JUDGMENT : Muralee Krishna, J. The petitioner in W.P.(C)No.19703 of 2019 filed this intra court appeal under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, challenging the judgment dated 10.07.2023, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant/writ petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Exts.P3 to P5 orders and to declare that the appellant is senior to the 6 th respondent as per Rule 37 of Chapter XIVA of the Kerala Education Rules, 1959 (‘KER’ for short), and therefore entitled to be promoted to the post of Headmaster in preference to the 6 th respondent. 2. The appellant entered service as a High School Assistant (‘HSA’ for short) (Natural science) in the school of the 5 th respondent on 04.06.2007. The 6 th respondent was also appointed as HSA (Mathematics) in the same school on the same date. The date of birth of the appellant is 16.05.1973, and that of the 6 th respondent is 28.05.1974. According to the appellant, since the 6 th respondent is younger than the appellant, she is to be treated as senior to the 6 th respondent as stipulated in Rule 37(2) of Chapter XIVA of the KER. When the 5 th respondent prepared a provisional seniority list showing the appellant as Junior to the 6 th respondent, the appellant submitted objections to the provisional seniority list. She has also filed a complaint before the 4 th respondent. By Ext.P2 order dated 17.04.2017, the 4 th respondent declared the appellant as Senior to the 6 th respondent. Challenging Ext.P2 order, the 6 th respondent filed an appeal before the 3 rd respondent Deputy Director of Education. By Ext.P3 order dated 27.06.2017, the 3 rd respondent allowed the appeal holding that the 6 th respondent is Senior to the appellant, stating the reason that the 6 th respondent had worked in the U.P Section of the school from 23.11.1998 to 31.03.1999 in a leave vacancy and hence her first appointment was prior to the appointment of the appellant. The appellant challenged Ext.P3 order before the 2 nd respondent Director of Public Instructions and by Ext.P4 order dated 16.09.2017, the 2 nd respondent confirmed the finding in Ext.P3 order. The appellant again filed a revision before the 1 st respondent under Rule 92 of Chapter XIVA of the KER. The appellant challenged Ext.P3 order before the 2 nd respondent Director of Public Instructions and by Ext.P4 order dated 16.09.2017, the 2 nd respondent confirmed the finding in Ext.P3 order. The appellant again filed a revision before the 1 st respondent under Rule 92 of Chapter XIVA of the KER. However, the revision was dismissed by Ext.P5 order dated 29.03.2019. Thereafter, the appellant approached this Court with the writ petition. 3. Respondents 1, 4, and 6 filed separate counter affidavits dated 20.01.2020, 19.09.2022, and 06.10.2021, respectively, in the writ petition opposing the reliefs sought in the writ petition. Along with the respective counter affidavits, the fourth respondent produced Ext.R4(a), and the 6 th respondent produced Exts.R6(a) to R6(c) documents. With an affidavit dated 26.10.2021, the 5 th respondent produced Exts.R5(A) to R5(C) documents. 4. To the counter affidavit filed by the 1 st and 4 th respondents, the appellant filed reply affidavits dated 25.03.2022 and 05.10.2022 respectively. 5. To the documents filed by the 5 th respondent, the appellant filed a counter affidavit dated 25.03.2022, producing therewith Exts.P6 to P9(A) documents. 6. After hearing the learned counsel on both sides and appreciating the materials on record, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Senior Government Pleader, the learned counsel for the 5 th respondent, and also the learned counsel for the 6 th respondent. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant would argue that the 6 th respondent was granted seniority over the appellant for the reason that she had worked temporarily in the school for the period 23.11.1998 to 31.03.1999. By way of amendment to Rule 7A(3) of Chapter XIVA of KER, the vacancies, the duration of which is less than one academic year shall not be filled up with temporary hands. As per Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the said amendment is retrospective in operation, unless there is a Saving Clause. Therefore, the previous service of the 6 th respondent, which is less than one academic year, cannot be reckoned for calculating seniority. As per Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the said amendment is retrospective in operation, unless there is a Saving Clause. Therefore, the previous service of the 6 th respondent, which is less than one academic year, cannot be reckoned for calculating seniority. The learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Manager, VKNM Vocational Higher Secondary School v. State of Kerala and others [(2016) 4 SCC 216] and that of this Court in Johny v. State of Kerala [ 1980 KLT 734 ] in support of his contention regarding the retrospective operation of amendment to Rule 7A(3) of Chapter XIVA of the K.E.R. According to the learned counsel, in the absence of prior service to be reckoned, the 6 th respondent will be junior to the appellant by virtue of Rule 37(2) of Chapter XIVA of KER. 9. The learned Senior Government Pleader would argue that the 6 th respondent had got approval as a UPSA (leave substitute) for the period from 23.11.1998 to 19.02.1999 and from 20.02.1999 to 31.03. 