party. The constitutional mandate in terms with Article 226(3) of the Constitution is that the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later. The said provision further stipulates that where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next date afterwards on which the High Court is open and if the application is not disposed off, the ad- interim order shall on the expiry of that period, or as the case may be, the expiry of the said next date stand vacated. 44. Now the most pertinent question therefore arises as to from when the period of two weeks is to be counted. In the foregoing paragraphs we have duly observed that as regards the date of furnishing a copy of the application to the party in whose favour an ad-interim order has been passed or to the counsel of the said party is not difficult to ascertain. However, it seen that the terms “makes an application to the High Court” and “from the date on which it is received” have received various interpretations. The Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of District Development Officer Vs. However, it seen that the terms “makes an application to the High Court” and “from the date on which it is received” have received various interpretations. The Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of District Development Officer Vs. Maniben Virabhai reported in (2000) SCC Online GUJ 115 held that the term “makes an application” and “when it is received” to mean filing an application in accordance with the practice of the High Court and in that regard, had referred to various provisions of the Gujarat High Court Rules 1993. It was observed that making an application would mean filing the application by presenting in the Office of the Registry to such person as the Registry by special or general orders, ordinarily between 10:30 A.M. to 04:30 P.M. Now the question arises as to whether the term “makes an application to the High Court” and “when it is received” interpretation so given by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court can be duly adopted by us. We with great respect differ with the opinion of the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court for the following reasons. First, the interpretation so given of a Constitutional provision on the basis of Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993 and thereby holding the term “makes an application” and “when it is received” to mean filing the application before the Registry do not in our opinion seems to be in consonance with the well settled principles for interpretation of a Constitutional provision. We again find it apposite to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohit Minerals (P) Ltd. (supra) wherein it was specifically observed that the provisions of the Constitution which is the grundnorm of the Nation, cannot be interpreted based on a provision of a primary legislation and it is the provision of a primary legislation that can be interpreted with reference to the Constitution. Secondly, the term “makes an application to the High Court” if given an interpretation as filing an application before the Registry of the High Court would amount to changing the legislative intent of the very provision of Article 226(3) of the Constitution that too, when the said provision do not in any manner stipulate that the application is required to be filed before the Registry of the Court or making an application to the High Court as per the procedure of the High Court. We feel it apposite to observe that the settled position of law by the various Supreme Court judgments referred to supra clearly mandates that a constitutional provision is required to be given a broad and liberal interpretation however without stretching or perverting the language of the constitution. A perusal of the Article 226 of the Constitution would show that it refers to the High Court. In terms with Article 216 of the Constitution, the High Court shall consist of the Chief Justice, and such other Judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint. In the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Prakash Chand and Others reported in (1998) 1 SCC 1, the Supreme Court categorically observed that the Administrative Control of the High Court vests upon the Chief Justice of the High Court alone and that it is his prerogative to distribute the business of the High Court, both judicial and administrative and what work the Benches shall do. Under such circumstances, the term “makes an application to the High Court” in our opinion would mean when the application so filed for vacating an ad- interim order is listed before the Bench holding the roster as endorsed by the Chief Justice of the High Court. The term “the date on which it is received” would therefore mean the day the application for vacating an ad-interim order is listed before the Bench endorsed the roster to take up the writ petition. Thirdly, we further find that adopting the above interpretation to the terms “makes an application to the High Court” and “the date on which it is received” is also in consonance with the concept that our Constitution is living organism which has a soul and consciousness of its own. The provision of Article 226(3) was inserted by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. The provision of Article 226(3) was inserted by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. In the Seventy-Ninth Report of the Law Commission of India on “Delay and Arrears in High Courts and other Appellate Courts”, it was mentioned that the total pendency of cases in High Courts as on 30.06.1978 was 6,22,030 and as on 31.12.1978, it was 6,24,927. As we pen our opinion today, the total pendency of cases in the High Courts are 59,58,811 as from the data available from the National Judicial Data Grid (High Courts of India). Therefore, if the meaning of “makes an application to the High Court” means an application being filed before the Registry of the Court, it may result in vacation of an ad-interim order without the application for vacation of the ad-interim order being placed before the Court which would violate the principles of natural justice which is a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. 45. Accordingly, we decide the reference as herein under. (i) Article 226(3) of the Constitution is not a directory provision. (ii) An order referred to in Article 226(3) of the Constitution is an adinterim order. The said ad-interim order is required to be of limited duration or in other words, the existence of the ad-interim order has to limited to a date so fixed. (iii) The ad-interim order is converted to an interim order only after an opportunity of being heard is granted on the prayer for interim relief to all parties to the proceedings. (iv) The High Court on an application filed under Article226(3) of the Constitution may reject the application or vacate, modify and/or alter the adinterim order or may extend the ad-interim order in the presence of the parties to the lis. Once the ad-interim order is extended after hearing both the parties, it shall then be converted into an interim order and the prescription for automatic vacation of the ad-interim order for not being disposed within two weeks cannot be applied. However, the High Court can still vacate the interim order on various grounds viz. Once the ad-interim order is extended after hearing both the parties, it shall then be converted into an interim order and the prescription for automatic vacation of the ad-interim order for not being disposed within two weeks cannot be applied. However, the High Court can still vacate the interim order on various grounds viz. (i) when a litigant, after obtaining an interim order deliberately prolongs the proceedings either by seeking adjournments on unwarranted grounds or remains absent when the main case in which the interim relief is granted is called out for hearing before the High Court with the object of taking undue advantage of the interim order and/or (ii) when the High Court finds that the interim order is granted as a result of either suppression or misrepresentation of material facts by the party in whose favour the interim order of stay was made and/or (iii) the High Court finds that there are material changes in the circumstances requiring interference with the interim order passed earlier. The above grounds so stated are not exhaustive and there can be other valid grounds for vacating an interim order. (v) The term “makes an application to the High Court” and “the date on which it is received” would mean when the application is filed seeking vacation of an ad-interim order is placed before the learned Judge(s) who is/are holding the roster as endorsed by the learned Chief Justice of the High Court and date on which such an application is listed before the learned Judge(s) for the first time.” 22. In the light of the discussions made above and after gainfully referring to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court in Rukuvotu Ringa(supra) and the proposition of law laid down therein, this Court holds that Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India is not directory in nature and accordingly, the order dated 22/04/2024 passed by this Court in the writ petition directing the parties to maintain status-quo in respect to the disputed land stands vacated by operation of the provisions of Article 226(3) of the Constitution. 23. Application allowed. No cost.