1999. As per Rule 37(2) of Chapter XIVA of KER, the seniority has to be decided with reference to the date of first appointment. Only if the date of the first appointment is the same, seniority shall be decided with reference to age, the older being the senior. Since the 6 th respondent was appointed prior to the appellant, the 2 nd limb of Rule 37(2) will not be applicable to the instant case. 10. The learned counsel for the 5 th respondent would argue that from Ext.R5(B), it is clear that the 6 th respondent was appointed in the leave vacancy from 23.11.1998 to 19.02.1999 and then from 20.02.1999 to 31.03.1999. This appointment was approved by the District Educational Officer, Mavelikkara, vide orders dated 23.11.1998 and 20.02.1999, as evident from the endorsement in those documents. In such circumstances, now, by relying on the amendment to Rule 7A(3), the appellant cannot contend that the previous service of the 6 th respondent cannot be considered for fixing the seniority. 11. The learned counsel for the 6 th respondent also relied on Ext.R6(a) document, which is produced as Ext.R5(B) by the 5 th respondent and addressed the very same argument as that of the 5 th respondent. 12. 11. The learned counsel for the 6 th respondent also relied on Ext.R6(a) document, which is produced as Ext.R5(B) by the 5 th respondent and addressed the very same argument as that of the 5 th respondent. 12. The appellant, as well as the 6 th respondent, were appointed on a regular basis in the school of the 5 th respondent with effect from 04.06.2007. However, the 6 th respondent was working on leave vacancy from 23.11.1998 to 31.03.1999. This appointment was approved by the District Educational Officer as early as in the year 1999, as evident from the endorsement made in Exts. R5(B) appointment orders. 13. Rule 37 of Chapter XIVA of KER reads thus: (1) Seniority of a teacher in any grade in any unit shall be decided with reference to the length of continuous service in that grade in that unit provided he is duly qualified for the post. Provided that the period of service rendered in the parent school or in another school by a teacher who is relieved under Rule 52, shall be reckoned for seniority on his reappointment to the parent school. (2) In the case of teachers in the same grade in the same unit whose date of commencement of continuous service is the same, seniority shall be decided with reference to the date of first appointment. If the date of first appointment is also the same, seniority shall be decided with reference to the age, the older being the senior”. 14. A reading of Rule 37(2) makes it clear that in the case of teachers in the same grade who commence continuous service on the same date, seniority shall be decided with reference to the date of first appointment. If the date of first appointment is also the same, the seniority shall be decided with reference to age, the older being the senior. Pointing out that by virtue of the amendment dated 16.04.2005, Rule 7A(3) was amended to the effect that vacancies, duration of which is less than one academic year shall not be filled up by any appointment, the learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the previous service below one year on leave vacancy by the 6 th respondent cannot be considered to decide that she was appointed before the appellant. 15. 15. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant to argue that the amendment to Rule 7A(3) of Chapter XIVA of the KER has retrospective operation, reads thus: “ 6. Effect of repeal Where this Act, or any, Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not – (a) Revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) Affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) Affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) Affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) Affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture, liability or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.” 16. It is pertinent to note that the appointments of the 6 th respondent was approved prior to the amendment to Rule 7A(3) of Chapter XIVA of the KER. At the time of approval of the appointment of the 6 th respondent, the restriction in Rule 7A(3) was against the appointment, if the duration of the vacancy is two months or less. It is clear from Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, that a right already acquired will not be affected by the subsequent amendment in the statute or regulation, unless a different intention is shown or appears from the amended provision. Since no such intention can be gathered from the amendment effected to Rule 7A(3), it is only to be held that the approval of the first appointment of 6 th respondent will not be affected by the amendment to Rule 7A(3). The 6 th respondent is therefore entitled to claim seniority over the appellant based on the date of her first appointment, which was approved by Ext.R5(B) appointment order. 17. The 6 th respondent is therefore entitled to claim seniority over the appellant based on the date of her first appointment, which was approved by Ext.R5(B) appointment order. 17. The contention of the appellant based on the judgment of the Apex Court in VKNM Vocational Higher Secondary School [ (2016) 4 SCC 216 ] was taken before the learned Single Judge also as evident from the impugned judgment. It was based on Rule 51A of Chapter XIVA of the KER, the appellant contented that the engagement of a teacher should have lasted for one clear academic year. But as rightly found by the learned Single Judge, the 6 th respondent is not claiming the benefit of Rule 51A, but claiming the benefit of Rule 37 of Chapter XIVA of the K.E.R. For the very same reason, the judgment in Johny [ 1980 KLT 734 ] is also not applicable to the facts of the instant case. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar, we find that the learned Single Judge has considered all the contentions raised by the parties on merit and arrived at the right conclusion. The appellant failed to make out any sufficient ground to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. In the result, writ appeal stands dismissed.